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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0164

Court of Appeals McKeig, J.
Dissenting, Thissen, J., Hudson, C.J.
Took no part, Hennesy, J.
State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: July 31, 2024
Office of Appellate Courts
Deshawn Kejuan Woolridge Carter,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Maria Villalva Lij ó, Assistant Attorney General,
Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne Senecal-Hill, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The term “probation” as used in Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1)
applies to a defendant subject to court -ordered conditions under a stay of adjudication
following the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea to a felony offense.
2. The phrase “entry of a guilty plea” as used in Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2) refers to the defendant’s act of pleading guilty on the record.
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3. In calculating appellant’s criminal history score, the district court did not err
in assigning him a custody status point because at the time appellant committed the current
offense, he was on probation after entering a guilty plea to a felony offense.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
MCKEIG, Justice.
When a district court calculates an offender’s criminal history score, Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 2.B.2.a directs the court to assign the offender a
custody status point if the offender was on “probation” after “entry of a guilty plea” to a
felony offense at the time the current offense was committed. This case requires us to
decide whether this language from Guideline 2.B.2.a requires the district court to assign a
custody status point to a defendant who commits a new offense while subject to court-
ordered conditions under a stay of adjudication following the defendant’s entry of a guilty
plea to a felony offense.
Appellant Deshawn Woolridge Carter was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct. When he committed the offense, Woolridge Carter was subject to court-ordered
conditions under a stay of adjudication following his guilty plea to a felony theft offense.
At sentencing, the district court included a custody status point in Woolridge Carter’s
criminal history score, concluding that the circumstances satisfied the requirements of
Guideline 2.B.2.a. On appeal, Woolridge Carter argued that because no conviction ha d
been entered for his felony theft offense, he was not on “probation” and also that the district
court had not “entered” his guilty plea. The court of appeals affirmed . Because we
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conclude that the assignment of one custody status point to Woolridge Carter’s criminal
history score was required under the unambiguous language of Guideline 2.B.2.a, we
affirm.
FACTS
In 2021, a Blue Earth County jury found Woolridge Carter guilty of criminal sexual
conduct in the first-degree for sexually assaulting K.O.1 At the time he committed the
offense, Woolridge Carter was subject to court-ordered conditions under a stay of
adjudication following his guilty plea to a 2016 felony theft offense. A presentence
investigation (PSI) report was prepared by a probation officer in anticipation of the district
court’s sentencing of Woolridge Carter for his criminal sexual conduct offense. The
probation officer did not include a custody status point when calculating Woolridge
Carter’s criminal history score. Based on a criminal history score of zero, the probation
officer recommended the district court impose a sentence within the presumptive
sentencing range of 144 to 172 months.
After reviewing the PSI report, t he State challenged the probation officer’s
calculation of Woolridge Carter’s criminal history score. T he State argued Guideline
2.B.2.a required the district court to assign Woolridge Carter one custody status point

1 The jury also found Woolridge Carter guilty of the lesser-included offense of
criminal sexual conduct in the third-degree. Because he was not sentenced on the lesser -
included charge, that verdict is not relevant here.

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because, when Woolridge Carter committed the current offense, he was on probation after
entering a guilty plea to a felony offense.2
At sentencing, the district court agreed with the State and included one custody
status point in Woolridge Carter’s criminal history score because the court concluded that
Woolridge Carter was on felony probation when he committed the current offense,
satisfying the requirements of Guideline 2.B.2.a. The addition of one point to Woolridge
Carter’s criminal history score resulted in a higher presumptive sentencing range of 144 to
187 months. Based on a criminal history score of one, the court imposed a 156-month
prison sentence—a sentence within the presumptive sentencing ranges for a criminal
history score of either zero or one.
On appeal, Woolridge Carter argued that because no conviction had been entered
for his felony theft offense due to the stay of adjudication, it could not be said that he was
on probation or that the district court had entered his guilty plea. The court of appeals
affirmed Woolridge Carter’s conviction and sentence, holding that Guideline 2.B.2.a
unambiguously authorizes assignment of a custody status point to a defendant for an
offense committed while on probation under a stay of adjudication. State v. Woolridge
Carter, 986 N.W.2d 7, 16 (Minn. App. 2023). We granted Woolridge Carter’s petition for
review.

2 The Guideline at issue directs a district court to assign a custody status point to a
defendant’s criminal history score if, among other conditions, the defendant was on
probation at the time the current offense was committed. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.B.2.a(1)(i).
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ANALYSIS
On appeal, Woolridge Carter argues that, as used in Guidelines 2.B.2.a, the terms
“probation” and “entry of a guilty plea” are ambiguous, and that extrinsic sources—
including the history of and comments to Guideline 2.B.2.a—resolve those ambiguities in
his favor.3 We disagree.
As relevant here, Guideline 2.B.2.a directs a district court to “[a]ssign one custody
status point when the conditions in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3)(ii) . . . are met.” Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a. Those conditions are:
(1) The offender was under one of the following custody statuses at the time
the current offense was committed:
(i) probation;
(ii) parole;
(iii) supervised release;
(iv) conditional release following release from an executed prison
sentence . . . ;
(v) release pending sentencing;
(vi) confinement in a jail, workhouse, or prison pending or after
sentencing; or
(vii) escape from confinement following an executed sentence.

(2) The offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) after
entry of a guilty plea, guilty verdict, or conviction.

(3) The offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) for
one of the following:
. . .

3 The State conten ds that Woolridge Carter has forfeited the ambiguity arguments he
raises before our court because they differ from arguments he made to the court of appeals.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Woolridge Carter has simply refined his
arguments, and therefore the forfeiture doctrine does not apply here. Jacobson v. $55,900
in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 523 (Minn. 2007) (concluding that the appellant was
“not raising a new argument on appeal” but was instead “refin[ing] the argument” he made
below).

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(ii) any other felony[.]

Id. (emphasis added).
Relevant to our analysis is that under certain circumstances, a court may stay
adjudication in a criminal case after a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.095(b) (2022) (allowing a court to not adjudicate the defendant’s guilt based on
agreement of the parties); see also Minn. Stat § 152.18 (2022) (authorizing stays for certain
drug offenses). When adjudication is stayed, the district court does not record the
defendant’s entry of a guilty plea, and therefore, no conviction is entered by the court.
Johnston v. State, 955 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2021) (holding that a “conviction” requires
the court to accept and record a guilty plea).
The de novo standard of review controls our interpretation of the language in
Guideline 2.B.2.a. State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019). Despite a court’s
mandate to adhere strictly to statutes and its ability to depart from the Guidelines under
certain circumstances, the principles of interpretation we use for the Guidelines are the
same as those we use for statutes. Id. at 306–07. Therefore, our objective when interpreting
the Guidelines is to effectuate the intent of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission (Commission). Id. at 307 (describing the aim in interpreting the Guidelines
as determining the intent of the Commission); see also State v. Powers, 962 N.W.2d 853,
858 (Minn. 2021) (“Our aim in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the
Legislature.”). When interpreting statutes, “we presume that the Legislature acts with full
knowledge of existing law, including the common law.” Comm’r of Revenue v. Dahmes
Stainless, Inc., 884 N.W.2d 648, 656 (Minn. 2016) (emphasis added); see also In re
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Comm’n of Highways, 223 N.W. 915, 917 (Minn. 1929) (stating that when the Legislature
enacts statutes, it “is presumed to have known and had in mind all existing laws relating to
the subject-matter”). 4 This principle applies with equal force when interpreting the
Guidelines. See Strobel, 932 N.W.2d at 306–07.
We also presume that plain and unambiguous language in the Guidelines manifests
the intent of the Commission. Id. at 307. It is only if the language of the Guidelines is
ambiguous—meaning that it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation—that we
may consider extrinsic sources and canons. Douglas v. State, 986 N.W.2d 705, 711 n.4
(Minn. 2023) (explaining that extrinsic canons are only applied to determine the meaning
of ambiguous statutory language); State v. Overweg, 922 N.W.2d 179, 184 n.3 ( Minn.
2019) (same); State v. Notch, 446 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 1989) (explaining that when
the language of a provision in the Guidelines is “clear and unambiguous,” the court will
apply the plain language even if the comment to the Guidelines provision suggests a
different outcome). Thus, our analysis begins with the language of Guideline 2.B.2.a.
At issue here is the meaning of the term “probation” and the phrase “after entry of
a guilty plea” and whether these terms include a defendant who is subject to court-ordered
conditions under a stay of adjudication. We analyze each term and phrase in turn, and then

4 The dissent notes that this case analyzed previously enacted portions of the same
statute and then points out that Minnesota Statutes section 152.18 (authorizing stays of
adjudication for certain drug offenses) and Guideline 2.B.2.a are not part of the same
statute—which is entirely true. But both the statute and the Guideline give direction to a
district court after a defendant has been found guilty of a crime, or, more simply, they both
relate to the same subject matter.
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determine whether the district court erred when it assigned Woolridge Carter a custody
status point.
I.
First, we must determine the meaning of the word “probation” as intended by the
Commission in Guideline 2.B.2.a.
A.
For more than 50 years, existing law has used the term “probation”—in both
statutory text and case law—to describe court-ordered supervised conditions imposed
without adjudication of guilt. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 152.18, subdivision
1 (1971),5 authorized a court to stay the defendant’s adjudication of guilt in certain drug
cases. When describing the process, the statute reads in relevant part: “the court may,
without entering a judgment of guilty and with the consent of such person, defer further
proceedings and place him on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may require
and for a period, not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for such violation.” 6
Id. (emphasis added).

