In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: T. R. F. P., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0306

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
T. R. F. P., Parent.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-21-527

James R. Martin, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant T.R.F.P.)

Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Julia A. Forbes, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance)

Julie A. Nelson, Owatonna, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cochran , Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order terminating her parental
rights. Mother first seems to argue that the district court’s findings of fact regarding the
county’s reunification efforts are clearly erroneous and that its determination that those
efforts were reasonable was an abuse of its discretion. Mother also argues that the district
court’s determination that statutory grounds supported termination is clearly erroneous.
Finally, mother argues that the district court’s determination that termination of mother’s
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parental rights was in the children’s best interests is an abuse of its discretion. Because the
district court’s determinations regarding reasonable efforts and statutory grounds for
termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and the district court acted
within its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant T.R.F.P. is the mother of child 1, born in April 2011, and child 2, born in
July 2020. Mother was not married to child 1’s father, R.S.K., or child 2’s father, G.R.
Both R.S.K.’s parental rights to child 1 and G.R.’s parental rights to child 2 were
involuntarily terminated through separate proceedings. Previously, mother and R.S.K. had
voluntarily terminated their parental rights to two older joint children.
In July 2020, G.R.— mother’s live-in boyfriend at the time—disclosed to mother
that he had been sexually abusing child 1. At a regularly scheduled therapy appointment
five days later, mother told her therapist about G.R.’s disclosure of the abuse. Mother’s
therapist immediately reported mother’s statement to police, who responded to mother’s
residence and took a statement from mother. During mother’s interview, she stated that
after G.R. told her that he had sexually abused child 1, she questioned the child, who denied
any abuse was occurring. In her police statement, mother said she questioned whether the
disclosed sexual abuse “was all in [G.R.’s] head.” G.R. had remained in the home with
child 1 during the five-day period following his disclosure of the abuse to mother. Mother
also reported to police that G.R. had taken the family van and left the home without
informing anyone of his whereabouts.
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Respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance (the county) directed mother to
bring child 1 to the county office for an interview, which mother did. Police and county
staff then continued mother’s interview and conducted an interview with the child. During
the initial interview, child 1 did not disclose sexual abuse; however, several months later,
child 1 told a social worker that G.R. had sexually abused her. After child 1 divulged the
abuse to the social worker, child 1 participated in a forensic interview. G.R. contacted
mother while mother and child 1 were at the county office . He then reported to law
enforcement for questioning and was placed under arrest.
After G.R.’s questioning and arrest, police and county staff resumed their interview
with mother, who stated that prior to G.R.’s disclosure of the abuse, mother had (1) found
child 1 watching pornography on G.R.’s phone, (2) discovered G.R. masturbating on a bed
while child 1 was under the blankets, and (3) been informed by her ex-husband, C.P., that
child 1 disclosed sexual abuse by G.R. to C.P. Based on this information, the county placed
child 1 into emergency protective care and filed a petition in Steele County District Court
alleging that child 1 was in need of protection or services. Two weeks later, the county
amended the petition to include child 2 after child 2 was born.
Child 1 and child 2 were adjudicated as children in need of protection or services
(CHIPS) under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(2), (3), (8), (9), (11) (2020). At a
