State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1142

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Earl Stevenson,
Appellant.

Filed August 8, 2022
Reversed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-22003

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James R. Rowader, Jr., Minneapolis City Attorney, Zenaida Chico, Assistant City
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Arielle S. Wagner, Kate M. Baxter- Kauf, Special Assistant Public Defenders, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Antonio Earl Stevenson , who was convicted of misdemeanor and gross
misdemeanor offenses after a stipulated-facts court trial, challenges the district court’s
2
order denying his motion to suppress the evidence. Because we conclude that a sheriff’s
deputy unconstitutionally expanded the scope of a traffic stop by opening Stevenson’s car
door without an individualized, reasonable, and articulable justification, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Stevenson with giving a peace officer a
false name, Minn. Stat . § 609.506, subd. 2 (2020), obstructing legal process, Minn. Stat
§ 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2020), and driving after revocation, Minn. Stat § 171.24, subd. 2
(2020), following a traffic stop in Minneapolis. Stevenson moved the district court to
suppress the evidence against him, arguing that it resulted from an unconstitutional seizure.
An evidentiary hearing was held, and the facts presented were as follows.
On a fall afternoon in 2020, while patrolling Minneapolis in separate squad cars,
two sheriff’s deputies observed a car without a front license plate and with expired
registration tabs. They initiated a traffic stop in a nearby parking lot, parking their squad
cars behind the car. Stevenson was the driver and sole occupant of the stopped car.
Both deputies approached the car. One deputy walked to the driver’s side, and the
other went to the passenger’s side. Rather than initiating contact with Stevenson through
the car window, the deputy who approached the driver’s side immediately opened the
driver’s-side door.
The deputy said, “S’up man. How you doing?” Stevenson raised both of his hands
and said, “Good.” The deputy then explained, “Stopped you for a few reasons.” Gesturing
to the rear window on the driver’s side, he stated, “[O]bviously your tint.” He then
continued, “K, you’ve got no front plate and you also got expired tabs.”
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The deputy asked Stevenson whether the car was his. Stevenson responded that it
was his car and that it was registered to him. When the deputy asked his name, Stevenson,
speaking softly, said “Antwon.” He pointed to the driver’s-side door and told the deputy
that his “ID” was there. The deputy, who smelled marijuana and observed “marijuana
shake” on the driver’s-side floorboard, asked, “Smoke weed in here?” Stevenson replied
that he did not. The deputy asked Stevenson to exit the car, and the second deputy
handcuffed Stevenson and placed him in the back of a squad car. Then, the deputies
extensively searched the passenger compartment and trunk of Stevenson’s car. The search
revealed nothing. During this time, other law enforcement officers arrived at the scene.
The deputy suspected that Stevenson had provided a false name and that the driver’s
license in the car was not Stevenson’s. But when the deputy confronted Stevenson with
his suspicions, Stevenson insisted that the driver’s license was his , and he refused to
cooperate in further efforts to confirm his identity. Eventually, Stevenson was arrested for
obstructing legal process. An identification procedure later performed at the jail revealed
that Stevenson had given the deputy a false name and had produced a driver’s license
belonging to another person.
The focus of the evidentiary hearing on Stevenson’s motion to suppress was the
deputy’s decision to open Stevenson’s car door at the beginning of the traffic stop. Both
deputies who initiated the stop testified at the hearing, and the state introduced video
footage from the deputies’ body-worn cameras.
In their testimony, the deputies confirmed that Stevenson was stopped for a license-
plate violation and expired tabs. Although the deputy who opened Stevenson’s car door
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initially could not recall doing so, he acknowledged that he likely opened it after viewing
the footage from his body-worn camera. When Stevenson’s counsel asked the deputy why
he opened the car door, the deputy testified that he did not recall how he “felt on that day,”
but if he opened the door, “it was to view more of what [he] could see.” He explained,
“[A]nytime I open a door to view someone, I’m doing it because —for officer safety
reasons.” The second deputy, who had approached the passenger side of Stevenson’s car,
testified that he could see through the back windshield and the front passenger window of
Stevenson’s car “pretty clearly.”
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Stevenson’s suppression
motion in a written order, concluding that, although the deputy expanded the scope of the
traffic stop by opening the car door, safety concerns justified the additional intrusion.
Stevenson stipulated to the prosecution’s case and had a court trial to preserve his
suppression issue for appeal.1 The district court found Stevenson guilty of all three charges
and placed him on probation for two years, staying 180 days of jail time.
Stevenson appeals.
DECISION
Stevenson argues that the deputy violated his federal and state constitutional rights
by opening the driver’s-side door of the car at the outset of the traffic stop. Although he
concedes that the deputies had a lawful basis for the traffic stop, he contends that opening