5 This statute was first enacted in 1971. See Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 937, § 18, 1971
Minn. Laws 1923, 1937–38.

6 The Legislature has consistently used the phrase “defer further proceedings and
place him on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may require and for a period,
not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for such violation” when authorizing
stays of adjudication in other contexts. Minn. Stat. § 609.1056, subd. 3(d) (2022) (special
procedures for military veterans) (emphasis added); Minn. Stat. § 609.3751, subd. 2 (2022)
(special provisions for failure to support child or spouse) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Legislature has expanded the use of stays of adjudication to all cases in which the parties
agree to a stay of adjudication. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (2022).

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We also explicitly used the word “probation” when referring to the court-ordered
conditions imposed under a stay of adjudication prior to the creation of the Guidelines. In
State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506, 507 (Minn. 1977), a defendant was found guilty of
two counts of possession of controlled substances. The trial court, “by authority of
[section] 152.18, deferred imposition of sentence and, without entering a judgment of
guilty, placed defendant on probation for 3 years.” Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 511–12. The
Goodrich court explicitly referred to the court-ordered conditions placed upon the
defendant as “the conditions of his probation,” acknowledging that after successful
compliance with those conditions, “the proceedings against him were dismissed.” Id. at
512. Because a determination that court -imposed conditions following a stay of
adjudication under section 152.18 constitute “probation” was necessary to the court’s
mootness analysis, 7 that determination was part of the existing law when the Guidelines
were first promulgated 3 years later. In accordance with the principle stated in Dahmes

7 The dissent claims that the Goodrich court undertook no analysis of the word
“probation,” but instead merely parroted the language of section 152.18. However, the
defendant’s status on probation was essential to the court’s mootness analysis. 256 N.W.2d
at 511. In reject ing “the state’s argument that defendant’s appeal is moot because of his
discharge from probation without adjudication of guilt,” the Goodrich court explained that
the fact that the defendant had been placed on probation exposed him to possible future
adverse legal consequences that made his appeal not moot. Id. (emphasis added).

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Stainless, Inc., 884 N.W.2d at 656, we must assume that in 1980, when the Guidelines were
first promulgated,8 the Commission had full knowledge of that existing law.9
Because “probation” included court-ordered conditions imposed under a stay of
adjudication at the time of the Guidelines’ initial promulgation, we presume the
Commission knew that using the term “probation,” without adding a definition or further
limiting language to the Guidelines themselves, could include conditions imposed under
stays of adjudication.
But we do not stop our analysis there. P re-ambiguity canons of interpretation lend
additional support to the understanding that stays of adjudication are included in the
Guidelines’ definition of “probation.” As discussed above, the principles of interpretation
we use for the Guidelines are the same as those we use for statutes. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d
at 306–07. Therefore, the whole-statute canon “provides that a [Guideline] should be read

8 See generally Minn. Sent. Guidelines (1980).

9 Note, however, that t he dissent discusses the facts of Dahmes at length to
differentiate it from the issue here, and we do not pretend that the cases are analogous. The
dissent attempts to distinguish Dahmes by arguing that because the statute directs us to
look to the common law when interpreting the statutory language in that case, see Minn.
Stat. § 297A.61, subd. 10(b)(1) (2014), and 2.B.2.a of the Guidelines does not, we cannot
consider the common law definition of “probation” because the Legislature did not direct
us to do so in the statute’s text. But even if the Legislature does not explicitly direct us to
look to the common law, “[w]e generally presume that a statute is consistent with the
common law, and if the [L]egislature intends to enact a statute that abrogates the common
law, the [L]egislature will do so by express wording or necessary implication.” Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dynamic Air, Inc., 702 N.W. 2d 237, 244 (Minn. 2005) (citing In re
Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1953). Here, there is no express or implied indication
that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law with respect to the use of
“probation” in section 152.18. Therefore, the proposition that the Commission was aware
of the way “probation” was used by the Legislature—and of the common law
understanding of the term—is not diminished by these differences.
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and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts.” State v.
Johnson, 995 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. 2023) (citing State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 212
(Minn. 2021)). The canon against surplusage requires us to “avoid interpretations that
would render a word or phrase superfluous, void, or insignificant, thereby ensuring each
word in a [Guideline] is given effect.” State v. Galvan-Contreras, 980 N.W.2d 578, 585
(Minn. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To add a custody status point, paragraph (2) of Guideline 2.B.2.a requires that “[t]he
offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) after entry of a guilty plea,
guilty verdict, or conviction.” (Emphasis added.) When the Commission unambiguously
uses the word “or,” we read the term “in the disjunctive and require that only one of the
possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied.” State v. Abdus-
Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871, 878 (Minn. 2024) (citing Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 338
(Minn. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because there is no ambiguity
surrounding the use of “or,” here, paragraph (2) may be satisfied in any one of three ways:
1) entry of a guilty plea; 2) entry of a guilty verdict; or 3) entry of a conviction. Of the
custody statuses listed, there is only one that could conceivably require a distinction
between entry of a guilty plea or verdict and an ultimate entry of conviction: probation. 10

10 “[P]arole,” “supervised release,” “conditional release following release from an
executed prison sentence,” “confinement in a jail, workhouse, or prison . . . after
sentencing,” and “escape from confinement following an executed sentence” are all
custody statuses that require a conviction. Minn. Sent. Guideline s 2.B.2.a(1); see also
Schroeder v. Simon, 985 N.W.2d 529, 534 n.2 (Minn. 2023) (“Supervised release is the
current term for the release practice formally known as parole.”). “[R]elease pending
sentencing” and “confinement in a jail, workhouse, or prison pending . . . sentencing” are

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Because we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of the term “probation”
is one that includes court-ordered conditions imposed under a stay of adjudication, we must
apply the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term, without considering extrinsic
sources and canons, including the nonbinding comments to the Guideline provision. Notch,
446 N.W.2d at 386; see also State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 554– 55 (Minn. 2018) (“If
the Guidelines language is plain and unambiguous, it is presumed to manifest the intent of
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission . . . .”).
B.
Woolridge Carter’s and the dissent’s contrary arguments about the meaning of the
term “probation” miss the mark. According to Woolridge Carter and the dissent, the term
“probation” can reasonably be interpreted to mean sanctions imposed upon an offender
only following a criminal conviction. In support of this argument, Woolridge Carter quotes
language from our decision in State v. Jones, 869 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Minn. 2015), where we
said that Minnesota’s “probation statutes create an alternative to confinement following a
criminal conviction.” (Emphasis added).
Woolridge Carter’s reliance on Jones is misplaced for two reasons. First, the
language Woolridge Carter quotes does not state that probation only follows a criminal

custody statuses that automatically exist upon an entry of guilt through plea or verdict,
making the entry of conviction irrelevant. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1). “Probation”
is the only custody status where an appreciable distinction exists between pre- and post-
conviction. An interpretation that allows only for a person to be on “probation” following
a conviction makes paragraph 2.B.2.a(2) superfluous. Accordingly, the dissent’s position
that probation may only exist after entry of conviction —which makes paragraph (2) of
Guideline 2.B.2a unnecessary—is in contravention of our principles of interpretation.

