State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0727

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Ricky James Bedell,
Respondent.

Filed December 27, 2022
Reversed
Bjorkman, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-21-73

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David Classen, Assistant County Attorney, Center
City, Minnesota (for appellant)

Hillary B. Parsons, Joseph P. Tamburino, Caplan & Tamburin o Law Firm, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota challenges an order suppressing
evidence obtained after law-enforcement officers ordered respondent Ricky James Bedell
2
to exit his vehicle during a traffic stop. Because the officers did not impermissibly expand
the scope of the stop, we reverse.
FACTS
While patrolling on the evening of January 22, 2021, a Chisago County Sheriff’s
deputy and sergeant encountered a Chevrolet pickup truck that had only one working
headlight. The officers stopped the truck for this equipment violation. The deputy
observed that the truck was black in color and had a Wisconsin license plate. A license-
plate check revealed that the truck was registered to a Wisconsin owner and listed as being
red in color.
The deputy approached the driver and sole occupant while the sergeant stood on the
passenger side of the truck. At this point, both officers’ body-worn cameras were recording
audio and video. The deputy asked Bedell for his driver’s license. He replied that he did
not have one and identified himself by name and date of birth. When Bedell provided a
Minnesota address, the deputy pointed out that the truck had Wisconsin license plates.
Bedell explained that he bought the truck “last week” and had not yet registered it because
he did not have a valid license. Bedell also handed the deputy a sheet of paper containing
insurance information for the truck. Bedell then asked if he could call his girlfriend to
come and drive the truck home. The deputy responded that Bedell could do so “after we’re
done here.”
Both officers then returned to their patrol vehicle. Upon arrival, the sergeant muted
his body-worn camera and asked the deputy if the driver was Ricky Bedell. The deputy
3
answered affirmatively; the sergeant immediately told her to mute her body-worn camera.
The two officers remained in their vehicle for approximately ten minutes.1
The sergeant then exited the patrol vehicle and unmuted his body-worn camera. He
approached another officer who had arrived at the scene, saying, “Ricky Bedell,” and, “Got
a little digging to do on the VIN.” The two walked to the passenger side of Bedell’s truck
while the deputy approached the driver’s side and spoke with Bedell. When the deputy
directed Bedell to get out of the truck so that she could look for its vehicle identification
number (VIN), Bedell instead sped off. All of the officers pursued Bedell, eventually
arresting him after he drove his truck off the road.
Police searched Bedell’s vehicle, finding a single .22 caliber cartridge. Officers
noted that Bedell appeared to be throwing items out of his truck during the pursuit, and
subsequent searches of the area discovered a bag containing 21 rounds of .22 caliber
cartridges and a .22 caliber revolver.
The state charged Bedell with unlawful possession of ammunition or a firearm2 and
fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. Bedell moved to suppress the gun and
ammunition, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle
and they improperly expanded the scope of the stop. At the suppression hearing, the deputy
testified that she suspected the truck was stolen because Bedell’s insurance document pre-

1 During the suppression hearing, the sergeant testified that it was a common practice in
his department to mute “investigative conversations” between officers.

2 Bedell was prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition due to a prior assault
conviction.
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dated his claimed purchase of the truck and the truck was registered as being red but
appeared to have been painted black. Because the sergeant told her Bedell “had a history
of fleeing” and “assaultive behavior towards law enforcement,” she ordered Bedell out of
the truck before checking the VIN out of concern for her safety. The deputy also
acknowledged that the truck had not been reported stolen.
The sergeant testified that he recognized Bedell from past encounters and suspected
the truck was stolen because it was registered to a different owner as a different color, and
Bedell’s insurance paperwork “did not appear to be legitimate.” The sergeant stated that
he “didn’t feel that [it] was safe” for the deputy to check the VIN with Bedell in the truck
as the deputy was too short to see the VIN by looking through the windshield.
The district court granted Bedell’s motion to suppress. Although the court
determined the initial stop was valid, it concluded the officers impermissibly expanded its
scope by ordering Bedell out of the truck because their “subjective reason to expand the
scope of the stop—to investigate a possible motor vehicle theft —was not objective given
the totality of the circumstances.”
The state appealed, arguing that directing Bedell to exit the truck was justified by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the truck was stolen. The state did not argue that the
officers could order Bedell out of his truck as a matter of course, without articulating a
reason. Nor did the state argue that officers could view the VIN without infringing on
Bedell’s privacy expectations. Because appellate courts have a responsibility to decide
cases in accordance with law, State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990),
we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing:
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(a) What impact, if any, does Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), have
on the parties’ arguments?

(b) What impact, if any, does New York v. Class , 475 U.S. 106 (1986), have on
the parties’ arguments?

The parties complied with our request.