1 Under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, a defendant may
preserve appellate review of a dispositive issue by waiving a jury trial and stipulating to
the prosecution’s evidence.
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his car door was an additional intrusion that required additional justification. Stevenson
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because
the state failed to establish any reason for the expanded intrusion.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article I, sectio n 10
of the Minnesota Constitution, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable under both the state and federal constitutions unless
a recognized warrant exception applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-
55 (1971); State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). The state must show that
an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250
(Minn. 2003).
One exception to the warrant requirement permits limited investigatory seizures.
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004). Under this exception, a police
officer may briefly detain an individual when the officer “has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn.
2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30 (1968))). There is a reasonable, articulable suspicion if “the police officer [is]
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. “Generally, if
an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic law,
that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a
traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004). An officer’s actions
6
during a traffic stop, however, must be “reasonably related to and justified by the
circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364.
An investigatory seizure “may become invalid if it becomes ‘intolerable’ in its
‘intensity or scope.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18). The Minnesota Supreme
Court has interpreted the state constitution to afford more protection from unreasonable
seizures during traffic stops than the Fourth Amendment. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 152.
Under the state constitution, any intrusion that is not closely related to the initial
justification for the stop is invalid unless it can be justified by independent probable cause
or reasonableness. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364. Thus, “each step of an officer’s
investigation must ‘ be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original
legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness.’ ”
State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365).
Where police action expanded the scope of a stop, a court must consider “whether
the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to support that expansion.” State v. Smith,
814 N.W.2d 346, 351 (Minn. 2012). Such suspicion “must be individualized to the person
toward whom the intrusion is directed.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d. at 365. And “[t]his
particularized basis for the intrusion must be both articulable and reasonable.” Id. at 364;
see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (“[D]etaining officers must
have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.”).
“To determine whether the officer’s actions meet an objective standard of
reasonableness the court should ask whether with the facts available to the officer at the
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moment of the seizure or search, would a person of reasonable caution believe that the
action taken was appropriate.” State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992). “The
test for appropriateness, in turn, is based on a balancing of the government’s need to search
or seize ‘and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by
law officers.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878, (1975)). And “[f]inally, it is the state’s burden to show that a seizure was
sufficiently limited to satisfy these conditions.” Id.
Here, the district court determined that the deputy expanded the scope of the stop
when he opened Stevenson’s car door and that this additional intrusion was justified. The
district court stated:
In [the deputy’s] initial interactions with [Stevenson],
he stated that window “tint” was one of the reasons for the
traffic stop. This expressed reasoning for the stop, as well as
[the deputy’s] general testimony that when he opens a vehicle
door, it is to view person inside for officer safety, demonstrated
[the deputy’s] inability to see [Stevenson] clearly inside the
vehicle. The reliance on window tint for a basis for the stop,
coupled with the [the deputy’s] testimony that he opened
[Stevenson’s] door for officer safety, is reasonable in light of
the safety concerns posed by an officer being unable to see a
vehicle’s occupants.

In reviewing a district court’s order on a motion to suppress, appellate courts review
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d
836, 843 (Minn. 2011). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence,
we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010). Whether an officer had a reasonable,
8
articulable suspicion or probable cause is reviewed de novo. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d
128, 135 (Minn. 1999).
A. The deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop by opening
Stevenson’s car door.

