The Estate of Michael T. Conneran, Jr., Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1345

The Estate of Michael T. Conneran, Jr.,
Respondent,

vs.

Michelle Knipe, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed July 5, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CV-20-1971

Benjamin J. Hasbrouck, Abigale R. Griffin, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Fargo, North
Dakota (for respondent)

Curtis D. Ripley, Ryan D. Fullerton, Pemberton Law, P.L.L.P., Alexandria, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Respondent The Estate of Michael T. Conneran, Jr., sued appellants Michelle
Knipe, Vesper Properties II, LLC, The Tax Minimizers, LLC, and Greg Crane in
connection with the sale of real prop erty and shares of stock that had been owned by
Conneran before his death. Appellants moved to dismiss the lawsuit for, among other
2
reasons, lack of personal jurisdiction. The estate, meanwhile, moved for temporary
injunctive relief or prejudgment attachment to escrow rental income from the real property
pending resolution of the case. The district court denied appellants’ motion to dismiss,
concluding that the estate had made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, and
granted the estate ’s request to escrow cash -rent payments . Appellants challenge both
decisions. We conclude that the district court did not err by concluding that the estate made
a prima facie showing that appellants had sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota to
satisfy due-process requirements for personal jurisdiction at the motion-to-dismiss stage
and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that cash-rent payments
be placed in escrow pending resolution of the case. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
This recitation of facts derives from the estate’s amended complaint and the
affidavits that the estate submitted in support of its prima facie showing of the existence of
the district court’s personal jurisdiction over the appellants. See Rilley v. MoneyMutual,
LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that courts must take as true the
factual allegations in the complaint and supporting affidavits when determining whether
the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of the existence of personal jurisdiction).
Michael T. Conneran, Jr., was a resident of Arizona and owned farmland in Polk
County, Minnesota, purportedly worth about $5.5 million, and shares of stock in American
Crystal Sugar Company (ACS), a Minnesota cooperative, purportedly worth about $4.1
million. Conneran rented the farmland to Adams Family Farms, a North Dakota entity, and
there were leases between Conneran and Adams Family Farms for the 2020, 2021, and
3
2022 crop years. The ACS stock related to beets farmed by Jay Gudajtes, a Minnesota
farmer.1 Conneran had borrowed about $1.2 million with Town and Country Credit Union,
with the loans secured by the farmland and the ACS stock.
Conneran died intestate on September 26, 2020. Before his death, Conneran had
long struggled with substance abuse, causing him significant health issues and a decline in
his mental capacity. During some of his hospitalizations, Conneran was subject to
guardianships and/or conservatorships, with members of his family serving as his guardian
and/or conservator. Conneran made allegations that family members serving as his
guardians and/or conservators acted improperly in those roles, but Arizona courts
determined that Conneran’s claims had no merit.
In 2015, Knipe, an Arizona resident, and her business Tax Minimizers, an Arizona
entity, began providing accounting and related services to Conneran. On December 4,
2017, Conneran apparently executed a general power of attorney naming Knipe as his agent
and attorney-in-fact, giving Knipe broad power over Conneran’s finances, property, and
transactions. Conneran’s sister, in an affidavit, stated that she is familiar with Conneran’s
signature and does “not believe that [Conneran] actually signed the power of attorney” and
that, in her opinion, “that is not his signature.”
On October 4, 2019, Knipe, acting as Conneran’s attorney-in-fact, executed an asset
purchase agreement with Vesper Properties, selling to Vesper Properties the farmland and

