Brian Thomas Hughes, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0899

Brian Thomas Hughes,
Relator,

vs.

Minnesota Department of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed January 10, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Minnesota Department of Public Safety

Brian Thomas Hughes, Marine on St. Croix, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leah M.P. Hedman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator seeks review of a decision by respondent agency to
sustain the cancellation of relator’s driving privileges subject to relator completing the
ignition interlock program. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Relator Brian Thomas Hughes appeals a decision from the Minnesota Department
of Public Safety (DPS) cancelling his driver’s license as inimical to public safety and
requiring him to participate in the ignition interlock program as a condition of license
reinstatement.
Relator has several alcohol-related viol ations on his driving record, including
impaired-driving offenses in October 2 006, October 2009, and October 2015. In
November 2015, DPS i ssued a notice of cancellation to relator informing him that his
driving privileges were revoked as inimical to public safety because of incurring three
alcohol-related driving incidents in ten years. Because relator’s last alcohol-related
violation occurred after July 1, 2011, the effective date of the ignition interlock program,
DPS required relator to par ticipate in the ignition interl ock program as a condition to
reinstating his driver’s license.
In April 2021, DPS received a letter from relator requesting review of DPS’s
decision. Relator asserted that he was not subject to the ignition interlock requirement
because it was applied retroactively. DPS completed an administrative review of relator’s
request in April 2021 and sustained its earlier decision.
This certiorari appeal follows.1

1 DPS challenges the timeliness of relator’s petition. See Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2020)
(requiring relator to file petition for writ “within 60 days after the party applying for such
writ shall have received due notice of the proceeding sought to be reviewed thereby”); see
also Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd. , 781 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn. App. 2010)
(holding that “[a] party’s failure to meet the time requirements of Minn. Stat. § 606.01 is a
jurisdictional defect”), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2010). He re, it is not clear from the
3
DECISION
Minnesota law authorizes the commissioner of public safety to cancel the driving
privileges of any person who is not entitled to a driver’s license under Minn. Stat. § 171.04
(2020). See Minn. Stat. §§ 171.14(a)(4) (2020) (aut horizing the commissioner to cancel
driver’s license upon determination that “the person, at the time of the cancellation, would
not have been entitled to receive a license under section 171.04”); 171.04, subd. 1(10)
(providing that the commissioner “shall not issue a driver’s license . . . to any person when
the commissioner has good cause to believe th at the operation of a motor vehicle on the
highways by the person would be inimical to public safety or welfare”). Upon reviewing
the evidence, the commissioner shall sustain the withdrawal of a person’s license if there
is sufficient cause to believe that withdrawal is authorized by a rule or law. Minn. R.
7409.4600, subp. 4 (2019). Implied-consent cases, including driver’s-license revocations
such as this, are civil proceedings. State v. Dumas , 587 N.W.2d 299, 303 (Minn. App.
1998), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1999). We apply the general ce rtiorari statute to the
quasi-judicial decisions of agencies absent other specific statutory review. Dietz v. Dodge
County, 487 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1992); Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2020).
In November 2015, DPS revok ed relator’s driving privil eges for incurring three
qualified prior impaired driving incidents in te n years. Qualified prior impaired driving
incidents are defined as “prior impaired dr iving convictions and prior impaired driving-
related losses of license.” Minn. Stat. § 16 9A.03, subd. 22 (2020 ). A prior impaired

record when relator received DPS’s decision. That said, because we conclude that relator
is not entitled to relief on the merits, we consider DPS’s timeliness argument moot.
4
driving-related loss of license includes “a driver’s license suspension, revocation,
cancellation, denial, or disqualification” under certain enumerated statutes, including
section 169A.54, for impaired driving conv ictions and adjudications. Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.03, subd. 21(a)(1).
Relator does not challenge DPS’s decision to cancel his driver’s license in
November 2015. Instead, relator argues that DPS erred by requiring him to participate in
the ignition interlock program outlined in Minn. Stat. § 169A.55 (2020), as a condition to
reinstating his driver’s license. An individual’s driving privileges may be reinstated under
certain conditions. Minn. Stat. § 169A.55, subd. 2. Under subdivision 4,
(b) A person whose driver’s license has been canceled
or denied as a result of three or more qualified impaired driving
incidents shall not be eligible for reinstatement of driving
privileges without an ignition interlock restriction until the
person:
(1) has completed reha bilitation according to
rules adopted by the commissioner or been granted a variance
from the rules by the commissioner; and
(2) has submitted verification of abstinence from
alcohol and controlled substanc es under paragraph (c), as
evidenced by the person’s use of an ignition interlock device
or other chemical monitori ng device approved by the
commissioner.
(c) The verification of abstinence must show that the
person has abstained from the us e of alcohol and controlled
substances for a period of not less than:
(1) three years, for a person whose driver’s
license was canceled or denied for an offense occurring within
ten years of the first of two qu alified prior impaired driving
incidents, or occurring after three qualified prior impaired
driving incidents[.]

