State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0975

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Carl Joseph Matusovic,
Appellant.

Filed June 13, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CR-19-2706

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that his conviction for intentionally providing a false address on a
sex-offender registration form should be overturned because the evidence was insufficient
2
to support his conviction, a Blakely violation occurred, and his speedy -trial right was
violated. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Carl Joseph
Matusovic with failing to register as a predatory offender or intentionally providing false
information to a “corrections agent, law enforcement authority, or the bureau” in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2016). 1 Matusovic, a repeat sex offender who has
been required to register since 1993, had been released in June 2018 from the Goodhue
County jail in Red Wing on an unrelated charge. The state alleged that Matusovic provided
a false address on a sex-offender registration form prior to his release from the jail.
Matusovic received a trial date of January 13, 2020. On January 13, Matusovic
requested a continuance to conduct more discover y. Trial was rescheduled for February
18. On February 10, Matusovic fired his public defender and asked for trial to be delayed
again so he could prepare. On February 26, Matusovic waived his right to a speedy trial.
Although his trial was scheduled for May 11, the COVID-19 pandemic caused his trial date
to be moved to September. During this time, he again demanded a speedy trial. However,
as the trial approached, Matusovic requested and was appointed a new public defender to
represent him, and he agai n waived his speedy -trial demand. His trial was scheduled for
December.

1 The “bureau” is defined as the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) . Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 1a(b) (2016).
3
On December 14, Matusovic again demanded a speedy trial. Because COVID-19
restrictions prevented the commencement of trial on December 14, Matusovic consented
to a new trial date of February 8, 2021. On January 21, 2021, the chief justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court instituted a moratorium on jury trials until March 15, 2021,
unless an exception was requested and granted. See Order Governing Continuing
Operations of the Minneso ta Judicial Branch , ADM20-8001, at 2 (Minn. Jan. 21, 2020)
(January jury-moratorium order). Matusovic’s trial was continued to March 29, 2021, at
which time a court trial occurred.
The following facts were elicited at trial. A Goodhue County detention deputy
testified that she assisted Matusovic with filling out a BCA change-of-information form,
which he was required to complete before his discharge from the jail. The deputy ask ed
Matusovic for information and then recorded the information provided by Matusovic on
the form. She asked Matusovic to identify his primary address for registration purposes ,
and Matusovic provided a Rosemount address which the deputy then recorded on the form.
The deputy completed the BCA form with information provided by Matusovic, printed the
form, and then provided the form to Matusovic to verify the information and sign in the
appropriate area, which he did . The deputy testified that Matusovic did no t appear to be
confused about the form.
Matusovic also testified at trial. He admitted that he never lived at the address he
provided on the form. He explained that he provided the Rosemount address as a mailing
address, not a primary address, and he kn ew he would be homeless when he was released
from the jail. He testified that he thought he was providing an address to allow probation
4
to contact him. He also testified that he did not intend to register at that address as a sex
offender because he did not want to put his friend who lived at the address “through that.”
He testified that he was both unaware of and confused about the process of registering as
homeless.
Matusovic’s friend who lived at the Rosemount address testified that she had not
spoken with Matusovic in a long time . A police officer testified that Matusovic’s friend
was surprised that he listed her address on the form.
The district court found Matusovic guilty of intentionally providing false
information on the BCA form. Specifically, the district court found that Matusovic had
filled out numerous registration forms in the past, understood what it meant to provide an
address on a change-of-information form, and “had no intention by his own admission” of
staying at the Rosemount address. At sentencing, the state asked the district court to make
a finding of fact that Matusovic was a level -III offender in order for the court to impose a
ten-year term of conditional release. The district court then found that Matusovic w as a
level-III sex offender and imposed the ten-year term of conditional release. Matusovic
appeals.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to find Matusovic guilty under Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 5(a).

Matusovic argues that the evidence is not sufficient to convict him under Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 5(a) , because (1) the deputy at the jail to whom he gave the false
information does not qualify as a “law enforcement authority” under the statute and (2) he
5
did not intentionally provide false information. A defendant is guilty under Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 5(a) , if they “ intentionally provide[] f alse information to a corrections
agent, law enforcement authority, or the bureau.” “We use the same standard of review in
bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v.
Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). Under that standard, “[t]he verdict will not
be overturned if, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and the prosecution ’s
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the [fact-finder] could reasonably have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 319
(Minn. 2005).
In evaluating sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenges, we “carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit th e factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Waiters , 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). We assume that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved
any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). This
standard of review applies when a conviction is adequately supported by direct evidence.
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). Direct evidence is “evidence that is based
on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
If the state uses circumstantial evidence to prove an element of an offense, we apply
a heightened standard of review to the evidence underlying that element. State v. Porte ,
832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013) (citing State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473
6
(Minn. 2010)). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from whic h the factfinder can infer
whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted).
A. The direct evidence at trial established that Matusovic provided false
information to a corrections agent, law enforcement au thority, or the
bureau.

Matusovic first argues that his conviction must be overturned because the Goodhue
County detention deputy to whom he provided false information about his primary address
is not a “law enforcement authority” under the statute. We disagree.
We first observe that Matusovic’s argument is based on a mischaracterization of the
state’s allegations, arguments at trial, and the basis for the district court’s determination of
guilt and subsequent conviction. Matusovic asserts that the s tate did not base its case on
Matusovic providing false information to the BCA, and that the district court only
convicted him of providing false information to “the local authorities ,”2 which he
seemingly equates to the statutory term “law enforcement authority.” But the record belies
that argument. The complaint contained allegations that Matusovic provided false
information on the BCA “Change of Information Form ,” which listed the BC A as a
recipient of this false information. The state consistently argued at trial that the false
information on the form was sent to the bureau in violation of the statute, specifically noting
in its opening statement that the form containing the false information was sent to the BCA

2 We note that Matusovic cites this language out of context; the district court’s reference
to “local authorities” related to Matusovic failing to register and was unrelated to him
providing false information to the detention deputy or on the form.
7
and in its closing argument that Matusovic’s signed form with the false information was
submitted to the BCA. The district court based Matusovic’s conviction on the false
information contained on the BCA form delivered to th e bureau , not the statements
communicated to the detention deputy. Matusovic does not contest that the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that he provided false information regarding his primary address
to the BCA, which the statute expressly criminalizes. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)
(stating a defendant is guilty if they “ intentionally provide[] false information to a
corrections agent, law enforcement authority, or the bureau.” (emphasis added)).
Regardless of Matusovic’s ch aracterization of the state’s case and his conviction,
the direct evidence elicited at trial shows that Matusovic provided false information to the
BCA. After the deputy received the registration information from Matusovic, she entered
the information onto a BCA registration form and printed it for Matusovic to review, verify,
and sign, which he did . The form is titled “BCA Change of Information Form” and
indicates that all information on the form will be sent to the BCA. In the area above
Matusovic’s signature, the form contains a notice that the offender has a duty to register
and provide accurate information. Because the form is from the BCA, expressly indicates
that the information would be sent to the BCA for registration purposes , and the evidence
shows that Matusovic provided false information on the form and thereafter verified that
information and signed the form, the evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s
finding that Matusovic provided false information to the BCA in violation of the statute.
Turning to Matusovic’s argument on appeal, we are not persuaded that a detention
deputy in the Goodhue County jail is not a “law enforcement authority” within the meaning
8
of the statute. When interpreting a statute, we “must read and construe the statute as a
whole, and we must interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections, so as to give
effect to all of the provisions.” State v. Barrientos , 837 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2013).
Statutes should be interpreted in a way to “avoid absurd results.” State v. Greenman, 825
N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. App. 2013) (quoting Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616
N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000) ). And “reviewing courts should give a reasonable and
sensible construction to criminal statutes.” Id. (quoting State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909,
916 (Minn. 1996)). We review de novo a sufficiency -of-the-evidence claim that turns on
the meaning of a statute under which the defendant was convicted. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926
N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019).
