State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1236

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christian Anthony Paul Ruth,
Appellant.

Filed August 15, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-20-2832

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Cecilia A. Knapp, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Christian Anthony Paul Ruth challenges his conviction for second-degree
driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that the use of a 2018 driver’s-license revocation
to enhance the DWI offense violated his constitutional right to due process. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2020, Ruth was arrested for suspected DWI. Ruth told the officer that he
had consumed alcohol before driving and a subsequent breath test revealed that Ruth’s
alcohol concentration was 0.08.
Following the arrest, respondent State of Minnesota charged Ruth with two counts
of second-degree DWI—one count for driving under the influence of alcohol and one count
for driving with an alcohol concentration of 0 .08 or higher as measured within two hour s
of driving.1 Minn. Stat. § 169A.20 , subd. 1(1), (5) (2020). The state relied on two prior
impaired-driving incidents to enhance the charges to second-degree offenses. One of these
impaired-driving incidents was a 2018 driver’s-license revocation, which is the focus of
Ruth’s appeal to this court.
As to the 2018 license revocation, the record shows that Ruth was arrested for DWI
in Minnesota in February 2018. Later that month, his driver’s license was revoked by
operation of Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4(a) (2020) (providing for

1 Ruth was also charged with possession of an open bottle while driving, Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.35, subd. 3 (2020), but that charge is not at issue here.

3
automatic revocation of a driver’s license when a police officer certifies that probable cause
existed to believe the driver was driving while impaired and subsequent testing revealed
an alcohol concentration over the legal limit). In the related criminal DWI proceeding, the
district court ordered a competency examination, which was completed in June 2018.2 The
examiner determined that Ruth was legally competent to proceed in the prosecution
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01. But the examination concluded
that, at the time of the DWI offense, Ruth’s mental illness had made him unable to
understand the nature or wrongfulness of his behavior. In October 2018, the district court
found Ruth not guilty of the criminal DWI charges by reason of mental illness. See Minn.
R. Crim. P. 20.02, subds. 1, 4(a), 4(b) (“[T]he defendant, at the time of committing the

2 The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for two types of competency
evaluations. First, under rule 20.01, subdivision 3, if counsel or the court questions the
defendant’s competency to proceed, upon a motion and probable cause determination, the
court must order a competency examination of the defendant. The examiner must write a
report that includes “the defendant’s mental condition” and an opinion as to whether the
defendant has the “capacity to understand the proceedings or participate in the defense.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 4(b)(1), (2)(a). “If the court finds the defendant competent
[to proceed with trial], the criminal proceedings must resume.” Id., subd. 6(a).

The second type of evaluation concerns a defendant’s competence at the time of the
offense. Under the rules, when a defendant notifies the state of “a mental illness or
cognitive impairment defense” or “the defendant offers evidence of mental illness or
cognitive impairment at trial,” the district court may order an examiner to provide “an
opinion as to whether, because of mental illness or cognitive impairment, the defendant, at
the time of committing the alleged criminal act, was laboring under such a defect of reason
as not to know the nature of the act or that it was wrong.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02, subds.
1(a), (c), 4(b). A district court may then utilize the examination in determining whether
the defendant is not guilty because of mental illness or cognitive impairment. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 20.02, subd. 7(c).

A defendant may be simultaneously evaluated under Rule 20.01 and Rule 20.02.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.04.
4
alleged criminal act, was laboring under such a defect of reason as to not know the nature
of the act or that it was wrong.”), 4(c)-(e), 7(c).
At the outset of the criminal prosecution for the 2020 second-degree DWI charges,
Ruth filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, arguing that the state’s use of the
2018 license revocation to enhance the severity of the charges violated his constitutional
rights. Ruth contended that the district court’s ruling in the corresponding 2018 criminal
case that he was not guilty by reason of mental illness created an inference that he was also
incompetent during the 60-day judicial-review period for the revocation of his driver’s
license. He further argued that, because he was unable to challenge the 2018 revocation
due to his incompetence, the state’s use of the revocation to enhance the 2020 DWI charges
violated his right to due process.
The district court denied Ruth’s motion to dismiss. Although the district court took
judicial notice of the order in the 2018 criminal case finding Ruth not guilty by reason of
mental illness, it was unpersuaded “that a judicial finding of mental incompetence during
the 60-day judicial-review window somehow prevents the State from using the license-
revocation proceeding as an aggravating factor in the instant case.”
Following the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, Ruth stipulated to the
state’s case to preserve his right to appeal the ruling.
3 Based on the stipulated record, the
district court found Ruth guilty of one count of second-degree DWI for driving under the