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conviction. In fact, immediately succeeding the “following a criminal conviction”
language, the Jones court quotes the statutory definition of “probation,” Minn. Stat. §
609.02, subd. 15 (2014 ), in which the requirement of a “conviction” is notably absent. 11
Jones, 869 N.W.2d at 26. Second, the “following a criminal conviction” language in Jones
is obiter dicta because answering the question of whether a conviction is a prerequisite of
probation was not necessary or essential to that analysis. See Wandersee v. Brellenthin
Chevrolet Co., 102 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 1960) (“Statements and comments in an
opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor
essential to determination of the case in hand constitute obiter dicta, and lack the force of
an adjudication.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Like Woolridge Carter, the dissent contends the term “probation” can reasonably be
interpreted to mean sanctions imposed upon an offender only following a criminal
conviction—which necessarily excludes sanctions before a criminal conviction. In support
of its argument, the dissent relies on dictionary definitions to ascertain the commonly
understood meaning of the term “probation.” It observes that some dictionaries have
defined “probation” as “the action of suspending the sentence of a convicted offender and

11 The State contends the absence of the word “conviction” in the criminal code’s
statutory definition of “probation,” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 15, demonstrates that the
Commission did not intend to limit the term “probation” to court-ordered conditions
imposed after a conviction. We disagree. Unlike subdivision 1(c) of section 152.18, which
was enacted 9 years before the Commission decided to use the term “probation” in
Guidelines 2.B.2.a, subdivision 15 of section 609.02 was enacted 17 years after the
Commission decided to use the term “probation” in Guidelines 2.B.2.a. See Act of May
30, 1997, ch. 239, art. IX, § 34, 1997 Minn. Laws 2742, 2884 (enacting Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 15).
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giving the offender freedom during good behavior under the supervision of a probation
officer,” Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary 928 (10th ed. 1996) (emphasis added);
see also American Heritage Dictionary of English Language 1090 (3d ed. 2000) (providing
a nearly identical definition), and that Bryan Garner has defined “probation” as the
“procedure by which a convicted offender is released subject to court-imposed conditions
rather than being sent to jail.” Bryan Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 711
(Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added).
Setting aside the question of whether we should turn to dictionary definitions when
over 50 years of existing law has used the term “probation” to describe court -ordered
conditions imposed under a stay of adjudication, none of the dictionary definitions cited by
the dissent define “probation” as sanctions imposed upon an offender only following a
criminal conviction. Put another way, none of the definitions cited by the dissent exclude
sanctions occurring before a conviction. As a result, those definitions are not actually in
conflict with a definition of “probation” that also include s pre-conviction conditions of
release.
12 Even if the dissent could locate a dictionary definition that defined “probation”

12 In fact, dictionary definitions themselves cast further doubt on the reasonableness
of Woolridge Carter’s and the dissent’s interpretation. One example in which Black’s Law
Dictionary uses “probation” is a clear analogue to stays of adjudication. Specifically, a
“deferred judgment” is defined as “[a] judgment placing a convicted defendant on
probation, the successful completion of which will prevent entry of the underlying
judgment of conviction.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 847 (7th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
At first glance, the inclusion of the phrase “convicted defendant” may suggest support for
Woolridge Carter’s and the dissent’s position, but this same dictionary defines
“conviction” as “the state of having been proved guilty,” with no mention of a requirement
that a court actually record such finding of guilt. Id. at 335. Put differently, definitions in
a prominent legal dictionary suggest that a defendant may be found guilty, placed on

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as sanctions imposed upon an offender only following a criminal conviction, it makes little
sense to resort to dictionary definitions when the Legislature itself had provided a clear
example of how it used the term “probation” and our court had conducted a mootness
analysis that was necessarily premised on a determination that court-imposed conditions
following a stay of adjudication under section 152.18 constitute “probation.”13 See Minn.
Stat. §152.18 (1976); State v. Gibson, 945 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn. 2020) (“A dictionary
is merely evidence of common usage; it is not dispositive in defining common usage.”);
Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 511.
Nor are we, as the dissent contends, using extrinsic canons to make our job easier.
We simply find that it would be unreasonable to conclude that the Commission, with full
knowledge of how “probation” was used by the Legislature, intended such stays to be
excluded based on the plain language of the Guidelines— a determination that is supported
by the whole-statute canon and the canon against surplusage. Ultimately, even if language
appears to have more than one reasonable interpretation “at first glance,” we may still find
“one clear meaning after analyzing the various potential interpretations.” Goodman v. Best

“probation,” and never have his “conviction” entered by the court if he successfully
completes his supervised conditions—just like a stay of adjudication. So, where Woolridge
Carter’s and the dissent’s favored dictionary definitions do not exclude a definition of
“probation” that includes pre-conviction supervision conditions, there are other dictionary
definitions that necessarily require inclusion of pre-conviction conditions.

13 The dissent claims that we rely on the “somewhat related” section 152.18 to
“exclude” consideration of its preferred dictionary definitions. However, consideration of
those alternative definitions is precisely the inquiry we have engaged in here, and below.
Accordingly, factors outside of dictionary definitions— including the way “probation” is
used in section 152.18—make plain that the dissent’s alternative definition is not
reasonable.
16
Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 759 n.3 (Minn. 2010). An interpretation that “probation” as
used in the Guidelines is limited to mean sanctions imposed only following a conviction is
simply not reasonable.
Next, we address the dissent’s argument regarding the comments to the Guidelines.
Because w e do not find ambiguity in the term “probation” we need not explore the
comments to the Guidelines to determine the Commission’s intent. The dissent, however,
finds ambiguity and makes a vociferous case for the interpretation that probation may only
exist after an entry of conviction based on the comments to the Guidelines. But the
dissent’s reliance on those comments to interpret the Commission’s intent is not as
straightforward as it claims.
The dissent suggests that language in comment II.B.201 (2002) directed district
courts to apply the rule pre-conviction in only one specific circumstance, but that otherwise
the general rule of Guideline 2.B.2.a “expressly limited the imposition of custody status
points to persons who were in custody status following a conviction.” In reality, this
comment does not highlight some unique exception to the Guideline. Rather, it plainly
demonstrates the Commission’s application of its own Guideline. The comment states that
probation given for an offense under section 152.18, subdivision 1, “will result in the
assignment of a custody point because a guilty plea has previously been entered and the
offender has been on a probationary status.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. II.B.201
(emphasis added). The dissent’s claim that this represents the “one specific circumstance”
where a custody status point should be imposed for probationary status prior to a conviction
is simply not supported.
17
The Commission could not have created such an exception via comment. See State
v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Minn. 2014) (“Comments to the sentencing guidelines,
however, are advisory and are not binding on the courts.”); State v. Vanengen, 3 N.W.3d
579, 583 (Minn. 2024) (discussing the “nonbinding comments to the guidelines”). But
even if the Commission thought it could create an exception to the general rule in its
comments, it would not have used the word “because,” which recognizes the consistency
between section 152.18 and the criteria within the rule. Instead, to create an exception, the
Commission would have used a word like “despite” or “notwithstanding” or another word
indicating any sort of inconsistency between section 152.18 and the rule. This comment is
not an exception. It plainly explains how the rule should be applied to pre-conviction
supervision conditions. The Commission’s subsequent deletion of this comment does not
rid the Guidelines of any exception to the rule—it merely deletes a non-binding comment.
14
Simply, the comments fail to refute the fact that there is no language in Guideline
2.B.2.a. to suggest that the term “probation” does not include court-ordered conditions
imposed under a stay of adjudication, and under well-established law, we cannot add such

14 Even if we could consider the nonbinding comments from the Commission, they
offer more confusion than clarity. For example, the comment discussed above—II.B.201
(2002)—first states that “[p]robation given for an offense treated pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 152.18, subd. 1, will result in the assignment of a custody point because a guilty plea has
previously been entered and the offender has been on a probationary status,” but it then
states that “the custodial statuses covered by this policy are those occurring after conviction
of a felony or gross misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.) This single comment states that
probation can exist pre -conviction, but then confoundingly states that it cannot. Though
the comment has since been deleted from the Guidelines, this is evidence that reliance on
comments to the Guidelines offers far less clarity than the dissent suggests.

18
language.15 Save Lake Calhoun v. Strommen, 943 N.W.2d 171, 177 (Minn. 2020)
(explaining that we do not add words or phrases to unambiguous statutes or rules).
II
Woolridge Carter also contends that the term “entry,” in the framework of Guideline
2.B.2.a(2) is ambiguous where the paragraph reads: “The offender was under one of the
custody statuses in paragraph (1) after entry of a guilty plea, guilty verdict, or conviction.”
Minn. Sent. Guideline s 2.B.2.a(2) (emphasis added). Woolridge Carter argues that the
term “entry,” or more accurately, the phrase “after entry of a guilty plea,” can be reasonably
interpreted to either mean 1) a defendant has pleaded guilty on the record; or 2) the district
court has accepted and recorded the guilty plea. With this proposed ambiguity in mind,
Woolridge Carter advocates for the latter interpretation— that a district court alone has the
power to “enter” a guilty plea through acceptance and recording. He then reasons that
because a district court does not accept or record a guilty plea when imposing a stay of
adjudication, Guideline 2.B.2.a therefore excludes stays of adjudication.
But Woolridge Carter’s preferred interpretation is not reasonable. As noted above,
we use the principles of statutory interpretation when interpreting the Guidelines. See

15 The dissent also highlights an email from a Commission staff member to the
probation officer in this case. There exists no canon of interpretation or construction, either
pre- or post-ambiguity, that would direct us to consider an email from the Commission
staff when determining the intent of the Commission as it relates to interpretation of the
Guidelines. The Commission does not speak through staff emails. When interpreting
statutes, we do not reach out to a legislative aide when looking for legislative intent, so
consistent with Strobel, we do not give interpretive weight to an explanatory email from a
Commission staff member. 932 N.W.2d at 306–07 (“We apply the same principles of
interpretation to the Guidelines as we apply to statutes . . . .”).

