In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1446

In re the Marriage of:

Richard Kurtis Traugott, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Sherry Louise Traugott,
Respondent.

Filed May 30, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-FA-15-1400

Richard Traugott, Foley, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

April Anne Lindstrom, Lindstrom Family Law, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this parenting dispute, appellant-father challenges an order awarding
respondent-mother costs and attorney’s fees as sanctions for father’s bad-faith motion to
find mother in civil contempt of court. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion
by awarding costs and attorney’s fees as sanctions against father, we affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant Richard Traugott (father) and respondent Sherry Traugott (mother )
married in 1995, separated in 2015, and divorced in 2017. They are the parents of three
children born in 1998, 2005, and 2010. At the time of the divorce, the oldest child was an
adult. Since the divorce, father and mother have shared legal custody of their two younger
children, while mother has had sole physical custody. Father and mother have continued
to litigate parenting time, child support, and other issues. Both parties have filed multiple
civil contempt motions.
Relevant to this appeal, the district court ordered a temporary modification of the
parties’ parenting-time schedule in November 2020. Specifically, the district court limited
father’s parenting time with the two minor children based on the district court’s finding
that it was “in the children’s best interest that parentin g time with their father be limited
and supervised” until the relationship between the children and father was repaired through
therapy. The district court ordered the parties to complete a coparenting course, attend
individual therapy with a coparenting specialist, and sign releases allowing their therapists
and the children’s therapists to receive information from the other parent. The district court
also ordered father to engage in family therapy with the minor children “[w]hen
recommended as appropriate by his individual therapist, [and] after consultation with the
children’s therapist.”
In March 2021, father filed a motion to find mother in civil contempt of court,
alleging that mother had violated the district court’s November 2020 order by failing to
begin individual therapy, failing to provide a release of information, and refusing to allow
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the minor children to attend family therapy. Mother opposed the motion and asked the
district court to order father to reimburse her for the costs and attorney’s fees she had
incurred by responding to father’s contempt motion. Mother also asked the district court
to impose “additional sanctions” against father for his “frivolous filing.”
In May 2021, the district court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, mother
asserted that she had started individual therapy with a coparenting specialist, provided the
necessary information to father, and otherwise followed the district court’s order. She
explained her understanding that the district court required the parties and the children to
first engage in individual therapy and then begin family therapy with a coparenting
specialist only “after all of the therapists consult with one another and agree that the
children are ready.” The district court confirmed that its “vision for moving forward was
that family therapy would not take place until the children’s therapists and [father’s]
therapist agreed that it’s appropriate.” Mother again requested sanctions against father,
arguing that sanctions were necessary to deter him from continuing to file contempt
motions.
The district court denied father’s motion in a May 2021 order. The district court
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of contempt because
there was no direct evidence that mother had failed to comply with the November 2020
order. In its order, the district court also stated that mother could “file an affidavit for costs
and fees for the [c]ourt’s consideration.” Mother’s attorney filed an affidavit seeking
financial sanctions against father in the amount of $1,796 in costs and attorney’s fees
resulting from father’s contempt motion.
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In June 2021, the district court filed an order granting mother’s request. The district
court found that father “lacked a good-faith basis to assert that [mother] had intentionally
failed to comply with the provisions of the [c]ourt’s [November 2020] order” and that
“[father’s] claims of contempt were frivolous and intended to harass or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation.” The district court therefore concluded that an award of costs and
attorney’s fees to mother was appropriate pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211 (2022) and
ordered father to pay mother or her counsel $1,796.
In July 2021, father filed a notice of appeal. Father included copies of both the
May 2021 and June 2021 orders with the notice of appeal. This court construed the appeal
as being taken from both orders but determined that father’s appeal of the June 2021 order
awarding costs and attorney’s fees was pre mature because judgment had not yet been
entered on the June 2021 order. Consequently, we dismissed that part of the appeal but
allowed father’s appeal of the May 2021 order denying father’s contempt motion to
proceed. The record shows that judgment was eventually entered on the award of costs
and attorney’s fees on September 30, 2022.
Before judgment was entered on the award of costs and attorney’s fees, this court
affirmed the district court’s denial of father’s contempt motion. Traugott v. Traugott,
No. A21-0912, 2022 WL 351115, at *1 (Minn. App. Feb. 7, 2022). We explained that,
“[w]ithout a finding of fact that [mother] violated the court’s order, there was no basis for
the district court to invoke its discretionary powers to hold [mother] in contempt of court.”
Id. at *2. We further explained that, although father may still dispute mother’s testimony
that mother is complying with the district court’s November 2020 order, “the district court
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made a finding to the contrary on this point, and . . . there is reasonable evidence in the
record to support that finding.” Id. We therefore determined that the district court’s factual
finding was not clearly erroneous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying father’s contempt motion. Id.