1 An affidavit submitted to the district court describes Gudajtes simply as an “area farmer,”
but, at oral argument before this court, counsel for appellants said: “I believe Mr. Gudajtes
is in Minnesota.”
4
the ACS stock for $7.5 million. Vesper Properties is an Arizona entity, and its owner is
Greg Crane, an Arizona resident. Under the agreement, Vesper Properties was to pay
Conneran $100,000 upon signing and the remaining balance pursuant to a promissory note.
Vesper Properties would also receive “100% of all dividend, lease and or other income in
regard to the Assets.” Pursuant to the promissory note, the remaining $7.4 million would
be due on July 2, 2040 (when Conneran would have been 81 years of age), and Vesper
Properties would not owe Conneran interest. Conneran would pay all loans, property taxes,
and insurance, but he could not borrow against the property. Further, any remaining debts
would be satisfied at the time of Conneran’s death. Ultimately, Vesper Properties paid
about $262,000 to Conneran prior to his death.
Also on October 4, 2019, Knipe, acting as Conneran’s attorney-in-fact , executed a
warranty deed that made Conneran and Vesper Properties joint tenants in the farmland.
Knipe recorded or caused to be recorded this deed, along with the power-of- attorney
document, in Polk County. Knipe also recorded or caused to be recorded in Polk County a
mortgage that Vesper Properties executed on the property to secure the debt that it owed to
Conneran. She additionally executed and then recorded or caused to be recorded in Polk
County a transfer-on-death deed that would fully transfer the farmland to Vesper Properties
upon Conneran’s death.
In October 2020, following Conneran’s death, his sister, Paula Conneran-Weig, was
appointed as the personal representative of the estate in an Arizona probate action. Though
not a formal party to this appeal, Conneran-Weig apparently resides outside of Minnesota.
5
The estate brought this action in Minnesota in November 2020. In its amended
complaint, the estate alleges that Knipe acted in concert with Tax Minimizers, Vesper
Properties, and Crane to fraudulently obtain Conneran’s farmland and ACS stock. The
estate alleges that the entire transaction is void or voidable due to fraud, breach of fiduciary
and other duties, undue influence, lack and/or failure of consideration, and Conneran’s lack
of capacity, and asks the district court to void the transaction, quiet title in favor of the
estate, and award the estate any appropriate damages.
In January 2021, Crane contacted Steve Adams of Adams Family Farms and
informed him that Vesper Properties was now the owner of the farmland and that new
leases would have to be prepared. Crane did not tell Adams that there was a dispute as to
ownership of the land. Adams Family Farms and Vesper Properties entered into new leases
for the farmland with the same terms as the prior leases with Conneran. Rent in the amount
of $234,311.70 was due from Adams Family Farms to Vesper Properties on March 1, 2021.
Counsel for the estate proposed to appellants’ counsel that those funds be placed in escrow
to protect Adams Family Farms from being doubly liable for rent. Adams Family Farms
supported that request. After that request, Crane contacted Adams and demanded the rent
payment, threatening eviction if the payment was not promptly paid. Family Farms paid
the rent to Vesper Properties, but Adams felt that he was coerced into doing so. Vesper
Properties also demanded that Gudajtes pay it the approximately $250,000 that he owed
Conneran in relation to the ACS stock.
6
Town and Country Credit Union, a North Dakota entity, intervened in this case to
notify the parties that it held a $1.2 million loan against the farmland and ACS stock and
that it would soon be forced to commence a foreclosure action.
Against this backdrop, appellants moved to dismiss the action, contending, among
other things, that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the appellants.
The estate moved for a temporary injunction and prejudgment attachment, asking the
district court to place all cash rent that has been or may become due, including the rent paid
by Adams Family Farms to Vesper Properties, in escrow pending the case’s resolution. The
district court denied appellants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the estate had made a
prima facie showing of the district court’s personal jurisdiction over appellants, and granted
the estate’s motion, ordering that the rent already received from Adams Family Farms by
Vesper Properties and any future rent payments be placed in escrow.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss based on
lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(b), arguing that they did
not have sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota to satisfy due process. Additionally,
appellants challenge the district court’s grant of the estate’s motion for injunctive relief and
prejudgment attachment.
7
I. The estate sufficiently alleged a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over
the appellants.