As an initial matter, we address the state’s new argument that the deputy’s act of
opening the car door was merely part of the traffic stop and did not constitute an additional
intrusion. Although the state acknowledges that it did not present this argument to the
district court, it urges us to consider the argument because our review of legal issues is de
novo and the record is adequately developed. See State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137
(Minn. 2003) (holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to consider a new argument
raised on appeal where the record was sufficiently developed for appellate review). For
the reasons identified by the state, and because Stevenson makes no argument that the state
forfeited the argument by failing to raise it below, we elect to consider it.
The state contends that the deputy did not change the scope or intensity of the traffic
stop by opening Stevenson’s car door because caselaw allows an officer to engage in an
even greater intrusion—ordering a driver to exit a car—without additional justification. In
support of this argument, the state cites Pennsylvania v. Mimms, where the United States
Supreme Court determined that an officer reasonably ordered a driver, at the outset of a
traffic stop for an expired license plate, to exit the car and produce his driver’s license. 434
U.S. 106, 107-08 (1977). The state argues that Mimms stands for the proposition that
officers can order drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course during traffic stops in
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the interest of officer safety. And, according to the state, if an officer can order someone
to get out of the car, an officer can also open the driver’s-side door “as a matter of law.”
But the state’s reliance on Mimms is misplaced. Although the Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that the officer reasonably ordered the driver out of the car in the
interest of public safety, it characterized the officer’s order as an “additional intrusion,”
and an “incremental intrusion” separate from the initial intrusion of the stop. Id. at 109,
111 (“This inquiry must therefore focus not on the intrusion resulting from the request to
stop the vehicle . . . but on the incremental intrusion resulting from the request to get out
of the car once the vehicle was lawfully stopped.” (emphasis added)). Mimms therefore
does not advance the state’s argument that opening Stevenson’s car door did not expand
the traffic stop. Instead, it furthers Stevenson’s assertion —and the district court’s
determination—that this was an additional intrusion.
The state also cites State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978) to support its
argument that the deputy did not expand the scope of the stop by opening Stevenson’s door.
In Ferrise—decided decades before the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state
constitution provides greater protection to individuals during traffic stops than the Fourth
Amendment, see Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 361-62—the supreme court considered
whether an officer violated a passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights by opening a car door
during a traffic stop. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d at 890-91. There, deputies stopped a car driving
in the wrong lane of traffic shortly after a reported robbery. Id. at 889. The driver
independently exited the car and approached the officers. Id. Because the driver did not
have identification and acknowledged that there was a passenger in his car, an officer
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approached the car to speak with the passenger. Id. But the passenger window was covered
in snow, it was dark, and the officer could not see inside the car. Id. Rather than tap on
the window, the officer opened the passenger’s door, and immediately discovered a gun
and other evidence of the robbery. Id.
At the supreme court, the passenger argued that the officer’s act of opening the door
violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 890. Referencing Mimms, the supreme court
observed that “there is little practical difference between ordering a driver to open his door
and get out of his car, on the one hand, and opening the door for the driver and telling him
to get out, on the other.” Id. But the supreme court went on to characterize the officer’s
act of opening the door as an “intrusion.” Id. at 891. And after considering “the
reasonableness of the intrusion under all the circumstances,” the supreme court concluded
that “the minimal intrusion was completely reasonable and proper.” Id. Thus, Ferrise does
not support the state’s contention that an officer acts within the scope of a traffic stop by
opening a car door.2

2 Likewise, in addition to having no precedential value, the unpublished cases that the state
cites do not support the argument that opening a car door is necessarily within the scope of
a traffic stop. See State v. Perry, No. A08-0083, 2009 WL 233937, at *4 (Minn. App.
Feb. 3, 2009) (holding that an officer’s decision to open a car door and turn off the engine
was reasonable where the officer received a report of erratic driving, located the car at a
rest stop, and found the driver and passengers asleep); State v. Keith, No. C9-00-1359,
2001 WL 139008, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 20, 2001) (holding that it was reasonable for an
officer to open a car door because an informant reported that the suspect was actively
“cutting” cocaine in the car, and the officer observed the suspect for about one minute
before opening the door); State v. Perkins, No. C5-97-2013, 1998 WL 217212, at *3 (Minn.
App. May 5, 1998) (holding that an officer’s actions were reasonable where the officer had
a conversation with both the driver and the passenger, noticed the passenger was not
wearing a seat belt, asked for the passenger’s identification, ordered the driver out of the
car, and then opened the car door to hear the passenger more clearly); State v. Atkins,
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Finally, we disagree with the state’s premise that the deputy’s act of opening
Stevenson’s car door was equivalent to an officer’s request to exit a vehicle during a traffic
stop. Opening Stevenson’s car door at the outset of the traffic stop was a greater intrusion
than such a request. By opening the door, the deputy physically intruded on Stevenson’s
private space without warning. And by opening the car door and leaving it open, the deputy
exposed more of the car to view, facilitating a substantial visual intrusion into the car’s
interior, which the deputy acknowledged was his intent. Thus, even if Mimms does stand
for the proposition that police can always order drivers out of cars during traffic stops in
the general interest of officer safety, it cannot be extrapolated to mean that the deputy here
acted within the scope of the traffic stop by engaging in the more intrusive act of opening
Stevenson’s car door.
For these reasons, we reject the state’s argument that the deputy did not expand the
scope of the traffic stop by opening Stevenson’s car door. The deputy’s act was an
additional intrusion that required additional justification beyond the violations that
established the basis for the traffic stop itself.

No. A19-0021, 2019 WL 6112359, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 18, 2019) (holding that it was
reasonable for an officer to open a car door after stopping the car for erratic driving and
waiting for “approximately eight seconds” while the driver “fumbl[ed]” and struggled to
open the window).
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B. The state failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the deputy had a n
individualized, articulable, and reasonable suspicion that warranted
opening Stevenson’s car door.

