In re the Marriage of: Michael Robert Jacobson, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0998

In re the Marriage of:
Michael Robert Jacobson, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.
Dunja Vukosavovic,
Appellant.

Filed May 15, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-FA-22-64

Timothy D. Lees, Lees Family Law, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jacob Thomas Erickson, Smith, Paulson, O’Donnell & Erickson, P.L.C., Monticello,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Minnesota resident petitioned the district court for the dissolution of his marriage
to a Florida resident. The Florida resident moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the Florida resident
has the requisite minimum contacts with Minnesota. We conclude that the district court
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did not err by denying the motion to dismiss. We also conclude that the district court did
not err by denying the Florida resident’s motion challenging venue and her motion seeking
conduct-based attorney fees. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Michael Robert Jacobson has alleged that he is a Minnesota resident. Dunja
Vukosavovic is or was a resident of California who was present in Florida throughout much
of late 2020 and early 2021. The facts recited below are found in Jacobson’s petition for
dissolution and the affidavits he filed in response to Vukosavovic’s motion to dismiss. For
purposes of this opinion, we assume Jacobson’s allegations to be true, even if they are in
conflict with factual statements in Vukosavovic’s affidavits.
Jacobson and Vukosavovic began dating each other in Florida in early 2021. They
were married in Florida on May 20, 2021, after a brief engagement. One day later,
Vukosavovic, who was born in Yugoslavia, spoke by telephone with her New York-based
immigration lawyer. Vukosavovic then “insisted” that Jacobson make her a joint owner of
two residential properties he owned because doing so would improve her prospects for
obtaining U.S. citizenship. Jacobson promptly executed warranty deeds to convey two
parcels of residential property that he then owned—a home in Lindstrom, Minnesota, and
a home in Naples, Florida (the latter of which he had acquired in December 2020)—to
himself and Vukosavovic in joint tenancy.
Vukosavovic visited Minnesota on two occasions in the summer of 2021. Jacobson
and Vukosavovic hosted Vukosavovic’s brother an d nephew at the Lindstrom property
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from May 23 to 31, 2021, and Vukosavovic also was in Minnesota from June 26 to 28,
2021.
A few months later, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate. In September
2021, Jacobson discovered that Vukosavovic had been engaged to another man during their
courtship and, as of February 21, 2021, was planning a wedding with the other man for
March 20, 2021. Jacobson also discovered that the other man had, on January 25, 2021,
and February 19, 2021 , conveyed Florida real property to Vukosavovic with quit-claim
deeds, in consideration of a payment of ten dollars and “love and affection,” initially by
conveying a condominium unit to the two of them in joint tenancy and later conveying it
to Vukosavovic as the sole grantee. On March 24, 2021, Vukosavovic’s former fiancé
commenced a lawsuit against her in a Florida trial court, alleging that he is “of advanced
age” and that she engaged in fraud and undue influence over him. In addition, Jacobson
discovered that a third man had conveyed Florida real property to himself and Vukosavovic
as joint tenants with a quit-claim deed dated December 16, 2020, also with stated
consideration of a payment of ten dollars and “love and affection. ” The same Florida
attorney prepared the three deeds executed by the two other men.
Soon thereafter, Jacobson returned to Minnesota and began making plans to obtain
a divorce. Vukosavovic remained in Florida at the parties’ jointly owned Naples home,
which required Jacobson to cancel agreements to rent out the home during the period of
January to March 2022, thereby incurring cancellation fees and forgoing rental income. As
of April 2022, Jacobson was making all mortgage payments and paying for all utilities for
both the Naples home and the Lindstrom home.
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Jacobson initially filed a dissolution action in Collier County, Florida. At the time
of filing, howe ver, Jacobson did not satisfy Florida’s residency requirement. He
voluntarily dismissed the action after Vukosavovic said she would move to dismiss it.
In November 2021, Jacobson petitioned the district court in Chisago County,
Minnesota, for dissolution of the marriage. Vukosavovic moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground that neither Jacobson nor Vukosavovic satisfied the 180-day residency
requirement for a dissolution of marriage. See Minn. Stat. § 518.07, subd. 1(1) (2022). On
February 4, 2022, the district court granted the motion for the reasons urged by
Vukosavovic and dismissed the petition. The district court also granted Vukosavovic’s
motion for conduct-based attorney fees and awarded her $999.