“Law enforcement authority” is defined as , “with respect to a home rule charter or
statutory city, the chief of police, and with respect to an unincorporated area, the county
sheriff.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(e) (2016). There is no dispute that Red Wing,
the city where the jail is locate d, is a home-rule charter city. Matusovic therefore argues
that he is only liable under the statute if he provided false registration information to one
person, the Red Wing Chief of Police. The state concedes that Matusovic did not give false
information to the Red Wing Chief of Police but argues that Matusovic’s restrictive reading
and application of the statute is misplaced. We agree.
The definition of “law enforcement authority” is not as rigid as Matusovic suggests
because the p lain language of the statute sets forth a definition of “law enforcement
authority” “unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1a(a) (2016). The context here clearly indicates otherwise and includes a detention
9
deputy charged with the responsibility of collecting information from a predatory offender
about to be released from custody to enable the statutory registration requirements.
A predatory offender about to be released from custody must complete registration
requirements before release. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3 a(b) (2016) (requiring
offenders to register at least three days before their release from a correctional facility).
Under Matusovic’s interpretation, criminal liability does not attach when an inmate in his
position provides false registration information to a detention deputy, or anyone other than
the chief of police, charged with the responsibility for collecting official registration
paperwork.3 Matusovic’s overly limiting interpretation that he is guilty of providing false
information to a law -enforcement authority only if he provides false information to one
person is not reasonable, would lead to absurd results, and frustrates the statute’s overall
purpose of creating “a sexual -offender registry to assist law enforcement with

3 We also note that t he Red Wing Police Department enacted a policy effective May 23,
2008, approved by the chief of police, the purpose of which is to set forth the manner in
which “th[e] agency complies with the requirements of Minnesota Statutes 243.166 . . .
that provide for the registration of predatory offenders for community notification relative
to the release of these offenders.” See Red Wing Police Dep ’t, Policy No. 27, Predatory
Offender Registration and Community Notification 1 (2008). On appellate review, we are
permitted to take judicial notice of public records. In re Reissuance of NPDES/SDS Permit
to U.S. Steel Corp., 954 N.W.2d 572, 581 n.8 (Minn. 2021). The policy provides that the
department will “facilitate” the registration requirements for those who are “about to be
released from custody” by working with “law enforcement agenc[ies],” including “all
agencies which carry on law enforcement or prosecutor ial functions including, but not
limited to, local, state and federal agencies, and parole, probation and court services
agencies.” Policy No. 27, supra, at 1-2. Thus, the clear context set forth in this policy,
adopted by the Red Wing Police Department and approved by the chief of police, is to
facilitate registration of predatory offenders as required by statute by coordinating with
other law-enforcement authorities, including staff employed at the jail.
10
investigations.” State v. Munger , 858 N.W.2d 814, 820 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 2015).
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence at trial demonstrated beyond a
reasonable doubt that Matusovic provided false registration information to the bureau and
alternatively to a law-enforcement authority.
B. The evidence is sufficient to establish Matusovic’s intent.
Matusovic also argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he
intentionally provided false registration information. The parties disagree on whether a
direct- or circumstantial-evidence standard of review should apply. “[I]ntent is a subjective
state of mind usually established only by reasonable inference from surrounding
circumstances.” State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
We agree that evidence of Matusovic’s intent, or subjective state of mind, must be derived
from the evidence presented at trial and apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of
review. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599.
We review the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence by conducting a t wo-step
analysis. State v. German , 929 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. App. 2019) (citing State v.
Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011)). First, we identify the circumstances proved
by the state. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). “[W]e assume that
the [fact -finder] resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent” with the
verdict. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). Second, we determine “whether
the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsisten t with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt. ” Loving v. State , 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)
11
(quotation omitted) . We do not defer to the fact -finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. We will reverse the conviction if a reasonable
inference other than guilt exists. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643 . But we will uphold the
verdict if the circumstantial evidence forms “a complete chain” which leads “directly to
the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference
other than guilt.” State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
We first identify the circumstances proved. Since 1993, Matusovic has been
required to register as a predatory offe nder. He has completed numerous forms updating
his registration status and address. Matusovic had often initialed or signed the forms asking
him to verify the accuracy of his submissions. In this case, w hen asked by the detention
deputy for his primary address for registration purposes, Matusovic identified the address
of a friend in Rosemount. Matusovic admitted that he never lived at that address and did
not intend to reside at that address after his release. The friend at the Rosemount address
did not authorize Matusovic to reside at the address and had no knowledge that Matusovic
listed her residence as his primary address. Matusovic intended to be homeless after his
release. Matusovic reviewed the information recorded on the BCA registration form ,
verified its accuracy, and signed the form. The form is an official BCA document and
indicates that the completed form will be sent to the bureau.