The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
See Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 2004).
“When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we determine
whether, taking all the factual allegations in the complaint and supporting affidavits as true,
the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Rilley, 884 N.W.2d
at 326. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the initial determination of personal jurisdiction is
only a prima facie determination, based on allegations, not facts; “the defendant is not
foreclosed from a complete litigation of the issue at trial on the merits.” Wuertz v. Garvey,
178 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Minn. 1970). The plaintiff must, at a later stage, prove the facts
necessary to establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
A district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must satisfy both
Minnesota’s long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (2020), and the due-process
requirements of the federal constitution. Trident Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Kemp & George, Inc.,
502 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 1993). Minnesota’s long-arm statute extends personal
jurisdiction as far as the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution allows. Rilley, 884
N.W.2d at 327. Thus, if the due-process requirements are met, then the long-arm statute is
also satisfied. Id. Minnesota courts may apply federal caselaw when determining whether
due-process requirements have been satisfied. Id.
Due process requires that a district court not exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant unless that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state
8
and the lawsuit “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id.
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Minimum contacts exist
when the defendant “‘purposefully avails itself’ of the privileges, benefits, and protections
of the forum state, such that the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.’” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985)).
In Minnesota, courts apply a five-factor test to determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is consistent with due process . Juelich,
682 N.W.2d at 570. The five factors are (1) the quantity of contacts with Minnesota, (2) the
nature and quality of those contacts, (3) the connection of the cause of action with those
contacts, (4) Minnesota’s interest in providing a forum, and (5) the convenience of the
parties. Id. The first three factors “determine whether minimum contacts exist,” and the
final two factors “determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable according to
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. The first three factors are the
“primary factors,” with the last two “deserving lesser consideration.” Dent-Air, Inc. v.
Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1983).
We begin with the first factor. Appellants argue that the quantity of contacts with
Minnesota is insufficient because the allegedly fraudulent transaction was between Arizona
residents and Arizona entities, the transaction was negotiated and signed in Arizona, none
of the parties stepped foot in Minnesota as part of the transaction, and the companies do
not solicit business in Minnesota. They contend that ownership of the Minnesota farmland
is not enough. The estate, in turn, argues that appellants’ asserted ownership of the
Minnesota farmland and the stock in a Minnesota cooperative and their real- property
9
filings in Polk County constitute sufficient contacts to make a prima facie showing of the
existence of personal jurisdiction.
Based on the allegations, the appellants did not have a large quantity of contacts
with Minnesota. But, “[w]hen the quantity of contacts is minimal, . . . the nature and
quality of the contacts with a state are dispositive.” Trident Enter. Int’l, Inc., 502 N.W.2d
at 415. Here, the alleged nature and quality of the contacts, the second factor, support a
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Critically, Vesper Properties claims to own
real property in Minnesota. The Minnesota long-arm statute explicitly allows personal
jurisdiction when a nonresident individual or entity “owns, uses, or possesses any real or
personal property situated in this state.” Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(1). Though the
presence of property in Minnesota alone is not enough to satisfy due process, the “presence
of the defendant’s property in [Minnesota] might suggest the existence of other ties among
the defendant, [here, Minnesota], and the litigation.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209
(1977).
Further, “when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
controversy,” the United States Supreme Court has concluded that “it would be unusual for
the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.” Id. at 207. Shaffer also
notes that “the defendant’s claim to property located in the State would normally indicate
that he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest” and that jurisdiction
would also be supported by the state’s “strong interests in assuring the marketability of
10
property within its borders.” Id. at 207-08. 2 Here, Vesper Properties claims to own real
property in Minnesota worth millions of dollars, and that property is at the heart of th is
dispute. Vesper Properties’ claimed ownership of the farmland is thus a significant alleged
contact in Minnesota.
In addition, Vesper Properties allegedly demanded lease payments from Adams
Family Farms for the farmland located in Minnesota. And Crane allegedly contacted
Gudajtes about money owed related to the ACS stock, stock in a Minnesota cooperative.
These actions add to the alleged contacts with Minnesota.
But appellants argue that, based on the allegations, because the entire negotiation
and execution of the agreement occurred outside of Minnesota and involved Arizona
entities, and becaus e the leases they later negotiated for the farmland involved a North
Dakota entity, there were less than the minimum contacts necessary to support a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Appellants rely on Dent-Air, where the supreme
court concluded that due process was not satisfied when nonresident defendants negotiated
lease agreements for airplanes, located outside of Minnesota, with Minnesota plaintiffs.
332 N.W.2d at 906-09. But this case deals with real property in Minnesota, not with
movable property outside of Minnesota, as in Dent-Air. Thus, Dent-Air does not dictate the
outcome in this case.