In March 2022, Jacobson commenced this action by filing a second dissolution
petition in the district court in Chisago County. Vukosavovic promptly moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, to dismiss for improper venue, and for a second award of
conduct-based attorney fees. In June 2022, the district court denied Vukosavovic’s
motions. Vukosavovic appeals.
DECISION
I. Motion to Dismiss
Vukosavovic first argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A.
The concept of personal jurisdiction, which flows from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, is concerned with whether a state has “authority to bind a
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nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283
(2014). In Minnesota, a statute provides that a state court “may exercise personal
jurisdiction over” an out-of-state defendant “in the same manner as if the defendant were
a resident” of the state, so long as one of four prerequisites is satisfied. Minn. Stat.
§ 543.19, subd. 1 (2022). The statute is broad enough to authorize any exercise of personal
jurisdiction that is permitted by the Due Process Clause. See Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d
276, 281 (Minn. 1982). Consequently, Minnesota courts typically apply federal
constitutional caselaw to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists. Rilley v.
MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 2016).
Federal caselaw provides that a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state so
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quotation omitted). To satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts, the out-of- state
defendant must have “purposefully availed” herself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state such that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-82 (1985) (quotation
omitted); see also V.H. v. Estate of Birnbaum, 543 N.W.2d 649, 656-57 (Minn. 1996).
If a defendant challenges the existence of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff or
petitioner has the burden to show that the defendant or respondent has sufficient contacts
with Minnesota to support the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Bandemer v. Ford
Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 2019); Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics
6
Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Minn. 2004). Upon a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint or petition and any supporting
affidavits are assumed to be true for the purposes of determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists. Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326. If a defendant or respondent submits an
affidavit in support of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff or petitioner “cannot rely on general
statements for a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction” but, rather, must submit
“specific evidence” that supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 334-35 (citing
Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 363 n.2 (Minn. 1982)). “ When reviewing a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we determine whether, taking all the factual
allegations in the complaint and supporting affidavits as true, the plaintiff has made a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 326. We apply a de novo standard of review
to a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
In this case, there is no dispute between the parties concerning whether the
requirements of Minnesota’s jurisdictional statute are satisfied. The undisputed facts
satisfy the first alternative of the statute, that a non-resident “owns, uses, or possesses any
real or personal property situated in this state. ” Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(1) (2022).
The parties’ dispute is focused on the constitutional issue of minimum contacts.
Minnesota courts apply a five-factor test to determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process. We consider (1) the quantity of the
contacts with Minnesota, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts with Minnesota, (3) the
connection of the cause of action with the contacts with Minnesota, (4) Minnesota’s interest
in providing a forum for resolution of the dispute, and (5) the convenience of the parties.
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Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570. The first three factors are the “primary factors” and determine
whether the requisite minimum contacts exist. Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv.,
Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1983). The fourth and fifth factors are the “secondary
factors” and determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 270
N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978).
B.
The district court did not rely on the five-factor test to structure its analysis. Rather,
the district court focused on the fact that, because Vukosavovic jointly owns real property
in Minnesota, she has “reaped the financial benefits” of her joint ownership of the property
by receiving rental income. On appeal, however, both parties present arguments based on
the five-factor test. We will discuss each of the five factors. To reiterate, for purposes of
this appeal from a pre-trial motion to dismiss, we assume as true the allegations in
Jacobson’s petition and affidavits. See Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326.1

1In her reply brief, Vukosavovic argues that this court should disregard or discredit
Jacobson’s sworn factual statements to the extent that they are inconsistent with other
evidence that she has introduced. She cites no caselaw in support of the argument. The
argument is inconsistent with Rilley and other Minnesota opinions, which require district
courts and appellate courts to assume Jacobson’s factual statements to be true for purposes
of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326;
Marquette Nat’l Bank, 270 N.W.2d at 292. Vukosavovic also argues that this court should
disregard or discredit Jacobson’s sworn factual statements to the extent that they are
inconsistent with findings or conclusions made by the district court s in Jacobson’s two
prior dissolution actions. In support of this argument, she cites Kiesow v. Kiesow , 133
N.W.2d 652 (Minn. 1965). In that case, the supreme court considered, under a now-
outdated statutory scheme, whether a party should be allowed to bring multiple successive
motions to amend an award of alimony and a division of marital property. Id. at 659. The
Kiesow opinion simply does not apply to prior determinations of purely factual issues such
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1. Quantity of Contacts
As stated above, Vukosavovic owns real property in Minnesota. In addition,
Vukosavovic has visited Minnesota twice, from May 23 to 31, 2021, and from June 26 to
28, 2021. There is no particular minimum quantity of contacts required for compliance
with due process. See Marquette Nat’l Bank, 270 N.W.2d at 295. Even a “single contact
can suffice to establish personal jurisdiction. ” Sherburne County Soc. Servs. v. Kennedy,
426 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Minn. 1988).