We next determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rat ional hypothesis other than guilt. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
Matusovic argues that a rational hypothesis inconsistent with guilt exists , namely that he
was confused when he filled out the form and thought he was just putting down a mailing
12
address for p robation to contact him. This hypothesis is not reasonable given the
circumstances proved. Matusovic had been registering as a predatory offender for decades
before the instant offense. He knew at the time of his registration that the information he
provided regarding his residence was untrue and that he would be homeless after his
release. Matusovic’s hypothesis that he listed the Rosemount address simply as a probation
contact point is not rational given that the friend at the Rosemount address was “shocked”
when police arrived at her house in an attempt to contact Matusovic, Matusovic had not
contacted the friend in years, and Matusovic testified that he did not want to involve his
friend in his offender-registry affairs. The form also clearly denotes that it will be sent to
the BCA, not to probation. Although Matusovic alleges that he made an honest mistake,
the district court discredited his testimony and found that he did not make an unintentional
mistake in filling out the form. We do not review credibility determinations on appeal.
State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. App. 1997). Accordingly, the only
rational hypothesis from the circumstances proved is that Matusovic intentionally listed a
false address on the registration form.
II. Although a Blakely violation occurred, the error was harmless.
Matusovic next argues that his term of conditional release should be reversed
because he is entitled to a trial on the issue of whether he is a level-III sex offender. “Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see State v. Hagen,
690 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Minn. App. 2004). The statutory maximum that a court may impose
13
for a crime is “the maximum sentence [allowed] . . . solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washingt on, 542 U.S. 296,
303 (2004) (emphasis omitted). Whether a Blakely error has occurred is a legal question
which we review de novo. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Minn. 2006).
A defendant convicted for violating Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a), is subject to
a ten-year term of conditional release if the defendant was assigned a risk level III under
Minnesota Statutes section 244.052 (2016) at the time of the violation. Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 5a (2016). The imposition of this t erm of conditional release requires a
jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was assigned a risk level III
at the time of the violation, absent a waiver by the defendant of this right. State v. Her ,
862 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Minn. 2015); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(b) (allowing
for waiver of jury trial to determine aggravating factors).
The state concedes that a Blakely violation occurred in this case but argues that the
violation was harmless. We agree with the parties th at a Blakely violation occurred and
must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.
Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 30 (Minn. 2006) (applying harmless -error test to Blakely
violation). A Blakely error is harmless if a review ing court can “say with certainty that a
jury would have found the aggravating factors used to enhance [the defendant’s] sentence
had those factors been submitted to a jury in compliance with Blakely.” Dettman, 719
N.W.2d at 655. When all evidence presen ted at trial uncontrovertibly establishes the
existence of the aggravating factor, the error is harmless. State v. Essex, 838 N.W.2d 805,
813 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 2014).
14
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes with certainty that a jury
would have found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Matusovic was a
level-III sex offender. A BCA agent and police officer testified at trial that Matusovic was
a level -III offender. The state introduced into evidence a transcript of Matusovic’s
interview with law enforcement where he admitted that he is a level-III offender. The state
also introduced into evidence multiple notices sent to Matusovic relating to his
sex-offender registration which list him as a level -III sex offender. Although Matusovic
argues that it is “unclear” what evidence the state would have used to establish his level-III
status, he does not argue that any other evidence exists to show t hat he was not a level-III
offender at the time of the violation and does not deny on appeal that he is, in fact, a level-III
sex offender. The record contains incontrovertible evidence that Matusovic was a level-III
sex offender at the time of the offens e, and we conclude that although a Blakely violation
occurred, the violation was harmless.