dispositional hearing, the district court ordered mother to comply with requirements,
including but not limited to the following: have supervised visitations with child 1 and
child 2; disclose significant relationships to county staff; participate in individual therapy
and follow recommendations; follow the recommendations of her completed
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parenting-capacity evaluation; demonstrate skills to provide safety to child 1 and child 2;
remain law-abiding and ensure that criminal activity does not occur in her home;
demonstrate knowledge of child development and provide safe, nurturing, and responsive
care to child 1 and child 2; support the children’s educational, medical, and psychological
needs; ensure the conditions of her home are adequate for the ages of both children; and
work with the county to successfully complete a case plan.
The county filed a permanency petition seven months later, and a court trial was
held over nine days between October 2021 and January 2022. The district court heard
testimony from numerous individuals, including mother, the children’s mate rnal
grandmother and biological fathers, the guardian ad litem (GAL), one of the children’s
foster parents, law-enforcement officers, social workers, therapists, and medical providers,
among others. The county presented e vidence about G.R.’s sexual abuse of child 1 and
mother’s response to the abuse, as well as evidence of mother’s history of relationships
with individuals who had prior criminal-sexual -conduct convictions, some of whom are
required to register as predatory offenders, including R.S.K. and C.P.
Witnesses testified that, during the CHIPS proceeding, mother was engaging in
relationships she did not disclose to the county and allowing visitors to the home who had
criminal convictions or open child -protection cases. The county expressed concerns that
mother was not complying with the court’s order and that mother was not demonstrating
that she could provide a safe environment in the home. The district court heard evidence
of mother’s participation in mental-health services, the degree of her progress, and the
results of her neuropsychological examination and parenting- capacity evaluation.
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Additionally, the district court received evidence regarding mother’s supervised visitation
sessions, medical professionals’ observations of mother’s ability to appropriately care for
the children’s physical needs, and child 1’s special developmental needs resulting from
educational delays and having been a victim of sexual abuse.
In February 2022, the district court issued an order with findings that the county
made reasonable efforts toward reunification, that the county proved by clear and
convincing evidence that multiple statutory bases existed to terminate mother’s parental
rights, and that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
A district court may terminate parental rights “only for grave and weighty reasons,”
and it is presumed that parents are fit to be entrusted with the care of their children. In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). A
district court’s termination of parental rights may be affirmed if (1) the county made
reasonable reunification efforts, (2) at least one of the statutory grounds for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) termination is in the children’s best
interests. In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). On appeal
from a district court’s order terminating parental rights, we review the underlying findings
of fact for clear error, and we review the determination of whether a statutory ground for
termination exists, whether termination is in the child’s best interests, and a district court’s
ultimate decision on termination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
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Mother challenges the district court’s finding that the county made reasonable
reunification efforts, its determination that statutory grounds for termination of her parental
rights exist, and its determination that termination was in the children’s best interests. We
address each of mother’s arguments.
I. The district court’s findings of fact regarding the county’s reunification efforts
were not clearly erroneous, and its determination that those efforts were
reasonable was not an abuse of discretion.