19
Strobel, 932 N.W.2d at 306–07. Therefore, if the Commission unambiguously uses the
word “or,” we read the term “in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible
factual situations be present in order for the [Guideline] to be satisfied.” Abdus-Salam, 1
N.W.3d at 878 (citing Munger, 749 N.W.2d at 338) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
When doing so, we favor an interpretation that gives each word a distinct, non-identical
meaning. Friese, 959 N.W.2d at 210.
One condition required to add a custody point is that a defendant’s custody status
exists “after entry of a guilty plea, guilty verdict, or conviction.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.B.2.a(2) (emphasis added). There is no ambiguity surrounding the use of the word “or,”
so these three options must have distinct meanings. “Conviction” is defined in the
Minnesota criminal code as “any of the following accepted and recorded by the court: (1) a
plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilty by the court.” 16
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2022) (emphasis added). In other words, when a court
accepts and records a guilty plea, it is an entry of conviction. So, if “entry of a guilty plea”
could mean only that a guilty plea is accepted and recorded by the court as Woolridge
Carter claims, there would be no functional difference between an entry of a guilty plea
and an entry of conviction. These identical meanings flout our interpretive principles, and
Woolridge Carter’s interpretation is therefore not reasonable.

16 The definition for “conviction” has remained unchanged since the recodification of
Minnesota’s criminal code in 1963. See Act of May 17, 1963, ch. 753, art. 1, 1963 Minn.
Laws 1185, 1186 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 609.015, subd. 5 (1963)).
20
Put simply, the phrase “entry of a guilty plea” as used in Guideline 2.B.2.a(2), means
that a defendant has pleaded guilty on the record, and there are no other reasonable
interpretations of the term in this context. Because the term is not ambiguous, it plainly
applies to a stay of adjudication imposed following a defendant’s entry of a plea of guilty
to a felony offense.
III.
We now apply the above analysis of Guideline 2.B.2.a to the facts of this case. Here,
Woolridge Carter entered a plea of guilty to felony theft on the record to a district court.
The district court stayed adjudication and imposed supervision conditions. W hen
Woolridge Carter later committed first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct, he was
still subject to those conditions.
Accordingly, Woolridge Carter was 1) on probation; 2) following his entry of a
guilty plea; to 3) another felony. With all three conditions of Guideline 2.B.2.a satisfied,
the district court was required to assign one custody status point to Woolridge Carter’s
criminal history score. The district court did so, and consequently, we find no error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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D I S S E N T
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. The district court erroneously included a custody status point in Deshawn
Kejuan Woolridge Carter’s criminal history score. The district court concluded that
Woolridge Carter was on probation for purposes of Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines) 2.B.2.a based on the fact that he was subject to court-ordered conditions
imposed with a 2016 stay of adjudication when he committed sexual assault on August 31,
2019. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2020). He was convicted and sentenced
for the crime in 2021. Guidelines 2.B.2.a, however, does not authorize the inclusion of a
custody status point for an offender who is subject to court-ordered conditions under a stay
of adjudication.
I dissent because the court says there is no ambiguity where ambiguity exists. If
there is one thing that is plain about the word “probation” in Guidelines 2.B.2.a, it is that
the meaning of the word is ambiguous—reasonable people reading that word in the context
of the Guidelines provision could understand the ordinary meaning of the word, especially
as applied here, in different ways. Further, other clues suggest that “probation” as used in
Guidelines 2.B.2.a does not include conditions with a stay of adjudication. Most
compellingly, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (Commission) itself has
told us directly that violations of conditions for stay of adjudication are not to be counted
when calculating custody points. In other words, the Commission— whose words we are
interpreting—has told us that it does not consider conditions of a stay of adjudication to be

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probation (or any other custody status under Guidelines 2.B.2.a). We should listen and,
accordingly, I would reverse.
Guidelines 2.B.2.a directs a district court to assign a custody status point when three
conditions (as relevant here) are met:
(1) The offender was under “probation” at the time the current offense
was committed;
(2) The offender was under probation “after entry of a guilty plea, guilty
verdict, or conviction”; and
(3) The offender was under probation for committing “any other felony.”1

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a (2019). The question we confront is whether the term
“probation” as used in Guidelines 2.B.2.a includes conditions imposed with a stay of
adjudication.
At the outset, it is important to keep in mind that a stay of adjudication, by
definition, means that no judgment of conviction is entered. For instance, in Johnston v.
State, 955 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 2021), we held that a person who had received a stay of
adjudication following a guilty plea had no recourse under Minnesota’s postconviction
statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2022), to later challenge the validity of the guilty plea
because section 590.01 only applies when there is a conviction. We explained that “a
person has not been convicted when there is a stay of adjudication” because “a conviction
requires a district court to accept and record the guilty plea, guilty verdict, or finding of
guilt by the court.” Johnston, 955 N.W.2d at 911 (cleaned up); see Minn. Stat. § 609.02,

1 There is no dispute that the 2016 theft offense for which Woolridge Carter received
a stay of adjudication was a felony.

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subd. 5 (2022). But when adjudication is stayed, a guilty plea is not recorded because there
is no adjudication of guilt. Johnston, 955 N.W.2d at 911.
I now turn to the question before us: Do conditions imposed with a stay of
adjudication constitute “probation” for purposes of imposing custody points under
Guidelines 2.B.2.a?
A.
I start by considering whether the meaning of “probation” as used in Guidelines
2.B.2.a is plain—that the word probation has only one reasonable meaning. State v.
Allison, 999 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Minn. 2024) (stating that “[ t]he language of a statute is
ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). If there is only one reasonable meaning, then that is
the meaning we must apply. Id. But if there is more than one reasonable meaning, we
must look to other clues to sort out which reasonable meaning the Legislature intended. Id.
The Commission—the entity that was assigned by the Legislature to promulgate
and revise the Guidelines, Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022) —did not define the word
“probation” in the Guidelines. The Guidelines have an extensive list of definitions, but
that list does not include the word “probation.” See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.
Therefore, we must turn to other sources to determine whether the word
“probation” includes conditions imposed with a stay of adjudication. The court focuses on
Minnesota Statutes section 152.18, subdivision 1 (1971). The provision authorized (and
still authorizes) courts to defer prosecution for certain first-time drug offenders. It provided

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that a “court may, without entering a judgment of guilty . . . defer further proceedings and
place him on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may require.” Id.
Further, in State v. Goodrich, we recognized that the Legislature used the word
“probation” in Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1 (1976), to describe conditions imposed in a
deferred prosecution as defined in that statute. 256 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Minn. 1977). In
Goodrich, the defendant was charged with the possession of controlled substances subject
to deferred probation under section 152.18, subdivision 1. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 507.
The defendant challenged the inventory search of his car that led to the discovery of the
controlled substances. Id. We held that the evidence was inadmissible, being the fruit of
an unconstitutional search. Id.
We also rejected the State’s argument that the mootness doctrine prevented us from
reaching the question of whether the inventory search was unconstitutional. Id. at 511.
The State argued that because the defendant had successfully met the conditions of the
deferred prosecution stay, the criminal proceedings against him were dismissed and the
conviction that resulted from the unconstitutional search no longer existed. Id. at 511–12.
We observed that section 152.18, subdivision 1, expressly required that a non-public record
of the discharge and dismissal be retained for unspecified use in determining the merits of
subsequent proceedings. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 512 (citing Minn. Stat. § 152.18,
subd. 1). Accordingly, we held that the case was not moot because “a sufficient
‘possibility’ of ‘adverse collateral legal consequences’ ” existed. Id. at 512 (quoting State
ex rel. Djonne v. Schoen, 217 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1974)).