III. No violaton of Matusovic’s right to a speedy trial occurred.
Matusovic also argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an accused “the right to a speedy
and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. “Whether a
defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question subject to de novo
review.” State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).
“[T]he central question that we must answer when assessing a Sixth Amendment
speedy trial claim is this: Did the State bring the accused to trial quickly enough so as not
to endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects?” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d
15
230, 244 (Minn. 2021). “While the speedy trial right protects the individual interests of
the accused, the speed with which an accused must be brought to trial must be considered
with regard to the practical administration of justice.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Criminal
prosecutions are designed to move at a deliberate pace both to protect the rights of the
accused and to ensure the ability of society to protect itself by allowing for thorough and
prepared prosecutions; whether a trial is prompt enough must be assessed in light of both
interests.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial c laim necessitates a
functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 522 (1972). “Accordingly, whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts
to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends o n the circumstances.” Mikell, 960
N.W.2d at 244 (quotation omitted).
In determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, we
apply the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker. State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311,
315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). The four factors are: (1) the length of
the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy
trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. None of these factors
are dispositive; they must be considered together along with any other relevant
circumstances. State v. Taylor , 869 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2015). “This balancing test
allows the court to accommodate the sometimes co mpeting interests between the orderly
prosecution of crimes that is fair to both sides and the prompt resolution of the case by
trial.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245. We address each factor in turn.
16
A. Length of the Delay
Matusovic argues that presumptive pre judice occurred because more than 60 days
elapsed between the date that he entered his speedy-trial demand and the date that his trial
commenced. “A defendant must be tried as soon as possible after entry of a plea other than
guilty. . . . [T]he trial must start within 60 days unless the court finds good cause for a later
trial date.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). The supreme court has interpreted this rule “to
mean that delays beyond the 60-day limit simply raise the presumption that a violation has
occurred and require the trial court to conduct a further inquiry to determine if there has
been a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d
509, 513 (Minn. 1989). “We determine whether good cause exists for a later trial date
under Rule 11.09 by applying the Barker factors.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246 (quotation
omitted).
Matusovic correctly notes that more than 60 days elapsed between when he made
his renewed demand for a speedy trial and when his trial commenced. But the “threshold
conclusion that a delay is presumptively prejudicial does not end our consideration of the
length of the delay in the weighing of the Barker factors.” Id. at 250. We instead consider
the reasons for the delay, noting that “a longer de lay may be justified if there are good
reasons for the delay.” Id.
B. Reason for the Delay
We next consider who bears responsibility for the delay: the state or the defendant.
Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19. Negligence or overcrowded courts are considerations that weigh
against the state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. However, delays related to the COVID -19
17
pandemic are not attributable to the state. State v. Jackson , 968 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn.
App. 2021), rev. granted and stayed (Minn. Jan. 18, 2022).
Matusovic argues that, although COVID-19 was generally responsible for delays at
the beginning of the pandemic, COVID -19 did not prevent the commencement of trial
within 60 days of his December 14 demand because procedures were in place in early 2021
to allow jury trials to safely occur. Specifically, he argues that the district court and the
state could have applied for his trial to begin as early as February 1, 2021, with permission
from the district chief and the chief justice. See Order Governing Continuing Operations
of the Minnesota Judicial Branch , ADM20-8001, at 2 (Minn. Nov. 20, 2020). He argues
that delaying the start of the trial, despite the November 20 order allowing for some jury
trials to occur, is more akin to the general court congestion described in Barker than to the
delays caused by COVID -19 described in Jackson. The state notes that the district court
did not seek for permission to conduct his trial because Matusovic initially requested, and
was granted, a February 8 trial date, which was within 60 days of his demand . Between
the demand and the scheduled trial date, the chief justice instituted another
COVID-19-related moratorium on jury trials until March 15, 2021, unless an exception
was requested and granted. See January jury-moratorium order, supra, at 2. The state also
argues that even if the delay is attributable to the state, the concerns and challenges posed
by COVID-19 provided good cause to delay the trial and this factor should be given little
weight.