3 Under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4, a defendant may
preserve appellate review of a dispositive issue by waiving a jury trial and stipulating to
the prosecution’s evidence.
5
influence of alcohol with an alcohol concentration over the legal limit, but not guilty of the
second DWI count and the open-bottle charge. The district court placed Ruth on probation
for five years and ordered him to serve 365 days in jail but stayed 275 days of the jail time.
Ruth appeals.
DECISION
Ruth argues that the use of his 2018 driver’s-license revocation to enhance the
conviction he now challenges violated his state and federal right s to procedural due
process. We review de novo a district court’s legal determination regarding the due process
implications of using a prior driver’s-license revocation to enhance a later DWI charge.
See State v. Goharbawang, 705 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 17, 2006) (applying de novo review in considering whether the district court erred in
determining that the use of a prior license revocation to enhance a subsequent offense
violated the defendant’s right to due process).
Under Minnesota law, the revocation of an in dividual’s driver’s license following
an impaired-driving arrest may be used to enhance the severity of subsequent DWI charges.
State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 569 (Minn. 2007); see Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subds.
21(a)(1), 22 (2020) (defining a qualified prior impaired-driving incident used to enhance a
subsequent offense to include driver’s-license revocation). But due to “the liberty interests
at stake, the use of a license revocation as an aggravating factor is limited to a situation
where judicial review has already occurred or been waived by the failure to file a timely
petition” for judicial review. Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926, 929
(Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
6
Designed to protect public safety, DWI-related driver’s-license revocations are civil
proceedings in which the 60-day period for requesting judicial review is strictly construed,
even when a delay in pursuing judicial review is not the driver’s fault. McShane v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 377 N.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23,
1986); see State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 1996) (“[T]he primary purpose of
the [license-revocation] law is to protect the public by removing from Minnesota’s streets
and highways those who drive under the influence of alcohol. ”); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.53, subd. 2(a) (2020) (“Within 60 days following receipt of a notice and order of
revocation . . . a person may petition the court for review.”). “[F]ailure to file a petition
for judicial review within the [60]-day statutory period deprives the district court of
jurisdiction to hear the petition.” Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 929 (quoting Thole v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 2013)).
Ruth acknowledges that he did not timely seek judicial review of his 2018 driver’s-
license revocation. But, relying on the district court’s 2018 determination that he was not
guilty of the corresponding criminal DWI charges by virtue of his mental illness, he
contends that he was also mentally incompetent during the 60-day window for requesting
judicial review and therefore could not timely initiate that process. In further support of
his assertion that he was not competent to timely seek judicial review, he asks us to take
judicial notice of the evaluator’s competency report in the 2018 criminal case, which
concluded that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of driving while impaired at the
time of the offense. According to Ruth, because there was no judicial review of the 2018
7
revocation, and because he was incapable of requesting judicial review, the revocation
could not be used.
Ruth’s challenge is a collateral attack on the validity of his 2018 license revocation.
The validity of a revocation can be challenged collaterally in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, but only if a defendant can establish the existence of unique circumstances.
State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988). Generally, collateral attacks are
disfavored because they undermine the finality of judgments. Id. But such challenges are
permitted for constitutional violations that “rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect.”
State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 533 -34 (Minn. 2006). Historically, collateral attacks
have been permitted in cases where a defendant’s “pivotal constitutional right” to counsel
was violated, Warren, 419 N.W.2d at 798, or where the prior proceeding “effectively
eliminate[d] the right of the [defendant] to obtain judicial review.” United States v.
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 829 (1987).
The statutory scheme for judicial review of an administrative driver’s-license
revocation satisfies the requirement for due process. See State v. Coleman, 661 N.W.2d
296, 301 (Minn. App. 2003) (“[T]he availability of judicial review, though unexercised by
[the defendant], satisfies the Mendoza-Lopez requirement that an alternative means of
obtaining judicial review must be made available.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 5, 2003). Thus, even if a defendant does not seek the available review, there is
generally no due process violation. Id.
Ruth contends that his case is unique, making his collateral attack on the validity of
the 2018 revocation proper, because his incompetence precluded him from utilizing the
8
available judicial review. In support of this argument, he cites to Anderson, where a driver
attempted to challenge prior revocations by initiating an untimely civil implied-consent
hearing—the judicial-review hearing afforded under the statutory scheme. 878 N.W.2d at
928. Like Ruth, the driver in Anderson argued that he had been incapable of timely
requesting judicial review because, due to his mental incompetence, he had not understood
the notice he received. Id. at 929. We rejected the driver’s use of an implied-consent
hearing as a vehicle for challenging the revocations because the district court lost
jurisdiction over such a proceeding when the driver failed to timely request review.4 Id. at
930. But we stated that the driver could potentially challenge the revocations in a criminal
proceeding if the state sought to use the revocations to enhance criminal charges. Id.
Ruth points out that we essentially addressed his circumstances in Anderson, when
we stated, “The circumstances in this case may well constitute one of the ‘unique’ cases in
which a criminal defendant may collaterally attack a revocation to prevent it from serving
as an enhancement.” Id. He observes that he, like the driver in Anderson, was unable to
timely seek judicial review due to mental incompetence. But Ruth notes that, unlike the
driver in Anderson, he used the proper vehicle for challenging his revocations—a collateral
attack in the context of his criminal case.
Ruth’s attempt to collaterally challenge the 2018 revocation is flawed, however. We
reject his collateral attack on the revocation for two reasons.