D-5
In other words, we applied the plain language of section 152.18, subdivision 1—
including its use of the word “probation” to describe conditions imposed in a deferred
conviction—to reach our decision. But we undertook no additional analysis of the meaning
of the word “probation” and, consequently, the statement in Goodrich adds nothing more
to the analysis of the meaning of the word “probation” in Guidelines 2.B.2.a than is
provided by the Legislature’s use of the word “probation” in section 152.18, subdivision 1.
In addition to its reliance on the Legislature’s use of the word “ probation” in
section 152.18, subdivision 1, the court points to some dictionary definitions of words other
than “probation” that indirectly support its position that “probation” may refer to conditions
imposed without a conviction.
Based on this authority, I agree with the court that it is reasonable to interpret the
Commission’s use of the word “probation” in Guidelines 2.B.2.a to include conditions
imposed with a stay of adjudication. (For purposes of this analysis, I am comfortable with
the court’s position that the act of “defer[ing] further proceedings” “without entering a
judgment of guilty” under section 152.18, subdivision 1(c) (2022), is the functional
equivalent of what we now refer to as a stay of adjudication.)
Indeed, I would go further than the court. For instance, although not central to our
holdings, in cases we decided after the promulgation of Guidelines 2.B.2.a —when the
Guidelines first used the word “probation” in connection with custody status points—we
have referred colloquially and in passing to the conditions associated with a stay of
adjudication as “conditions of probation.” State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn.
2005); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 255–56 (Minn. 1996) (overruled in part as

D-6
recognized in Lee, 706 N.W.2d at 496). Moreover, the fact that the conditions imposed by
the district court with a stay of adjudication look and operate like probation conditions
imposed after a conviction also supports a conclusion that the meaning of “probation”
adopted by the court is reasonable. In short, one reasonable meaning of “probation”
includes conditions of a stay of adjudication.
But under our statutory interpretation methodology, the fact that one meaning of a
word in a statute is reasonable does not end the inquiry. We must also consider whether
there is another reasonable understanding of the word. If there is another reasonable
understanding of the word, then we cannot conclude that the meaning of the statute is
unambiguous and must consider other, non-textual clues to its meaning. Allison,
999 N.W.2d at 838 (stating that “the language of a statute is ambiguous if it is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In this case, there is another reasonable meaning of the word “probation” as it is
used in Guidelines 2.B.2.a: “probation” means sanctions imposed after a conviction.
Common dictionary definitions of the word “probation” are consistent with this
understanding of “probation” that is limited to sanctions imposed after a conviction. We
may look to dictionary definitions to help us understand the meaning of words in the
Guidelines. See State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2019) (considering
dictionary definitions to help determine the meaning of words in the Guidelines); see In re
Surveillance and Integrity Rev. (SIRS) Appeals by Trinity Home Health Care Servs. and
Etyane Ayana, 996 N.W.2d 178, 185 (Minn. 2023) (using dictionaries to help us

D-7
understand the ordinary meaning of statutory text). For instance, the Merriam- Webster
Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1996) defines “probation” as “the action of suspending the
sentence of a convicted offender and giving the offender freedom during good behavior
under the supervision of a probation officer.” Id. at 928 (emphasis added). Likewise, The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 2000) defines probation as
“[t]he act of suspending the sentence of a person convicted of a criminal offense and
granting that person provisional freedom on the promise of good behavior.” Id. at 1090
(emphasis added).
Further, because the word “probation” is being used in the Guidelines in a legal
context, it is also worth considering legal definitions of the term “probation” that reflect
how lawyers and judges understand the term. And those sources tell us that one reasonable
way that lawyers understand the term “probation” mirrors the definition in lay
dictionaries: the imposition of conditions after conviction. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“probation” as “a court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to certain stated conditions,
releases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or
prison.” Probation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Bryan A. Garner’s A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2011)
defines “probation” as “the procedure by which a convicted offender is released subject to
court-imposed conditions rather than being sent to jail.” Id. at 711 (emphasis added).2

2 In State v. Jones, 869 N.W.2d 24 (Minn. 2015), we stated that “[o]ur probation
statutes create an alternative to confinement following a criminal conviction.” Id. at 26.
I agree with the court, however, that the language in Jones is not dispositive of the meaning

D-8
Based on these definitions, I conclude that another reasonable understanding of the
ordinary meaning of the word “probation” is a court-ordered sanction imposed as an
alternative to confinement after a person is convicted of a crime. As discussed above, a
person subject to a stay of adjudication has not been convicted of a crime. Johnston,
955 N.W.2d at 911. Thus, conditions imposed by the district court with a stay of
adjudication are not court-ordered sanctions imposed upon a person convicted of a crime.
Accordingly, conditions imposed with a stay of adjudication do not fall within this meaning
of “probation.”
B.
The court reaches a different conclusion that it is unreasonable to read the text of
Guidelines 2.B.2.a to mean that the word “probation” is limited to a court-ordered sanction
imposed as an alternative to confinement after a person is convicted of a crime. For the
following reasons, I disagree with the court’s reasoning.
The court offers a mélange of statutory interpretation practices and alternative
dictionary definitions of words other than “probation” to support its position; an analysis
which in the end boils down to this: A common and uniform dictionary definition of
“probation” is not a reasonable interpretation of the term because another interpretation of
the term is also reasonable. But that is not how we interpret sentencing Guidelines, see
State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485, 493 (Minn. 2017) (“The rules of statutory interpretation

of “probation”; it is at best a very weak clue favoring the conclusion that probation is
limited to court-ordered sanctions imposed after a criminal conviction as an alternative to
custody.

D-9
and construction apply to the Guidelines.”). And it is not clear why— in determining plain
meaning— we should reject one reasonable meaning of a term over another reasonable
meaning of a term.
1.
First, the court seemingly establishes a new statutory interpretation principle that if
the Legislature has used a term in one way in statute (even, as here, in a way that has no
common law pedigree), then we must interpret that term in the same way in different, not
directly related statutes—and, indeed, in rules or guidelines adopted by an entity
independent of the Legislature. Not only is the court’s new rule not supported by any legal
authority, but it is not supported by any other evidence that the Co mmission was even
thinking about stays of adjudication when it used the word “probation” in its initial version
of the Guidelines in 1980 and 1981. The court merely assumes that the Commission had
to know that the Legislature used “probation” in the context of deferred prosecutions under
Minn. Stat. § 152.18 (2022) based on the fact that section 152.18 was enacted before the
Guidelines provision. Notably, the initial 1980 Report by the Commission to the
Legislature mentioned (and defined) stays of imposition and stays of execution but made
no mention of stays of adjudication. Minn . Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, Report to the
Legislature 58 (1980). This suggests that contrary to the court’s presumption, the
Commission did not have stays of adjudication—or their cousin, deferred prosecutions
under section 152.18— in mind when it placed the word “probation” in the custody status
section of the Guidelines.

D-10
But more critically, even if we assume that the Commission knew about and
considered the Legislature’s use of “probation” in section 152.18 (an entirely different
provision), the court does not offer any reason to assume the Commission did not also
consider (and ultimately use) the other broadly accepted ordinary meaning set forth in
dictionaries, including legal dictionaries, that define “probation ” as conditions imposed
postconviction. The question we are answering is whether the ordinarily accepted meaning
of “probation” as conditions imposed postconviction is unreasonable. The court cannot
merely determine that one accepted ordinary use of a term is unreasonable at the
pre-ambiguity phase solely based on an unsupported assumption that the enactor of the
provision had in mind a different reasonable meaning and meant that meaning. Such
“begs-the-question” logic is flawed. See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal
Usage 105, 672 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that begging the question, or petitio principii, is a
“logical fallacy” where a person “bas[es] a conclusion on an assumption that is in as much
in need of proof or demonstration as the conclusion itself”).
What the court appears to be doing is engineering a problematic expansion and
misuse of the stability canon of imputed common-law meaning. Once again to be clear,
I am not claiming here that the way that the Legislature used the word “probation” in
section 152.18, subdivision 1, is not a clue as to the reasonable meaning of the term.
3 My

3 It is not clear to me that the court can properly rely on its section 152.18,
subdivision 1, argument in assessing the reasonable meaning of the word “probation.” The
imputed common-law meaning canon is a dusty assumption telling us that a statute that
uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning. For
reasons stated below, I do not agree that the principle should be extended beyond

D-11
objection is to the court using the Legislature’s use of the word “ probation” in section
152.18, subdivision 1, to per se rule out the possibility that there may be some other
reasonable meaning of the word “probation.” That it cannot do. Using a stability canon in
this way is an abdication of the court’s actual job of trying to effectuate the intent of the
Commission.
The court bases this portion of its analysis on our decision in a tax case, Comm’r of
Revenue v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc., 884 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 2016). Dahmes Stainless arose
out of the sale by Dahmes Stainless, Inc. of drying systems and other industrial equipment
that Dahmes manufactured for customers. Id. at 651. Dahmes collected and paid to the
State sales taxes on the retail sales of its manufactured products. Id. The Commissioner
of Revenue, however, imposed additional use taxes and interest on the components that
Dahmes purchased and integrated into the industrial products it sold to customers. Id.

long-established common-law meanings of terms—something the court does not attempt
to establish here. But I also observe that we have held that the imputed common-law
meaning canon does not apply pre-ambiguity to help us determine whether more than one
reasonable meaning of a statutory term or phrase exists. See State v. Thonesavanh,
904 N.W.2d 432, 439 n.4 (Minn. 2017) (citing Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC , 771 N.W.2d
14, 21 (Minn. 2009)) (stating that the imputed common- law canon only applies after it is
determined that the text is ambiguous); see also State v Stay, 925 N.W.2d 428, 431 n.2
(Minn. 2019) (citing Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 439 n.4). I am not wholly convinced
that limiting our ability to rely on the way a word is used in a definitional sense in a
somewhat related statute—in the same way we use dictionary definitions—always should
be precluded when assessing whether more than one reasonable meaning of a term exists.
That may be especially true where, as here, there are other indications that the word
“probation” is sometimes used colloquially to refer to conditions of release imposed in
connection with a stay of adjudication. But I am convinced that we cannot point to the way
a word is used in a somewhat related statute to exclude consideration of definitions from
other widely accepted definitional sources that support another reasonable meaning of a
word.