Minn. Stat. § 169A.55, subd. 4(b)(1)-(2), (c)(1); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 171.09, subd. 1(g)
(2020) (stating it is a misdemeanor for a person with a restricted license to operate a motor
5
vehicle that is not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device); 171.306, subd. 4
(2020) (providing for ignition interlock program under specified circumstances); Minn. R.
7503.1725 (discussing ignition interlock program).
Resolving relator’s argument requires us to interpret the requirements of the statute,
and we review questions of stat utory interpretation de novo. Gray v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 918 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Minn. App. 2018). “The objective of statutory interpretation
is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485,
488 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “If the Legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s
plain and unambiguous language, then [a court] interpret[s] the statute according to its plain
meaning” without engaging in further construction. Id. Here, it is uncontested that relator
incurred three qualified prior impaired driving offenses within a ten-year period. The plain
language of the statute requires relator to participate in the ignition interlock program as a
condition to license reinstatement.
Relator does not argue that the statute is ambiguous or subject to a different
interpretation. Instead, relator argues that application of the ignition interlock requirement
violates both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions’ prohibitions against ex post
facto laws. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Minn. Const. art. I, § 11. “The ex post facto
prohibition forbids the Congress and the St ates to enact any law which imposes a
punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)
(quotation omitted). Additionally, “[n]o law sh all be construed to be retroactive unless
clearly and manifestly so inte nded by the legislature.” Mi nn. Stat. § 645.21 (2020). To
6
have retroactive effect, a statutory provision must contain clear evidence of retroactive
intent, “such as mention of the word ‘retroactive.’” State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335
(Minn. App. 2009) (citation omitted). We review this issue de novo. Id. (“The retroactivity
of a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.”).
To qualify as an ex post fact o law, a statute must be criminal or penal in nature,
rather than civil or regulatory. Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764, 790 (Minn. 2014)
(setting forth analysis to determine whether ex post facto prohibition applies to civil-
regulatory laws). Implied-consent cases, incl uding driver’s-license revocations such as
this, are civil proceedings. Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 878 N.W.2d 926, 928
(Minn. App. 2016). Thus, it is not clear that the ignition interlock requirement is clearly
within the punitive laws to which the ex po st facto laws apply. Even so, for purposes of
this appeal, we assume with out deciding that the igniti on interlock requirement would
qualify as a punishment under applicable law.
Relator notes that section 169A.55 was enac ted in 2011, after he acquired his first
two impaired-driving offenses in 2006 and 2009. Thus, relator argues that the ignition
interlock requirement cannot apply to his pre- 2011 offenses. We do not agree. DPS
imposed the ignition interlock requirement as a direct result of relator’s impaired-driving
offense in 2015, and the subsequent cancellation of his driver’s license for incurring three
impaired-driving incidents in ten years. DPS did not cancel relator’s license or require him
to participate in the ignition interlock program, until 2015. And section 16 9A.55 was in
effect when DPS cancelled relator’s driving privileges in 2015. DPS did not apply the
ignition interlock requirement retroactively.
7
It is also well established that “a statute that provides for enhanced penalties for a
repeat offender does not punish the old offense; rather it stiffens the penalty for the latest
crime.” Dumas, 587 N.W.2d at 304 (citing Nichols v. United States , 511 U.S. 738, 747
(1994) (noting that enhancement statutes do not change penalty for ea rlier convictions)).
In Dumas, the defendant’s license was revoked in 1995. Id. at 300. In 1998, the state
charged defendant with impaired driving and refusing to take a sobriety test. Id. Because
the defendant’s license was revoked within five years of his latest offenses, the impaired-
driving and test-refusal offenses were enhanced from misdemeanors to gross
misdemeanors. Id. The defendant argued that the enhancement violated the ex-post-facto
clauses of the Minnesota and United States constitutions because his license revocation
occurred before the enactment of the statute. Id. at 301. The district court agreed with the
defendant. Id. But on appeal, we reversed the district court’s decision and concluded that
the statutory provision enhancing the defendant ’s crimes did not vi olate the prohibitions
on ex-post-facto laws. Id. at 304-05. Similarly, in State v. Willis, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a sentence enhancement on an impaired-driving offense did not punish the
past crime, but instead “increased the possibl e penalty for the latest crime.” 332 N.W.2d
180, 185 (Minn. 1983). The supreme court reasoned that “[m]erely allowing a conviction
obtained before the amendment to be used in the assessment of the penalty for a subsequent
offense does not viol ate the constitution.” Id.; see also State v. Findling , 144 N.W. 142,
143 (Minn. 1913) (explaining that increased punishment for subsequent offense is not a
punishment for the first offense a second time, but a more severe punishment for the second
offense).
8
While this case does not involve the typica l ex-post-facto issue as addressed in
Dumas, Willis, and Findling , those cases are stil l instructive. Given our caselaw, we
determine that the ignition interlock requiremen t increased the penalty for relator’s latest
offense in 2015. Rather than punishing relator’s past im paired-driving offenses in 2006
and 2009, it merely “stiffen[ed] the penalty” for the 2015 offense. Dumas, 587 N.W.2d at
304. Thus, we determine th at DPS did not err by appl ying the ignition interlock
requirement in Minn. Stat. § 169A .55, subd. 4, to relator after his driver’s license was
cancelled as inimical to public safety.
Affirmed.