Rachel A. Grages, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1379

Rachel A. Grages,
Relator,

vs.

We Care Day Care, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed July 11, 2022
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 45520214-3

Nicole M. Mourgos, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., Mankato,
Minnesota (for relator)

We Care Day Care, Inc., Worthington, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Munazza Humayun, Anne B. Froelic h, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that she was
ineligible for unemployment benefits because she quit her job and did not meet the
statutory exception to ineligibility for quitting employment “because of a good reason caused
by the employer.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2020). We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Rachel Grages was employed by respondent We Care Day Care, Inc. (the
daycare) from April 2013 until February 2021. At the end of her employment, Grages
worked full-time as an assistant director and preschool instructor. Grages reported to the
executive director of the daycare. The daycare prepares and offers meals and snacks to the
children through its participation in a federal nutrition program. The meals are offered to
the staff free of charge, and the program recommends that staff members eat with the
children to encourage the children to try new, nutritious foods. However, staff members
are not required to eat the meals provided.
In January 2021, the executive director requested that staff members limit how often
they ordered food from outside sources. The executive director also requested that staff
members who planned to order lunch ask the rest of the staff if they were interested in
ordering food. The executive director allegedly made these requests because of the federal
nutrition program recommendations and state childcare regulations. The daycare asserted
that Minnesota regulations governing childcare facilities require that program staff be
seated with children during mealtimes and that childcare facilities maintain an appropriate
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staff-to-child ratio. Having staff members leave the daycare to pick up lunch could result
in the daycare failing to comply with these regulations. Staff were permitted to take an
unpaid lunch break, but the executive director requested that they notify her in advance to
ensure that the daycare maintained the appropriate staff-to-child ratio.
On February 18, 2021, Grages and a coworker ordered lunch and the coworker’s
boyfriend dropped the food off at the daycare. When Grages went into the daycare’s
kitchen to get the food, the executive director was in the kitchen. The executive director
asked Grages if she offered to order food for the staff and Grages replied that she did not.
The executive director reminded Grages that staff members were encouraged to limit
ordering food from outside sources and indicated that she could schedule Grages a lunch
break if notified in advance. Grages “became very emotional” and went into the bathroom.
She then confronted the executive director, told her she was a horrible boss, and left.
Grages sent a text message the following morning that said it was “with a very heavy heart”
that she would not be in to work, and that “[w]ords cannot express how hurt and betrayed”
she felt. She picked up her final paycheck and turned in her uniforms and keys to the
daycare later that day.
Grages subsequently established an unemployment-benefit account with respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED
issued a determination of ineligibility. Grages appealed this determination, and a ULJ held
an evidentiary hearing. Grages and the executive director testified at the hearing and gave
their accounts of the February 18 incident that led to Grages quitting her employment.
Grages also testified about her strained relationship with the executive director. Grages
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indicated that she had problems with the executive director’s “anger issues,” and that she
had expressed her concerns to the executive director several times prior to the February 18
incident. Grages testified that the executive director had “anger spouts,” during which she
would yell, slam doors, and throw things.
The ULJ issued a decision concluding that Grages quit for a good reason caused by
her employer and was therefore eligible for unemployment benefits if other requirements
were met. The ULJ determined that “Grages quit because she was not allowed a sufficient
amount of time to eat her lunch” as required by Minn. Stat. § 177.254, subd. 1 (2020), and
that this was a good reason to quit caused by her employer. The ULJ also found that Grages
quit, in part, “because she was scolded for ordering lunch from an outside source,” but that
this did not constitute a good reason caused by her employer to quit her job. The daycare
requested reconsideration of the decision.
On reconsideration, the ULJ issued an amended decision and determined that
Grages quit not because she was denied a meal break, but “because she was upset that [the
executive director] scolded her for not asking all employees if they wanted to eat out and
for not eating the meals prepared by the daycare.” The ULJ, however, still determined, as
in the initial decision, that this did not constitute a good reason to quit caused by the
employer. Grages was thus found to be ineligible for benefits. Grages appeals by writ of
certiorari.