D-12
The Commissioner based its decision to impose additional taxes on the sale of the
component parts on the definition of “retail sale” in Minn. Stat. § 297A.61, subd. 4(d)
(2014). Id. That definition provided:
A sale of building materials, supplies, and equipment to owners, contractors,
subcontractors, or builders for the erection of buildings or the alteration,
repair, or improvement of real property is a retail sale in whatever quantity
sold, whether the sale is for purposes of resale in the form of real property or
otherwise.

Id. On appeal, the tax court disagreed and concluded that the Commissioner could not
impose the additional use tax because the retail sale definition did not apply: Dahmes’s
component purchases were not taxable retail sales of building materials, supplies, or
equipment for the “improvement of real property.” Dahmes, 884 N.W.2d at 652. Rather,
the manufactured products Dahmes sold were tangible personal property. Id. In addition,
the tax court awarded attorney fees to Dahmes because the Commissioner’s position was
not “substantially justified” by a “reasonable basis in law and fact” under the Minnesota
Equal Access to Justice Act, Minn. Stat. § 15.471, subd. 8 (2014). Dahmes, 884 N.W.2d
at 652. The Commissioner appealed, challenging the award of attorneys’ fees. Id.
Resolving this question turned on whether the manufactured products that Dahmes
sold to its customers were “real property” or “tangible personal property.” Id. at 656.
We looked to the statutory language of the tax code to guide our analysis. Id. We
acknowledged that Chapter 297A did not define “real property.” Dahmes, 884 N.W.2d at
656. But we also observed that the statutory definition of “tangible property” included a
proviso which states that the phrase “tangible personal property” did not include “large
ponderous machinery and equipment used in a business or production activity [like the

D-13
manufactured products Dahmes sold to its customers] which at common law would be
considered to be real property.” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 297A.61, subd. 10(b)(1) (2014))
(emphasis added). In other words, the Legislature expressly directed the Commissioner
and the courts to consider the common law in determining whether the “large ponderous
machinery and equipment” that Dahmes sold was real property under the common law.
See id.
We concluded that the Commissioner’s position that the products that Dahmes sold
to customers were “improvements to real property” was not substantially justified.4 Id. at
661. As directed by the statute, we looked to the common law to make that determination.
Id. at 656. In so doing, we made the unsurprising observation that, when the Legislature
expressly directed us to look to the common law to determine whether large ponderous
machinery and equipment was real property, it understood the then-current understanding
of the types of large ponderous machinery and equipment that qualified as real property
under the common law. Id. (citing as part of its analysis that “we presume that the
Legislature acts with full knowledge of existing law, including the common law”). 5 It

4 The Commissioner’s position that the products were improvements to real property
turned on the conception that the products were “fixtures” and that, under the common law,
fixtures are improvements to real property. Dahmes, 884 N.W.2d at 656. We rejected that
position and agreed with Dahmes and the tax court, who asserted that the manufactured
and installed products were “trade fixtures” which are not considered real property under
the common law. Id.

5 In our Dahmes opinion, we cited to Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dynamic Air,
Inc., 702 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Minn. 2005). Dahmes, 884 N.W.2d at 656. The court also
cites Goodyear in this case. In Goodyear, however, we were actually applying the
presumption that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate the common-law meaning of a
word. 702 N.W.2d at 244. That is not true in this case.

D-14
makes sense to assume that the Legislature understood the status of the common law when
it expressly directed that the common law be determinative of whether something is real
property or tangible personal property in the very definitional statute we are interpreting .
But this is very different from the court’s conclusion that a reference to a non-definitional
use of a word (like “probation”) in a statute that is not directly related to the provision we
are interpreting is the only reasonable meaning of the word we are interpreting. Dahmes
is not controlling here; indeed, the court admits as much. Supra at 9.
More broadly, the court may be trying to extend the canon of imputed common-law
meaning. This is misguided. The canon of imputed common-law meaning is just that. It
is a judicially imposed gloss on statutory language—an assumption judges make about how
legislatures operate—intended to serve the distinct purpose of preserving the stability of
the common law developed over the years through case law. See Antonin Scalia and Bryan
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320–21 (2012). Of course, the
specific deferred prosecution provision in section 152.18 is not a common-law provision;
it is a specific and targeted legislative enactment. We have never extended the use of the
imputed common-law meaning canon in the way the court does in this case to say that once
the Legislature has used a word in one statute in passing, the use of the same word in a
distinct statute (or, as here, a guideline promulgated by an entity other than the Legislature)
has the same meaning. And I do not see any good reason why we should extend a judicially
created presumption about the meaning of words enacted by a different branch of
government—especially in a case like this where (1) the Legislature did not define the term
but merely used it in passing to describe a particular judicial process in a specific context,

D-15
and (2) we are not interpreting the words of a statute but instead the words of an
independent commission charged with independently developing a set of rules.
I find support for my conclusion that we should not extend the canon of imputed
common-law meaning in this case in the separate set of statutory interpretation rules we
use to determine how and when we can use words in distinct but related statutory provisions
to assess whether more than one reasonable meaning of a word exists:
We recognize that when two statutes were enacted at the same time and for
the same purpose, we may properly consider both in our effort to understand
the plain language of the statute—whether more than one reasonable
interpretation of the language exists. We refer to this as the whole statute
canon. State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Minn. 2021) (describing the
whole statute canon and noting that it applies when determining whether
text is ambiguous). And that principle makes sense as a method for
understanding what the Legislature intended when it enacted a statute. When
two parts of a statute are enacted at the same time and for the same purpose,
the Legislature has all of those provisions before it as it considers the
legislative solution to the particular problem, including the language used to
set forth that solution. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that all of the
provisions inform the legislators’ understanding of the text of the statute it
enacts. See generally State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 2018).

For that same reason, when trying to understand the plain meaning of
a statute, we cannot consider other statutes that were not enacted in the same
legislative act as the provision we are interpreting. The so -called related
statutes canon, which allows us to construe together two statutes that were
enacted separately but which share a common purpose and subject matter,
only applies after we have determined that the statute we are interpreting has
more than one reasonable meaning. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d at 80 (describing
the related statutes canon and stating that it applies after we have determined
that statutory text is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation).

D-16
State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. 2023) (emphasis added).6 Applying these
principles which more specifically address the issue we face in this case—the Legislature’s
use of the word “probation” in section 152.18, subdivision 1—is not relevant at the pre-
ambiguity stage of statutory analysis. 7 This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that we
have stated that the imputed common-law meaning canon—the canon which the court
seemingly extends in this case—also does not apply when determining whether more than
one reasonable meaning of a statutory term or phrase exists. See State v. Thonesavanh ,
904 N.W.2d 432, 439 n.4 (Minn. 2017); see, supra, n.5. The court is using its expansion
of the imputed common-law meaning canon as an end run around our related statutes
precedent.

6 To be clear, I am not endorsing the principle that the related statutes canon always
or ever applies when interpreting words used by the Legislature in a statute and words used
by a different body with legislative-like powers like the Commission. That is an issue for
another day.

7 The court relies on our 1929 decision in In re Commissioner of Highways, 223 N.W.
915 (Minn. 1929), where we said, “the Legislature is presumed to have known and had in
mind all existing laws relating to the subject- matter, and to have enacted them in the light
of such knowledge.” Id. at 917. But in that case, we were referring to previously enacted
continuing portions of the same statute we were interpreting —a statute dealing with the
specific topic of installation of safety devices on railroads—and applied the principle that
the statutory provisions should be read harmoniously. Id. Here, of course, section 152.18
and Guidelines 2.B.2.a are not part of the same statute. One is a statute dealing with
controlled substances and the other is a guideline adopted by the Commission to deal with
sentencing for all crimes. Under the related statutes canon, the fact that section 152.18 and
Guidelines 2.B.2.a relate to the same broadly defined subject matter of “giv[ing] direction
to a district court after the defendant has been found guilty of a crime” (supra at 5 n.4) is
irrelevant pre -ambiguity in determining the meaning of the text. Even post-ambiguity,
such a broad shared purpose may stretch too far the related statutes canon.