DECISION
I. The suppression order has a critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute.
The state has a limited right to appellate review of a district court’s pretrial order.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1). To obtain appellate review of a pretrial order, the
state must show that, unless the district court’s ruling is reversed, it will have a “c ritical
impact on [the state’s] ability to prosecute the case.” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776,
784 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). The state can show critical impact if the challenged
ruling either “completely destroys the state’s case” or “significantly reduces the likelihood
of a successful prosecution.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The state contends that the critical-impact requirement is satisfied because the
suppression order prevents the state from prosecuting the unlawful-possession charge. We
agree. Because the order precludes one of the two charges from going forward, the critical-
impact test is met. State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 2011) (stating “the exclusion
of evidence need not affect all charges against the defendant” and “[i]t is enough if the
exclusion affects the State’s ability to prosecute a specific charge”).
II. The district court erred by suppressing all evidence obtained after police
ordered Bedell to exit his vehicle.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
6
art. I, § 10. This guarantee extends to the right of the people to be secure in their motor
vehicles. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d
84, 87 (Minn. 2000). Generally, an officer may briefly stop a vehicle to conduct a limited
investigation if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person in the
vehicle is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Minn.
2004). Violation of a traffic law, no matter how minor, provides reasonable suspicion for
an investigative stop. Id. at 823.
Such an investigative stop must be reasonable in both duration and scope. State v.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004) (citing State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125,
136 (Minn. 2002)). In assessing reasonableness, we first determine “whether the stop was
justified at its inception.” Id. at 364. We next determine “whether the actions of the police
during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise
to the stop in the first place.” Id. A valid stop may be expanded so long as “each
incremental intrusion . . . [is] tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original
legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as
defined in Terry.” Id. at 365. We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error
and review de novo its legal determination whether an expansion of a traffic stop is
justified. State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
Bedell does not dispute that the traffic stop was justified at its inception. And he
does not contend that its duration was unreasonable. Rather, he asserts—as the district
court concluded—that asking him to get out of the truck was unreasonable and
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop. This assertion is unavailing.
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In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the United States Supreme Court held that it is
objectively reasonable for a police officer to order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful
traffic stop. 434 U.S. at 110-11. The Supreme Court reasoned that, while asking a driver
to exit a vehicle is an additional intrusion (i.e., an expansion of the stop), that intrusion
“can only be described as de minimis” and is outweighed by the legitimate officer safety
concerns that are generally present in traffic stops. Id. at 111.
Our supreme court has specifically applied Mimms to a situation where an officer
ordered a driver to exit a vehicle validly stopped for a headlight violation. State v. Faber,
343 N.W.2d 659, 660 (Minn. 1984) (“Having made a legal stop, the officer was justified
in requiring [the driver] to get out of the vehicle.”). And in Askerooth, the supreme court
contrasted an officer’s ability to “order a driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle without
an articulated reason,” with additional intrusions—such as frisking or confining a driver in
a squad car—that require additional justification. 681 N.W.2d at 367 (citing Mimms, 434
U.S. at 111).
Not only was asking Bedell to exit the truck permissible under Mimms, but doing
so to allow the deputy to view the VIN was not unreasonable. In New York v. Class, the
Supreme Court held that a driver lawfully stopped for a minor traffic violation did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN, so the officer’s intrusion into the car did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 475 U.S. at 114 (noting “the important role played by
the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation of the automobile”).
In short, the officers did not need to articulate a reason for ordering Bedell to exit
his vehicle. To convince us otherwise, Bedell cites our nonprecedential opinion in State v.
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Stevenson, No. A21-1142, 2022 WL 3152587 (Minn. App. Aug. 8, 2022). 3 This reliance
is misplaced. In Stevenson, we rejected the state’s argument that Mimms not only permitted
police to order a driver out of a car, but also permitted police to open a driver’s door at the
outset of a lawful traffic stop. 2022 WL 3152587, at *4-5. The state argued that opening
a driver’s door was not an expansion of the stop; this court concluded that it was, and that
such an expansion was a “more intrusive act” than ordering a driver out of a vehicle. Id.
at *5. Here, in contrast to Stevenson, the incremental intrusion of requiring Bedell to exit
a vehicle lawfully stopped for a minor traffic violation is de minimis and is justified by the
ordinary officer safety concerns associated with traffic stops.4
Reversed.

3 Nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding but may have persuasive value.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

4 Bedell points to several facts to suggest that the police had an unreasonable justification
for ordering him out of his car and checking his VIN—namely, that the police knew who
he was and concealed their conversation about him because they sought to target him. But
Bedell cites no authority to support his contention that these facts “should color this
[c]ourt’s decision.” Police are permitted to consider a person’s criminal history when
determining what actions to take during a traffic stop. See, e.g., Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at
249. And when we evaluate the reasonableness of a stop, an officer’s subjective intent is
not a relevant consideration. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 374-75 (citing Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).