Jerrod Feist, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0956

Jerrod Feist,
Relator,

vs.

City of Plymouth,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed April 25, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 45063675-3

Jerrod Feist, Rogers, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

City of Plymouth, Plymouth, Minnesota (respondent-employer)

Munazza Humayun, Anne B. Froelich, Minn esota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent-department)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presid ing Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Relator Jerrod Feist challenges the deci sion of the unemployment-law judge (ULJ)
that he is ineligible for une mployment benefits because he quit his job without a good
reason caused by his employer. We affirm.
FACTS
Feist worked as a utilities maintenance worker for the City of Pl ymouth (the city)
from March 2015 until January 21, 2021. Because the position includes snow plowing and
operating other commercial equipment, utilitie s maintenance workers must have a valid
Minnesota driver’s license with a good driving record, and they must obtain a valid Class
B commercial driver’s license (CDL) within six months of hire and a valid Class A CDL
within one year of hire. Th e job description for a utilities maintenance worker identifies
driving as “an essential function.”
On January 11, 2021, Feist was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated
(DWI). As a result of the arrest, Feist’s driver’s license was immediately revoked and his
CDL was withdrawn. 1 He informed the city of his driving status a day or two later but
maintained that he had not b een driving. While the city attempted to ascertain whether
Feist’s CDL had been affected and whether reinstatement was possible, Feist was allowed
to work intermittently on projects that did not involve driving and to take paid leave. On
January 21, 2021, Feist resigned from his position.