Mother argues that the county did not show by clear and convincing evidence that
it made reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children. Mother specifically bases her
contention that the county’s efforts were not reasonable on the following: (1) statements
the parenting-capacity evaluator made; (2) the county’s alleged failure to provide services,
ongoing assistance, or education to help mother improve the conditions of the home; (3) the
county’s decision to change child 1’s therapist while treatment was ongoing; and (4) the
lack of a trial home visit or transfer. We are not persuaded.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2020), requires that the district court make
specific findings in every termination-of-parental-rights proceeding that
reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the
child and the parent were made including individualized and
explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made
by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite
the family.

In evaluating whether the county made reasonable efforts, the district court must consider
whether the services provided to the child and family were: “(1) relevant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
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the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). To be reasonable, efforts must be
tailored to the problem that caused the inability to parent. In re Welfare of S.Z. ,
547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996). The district court must also consider the duration and
quality of the county’s efforts. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88.
We review the district court’s findings of fact regarding reasonable efforts for clear
error, see id. at 87, and we review the district court’s determination of whether the efforts
the county provided are reasonable under the circumstances of that particular case for an
abuse of discretion, In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App.
2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). When reviewing for clear error, we view the
evidence in a light favorable to the findings. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021); J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6 (applying Kenney in a
termination-of-parental-rights case). Unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has occurred based on the entirety of the evidence, we will not conclude that
the fact-finder clearly erred. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. In applying the clear-error
standard, our role is not to reweigh evidence; therefore, we need not engage in extended
discussion of the evidence to demonstrate the correctness of the district court’s findings.
Id. at 223. W hen the record reasonably supports the findings, it is immaterial that the
record might also provide a reasonable basis to the contrary. Id.
In support of its determination that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
mother and reunify her with the children, the district court found that the county offered a
parenting assessment and services, a referral for mental-health services, psychological or
therapeutic services, medical services, a referral for public-health nursing, visitation,
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transportation, case-management services, and services to assist mother with improving
her boundaries with men in her life. Consistent with the requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 260.12(h), the district court further found that the services offered were relevant to the
safety and protection of the children, adequate to meet the needs of the family, culturally
appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under the
circumstances. In so finding, the district court noted the testimony of both the GAL and
mother herself that the services offered were appropriate for mother and that no services
were missing that mother needed.
The record supports these findings. The county provided mother with many
services, including individual and family therapy, a child-protection social worker, a
mental-health worker, an early-childhood public-health nurse, and supervised visitation.
The services the county provided were tailored to the case-plan goals for mother. These
goals included that mother show acceptance and understanding of and provide emotional
support to child 1; demonstrate that she will not permit others to sexually abuse the
children; provide a safe and suitable home; attend mental-health appointments and follow
recommendations; accept responsibility for her actions related to the abuse of child 1;
appropriately and adequately parent the children and monitor the children’s health, safety,
and well- being; demonstrate knowledge of age-appropriate behavior for the children;
express anger appropriately; take appropriate action to avoid being a victim of domestic
violence; and follow a visitation schedule to maintain a relationship with the children. The
county and mother developed the case plan to specifically address the following safety
concerns for the children: that they may be harmed by mother’s continued failure to protect
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the children from abuse or exploitation; emotionally harmed by her denial of the abuse that
occurred; or physically, emotionally, or developmentally harmed by the cluttered condition
of her home.
The county social worker testified that the goal of working with mother was
reunification, and the GAL testified that the services provided to mother were appropriate,
and the efforts toward reunification were reasonable. Indeed, mother testified that there
were no additional services she needed that the county did not provide.
Notwithstanding her testimony, mother claims that the county did not
make reasonable efforts. She points first to a statement in the record by her
parenting-capacity-assessment provider that the assessment’s recommendations were not
necessarily designed to position mother as a good parent, but rather to benefit a parent in
everyday life, and seems to argue that the recommendations were not tailored to the
problem that caused her inability to parent. However, the same practitioner went on to say
that the recommendations, if followed, would contribute to improving parenting skills.
Mother next claims that the county did not offer services, ongoing assistance, or
education to help mother improve the issues of clutter and cleanliness at the home. To the
contrary, the record reflects that the social worker visited the home a number of times and
provided suggestions for mother to correct the conditions. Mother further claims that the
county’s decision to stop child 1’s individual therapy with the therapist who provided
mother’s family therapy and switch to another therapist “brings into question the
reasonable efforts” in this area. The county responds that this change was made out of
concern for child 1’s safety and protection because the previous therapist was not prompt
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in responding to requests for information from county caseworkers, communicated poorly
with child 1’s other service providers, and appeared reluctant to allow child 1 to establish
and communicate boundaries about physical affection with mother. In addition, the drive
time required for appointments with the therapist caused child 1, who was already
educationally delayed, to miss school.
Finally, mother argues that the lack of a trial home visit or transfer shows that the
county “made an insufficient reasonable effort,” but she does not point to any evidence or
authority suggesting that such a step was necessary for the district court to find that the
county’s efforts were reasonable. We perceive no clear error in the district court’s findings
of fact regarding the services the county provided and its reunification efforts, and we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that those services
were, in this particular case, reasonable and tailored to the problems that caused mother’s
inability to parent.
II. The district court ’s findings of fact underlying its determination that a
statutory basis existed for termination of mother’s parental rights are not
clearly erroneous, and its determination that a statutory basis to terminate her
parental rights existed was not an abuse of its discretion.

Mother argues that the district court incorrectly determined that statutory grounds
exist for termination of her parental rights. Only one statutory ground must be supported
by clear and convincing evidence to affirm the district court’s termination of mother’s
parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2020); In re Welfare of Child . of
R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). The district court found that the county proved by
clear and convincing evidence that four statutory bases exist to terminate mother’s parental
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rights.1 We agree with the district court’s determination that each of the four statutory
bases supports the termination of mother’s parental rights to the children. To affirm the
district court’s order, we only need to conclude that one of the four statutory bases is
supported by findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, and therefore we limit our
analysis to the following basis —that mother substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child
relationship.
Under Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), the district court may terminate a
parent’s rights if it finds
that the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable.