D-17
It is true that we have at times used common -law understandings of a concept to
provide insight into the ordinary meaning of statutory text. See, e.g. , U.S. Bank N.A. v.
Cold Spring Granite Co., 802 N.W.2d 363, 372 (Minn. 2011) (using the common-law
meaning of fraud to understand the ordinary meaning of the word fraud in Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.423 (2010)); In re Welfare of D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 1986) (without
citation, using the common-law meaning of “from the person” in the theft statute, Minn.
Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3(3)(a) (1984), a statutory crime based on common-law principles).
But in none of these cases did we use the common-law concepts to per se rule out other
legitimate and widely accepted sources for understanding ordinary meaning (like
dictionaries) at the stage of determining whether statutory language was susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation.8

8 We also have looked to the common law to fill in gaps where the statutory language
does not address an issue—something that is not at issue here. For instance, in Sanchez v.
State, 816 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 2012), the court addressed when the limitations period for
a petition brought under the postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2010), begins to
run. The relevant portion of the postconviction statute provides that a petition “must be
filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). We
held that the claim arises when the petitioner knew or should have known he had a
claim—an objective standard. Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 559. To reach that decision, we
relied on the fact that “in the context of other time-limitation provisions, we have assessed
the accrual of a cause of acti on based on an objective ‘knew or should have known’
standard.” Id. at 558; see id. at 559 n.8 (observing that we have applied an objective
standard “uniformly to statutes of limitations across substantive legal areas”). We further
observed that the Legislature did not provide for a standard different than our long-standing
approach in the postconviction statute. Id. at 559.
Notably, in the portion of the Sanchez opinion where we addressed whether an
objective or subjective accrual test should apply, we were not doing the same kind of
statutory interpretation that we are doing in this case. We were not parsing the relevant
text to try to understand the meaning of the words “claim arises.” No amount of parsing
of those words could tell us if the Legislature meant that a claim arises when the petitioner

D-18
As I stated earlier, I do not quibble in this case with the court’s use of section 152.18,
subdivision 1, and dictionary definitions of words other than “probation” as piece s of
information about the ordinary meaning of “probation” as it was used by the Commission
in Guidelines 2.B.2.a. But for all the reasons stated, I cannot accept the court’s use of a
variation on the imputed common-law meaning canon (especially in a case where the court
is not even relying on a common-law meaning) to hold that the use of the word “probation”
in section 152.18, subdivision 1, is the only thing we can consider in determining whether
there is more than one reasonable meaning of the word “probation.”
2.
I also disagree with the court’s position that the common dictionary definitions of
“probation” upon which I rely are expansive enough to encompass court- ordered
conditions before conviction. A fair reading of these definitions, which say that probation

subjectively knew that a claim existed or when a reasonable person should have known
that a claim existed, and no such argument was made. Indeed, we did not frame our
analysis in that section of Sanchez as one of statutory interpretation and certainly did not
assess (or cite any cases regarding) whether the phrase “claim arises” is plain or ambiguous
on that point. Compare id. at 558–59 (addressing whether accrual is assessed under a
subjective or objective test), with id. at 556–58 (addressing whether the 2-year time limit
in section 590.01, subdivision 4(c), applies to a claim brought under the interests of justice
exception and citing and applying our general methodology for determining whether a
statute is plain or ambiguous). In contrast, in this case, we are not trying to understand
how to apply a standard set forth in a statute; we are trying to ascertain the meaning of the
word “probation” and, more specifically at this point in the analysis, trying to determine if
there is more than one reasonable meaning of the word.
These observations about what we were doing in the relevant portion of the Sanchez
opinion is also true of other cases where we have looked to common -law usages of terms
to understand how to apply standards established in statute. See Gassler v. State,
787 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Minn. 2010) (looking to our prior cases to determine what must be
shown to obtain relief “in the interests of justice” under Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(b)(5)).

D-19
involves the act of releasing a convicted person subject to conditions, is that probation is
limited to conditions imposed following conviction. And regardless, the dictionary
definitions of the word “probation” certainly do not affirmatively state (as the court insists
must be the case) that probation applies to conditions imposed on persons who have not
been convicted.
The court’s citation to definitions of words other than the word “probation” does
not render unreasonable the uniform dictionary definition of the word “probation” as
conditions imposed on convicted persons following a conviction. It merely supports the
conclusion that there is more than one reasonable dictionary definition. See In re J.M.M.,
937 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 2020) (determining that the word “parent” was ambiguous
because the dictionaries supported two different reasonable meanings of the word and the
textual context did not render one reasonable and the other unreasonable).
The court also states that “it makes little sense to resort to dictionary definitions
when the Legislature itself had provided a clear example of how it used the term
‘probation.’ ” Supra at 13. It cites no authority that supports that principle. See id. The
case it does cite, State v. Gibson, 945 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn. 2020), simply states that
“[a] dictionary is merely evidence of common usage; it is not dispositive in defining
common usage.” See id. I am not claiming that the dictionary definition is dispositive in
defining common usage; I am merely saying that it is legitimate (and here unrefuted)
evidence of one common meaning of the term “probation” for both lawyers and ordinary
persons. Indeed, in Gibson, the court relied on a dictionary definition. My position is
entirely consistent with Gibson; it is the court’s position that is inconsistent with Gibson.

D-20
Of course, we may “set aside dictionary definitions when context makes clear that
dictionary definitions may not fit,” State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Minn. 2018).
That principle does not change my conclusion. Under that rule, the context we look to in
determining whether a particular meaning of a word “fits” is the language of the provision
we are interpreting (here Guidelines 2.B). See, e.g., id. (looking to other parts of Guidelines
2.B as context when interpreting the meaning of “current” in Guidelines 2.B.7.a). The
court does not look at that context, however. It does not explain what it is in the Guidelines
that renders the dictionary definition of “probation” unfit. Indeed, the court does not even
mention the language of Guidelines 2.B.2.a (or, indeed, any provision of the Guidelines)
in assessing whether the dictionary definitions of “probation” are a poor fit in the context
of Guidelines 2.B.2.a. Instead, the court looks to how the Legislature used the word
“probation”—again, in passing and not in a definition—in Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 2(a)
(2022). We have never stretched so far as to use an entirely separate statute to reject a
dictionary definition based on context. It simply does not make sense (and, as with the use
of the imputed common-law meaning canon above, runs afoul of the related statutes
canon).
Citing Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 759 n.3 (Minn. 2010), the court
also asserts that “even if language appears to have more than one reasonable interpretation
‘at first glance,’ we may still find ‘one clear meaning after analyzing the various potential
interpretations.’ ” Supra at 15. This assertion is problematic on several levels. First, the
Goodman court did not address multiple meanings that were reasonable interpretations,
but merely possible or initially potential interpretations. Goodman, 777 N.W.2d at 759

D-21
n.3. Second, and more importantly, the reason that we rejected some of the plausible
interpretations of the statutory text in Goodman was because the text itself did not make
sense if those plausible meanings applied; there were other textual clues in the statute that
rendered those potential meanings unreasonable. Id. at 759.
3.
The court asserts that an interpretation that limits the word “probation” to conditions
of the release imposed after conviction is ruled out as unreasonable by language in
Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2) that states that a custody status point can be imposed if “[t]he
offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) after entry of a guilty plea,
guilty verdict, or conviction.” (Emphasis added.)
That provision does not render unreasonable an interpretation of the word
“probation” that is limited to court- ordered sanctions imposed as an alternative to
confinement after a person is convicted of a crime. That is so because entry of a guilty
plea can—and most often does—result in a conviction. Thus, when a defendant is charged
with a new offense while on probation following a conviction, the defendant’s probationary
status plainly would require imposition of a custody status point. My alternative reasonable
interpretation of Guidelines 2.B.2.a does not render that language superfluous. Rather, the
court’s position that the reference to entry of a guilty plea in Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2) means
that conditions of release imposed in connection with a stay of adjudication following a
guilty plea are “probation” simply begs the definitional question (what does “probation”
mean?). The inclusion of the words “after entry of a guilty plea” does not exclude either

D-22
reasonable definition— and that is precisely the point. Certainly, the same argument would
not hold for other custody statuses listed in Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1).9
In short, I conclude that one reasonable understanding of the ordinary meaning of
the word “probation” as used in Guidelines 2.B.2.a includes conditions of release imposed
following a stay of adjudication and another reasonable understanding of the ordinary
meaning of the word “probation” is conditions of release imposed after a person has been
convicted of a crime. Accordingly, the meaning of “probation” is ambiguous.
C.
I now turn to the question of resolving which of the two reasonable meanings of the
word “probation” as used in Guidelines 2.B.2.a applies.