In October 2022, father filed an additional notice of appeal, which we construed as
taken from the district court’s September 30, 2022 judgment against father for $1,796.
Father subsequently filed an informal brief. Mother submitted a late brief without filing a
motion to accept a late brief. We therefore consider the matter on the merits pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03, which provides that a case shall proceed on the merits if a
respondent fails to file a brief.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s imposition of sanctions against him in the
amount of the costs and attorney’s fees that mother incurred as a result of father’s contempt
motion. The district court ordered father to pay mother’s costs and attorney’s fees pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 549.211, which provides the manner and procedure by which parties can
seek sanctions in civil actions. This statutory scheme overlaps with Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.
See Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 518-19 (Minn. App. 2007)
(describing the standards and procedure under both schemes).
We review a district court’s award of costs and attorney’s fees, including sanctions
awarded pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211, for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 518;
Collins v. Waconia Dodge, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact
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that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is
against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506
(Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Under Minn. Stat. § 5 49.211, a district court may impose sanctions upon a party
who signs, files, submits, or later advocates a written motion that is “presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.” Minn. Stat. § 549.211 , subds. 2(1), 3. A district court may also
impose sanctions on a party who files a motion that is not based on a reasonable belief that
“the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support.” Id., subds. 2(3), 3.
“[Such] conduct is measured by an objective standard,” and “[s]anctions are not
appropriate merely because a party does not prevail on the merits.” Radloff v. First Am.
Nat’l Bank of St. Cloud, N.A., 470 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. App. 1991) (explaining these
standards as applied to both rule 11 and an earlier version of the statute), rev. denied (Minn.
July 24, 1991). In addition, “[t]he purpo se of sanctions is deterrence rather than
punishment or cost-shifting.” Wolf v. Oestreich, 956 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn. App. 2021),
rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2021).
Here, the district court found that father “lacked a good-faith basis to assert that
[mother] had intentionally failed to comply with the provisions of the [c]ourt’s order”
because he moved to find mother in contempt “without a good-faith basis to believe that
[she] had not engaged in counseling, had prohibited the children from engaging in
counseling, or that she [had] obstructed family counseling, which was attempted by [father]
without soliciting input from the children’s counselors as required.” The district court
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further found that father’s claims “were frivolous and intended to harass or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.” The district court therefore concluded that awarding costs
and attorney’s fees to mother was appropriate pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211, noting
that the sanctions imposed—a total of $1,796 —were “limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of the conduct of the petitioner.”
Father argues that he filed the contempt motion in good faith and that it was not a
frivolous filing or an attempt to harass. He also appears to argue that the contempt motion
was necessary to clarify aspects of the district court’s previous order and to keep the parties
moving toward the goal of family reunification counseling for father and the children.
Father repeats the assertions he made in district court to support the contempt motion,
including that mother has not started counseling with a therapist specializing in coparenting
conflict, provided necessary information to father’s therapist, or allowed the children to
attend family counseling with father. And he insists that the contempt motion was his
“only recourse” for ensuring that mother followed the district court’s order. Father’s
arguments are unavailing.
The district court properly identified the applicable legal standard and a sufficient
basis to support its decision. The record supports the district court’s determination that
sanctions are appropriate because father filed his motion “without a good-faith basis to
believe that” mother was in contempt of the district court’s November 2020 order. As we
explained in our prior decision affirming the district court’s denial of father’s contempt
motion, “there is reasonable evidence in the record to support” the district court’s finding
that mother had not failed to comply with the November 2020 order—namely, mother’s
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testimony to that effect. Traugott, 2022 WL 351115, at *2. And we may not reweigh the
evidence on appeal when reviewing a factual finding for clear error. In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021). The record therefore supports the district
court’s determination that father had no good-faith basis for his contempt motion and that
it was an objectively frivolous filing.
We are not persuaded otherwise by father’s assertion that he filed the contempt
motion in good faith. “[Such ] conduct is measured by an objective standard,” not a
subjective one. Radloff, 470 N.W.2d at 157. In addition to the reasoning above, father’s
apparent contention that the contempt motion was necessary to clarify aspects of the district
court’s order, and that he filed the motion to “protect his daughters from the manipulative
tactics that [mother] has used,” further suggests that he did not file the motion for a proper
purpose but rather to harass or inconvenience mother. We also note that the sanctions
imposed by the district court are for a relatively modest amount, consistent with deterrence
rather than punishment. See Wolf, 956 N.W.2d at 256.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing sanctions on father under Minn. Stat. § 549.211 in the amount of the costs and
attorney’s fees that mother incurred as a result of father’s contempt motion and by entering
judgment against him accordingly.
Affirmed.