2 Shaffer held that a court still needs to have personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants in a case involving in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 196-209.
Thus, though Shaffer involves in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, it still supports the
general proposition that a nonresident defendant’s property ownership in a state is relevant
to an analysis of whether that state has personal jurisdiction over that nonresident
defendant.
11
Appellants also argue that their position is supported by Hardrives, Inc. v. City of
LaCrosse, 240 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1976), a case in which the supreme court determined
that minimum contacts existed. In Hardrives, the supreme court concluded that contacts
with Minnesota were sufficient when nonresident defendants visited Minnesota several
times to negotiate construction agreements for work in Wisconsin. 240 N.W.2d at 817-20.
Appellants contrast that case with the facts here, where, allegedly, all of the negotiations
for the property occurred in Arizona. But Hardrives involved leases for construction work
in Wisconsin—it did not deal with such a significant contact as the claimed ownership of
real property in Minnesota.
Appellants also cite to Walker Mgmt., Inc. v. FHC Enters., Inc ., where, in
concluding that minimum contacts were not present, this court observed that “each and
every significant element in the formation of the agreement . . . occurred outside
Minnesota.” 446 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1989).
But we also went on to discuss how the nonresident defendant company, which had been
solicited by an out-of-state business to provide marketing services, could not have expected
to be haled into court in Minnesota and did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and
protections of Minnesota law. Id. at 915-16. Here, based on the allegations, Vesper
Properties is the owner of record of Minnesota real property, and Knipe allegedly had
documents related to the transaction recorded or caused to be recorded in Minnesota. Thus,
based on the allegations, Vesper Properties and Knipe, at least, used Minnesota’s laws to
protect their interests and should reasonably have anticipated that they could be haled into
court in Minnesota.
12
As to the third factor, the connection between the cause of action and the contacts
in Minnesota, there is a clear connection here based on the allegations. The estate brought
this action to claim title to Minnesota property. Though the transaction and negotiation
occurred in Arizona, the location of the farmland in Minnesota connects the cause of action
to the contacts at this early stage of the litigation.
The fourth factor is Minnesota’s interest in providing a forum. Juelich, 682 N.W.2d
at 570. Minnesota has a strong interest here because this case involves Minnesota real
property. Minnesota’s laws will apply to this property, Minnesota will be entitled to taxes
on the property, and Minnesota has a strong interest in the marketability of its land. See
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08. And as to the fifth factor , the convenience of the parties,
though it is true that the appellants are located in Arizona, through their claimed ownership
of, or involvement with, Minnesota land, appellants should have, based on the allegations,
anticipated that they could be haled into court in Minnesota.
In sum, we conclude that, based on the five-factor test, the estate alleged sufficient
facts to make a prima facie showing of the existence of personal jurisdiction. This prima
facie showing, in relation to Vesper Properties, is sufficiently supported by the allegations
related to Vesper Properties’s negotiations and transaction for Minnesota property, its
income from that property, and its claimed ownership of that property. In relation to Knipe,
the estate’s prima facie showing is sufficiently supported by the allegations because, in
addition to allegedly participating in negotiations and a transaction for Minnesota property
on behalf of Conneran under a power of attorney, she also allegedly recorded or caused to
be recorded the relevant documents in Polk County, thus allowing her, acting as Conneran,
13
to, allegedly, reap the benefits of the sale of Minnesota property. In relation to Crane, the
estate’s prima facie showing is sufficiently supported because, based on the allegations,
Crane is the owner of Vesper Properties and he took actions seeking payment from Adams
Family Farms and Gudajtes in relation to the Minnesota farmland and the shares in ACS .
Based on the allegations, Vesper Properties, Knipe, and Crane all “purposefully avail[ed]”
themselves of the privileges, benefits, and protections of Minnesota and should have
“reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” in Minnesota. Burger King Corp., 471
U.S. at 474-75 (quotations omitted).
The estate’s prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Tax Minimizers
under the five -factor test is not as strong as it is for the other defendants, at least at this
stage in the litigation. Based on the allegations, Knipe, not Tax Minimizers, was acting as
Conneran’s power of attorney in entering into the challenged agreement at the heart of this