9 There is a textual wrinkle here that merits discussion. The language of Guidelines
2.B.2.a(2) does distinguish between “guilty pleas and verdicts” and “convictions.” For the
reasons stated above, that distinction does not resolve the question of what “probation”
means as a matter of plain language. But a closer look at the evolution of the Guidelines
2.B.2.a(2) explains why the words “guilty pleas and verdicts” was added. In 2003, the
Commission amended 2.B.2.a(2) as follows:
2. One point is assigned if the offender:
a. was on probation, parole, supervised release, conditional release, or
confined in a jail, workhouse, or prison pending sentencing, following
a guilty plea or verdict in a felony, gross misdemeanor, or extended
jurisdiction juvenile case, or following a felony, gross misdemeanor
or an extended jurisdiction juvenile conviction.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, Adopted Modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines 6
(2003). The Commission explained that the language was changed “to indicate that the
Custody Status Point applies to offenders who escape before sentencing.” Id. There are
times, especially following a guilty plea, when a district court will wait to enter a conviction
until the sentencing hearing. The reason for adding the language had nothing to do with
stays of adjudication.

D-23
In this case, the best clue to help determine which of the two reasonable meanings
of “probation” the Commission intended when it adopted Guidelines 2.B.2.a is to listen to
the Commission. A brief overview of the evolution of 2.B.2.a, particularly as it relates to
section 152.18, subdivision 1, is necessary.
Language similar to current Guidelines 2.B.2.a was adopted by the Commission in
1980 when the Guidelines were first promulgated. Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n,
Report to the Legislature 28 (1980) (stating that “[t]he offender is assigned one point if he
or she was on probation or parole or confined in jail, workhouse, or prison following
conviction of a felony or gross misdemeanor or released pending sentencing at the time the
felony was committed for which he or she was being sentenced” (emphasis added)). As
noted earlier, in 1980, the Commission expressly considered stays of imposition and stays
of execution in drafting the Guidelines but made no mention of deferred prosecutions under
section 152.18, subdivision 1, or, more generally, stays of adjudication. Id. at 58; see supra
at D-9.
In 1987, the Guidelines first suggested in Comment II.B.201 that custody points
should be assigned when prosecution has been deferred under Minnesota Statutes
section 152.18:
The basic rule assigns offenders one point if they were under some
form of criminal justice custody following conviction of a felony or gross
misdemeanor when the offense was committed for which they are now being
sentenced. Criminal justice custodial status includes probation (supervised
or unsupervised), parole, supervised release, conditional release, or
confinement in a jail, workhouse, or prison, or work release, following
conviction of a felony or gross misdemeanor, or release pending sentencing
following the entry of a plea of guilty to a felony or gross misdemeanor, or a
verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilty by the court of a felony or

D-24
gross misdemeanor. Probation given for an offense treated pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1, will result in the assignment of a custody status
point because a guilty plea has previously been entered and the offender has
been on a probationary status.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2 cmt. II.B.201 (1987) (emphasis added); see Minn. Sent.
Guidelines Comm’n, Proposed Modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines Effective
August 1, 1987 (1987). Accordingly, although the general rule expressly limited the
imposition of custody status points to persons who were in custody status following a
conviction, the Commission explained that district courts should apply the rule in one
specific circumstance where a conviction has not been entered —namely, where the court
has imposed conditions of a stay associated with a deferred prosecution under section
152.18 for certain drug offenses.10
In 2012, the Commission restructured the Guidelines and for the first time explicitly
referred to section 152.18 in Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2):
The offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) after
entry of a guilty plea, guilty verdict, or conviction. This includes a guilty
plea for an offense under Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1.

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see Minn. Sent. Guidelines
Comm’n, Guidelines Revision Project Adopted Modifications 16 (2012). Once again, the
language is limited to section 152.18; it does not mention stays of adjudication generally.
In 2019, the Commission deleted the language related to section 152.18 in
Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2). The change was debated by members of the Commission. Before

10 In 2010, the Commission moved the comment language about the section 152.18 to
Comment I.B.202. Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. I.B.202 (2010).

D-25
the Commission adopted the change, Commission staff explained that eliminating the
language related to section 152.18 “would eliminate the assignment of a custody status
point for a § 152.18 stay of adjudication.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, Proposed
Modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, Effective August 1, 2019 2,
5, 9 (2018).11 The recommendation to eliminate the assignment of a custody status point
for a section 152.18 stay of adjudication was adopted unanimously by the Commission on
December 20, 2018. Approved Meeting Minutes of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission for December 20, 2018 3–5.12 The Commission further explained its decision
as follows:

11 The document may be found at https://mn.gov/msgc-
stat/documents/meeting%20materials/2018/PublicHearingDecember/1August2019Propos
edModificationsCHS_SVO.pdf. See also Nate Reitz, Staff Memorandum to
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission 2 (Nov. 1, 2018) (stating that “[u]nder
existing policy, stays of adjudication generally do not qualify for a custody status
point” and explaining that the proposed change—later adopted by the Commission—is to
“eliminate” the “lone exception” for a section 152.18 stay of adjudication)
(https://mn.gov/msgc-stat/documents/meeting%20materials/2018/November/Combined4
ADocuments.pdf). Thus, by August 1, 2019, even the lone exception had been eliminated
from the Guidelines.

12 The meeting minutes may be found at https://mn.gov/msgc-
stat/documents/meeting%20materials/2018/December/ApprovedMSGCMinutes20Dec20
18.pdf. Commission Chair Associate Justice (Ret.) Christopher Dietzen stated in his report
that the proposed elimination of custody status points for section 152.18 stays of
adjudication, among other changes, “will promote rationality and proportionality in certain
sentences and make technical changes due to recent legislation and will not sacrifice public
safety.” The changes were submitted to the Legislature for consideration during the 2019
session and the Legislature did not reject the changes. See Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 11
(2022) (providing that “[a]ny modification which amends the Sentencing Guidelines grid,
including severity levels and criminal history scores, or which would result in the reduction
of any sentence or in the early release of any inmate, with the exception of a modification
mandated or authorized by the legislature or relating to a crime created or amended by the

D-26
The Commission also reconsidered its rule distinguishing, for purposes of
the custody status point, stays of adjudication granted under Minn. Stat.
§ 152.18 (applicable to some drug offenses) from all other stays of
adjudication. Under the current rule, a stay of adjudication qualifies for
custody status, but only if it was granted under § 152.18. The proposal
repeals this distinction. The proposed modifications—to Guidelines
§ 2.B.2.a(2) and Comment 2.B.203—may be found on pages 61 & 65.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, 2019 Report to Legislature 12 (2019).
The Commission could not be clearer. It recognized that for purposes of imposing
custody status points, the Guidelines treated court-ordered conditions imposed in
connection with deferred prosecutions under section 152.18, subdivision 1, differently than
conditions imposed in connection with stays of adjudication generally. It wanted to
eliminate that distinction. And it did so by eliminating the imposition of custody status
points for persons who commit another offense while on deferred prosecution release under
section 152.18, subdivision 1. In other words, with the exception of the section 152.18
deferred prosecutions, the Commission never intended custody status points to be awarded
for stays of adjudication.
More critically to the resolution of this case, that language related to section 152.18
deferred prosecutions was deleted from the Guidelines in 2019, well before the 2021
sentence imposed on Woolridge Carter that is the subject of this appeal. Thus, even if one
tried to make the argument that the Commission misunderstood the history of its own
Guidelines, by the time Woolridge Carter was sentenced, the Commission was clear that

legislature in the preceding session, shall be submitted to the legislature by January 15 of
any year in which the commission wishes to make the change and shall be effective on
August 1 of that year, unless the legislature by law provides otherwise”).

D-27
under the Guidelines in effect when Woolridge Carter committed the offense that is the
subject of this appeal, custody points are not to be assigned to a sentence for an offense
that occurs while a person is under release conditions imposed as part of any type of stay
of adjudication.
The clear intent and understanding of the Commission was reported to the district
court in this case. The probation officer who prepared Woolridge Carter’s Pre-Sentence
Investigation report checked with the Commission about the precise interpretation question
at issue before us and reported:
While the defendant was on supervision for a Felony Theft at the time of the
current offense, a custody status point is not applicable because of the Stay
of Adjudication. Per an email from [a member of the Commission staff],
2.B.2.a(1) and 2.B.1(2) can be referenced related to this issue. . . . The
“Guilty Plea” idea is misleading – no custody for Stay of Adjudication. The
Guilty Plea really points only to “release pending sentencing” for a custody,
they enter the plea and are to return for sentencing, then they commit the
current offense.

(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the probation officer’s report did not assign any custody
status points.
In this dispute with two reasonable interpretations of the relevant language, we
should listen and take seriously what the Commission, authorized by the Legislature to
adopt, amend, and administer the Guidelines, is telling us about the Guidelines: custody
status points should not be imposed for violations of release conditions imposed with a stay
of adjudication.
The district court erred when it included a custody status point in Woolridge Carter’s
criminal history score for his stay of adjudication on a 2016 felony theft. Therefore, I

D-28
would reverse and remand to the district court for proper sentencing consistent with the
Guidelines.

HUDSON, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Thissen.