4 For this reason, the district court was incorrect when it stated in its order denying Ruth’s
motion to dismiss that Ruth could have petitioned the court for judicial review of his 2018
driver’s-license revocation “at any time.”
9
First, in Anderson, we “express[ed] no opinion as to the outcome of [the] analysis.”
Id. at 930. Thus, Anderson does not hold that a driver’s incompetence during the judicial-
review period precludes the use of the revocation to enhance a subsequent offense.
Second, and even more importantly, the record does not support Ruth’s claim that
he was not competent to seek judicial review of the 2018 revocation. His claim relies
entirely on the district court’s judicial notice of an order in his 2018 criminal case finding
him not guilty of DWI by reason of mental illness. The record contains no evidence of
Ruth’s competence to participate in judicial proceedings during the 60-day window for
seeking judicial review. And the record does not even include the evaluation that the
district court relied on in 2018 to find Ruth not guilty by reason of mental illness. 5 Based
on the record here, we cannot infer—as Ruth asks us to do—that he was not competent to
seek judicial review in 2018. Yet, this factual assertion provides the entire foundation of
Ruth’s legal argument. Because the record does not support Ruth’s claim that he was not
competent to seek judicial review, his legal argument fails.

5 After filing his appeal, Ruth motioned the district court to supplement the record with the
2018 competency evaluation. The district court denied the motion, noting that it had not
relied on the evaluation in denying Ruth’s motion to dismiss.

In his brief, Ruth asks us to take judicial notice of the evaluation. Specifically, he
asks us to look to the contents of the 2018 competency evaluation—including the
conclusions reached by the evaluator —and to conclude on this basis that he was not
competent for the period during which he could have challenged his revocation. We
decline to do so. Such an analysis would require us to take notice of “adjudicative facts”—
“facts about the parties, their activities, properties, motives, and intent.” State v. Norgaard,
899 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Minn. App. 2017). We do not take notice of “adjudicative facts” in
criminal cases. Id. Moreover, these facts do not meet the requirements of Minnesota Rule
of Evidence 201(b), which governs judicial notice, because they are not “generally known”
or “capable of accurate and ready determination.”
10
We cannot conclude that Ruth’s mental condition prevented him from requesting
judicial review of his 2018 driver’s-license revocation. Because Ruth waived judicial
review by failing to timely request it, the use of the revocation to enhance his current DWI
offense did not violate his constitutional right to procedural due process.
Affirmed.