Having concluded that the deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop by opening
Stevenson’s car door, we next consider Stevenson’s argument that the deputy had no basis
for doing so.
The district court determined that the deputy had a reasonable basis for expanding
the scope of the traffic stop: officer safety. According to the district court, the deputy’s
statement to Stevenson that the car’s window tint “was one of the reasons for the traffic
stop,” coupled with the deputy’s “general testimony that when he opens a vehicle door, it
is to view the person inside for officer safety,” showed that the deputy could not see
Stevenson clearly in the car. The district court then concluded that it was reasonable for
the deputy to open the car door for his own safety.
Police may expand the scope of a traffic stop for a minor traffic violation where the
heightened intrusion “reasonably relate[s] to . . . a threat to officer safety.” Ortega, 770
N.W.2d at 152 (quoting Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 369-70). But the problem with the
district court’s rationale is that the state presented no evidence that the deputy had an
individualized, articulable, and reasonable basis to suspect that Stevenson posed any risk
to officer safety. See, e.g., State v. Johnson , 257 N.W.2d 308, 308-09 (Minn. 1977)
(holding that a traffic stop was unlawful where the officer testified that “something had
aroused his suspicion,” but was unable to articulate the facts that made him suspicious).
At the evidentiary hearing on Stevenson’s motion to suppress, the deputy testified
that he stopped Stevenson for having expired tabs and no license plate. He had no
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independent recollection of opening Stevenson’s car door, but after viewing the footage
from his body-worn camera he testified, “We can say I opened it.” Defense counsel then
questioned the deputy about his reason for opening the door:
Q: So we can agree you didn’t tap on the window first or
anything like that to get his attention?
A: No. I mean, if I open a door, there is a reason for it.
Q: Okay. And in this case it was expired tabs and no front
license plate.
A: Well, anytime I open a door to view someone, I’m doing
it because -- for officer-safety reasons. I want to be able to see
all that I can, including his hands, everything, his lap. I don’t
-- I don’t do that every time, but I know I do open doors at
times.
Q: So something about the situation just made you feel
suspicious.
A: Um, yeah. I mean, I guess I can’t remember how I felt
on that day, but, like I said, if I opened the door, it was to view
more of what I could see.
Q: Okay. And again, all you had noted in your police
report was that it was expired tabs and no front license plate;
correct?
A: Yeah.

The deputy surmised that he had a reason for opening the door. But he never
provided a reason specific to Stevenson. The deputy instead relied on a generalization:
“anytime” he opens a door, he is doing it “for officer-safety reasons.”
We review the reasonableness of a police officer’s belief using an objective
standard, considering whether the facts available to an officer would warrant a person “of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Sargent, 968
N.W.2d at 38 (citing Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364). The reasonableness inquiry considers
the totality of the circumstances, which include “the special training, experience, and
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ability . . . to make inferences and deductions beyond that of the average person.” Id. at
38-39.
Here, the available facts were the following: The deputies stopped Stevenson for
expired tabs and no front license plate—offenses that are not inherently dangerous. It was
the middle of the day. There were two deputies present at the outset of the encounter. They
flanked Stevenson’s car before making contact with him. One deputy could see clearly
into the car. And Stevenson did not make any unusual or furtive movements before or
during the stop. Considering the totality of these circumstances, there were no facts that
would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that opening Stevenson’s car
door was appropriate. See id. at 38.
The district court speculated that, due to the “tint” on a rear window, the deputy
could not see into Stevenson’s car. Then, the district court concluded that the deputy’s
inability to see into the car was a safety risk that justified opening the door.
But because the deputy did not testify that he was unable to see into Stevenson’s
car, and the record does not otherwise support that determination, the district court clearly
erred in finding that the deputy had an “inability to see [Stevenson] clearly inside the
vehicle.” And, by relying on this faulty factual premise, the district court further erred by
concluding that the deputy’s decision to open the car door for officer safety was
“reasonable in light of the safety concerns posed by an officer being unable to see a
vehicle’s occupants.”
The state bears the burden of showing that additional intrusions during a traffic stop
are related to the purpose of the stop, are based on independent probable cause, or are based
15
on reasonable and articulable suspicion. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Applying de novo
review, we conclude that the state failed to satisfy its burden here. The deputy’s decision
to open Stevenson’s car door was not related to the purpose of the traffic stop. The state
made no argument that the deputy had probable cause to believe Stevenson had committed
some additional offense. Considering the totality of the circumstances, there was no
objectively reasonable basis for opening Stevenson’s car door. And the deputy did not
articulate an individualized, reasonable, and articulable suspicion that justified the
additional intrusion. The deputy’s act of opening Stevenson’s car door at the outset of the
stop violated Stevenson’s rights under article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.
Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Stevenson’s motion to suppress the
evidence. See In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (holding that
the remedy for a constitutional violation is suppression of the evidence).
Reversed.