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DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s eligibility decision, this court may affirm, remand for
further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator
may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are
affected by an error of law or are unsupported by substantial evidence. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020). Factual findings are viewed in the light most favorable to
the ULJ’s decision and this court will not disturb them if they are substantially supported
by the evidence in the record. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn.
App. 2006).
An applicant for unemployment benefits is ineligible for benefits if she quit her
employment unless an exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). One such
exception is that an employee quit “because of a good reason caused by the employer.”
Id., subd. 1(1). To qualify for this exception, the reason must (1) be “directly related to the
employment and for which the employer is responsible”; (2) be “adverse” to the employee;
and (3) be one “that would compel an average, reasonable [employee] to quit and become
unemployed rather than remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a) (2020).
Whether an employee had a good reason to quit caused by the employer is a question
of law, reviewed de novo. Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. App.
2012). But the reason an employee quit is a question of fact. See Beyer v. Heavy Duty Air,
Inc., 393 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. App. 1986) (reviewing a determination of the reason an
employee quit as a question of fact). The determination that an employee did not have a
6
good reason to quit must be based on factual findings supported by substantial evidence.
Nichols v. Reliant Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 720 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Minn. App. 2006).
Grages argues first that she had a good reason caused by her employer to quit
“because the [daycare] violated Minnesota mealtime laws” b y not providing her with a
meal break. She argues that this constitutes a per se good reason to quit caused by her
employer. The ULJ found in the amended decision, however, that Grages quit “because
she had a personality conflict with [the executive director] and because she was scolded
for ordering lunch from an outside source,” not because of any alleged violation of
mealtime laws. And the record supports the ULJ’s factual finding that this was the reason
Grages quit.
The record reflects that, in her appeal of DEED’s initial determination of
ineligibility, Grages stated that she “left [the daycare] due to the continuous maltreatment
and abusive treatment by the [executive] director.” At the evidentiary hearing granted in
response to her appeal, Grages responded to a question about why she quit by stating, “there
were a lot of altercations that actually led up to this.” She then testified about the executive
director’s “anger spouts” and concerning behavior and said that she “became very
emotional” when the executive director confronted her in the kitchen about ordering food
from an outside source and not offering to order food for everyone. Finally, Grages’s brief
to this court expressly states that she “did not quit because of the consistent denial of a
meal break” but rather “because of the abusive treatment she received from [the executive
director] for having ordered outside food to eat, behavior that had occurred many times.”
The r ecord thus contains substantial evidence that Grages quit because of her ongoing
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personality conflict with the executive director and the February 18 incident when the
executive director scolded Grages, not because the daycare allegedly violated mealtime
laws.1
Grages argues second that she had good reason to quit caused by her employer based
on the executive director’s conduct toward her. This is a somewhat closer question. There
is evidence in the record that, when angry, the executive director would yell, swear under
her breath, slam doors, and throw items, like throwing eating utensils in the kitchen sink
or pens at the floor. There is no evidence, however, that the executive director threw items
at Grages or other employees. In addition, Grages testified that a main issue for her was
that the executive director inappropriately addressed issues with employees in front of the
children and not in a private room. Grages also acknowledged that some of the incidents
she testified about were in connection with other employees, not her.
The ULJ determined in the amended decision that “[a] preponderance of the
evidence shows Grages did not like how [the executive director] talked to her or behaved
generally when frustrated,” and that “Grages felt belittled by [the executive director] when
[the executive director] instructed her to perform tasks.” The ULJ ruled, however, that “an
average reasonable worker would not quit because of [the executive director’s] behavior.”
Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the ULJ erred, as a matter of

1 We also note that the cited law, Minn. Stat. § 177.254, subd. 1, provides: “An employer
must permit each employee who is working for eight or more consecutive hours sufficient
time to eat a meal.” Grages never asserted that she was not allowed sufficient time to eat
a meal. The record also shows that Grages was paid when eating lunch with the children
and that Grages had the opportunity to take unpaid meal breaks away from her work duties
when requested in advance.
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law, in reaching this conclusion. See, e.g., Portz v. Pipestone Skelgas, 397 N.W.2d 12, 14
(Minn. App. 1986) (holding that “[u]nsatisfactory working conditions and a poor
relationship with a supervisor did not give [the employee] good cause to quit”);
Bongiovanni v. Vanlor Invs., 370 N.W.2d 697, 697 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that
“disharmony between an executive and the employee” does not constitute good cause to
quit).
We note that Grages’s brief in this appeal focuses on the determination in the initial
ULJ decision that Grages failed to establish that she complained to her employer about the
executive director’s conduct and gave “the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct
the adverse working conditions before . . . quitting.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c)
(2020). Notice to the employer and an opportunity to cure are prerequisites to being able
to demonstrate good cause for quitting due to “adverse working conditions.” Id. Grages’s
argument, however, misses the mark for two reasons. First, the ULJ did not include this
determination in the amended decision and simply concluded that the alleged adverse
working conditions were not sufficient to constitute “[a] good reason caused by the
employer for quitting.” Id., subd. 3(a). And second, because we agree with that legal
conclusion, Grages would be ineligible for unemployment benefits regardless of whether
she provided notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged adverse working conditions.
Finally, Grages argues that “[t]he ULJ erred by considering additional evidence
outside of the limited scope of whether to order an additional hearing.” When the daycare
filed its request for reconsideration, it submitted ten statements from previous and current
employers that asserted the employees were provided with adequate time to eat meals.
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Grages argues that “[i]t appears from the changed reconsideration outcome that the ULJ
was improperly influenced by this evidence from the employer to alter the outcome of the
case, but [that] the ULJ erroneously did this without holding a second hearing.” We are
not persuaded.
The unemployment benefits statute provides that, on reconsideration, new evidence
may not be considered except for the purpose of determining whether to order an additional
hearing. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2020). The statute then sets out the criteria for
deciding whether to order a supplemental hearing, including whether the new evidence
“would show that the evidence that was submitted at the hearing was likely false and that
the likely false evidence had an effect on the outcome of the decision.” Id., subd. 2(c)(2).
The ULJ concluded in the amended decision that the new evidence “does not show that the
evidence submitted at the hearing was likely false and that the likely false evidence had an
effect on the outcome of the decision,” and that it “would not likely change the outcome of
the decision.” The amended decision does not otherwise reference the new evidence. It
thus appears that the ULJ followed the statute and only considered the new evidence to
determine whether a second hearing should be ordered. We therefore discern no basis to
conclude that the newly submitted evidence improperly influenced the ULJ’s decision.
Affirmed.