We find the state’s argument to be more persuasive. Between Matusovic’s
speedy-trial demand on December 14, 2020, and his scheduled trial date of February 8,
18
2021, the chief justice issued an order delaying the start of any new jury trials , absent
special permission, until March 15, 2021, due to COVID-19. Id. At the February 8 hearing,
both the state and Matusovic requested that the district court seek permission to schedule
the jury trial before March 15. The district court then asked Matusovic to formally request
in writing that an exception to the order be approved. But the record contains no evidence
that such a request was made. Thus, it appears that the only reason Matusovic’s trial did
not commence within the 60 days of his speedy -trial demand was because of the chief
justice’s order delaying jury trials due to COVID -19, which we have determined to be a
neutral factor in our analysis. Jackson, 968 N.W.2d at 61. Even so, we agree with the state
that the chief justice’s order on trial moratoriums issued because of the then -current
pandemic circumstances constitute good cause to delay trial. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at
251 (explaining that delays supported by good cause, such as unavoidable occurrences, are
given little weight and will generally not be held against the state).
C. Assertion of the Speedy-Trial Right
Although a “defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant was deprived of the rig ht,” the
inquiry “is necessarily contextual.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252 (quotation omitted).
Minnesota courts consider “other signals in the case to assess whether a demand for a
speedy trial is serious,” id., and consider “the frequency and force of a demand,” which is
likely “to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted” from an
alleged violation, Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515.
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Here, Matusovic clearly asserted his speedy-trial right at the December 14 hearing.
However, at the February 8 hearing, Matusovic did not object to the March 29 trial date
and conceded that it was “within the speedy time requirements.” As noted above,
Matusovic did not appear to seek an exception to the jury-trial moratorium to have his trial
occur before March 15 as permitted by the chief justice’s January jury-moratorium order.
We also note that during the pendency of this action, Matusovic asserted and then withdrew
his demand for a speedy trial on multiple occasions, requested continuances of his trial
even when the state was prepared to proceed, and caused delays in trial due to changes in
counsel. These factors impact the overall strength of his sp eedy-trial demand, and we do
not weigh this factor strongly in his favor. See Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515.
D. Prejudice Due to the Delay
We next consider whether Matusovic was prejudiced by the delay, focusing on three
interests: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 253 (quotation omitted). An impairment of the defense
is the “most serious” of the se interests and is typically “suggested by memory loss by
witnesses or witness unavailability.” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20 (quotation omitted).
Although Matusovic alleges that he faced oppressive pretrial incarceration and
increased anxiety about his tria l, Matusovic delayed the start of his trial multiple times
despite the state being ready to proceed. Matusovic does not argue, and the record does
not show, that he suffered any tangible or documented harm due to his confinement during
COVID-19 or from his anxiety. Matusovic also does not allege that his d efense was
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impaired in any way by the delay. See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 20. Thus, this factor also
does not weigh in Matusovic’s favor.
E. Balancing the Factors
In the final step, we conduct “the delicate and sensitive balancing required to
answer” whether the state brought the defendant to trial “quickly enough so as not to
endanger the values that the speedy trial right protects.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 255. The
supreme court, extrapolating from the Barker factors, identified “a series of commonsense
questions . . . to determine whether the values embedded in the speedy trial right were
protected.” Id. at 244-45. These questions are:
Who is responsible for the delay? Is the justification for the
delay good or bad? Is the length of the delay consisten t with,
and proportionate to, the justification for the delay? Were the
defendant’s interests harmed by the delay itself and did that
harm increase as the delay lengthened? Was the defendant
serious about getting to trial promptly, which is good evidence
that he perceived the delay as harmful?

Id. at 245.
Here, the delays in bringing Matusovic to trial were largely due to his own actions
or COVID-19-related delays. The court trial occurred within six weeks of the agreed-upon
date, and two weeks after the expiration of the chief justice’s moratorium on trials. And
Matusovic did not demonstrate measurable harm attributable to this delay. In balancing
these interests, we do not conclude that a speedy-trial violation occurred.
Affirmed.