1 The CDL disqualification was for a period of 364 days, from Ja nuary 21, 2021 until
January 20, 2022.
3
Following Feist’s resignation, he applie d for unemployment benefits. The
Minnesota Department of Employment a nd Economic Development (DEED) issued a
determination of ineligibility. Feist appealed the determination and had an evidentiary
hearing before a ULJ.
At the hearing, Feist admitted that the Janua ry 2021 DWI arrest was not his first.
Soon after he began working for the city in 2015, he was convicted of DWI and lost his
CDL. At that time, the city extended the probationary period associated with his new job
and provided him other work that did not require a CDL for one year. Given these
arrangements, Feist was able to continue in his position as a utilities maintenance worker.
When Feist was arrested for DWI again in January 2021, another city employee was
involved. According to the police report, Feist and the coworker left a bar together in the
coworker’s car. While the cowo rker drove, Feist “sucker punched” him. The coworker
pulled over and got out of the ca r. Feist then allegedly climbe d into the driver’s seat and
shut the door. The friend “knew Feist was extremely intoxicated,” so he pulled Feist from
the car and they fought on the street. Police responded, and Feist was arrested. He had an
alcohol concentration of 0.23.
A day or two later, Feist informed the city that he had been charged with DWI and
that his CDL had been revoked, but he did no t mention the fracas with the coworker. He
assured the city’s human resources (HR) director that he had not been driving and that the
situation would be “sorted out” in a few days.
The city allowed Feist to perform some work and to take leave while the city
reviewed the situation. The HR director spok e with Feist near the end of the workday on
4
January 20 and informed him that the city wa s still attempting to confirm the status of
Feist’s CDL. Shortly after the conversation, the city confirmed that Feist’s CDL was
withdrawn for one year.
The HR director spoke with Feist again on January 21. She explained that he could
no longer perform his job functions that required a CDL and that the city likely would not
authorize any driving. The HR director did not tell Feist that he was terminated. According
to the HR director, she told Fe ist to use his paid time off while the situation was in flux.
But Feist testified that he believed he was going to be placed on administrative leave.
That same day, Feist’s attorney contacted the city attorney to inquire about how
Feist could keep his position. The city attorney said that a CDL was required. But the city
attorney did not state that Feist was terminated. At that point, the city still had not decided
whether to terminate him. Feist’s attorney told the city attorney that he had filed a petition
to challenge the revocation of Feist’s driving privileges.
After speaking with his atto rney, Feist believed that th e city would terminate him
within a matter of days. He therefore chose to resign so that his employment record would
not show a termination and based on his belief that he would secure “Cobra insurance . . .
for a year.” While the city attorney was informing the HR director about the discussion
with Feist’s attorney, Feist emailed the HR director his resignation.
Based on the evidence introduced at the hearing, the ULJ determined that Feist had
quit his position without a good reason caused by the city and affirmed the determination
of ineligibility for benefits . Feist submitted a request for reconsideration, and a ULJ
affirmed the original determination.
5
Feist appeals.
DECISION
When reviewing the decision of the ULJ, this court may affirm, remand for further
proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator have
been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are “(1) in
violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the department; (3) made upon unlawful proc edure; (4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
Feist argues that the ULJ erred in c oncluding that he was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because he quit his job without a good reason caused by his
employer. We view “the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision,
giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ. In doing so, we will
not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when th e evidence substantially sustains them.”
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, Feist contends that he did not quit his position, but instead was
discharged by his employer. Under Minnes ota law, “[a] discharge from employment
occurs when any words or actions by an em ployer would lead a reasonable employee to
believe that the employer will no longer allo w the employee to work for the employer in
any capacity.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, su bd. 5(a) (2020). Conversely, an employee
voluntarily quits when he ex ercises his free will to leave or stop working. Id., subd. 2(a)
(2020). “Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit is a question of fact
6
subject to our deference.” Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25,
31 (Minn. App. 2012).
The ULJ found that Feist was not discharged because the city di d not lead him to
believe that he could no longer work in any capacity. Instead, the ULJ found, Feist “quit
because he believed he was going to be discharg ed and he did not wa nt a termination on
his record.” The evidence subs tantially sustains these findings. Feist acknowledged that
no supervisor or superior had informed him th at he was being discharged. Instead, based
on the HR director’s remarks, he inferred th at he would ultimately be discharged.
According to the HR director, the city had not made a decision about Feist’s position when
he resigned. She testified that the city was in a “holding pattern” waiting for more
information about the s ituation. During that time, Feis t worked three full days and an
additional hour. And the HR di rector also instructed him to take paid leave, which is
evidence that there was no discharge. See Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13a(d) (2020) (“An
applicant who is on a paid leave of absence, whether the leave of absence is voluntary or
involuntary, is ineligible for unemployment benefits for the duration of the leave.”); see
also id., subd. 13(c) (2020) (“A suspension from employment with pay, regardless of
duration, is not a separation from employme nt.”). Because the record substantially
supports the ULJ’s finding that Feist quit his employment, we reject his argument that he
was discharged.
Feist next argues that the ULJ erred in co ncluding that he quit without a good reason
caused by his employer. He contends that he was compelled to quit because he felt “there
7
was an impending termination,” there was no paid work available for him until his pending
criminal court case was resolved, and he “was fearful to have a termination on [his] record.”
Whether an applicant had a good reason to quit caused by the employer is a legal
question, which this court reviews de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr. , 614
N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000). An employee who voluntarily quits employment is
ineligible for unemploym ent benefits unless an exception applies. See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(1)-(10) (2020). One such exception exists when “the applicant quit the
employment because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). A good
reason caused by the employer is a reason “(1) th at is directly related to the employment
and for which the employer is re sponsible; (2) that is advers e to the worker; and (3) that
would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than
remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a) (2020). “To compel” is “[t]o cause or bring
about by force, threats, or overwhelming pressure.” Werner v. Med. Pros. LLC , 782
N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 321 (9th ed. 2009)).
This standard is an objective, reasonabl e-person standard, considering the conduct
of an ordinary prudent person. Id. The standard applies to the “average” person, “and not
the supersensitive.” Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., 720 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. App.
2006). The circumstances causing an employee to quit with good cause must be “real and
not imaginary, substantial and not trifling, reasonable and not whimsi cal or capricious”;
the reason for the quit must be “compelling and necessitous.” Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp.
Servs., 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 1976) (quotation omitted). The statutory analysis
8
“must be applied to the specific facts of eac h case.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(b)
(2020).
The reason why an individual quit employme nt is a fact question for the ULJ to
determine. See Beyer v. Heavy Duty Air, Inc. , 393 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. App. 1986)
(reviewing determination of reason employee quit as a question of fact). Here, the ULJ
found that Feist “quit because he believed he would be discharged du e to the loss of his
CDL.” We defer to this factual finding as we are required to do.
Feist’s reason for quitting is not one “for which the employer is responsible.” Minn.
Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(1). The city did not cause the loss of his driving privileges and
the ensuing uncertainty about when and whether he would be able to perform his job duties.
Moreover, anticipation of a future discharge from employment is not a good reason caused
by the employer for quitting. See id., subd. 3(e) (2020) (“Notification of discharge in the
future . . . is not a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.”); see also Ramirez v.
Metro Waste Control Comm’n, 340 N.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Minn. App. 1983) (concluding
that a relator’s quit was not the result of a go od reason caused by the employer where the
relator was late to work multiple times and fe ared discharge as a result). We therefore
conclude that Feist’s decision to quit was not based on a good re ason caused by his
employer.
Affirmed.