Bryan Leslie Franklin, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1378

Bryan Leslie Franklin,
Appellant,

vs.

Drew Evans, Superintendent,
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension,
Respondent.

Filed May 31, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-712

Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) claims as time-barred. Because the ongoing obligation to register as
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a predatory offender does not toll the statute of limitations, and appellant’s suit commenced
long after the six-year limitation period expired, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 1, 2009, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Bryan Leslie
Franklin with aiding and abetting several crimes, including second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon inflicting substantial bodily harm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 2 (2008), and kidnapping, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2) (2008).
Franklin pleaded guilty to the second-degree assault charge, and the other charges were
dismissed.
Following the district court’s September 28, 2009, imposition of an executed prison
sentence, Franklin was notified that he was required to register pursuant to the predatory-
offender-registration statute because “he was convicted of his current offense of Assault
2nd Degree out of the same set of circumstances” as the kidnapping charge. See Minn.
Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1) (2020) (requiring registration when charged with a
registerable felony offense arising out of the same set of circumstances as the convicted
offense). Franklin was also informed that he would have to continue to comply with the
registration requirements for an initial ten-year period. As a result, Franklin registered as
a predatory offender on October 26, 2009, and because of subsequent incarcerations,
Franklin remains required to register. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(c) (2020)
(extending the registration period following incarceration for a new offense).
On January 17, 2020, Franklin commenced a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) alleging that, by
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requiring him to register as a predatory offender, the BCA violated (1) his right to
procedural due process, (2) his right to substantive due process, (3) his right to be spared
cruel and unusual punishment, and (4) the common-law doctrine of laches. Franklin also
alleged in an amended complaint that the predatory -registration statute is an
unconstitutional bill of attainder.
The BCA moved for dismissal pursuant to rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure or, alternatively, summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 based, in part, on
the expiration of the statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion. Franklin
appeals.
DECISION
Although the district court characterized its order as a rule 12.02 dismissal, the
parties presented affidavits in support of their positions and the district court did not
exclude them. “If . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.02; see also Antone v. Mirviss, 720 N.W.2d 331, 334 n.4 (Minn. 2006). Therefore, we
treat the order as a grant of summary judgment.
On appeal from summary judgment, appellate courts “review de novo whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists,” and “whether the district court erred in its application
of the law.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2002)
(citations omitted). “[W]hen the relevant facts are undisputed the standard of review is de
novo . . . .” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 838 (Minn.
2012) (considering the standard of review for equitable relief on summary judgment). “The
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construction and application of a statute of limitations or repose, including the law
governing the accrual of a cause of action, are questions of law that [appellate courts] . . .
review de novo.” Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn.
2010).
In Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period
found in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2020). Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77
(Minn. App. 1989) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). “The statute of
limitations begins to run on a claim when ‘the cause of action accrues.’” Park Nicollet
Clinic v. Hamann , 808 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 541.01
(2010)). “A cause of action accrues when all of the elements of the action have occurred,
such that the cause of action could be brought and would survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.” Id.
The district court dismissed Franklin’s complaint because his “cause of action
accrued in October 2009, when he was initially required to register as a predatory
offender.” The district court reasoned that “the operative facts existed to support the
elements of his claims at that time” and he served his complaint “over four years after the
limitation period expired.” It rejected Franklin’s argument that the ongoing registration
requirements tolled the statute of limitations.
In certain situations, a cause of action which would otherwise be barred by a statute
of limitations will be tolled because the wrongful act is a continuing violation of the
plaintiff’s rights. “ The continuing violation doctrine is most commonly applied in
[employment] discrimination cases involving wrongful acts that manifest over a period of
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time, rather than in a series of discrete acts.” Davies v. W. Pub. Co., 622 N.W.2d 836, 841
(Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2001). It has also been applied to trespass,
N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Minn. 1963), and required
disclosures on political campaign signs. Lewison v. Hutchinson, 929 N.W.2d 444, 450-51
(Minn. App. 2019).
The primary case discussing the rationale for applying the continuing violation
doctrine to employment discrimination is Sigurdson v. Isanti Cnty., 448 N.W.2d 62 (Minn.
1989). In Sigurdson, the employer failed to promote Sigurdson to “deputy assessor” in
1976 when a position opened and again in 1979 when she began doing field appraising. In
1980, the employer negotiated a union contract creating a “property appraiser” position
below deputy assessor and retroactively categorized Sigurdson as a property appraiser. 448
N.W.2d at 64. The supreme court determined that “the proper focus is upon the time of
the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became
most painful.” Id. at 67 (quotation omitted). Although failure to promote Sigurdson when
she began doing the work of a deputy assessor in 1979 or when she was categorized as a
property appraiser in 1980 were “[a]rguably” single discriminatory acts, the supreme court
concluded that the discrimination was a continuing violation because the job classification
system lacked job descriptions and “simply left undisturbed the gender discrimination
against [Sigurdson] that had been occurring since December 1976.” Id. at 67-68. As this
court later described the Sigurdson holding, the “wrongful acts . . . manifest[ed] over a
period of time, rather than in a series of discrete acts.” Davies, 622 N.W.2d at 841.
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Franklin argues that registration is a continuing violation because “[t]he registration
statute requires every person with a registration requirement to register—at least—once a
year” by filling out and returning a verification form. This, he contends, is a continuing
violation of his rights because the BCA “is responsible not only for determining who must
register initially, but also for continuing to impose the conditions of registration on those
individuals.” We are not persuaded.
It is true that persons required to register have an ongoing obligation to comply with
the registration requirements for the entire period they are required to register. Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 6(a) (Supp. 2021); see State v. Longoria, 749 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn.
App. 2008) (holding that “violation of the predatory-offender-registration statute is an
offense that continues as long as the person required to register fails to do so”), rev. denied
(Aug. 5, 2008). Compliance with this section requires a registrant to comply with many
ongoing obligations, including reporting primary address changes, Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 3(b) (2020), reporting work and school addresses, id., subd. 3(c) (2020), completing
a verification form at least once per year and returning it to the BCA within ten days of
receipt, id., subd. 4(e)(1)-(2) (2020), reporting secondary addresses, id., subd. 4a(a)(2)
(2020), and disclosing registration status to healthcare facilities and home care services
providers before being admitted to a facility or services, id., subd. 4b(b)(1) (Supp. 2021).
The BCA maintains this information in the predatory-offender registry for use and access
by law enforcement and social services agencies. Minn. Stat. § 299C.093 (2020).
However, and unlike the continuing discrimination in Sigurdson, the act of the BCA
requiring Franklin to register was a discrete act which created these ongoing compliance
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obligations. The BCA determined, on one discrete occasion, that Franklin was required to
register, and the ongoing obligations came into effect as of that determination. Thus,
Franklin’s continued obligations were the natural result of being required to register in the
first instance, not the BCA’s continued enforcement of those requirements.
We acknowledge that the collateral consequences of predatory offender registration
are not insignificant. See Werlich v. Schnell, 958 N.W.2d 354, 361-63 (Minn. 2021). But
Franklin’s ongoing obligation to comply with the registration statute, and any
constitutional or common-law claims caused thereby, began in October 2009 when he was
required to register, and the six-year statute of limitations to challenge his registration also
began at that time. “If the result now seems harsh, it is a criticism that may be levelled
against many statutes of limitation.” Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926,
930 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Affirmed.