Vukosavovic contends that her contacts with Minnesota are less than those of the
non-resident party in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. App. 1998), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1989), in which this court concluded that minimum contacts were
lacking. The non- resident spouse in Mahoney previously had owned real property in
Minnesota but had disposed of it before the dissolution proceedings by quit-claiming it to
the resident spouse. Id. at 119. As a result, the Minnesota real property “no longer [had]
any connection to the dissolution.” Id. In this case, in contrast, Vukosavovic has not quit-
claimed away or otherwise disclaimed her interest in Minnesota real property. In that way,
Vukosavovic has a contact with Minnesota that the non-resident spouse in Mahoney did
not have. Furthermore, the Mahoney opinion states, “A nonresident’s contacts with the
forum state, not with residents of the forum, determine whether minimum contacts exist.”

as those at issue in this case. Vukosavovic does not argue that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel applies, perhaps because the factual issues in this case are different from the
factual issues in the prior cases. In any event, we reject Vukosavovic’s arguments in favor
of the rule that we assume as true the allegations in Jacobson’s petition and affidavits. See
Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 326.
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Id. at 118 (emphasis in original) (citing West American Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d
676, 679 (Minn. 1983)). Vukosavovic has a meaningful contact with the state of Minnesota
because she owns real property within the state.
Thus, the quantity of contacts between Vukosavovic and Minnesota is sufficient to
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Vukosavovic.
2. Nature and Quality of Contacts
Vukosavovic acquired her ownership interest in Minnesota real property during the
parties’ marriage. One day after the parties’ wedding, Vukosavovic urged Jacobson to
make her a joint owner of his two residential properties, and he did so. In addition,
Vukosavovic’s two visits to Minnesota were during the parties’ marriage. On one of the
visits, Jacobson and Vukosavovic hosted Vukosavovic’s brother and nephew for eight days
at the Lindstrom property.
A non-resident’s ownership of real property in the forum state is a significant
contact for purposes of the minimum-contacts analysis. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that “the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction
by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation.” Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 207 (1977). Furthermore, a non-resident’s ownership of real
property in the forum state “would normally indicate that [she] expected to benefit from
the State’s protection of [her] interest.” Id. at 208. In this case, Vukosavovic’s ownership
of real property in Minnesota is a meaningful contact with the forum state. See Estate of
Conneran v. Knipe, No. A21-1345, 2022 WL 2431650, at *4 (Minn. App. July 5, 2022)
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(reasoning that second factor supported personal jurisdiction because non-resident
appellant owned real property in Minnesota).
It is true that a non-resident party’s ownership of real property, by itself, generally
“would not support the State’s jurisdiction.” See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209; cf. id. at 210
n.37 (declining to consider “whether the presence of a defendant’s property in a State is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff”). But it
is also true that the combination of property ownership and “other ties” to a forum state
may constitute the requisite minimum contacts. Id. at 209. In this case, Vukosavovic’s
visits to Minnesota, and her week-long visit to the Lindstrom property in particular,
enhance the nature and quality of her contacts with Minnesota and provide the “other ties”
necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See id.; see also Howells v. McKibben,
281 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. 1979) (reasoning that non-resident defendant’s visits to and
activities in Minnesota were of a “significant” quality).