case. But a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Tax Minimizers is further
supported by the theory of conspiracy-based jurisdiction.
Conspiracy-based jurisdiction was established in Minnesota by Hunt v. Nev. State
Bank, 172 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. 1969). Under this doctrine, nonresident defendants
who participate in a tortious conspiracy, “the effect of which is felt in [Minnesota],” may
have adequate minimum contacts with Minnesota, even if the defendant has never
physically been in Minnesota. Hunt, 172 N.W.2d at 295. The Minnesota federal district
court has described Minnesota’s conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction doctrine as
requiring a showing by the plaintiff that “(1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the non-resident
defendant participated in or joined the conspiracy, and (3) an overt act was taken in
14
furtherance of the conspiracy within Minnesota’s borders.” WinRed, Inc. v. Ellison, No.
21-1575 (JRT/BRT), 2022 WL 228244, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2022) (citing Yellow Brick
Rd., LLC v. Childs, 36 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (D. Minn. 2014)). A conspiracy exists when
two or more people work together to accomplish “an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose
by unlawful means.” Harding v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. of Hamilton, Ohio, 41 N.W.2d 818,
824 (Minn. 1950).
Here, the estate alleges that “Vesper Properties acted at the direction of Crane and
in concert with Knipe and Tax Minimizers in connection with the wrongful conduct set out
[in the complaint],” that “Knipe, acting in concert with the other Defendants, did not
preserve the assets, but wrongfully misappropriated them,” that the transaction was
procured “by Defendants, acting in concert, in breach of fiduciary and other duties, by
undue influence, by fraud, and/or were made by Conneran (or on his behalf through power
of attorney) when he lacked capacity to engage in such transactions,” that the transactions
“are void or voidable due to Defendants’ fraud, breach of duty, and undue influence, while
acting in concert,” and that “Defendants, acting in concert, engaged in fraud and breached
their fiduciary and other duties owed to Conneran.”
When these allegations are taken as true, see Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326, Knipe used
her personal relationship with Conneran, as well as her professional relationship with him
through Tax Minimizers, to fraudulently obtain his power of attorney. Knipe then
conspired with Crane and Vesper Properties to fraudulently sell Conneran’s property to
Vesper Properties through a highly suspect and unfair asset purchase agreement and
promissory note. Knipe recorded or caused to be recorded these transactions in Minnesota.
15
In addition, Tax Minimizers and the management company for Vesper Properties have the
same business address. After Vesper Properties acquired its claimed full ownership of the
property after Conneran’s death, Crane used Vesper Properties’ claimed ownership of
Minnesota property to acquire rent proceeds from Adams Family Farms and to demand
payment owed by Gudajtes to Conneran in relation to the ACS stock.
These allegations are sufficient to assert a prima facie case that there was a
conspiracy to unlawfully acquire Conneran’s property, that all nonresident appellants
joined this conspiracy, and that overt acts were taken in Minnesota by Knipe when she
recorded or caused to be recorded t he transaction in Minnesota and by Crane when he
acquired rent for Minnesota farmland from Adams and demanded payment from Gudajtes.
See Yellow Brick Rd., 36 F. Supp. 3d at 864 (allowing personal jurisdiction “over those for
whom jurisdiction would otherwi se be absent” if the party helps further a conspiracy).
Therefore, the estate sufficiently alleged a prima facie showing of conspiracy-based
personal jurisdiction. The estate has therefore made a prima facie showing or personal
jurisdiction over all four appellants, consistent with due process.
Appellants contend, though, that there is not a prima facie showing of conspiracy-
based jurisdiction because, unlike in Hunt, the effects of the conspiracy alleged here are
not felt in Minnesota since the parties are nonresidents. In Hunt, the supreme court found
that due process was satisfied when several nonresident defendants conspired at an in-
person meeting in Minnesota to unlawfully convert assets of an insurance company, most
of whose policyholders were Minnesota residents. 172 N.W.2d at 296. However, actual
physical presence in Minnesota is not required once nonresident defendants have entered
16
into a conspiracy. Id. at 295. Further, though none of the parties are Minnesota residents
and Adams Family Farms is a North Dakota entity, the effects of the alleged conspiracy
would still be felt in Minnesota because the case involves the alleged fraudulent
conveyance of Minnesota farmland, land that Minnesota has a substantial interest in and
that provides ongoing income, as discussed above. Therefore, Hunt does not preclude a
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in this case.3
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the e state’s motion
for injunctive relief.

Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion by granting the estate’s
motion for a temporary injunction and prejudgment attachment, escrowing the cash rent
for the farmland. The district court concluded that the requirements for each of these
equitable remedies were met because (1) Town and Country Credit Union will be forced
to begin foreclosure action if it is not paid, and (2) Adams Family Farms could be doubly
liable for rent if the e state is successful in its suit. The district court also concluded that
there was a substantial likelihood that the estate would succeed on the merits because “the
transaction appears to have been accomplished by fraud or wrongful conduct.”

3 Appellants additionally complain that the district court failed to conduct an
individualized, defendant-specific due-process inquiry for each appellant. “When multiple
parties are named as defendants, personal jurisdiction must be established for each
defendant.” C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. FLS Transp., Inc., 772 N.W.2d 528, 533
(Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 2009). Here, the district court’s order
contains one paragraph applying the law of personal jurisdiction to the allegations, but
neither Crane nor Tax Minimizers is mentioned in the analysis. But, though there must be
a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction as to each defendant, that prima facie
showing is reviewed de novo by appellate courts. Based on our analysis above, the district
court was correct in concluding that there was a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction over all appellants.
17
We begin with the question of a temporary injunction. “A temporary injunction may
be granted if by affidavit, deposition testimony, or oral testimony in court, it appears that
sufficient grounds exist therefor.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02(b). Further, “the facts on which
the trial court acts in granting a temporary injunction are, by the nature of the situation,
provisional,” and injunctive relief “will continue only until a more scientific analysis of the
problem is made possible by trial on the merits.” Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 1965). Appellate courts review the grant of a temporary
injunction for abuse of discretion. Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 163
(Minn. App. 1993).
The party seeking the injunction must establish that “there is no adequate remedy at
law and that denial of the injunction will result in irreparable injury.” Id. (citing Cherne
Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979)). The purpose of
the injunction is to “preserve the status quo until a trial can be held on the merits.” Id.
Appellate courts consider five factors when determining whether the district court’s grant
of a temporary injunction was proper: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the relative
harm to the requesting party if not granted, (3) the likelihood of the requesting party’s
success on the merits, (4) any public policy expressed by statute, and (5) the administrative
burdens of enforcing the injunction. Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. The third factor is
the primary factor. In re Commitment of Hand , 878 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. App. 2016),
rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 2016).
Appellants argue that, under the Dahlberg factors, the estate did not carry its burden
of proof. First, appellants argue that there is no relationship between the parties. However,
18
as alleged in the complaint, there is a relationship between the parties because the
appellants entered into the challenged agreement with Conneran, and that agreement is at
the heart of this case, and it is his estate, not his sister, that is involved in this suit.
Second, appellants argue that there would not be harm to the estate if the injunction
were not granted because the damages are not uncertain—they can be calculated to a
specific dollar amount. There is some merit to this argument, as reflected in the district
court’s escrowing of the cash rent. But the district court also discussed the risk of
foreclosure, which could lead to much greater, and less quantifiable, consequences. It was
not an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine that the risk of foreclosure
could lead to irreparable harm, despite the escrowing of the cash rent; the rent alone is not
the only value of the farmland and ACS stock.
Third, appellants argue that there is no likelihood of success for the estate because
there was no evidence that appellants fraudulently obtained the property besides Conneran-
Weig’s speculation that the power-of-attorney document did not contain Conneran’s
authentic signature. But the estate has offered more than just speculation about the
signature; the e state has offered documentation about the transaction showing that the
agreement was unfavorable to Conneran, and it has offered support for Conneran’s
declining health and mental state. Because any facts that the district court considered in its
determination are “provisional” at this stage of litigation, these facts are sufficient at this
early stage for the district court to conclude that a significant likelihood of success exists.
See Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321.
19
Fourth, appellants argue that Minnesota has n o public-policy interest in this case.
Though the estate has not identified any public policy expressed by statute, this factor is
not the most important factor, and the absence of a public-policy interest by statute does
not mean that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the funds to be placed in
escrow. See Hand, 878 N.W.2d at 509.
Fifth, appellants argue that Minnesota would be burdened by holding funds in
escrow and by potential duplicative litigation in Arizona. But escrowing funds does not
present substantial administrative burdens, and, on the record currently before this court, it
is unclear that there actually is duplicative litigation in Arizona or that dual litigation will
result in administrative burdens for Minnesota. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (requiring
states, through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to enforce judgments from other states);
see also Matson v. Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Minn. 1983) (addressing the Full Faith
and Credit Clause). Thus, this final factor does not outweigh the other factors.
Given the likelihood of the estate’s success on the merits suggested by the district
court’s admittedly provisional factual determinations, the potential for irreparable injury,
and a lack of adequate legal remedy if Town and Country Credit Union forecloses on the
farmland, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the temporary injunction
and placing the relevant funds in escrow.4

4 Appellants additionally argue that injunctive relief is not necessary because there is a
forbearance agreement. However, this agreement is not part of the record and instead was
included in the appellants’ addendum. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (stating that the
record on appeal consists of the papers filed in the district court, the exhibits, and the
transcript). An appellate court can, sua sponte, strike both extra-record materials submitted
to it, and references to extra-record materials in an offending brief. Brett v. Watts, 601
20
Because the escrow of the cash-rent payments was not an abuse of discretion under
the law governing temporary injunctions, we do not need to analyze whether the district
court erred by also escrowing the funds under a theory of prejudgment attachment.
Affirmed.

N.W.2d 199, 201-02 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999); see Merle’s
Constr. Co. v. Berg, 442 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Minn. 1989) (striking extra-record materials
sua sponte).