In re the Marriage of: Richard Kurtis Traugott, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0912

In re the Marriage of: Richard Kurtis Traugott, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Sherry Louise Traugott,
Respondent.

Filed February 7, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-FA-15-1400

Richard Traugott, Foley, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

April A. Lindstrom, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Flor ey, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this appeal, appellant-father challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
hold respondent-mother in civil contempt of court, arguing that the district court’s findings
are not supported by the record. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
This case involves a parenting-time dis pute between appellant Richard Kurtis
Traugott and respondent Sherry Louise Traugott. The parties married in 1995 and are the
parents of three children, now ages 23, 16, and 11. Since their di vorce in 2017, the two
minor children have lived with respondent and the eldest child has lived with appellant.
The parties share legal custody of the two minor children.
In November 2020, the district court ordered a temporary modification of the
parenting schedule. The modification limited appellant’s parenting time to supervised
visits with the two minor children on every Sunday aftern oon for two hours. The district
court found that, until the relati onship between the two minor children and appellant was
repaired through therapy, it would be in the “children’s best interest that parenting time
with their father be limited and supervised .” Along with the modi fication of parenting
time, the district court ordered both appellant and respondent to complete a coparenting
course through Bridging Parental Conflict1 (Bridging), to attend individual therapy with a
therapist specializing in coparenting conflict, and to sign necessary releases to allow their
individual therapists and the children’s therapists to recei ve information from the other
parent. The district court also ordered appellant to engage in family therapy with the two
minor children “[w]hen recommended as appropriate by his individual therapist, [and] after
consultation with the children’s therapist.”

1 Bridging Parental Conflict is an online cour se designed to assist parents experiencing
conflict with their coparent or who are beginning a transition to a coparenting relationship.
3
In March 2021, appellant moved to hold resp ondent in contempt of court, alleging
that respondent violated the November district court order. The district court held a hearing
on the motion, and both appellant and respondent presented arguments. Appellant argued
that respondent was in civil contempt for failing to follow the November court order
because respondent took the Bridging course f our months after the order, had not started
counseling with a coparenting therapist, and refused to enroll the two minor children into
coparenting conflict resolution counseling with his counselor. Respondent countered that
appellant was misinterpreting the November court order and that it instead required the
parties to attend individual therapy before attending family or re unification therapy.
Respondent informed the court that she did complete the Bridging course and was attending
therapy with a therapist who sp ecialized in coparenting conf lict. And respondent noted
that because they shar e joint custody of the minor children, a release of information was
unnecessary but that she signe d the release anyway. Respo ndent provided the Bridging
completion certificate and release of information as exhibits to the district court.
The district court denied ap pellant’s contempt motion, finding that there was “no
direct evidence that the respondent has failed to participate in individual therapy as required
by the order; and there is no direct evidence . . . showing that the [appellant’s] proposed
family therapist consulted with the children’s therapists prior to attempting to set up family
therapy sessions.” Thus, the district court he ld that there was insu fficient evidence to
support a finding of contempt.
The district court reiterated that th e November order was modeled on the
recommendations from the court-appointed custody evaluator and “family therapy would
4
not take place until the children’s therapists a nd [appellant’s] therapist agreed that it’s
appropriate.” The district court did not impose a deadline on when therapy must be
concluded. But the district c ourt ordered the parties to subm it a list of family counselors
they would be comfortable working with, notin g that the counselor must be a different
counselor than the indi vidual therapists the parties were currently seeing. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to hold respondent in
civil contempt of court.2 When we review a district court’s decision about whether to hold
a party in contempt, we reverse the factual fi ndings only if they ar e clearly erroneous.
Mower Cnty. Hum. Servs. ex rel. Swancutt v. Swancutt, 551 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1996).
We review the district court’s decision to invoke contempt powers for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
Appellant argues the district court erred in denying his motion for contempt because
the facts he alleged against respondent in his motion were true. As he did in district court,
appellant alleges that respondent failed to follow through with the district court’s
November 2020 order to attend counseling with a therapist who specializes in coparenting
conflict and to sign a release of information for the children’s therapists. Appellant asks
this court to reverse the district court’s factua l findings. But the sta ndard of review here

2 On appeal, appellant asks this court to “reverse the original decision” of the district court,
which includes the award of attorney fees to respondent. This court dismissed the issue of
attorney fees in August 2021. Thus, this opinion addresses only appellant’s motion to hold
respondent in contempt of court.
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does not allow this court to engage in fact-finding anew. See Rasmussen v. Two Harbors
Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013) (d iscussing the clear-error standard). The
fact-finder has the primary responsibility to determine issues of fact, and this court’s duty
is “fully performed” after de termining that the evidence re asonably supports the fact-
finder’s decision. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations omitted).
Here, after the district court held an ev identiary hearing on appellant’s contempt
motion and considered all the affidavits, pleadings, testimony, and arguments of the parties,
it found as a matter of fact th at respondent had not failed to comply with the November
2020 order. Without a finding of fact that respondent violated the court’s order, there was
no basis for the district court to invoke its discretionary powers to hold respondent in
contempt of court. While a ppellant may still disput e respondent’s testimony that she is
attending counseling with a therapist specializing in coparenting conflict, the district court
made a finding to the contrary on this poi nt, and, on this record, there is reasonable
evidence in the record to support that finding. Thus, that finding of fact is not clearly
erroneous. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s
motion to hold respondent in civil contempt of court.
Affirmed.