Vukosavovic contends that this factor does not support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction on the ground that she did not take any action to acquire her ownership interest
in the Lindstrom property but, rather, was a passive recipient of Jacobson’s unilateral
decision to convey a property interest to her. Vukosavovic’s contention is consistent with
the caselaw, which requires that “‘there be some act by which the defendant purposely
avails [herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.’” Sherburne
County, 426 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). But
Vukosavovic’s contention is inconsistent with Jacobson’s allegations, which indicate that
she was not a passive recipient of Jacobson’s gratuitous generosity. Jacobson has alleged
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that, one day after their wedding, Vukosavovic spoke by telephone with her immigration
attorney, who recommended that Jacobson convey his real property interests to
Vukosavovic, after which Vukosavovic “insisted” that Jacobson do so. Jacobson
proceeded to execute a warranty deed with respect to the Lindstrom property, which was
filed with the Chisago County recorder by a Minnesota attorney within a week after the
wedding. This evidence is sufficient to prove that Vukosavovic purposely availed herself
of the benefits of the forum state.
Thus, the nature and quality of contacts between Vukosavovic and Minnesota
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Vukosavovic.
3. Connection of the Cause of Action with Contacts
In a dissolution action, the district court must divide marital property in an equitable
manner. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022); see also Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 302
(Minn. 2018). Because the parties’ marriage is very short in duration and they do not have
any joint children, the disposition of the Lindstrom property is likely to be a significant
issue for the district court to resolve.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “when claims to the property itself
are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it
would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.”
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207. That is the situation in this case, in which the disposition of the
Lindstrom property is likely to be the focus of the parties’ arguments at trial. In this way,
this case is different from Mahoney, in which the parties had visited Minnesota numerous
times more than a decade earlier, and the non-resident spouse had visited the resident
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spouse in Minnesota periodically in the decade before dissolution proceedings. 433
N.W.2d at 118. But this court reasoned that those contacts had “no connection with the
dissolution action.” Id. at 119.
Thus, the strong connection between the Lindstrom property and the dissolution
action supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Vukosavovic.
4. Interest of the State in Providing a Forum
A state has “strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its
borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the
possession of that property.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208; see also Piletich v. Deretich , 328
N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 1982).
Vukosavovic contends that Minnesota does not have a strong interest in providing
a forum for Jacobson because the state does not have an interest in allowing people to move
to Minnesota merely to obtain a divorce. In support of this contention, Vukosavovic cites
Thelen v. Thelen, 78 N.W. 108 (Minn. 1899), in which the supreme court concluded that
North Dakota did not have jurisdiction over a dissolution action because the petitioning
husband “never had any bona fide intention of removing to North Dakota” and “merely
went there temporarily , for the express and sole purpose of obtaining a divorce.” Id. at
109. The facts of this case are significantly different. Jacobson has lived in and owned
real property in Minnesota for years, and he considered Minnesota to be the state of his
residence before he married Vukosavovic. In addition, Minnesota has an interest in
providing a forum for disputes concerning ownership of real property within the state.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208; Piletich, 328 N.W.2d at 700.
13
Thus, Minnesota’s interest in providing a forum supports the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Vukosavovic.
5. Convenience of the Parties
The parties presently reside in Minnesota and Florida, respectively. They jointly
own real property in each state. As a consequence, the “convenience of the parties and
witnesses is a neutral factor in the analysis.” Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 576. Thus, the
convenience of the parties neither favors nor disfavors the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Vukosavovic.
6. Summary
All three of the primary factors support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Vukosavovic. In addition, the fourth factor supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Vukosavovic. The fifth factor is neutral. Because four of five factors support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Vukosavovic, the district court did not err by denying
her motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See JL Schwieters Constr., Inc. v.
Goldridge Constr., Inc., 788 N.W.2d 529, 535 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating in dicta that
district court had personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant that bought Minnesota
real property and borrowed money from Minnesota bank to finance development); First
Bank & Trust v. Larson, No. A11-328, 2011 WL 6141635, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Dec. 12,
2011) (concluding that district court had personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant
that purchased real property and obtained financing in Minnesota) ; see also Williams v.
Williams, 433 A.2d 1316, 1319 (N.H. 1981) (concluding that trial court had personal
jurisdiction in dissolution action over non-resident spouse who jointly owned real property
14
in forum state and had other contacts there); Holt v. Holt, 255 S.E.2d 407, 412- 13 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1979) (concluding that trial court had personal jurisdiction in post-dissolution
proceeding over non-resident former spouse who owned real property in forum state that
was connected to parties’ dispute); cf. KSTP -FM, LLC v. Specialized Communications,
Inc., 602 N.W.2d 919, 923-26 (Minn. App. 1999) (concluding that district court did not
have personal jurisdiction over non-resident company that “never . . . owned property . . .
in Minnesota”).
We reiterate that this decision is based on the record of Vukosavovic’s motion to
dismiss, at which stage we must assume Jacobson’s allegations to be true. See Rilley, 884
N.W.2d at 326. Nonetheless, Vukosavovic “is not foreclosed from a complete litigation of
the issue at trial on the merits.” Wuertz v. Garvey, 178 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Minn. 1970). If
Vukosavovic wishes to raise the personal-jurisdiction issue again at trial, Jacobson will be
required to prove the facts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction. Id.
II. Motion Concerning Venue
Vukosavovic also argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to
dismiss the action on the ground that a Minnesota venue is inconvenient for her.
Vukosavovic’s motion was based on the statute governing venue in dissolution
actions. The statute generally provides that a “proceeding for dissolution” shall be “venued
in the county where either spouse resides.” Minn. Stat. § 518.09 (2022). The statute also
provides that the district court has “the power . . . to change the place of hearing by consent
of the parties, or when it appears to the court that an impartial hearing cannot be had in the
county where the proceedings are pending, or when the convenience of the parties or the
15
ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” Id. On a motion for a change of venue,
the moving party bears the burden of showing that the circumstances required by the statute
are present. Krogstad v. Krogstad, 388 N.W.2d 376, 385 (Minn. App. 1986). This court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s ruling on a motion to
change venue. Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 642 (Minn. App. 2000).
In this case, the district court’s order does not specifically analyze Vukosavovic’s
motion to dismiss based on the venue statute. On appeal, Vukosavovic does not argue that
the district court erred by not analyzing that part of her motion. She argues only that she
should not be required to appear in a Minnesota court, and she asks this court to order,
pursuant to section 518.09, that dissolution proceedings occur in Collier County, Florida.
She cites no authority for the proposition that section 518.09 allows for the dismissal of a
dissolution action for reasons related to venue. She also cites no authority for the
proposition that section 518.09 allows for a transfer of a dissolution action to a court in
another state, as opposed to a court in a different county within Minnesota. We are unaware
of any such authority. In any event, Vukosavovic has not identified any exceptional
reasons why she cannot travel to Minnesota for court proceedings or why dissolution
proceedings in Minnesota would be more inconvenient for her than dissolution proceedings
in Florida would be for Jacobson. Accordingly, she has not demonstrated that “an impartial
hearing cannot be had” in Chisago County or that “the convenience of the parties or the
ends of justice would be promoted by the change” she has requested. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518.09.
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Thus, the district court did not err by impliedly denying Vukosavovic’s motion to
dismiss based on venue.
III. Motion for Attorney Fees
Vukosavovic last argues that the district court erred by denying her motion for
conduct-based attorney fees.
In a dissolution proceeding, the district court may, in its discretion, award conduct-
based attorney fees against a party who “unreasonably contributes to the length or expense
of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022); Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732
N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007); Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn.
App. 2001). The moving party has the burden of showing that the conduct unreasonably
contributed to the length or expense of the proceeding. Geske, 624 N.W.2d at 818. That
determination generally depends on “the impact a party’s behavior has had on the costs of
the litigation.” Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Minn. App. 1991). This
court applies an abuse -of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s ruling on a
motion for conduct-based attorney fees. Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 767 (Minn.
App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001).
In this case, the district court denied Vukosavovic’s motion based on its finding that
Jacobson “did not unreasonably contribute to the length or expense of these proceedings.”
On appeal, Vukosavovic contends that Jacobson unreasonably increased the length or
expense of proceedings by commencing a total of three dissolution actions, the first two of
which were improperly filed. But Vukosavovic already has received an award of attorney
fees relating to Jacobson’s prior Minnesota dissolution action. V ukosavovic does not
17
contend that Jacobson acted unreasonably in filing this dissolution action and in resisting
Vukosavovic’s motion to dismiss.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Vukosavovic’s motion for conduct-
based attorney’s fees.
Affirmed.