1 The district court determined that the following four statutory grounds existed for
termination of mother’s parental rights: (1) mother substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the
parent-child relationship; (2) mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child
relationship; (3) following the children’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts
under the direction of the court failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
placement; and (4) a child in mother’s care experienced egregious harm of a nature,
duration, or chronicity indicating a lack of regard for the child’s well-being, such that a
reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child or any child to
be in the parent’s care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4)-(6).
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The petitioner bears the burden of proving that a statutory termination ground exists and
must show that conditions justifying termination exist at the time of the hearing and will
continue to exist for an indeterminate period of time. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901-02 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The district
court must find that clear and convincing evidence supports its determination that a
statutory termination ground is present. Id. at 899.
To challenge the district court’s findings related to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 ,
subd. 1(b)(2), mother first argues that the district court clearly erred because it did not find
that she had made demonstrable changes to show that she could comply with the duties of
a parent. Mother points to her establishing a personal policy of non-involvement in
romantic relationships , improved skills in identifying problematic dating practices,
progress in her mental-health treatment, and improvements to the cluttered condition of the
home. Mother further argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the efforts
made by the social -services agency that failed to correct the conditions justifying
termination were reasonable, because they were not directed at correcting the problem
presented. Again, we disagree.
“[T]ermination of parental rights is always discretionary with the [district court].”
In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). We give considerable
deference to the district court’s decision “because a district court is in a superior position
to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396
(Minn. 1996). We review factual findings for clear error and the determination of the
existence of the statutory basis for abuse of discretion. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87.
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In determining that the county establish ed the existence of grounds to terminate
pursuant to Minn. Stat § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), the district court made factual findings
regarding mother’s refusal or neglect to comply with her parental duties. Those findings
include mother’s history of inappropriate relationships and failure to protect children from
sexual abuse. The record supports these findings, including evidence of mother’s failure
to take action to prevent the sexual abuse of child 1 after both having been warned by C.P.
that abuse was occurring and having observed G.R. masturbating in child 1’s presence.
The district court’s findings that the conditions that led to the county filing the
petition had not been corrected and would continue to exist for an indeterminate period of
time are supported by the record. Specifically, the district court heard evidence that mother
continues to allow individuals to visit the home who are required to register as predatory
offenders or who have other criminal convictions and open child-protection cases. In fact,
mother allowed one such individual to reside at the home for a period during the pendency
of the district court phase of these proceedings.
The social worker also indicated that mother lacked understanding or insight into
her pattern of dating men who have a history of harming children and that mother’s
repeated p ractice of allowing potentially unsafe people in her home demonstrates that
mother has not developed the skills to protect her children from situations and
environments that may cause them harm. The social worker provided specific examples
of this pattern that continued while the county and mother were working mother’s case
plan.
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As to the condition of the home, the social worker testified to observing some
improvement in the overall cleanliness of the house; however, the worker stated that
cluttered conditions persisted up to the time of the trial, with little room for children to play
in or move through the common areas and items stacked along the walls that a small child
could pull down or tip over.
Mother asserts that the county’s efforts were not directed to correct the conditions
that formed the basis of the initial petition and were therefore not reasonable. Specifically,
mother asserts that her delay in reporting the abuse of child 1 was “relatively short,” and
the perpetrator of the abuse is no longer in her home. We concluded above that the county
made reasonable efforts. Thus, mother’s argument fails here for the same reasons we
already discussed.
Mother’s argument regarding the statutory basis to terminate her parental rights also
fails to address the many other findings the district court made of mother’s continued
refusal or neglect to comply with her parental duties beyond those related to preventing
abuse of the children— conditions were not corrected by the county’s reasonable efforts.
For instance, the district court found that mother demonstrated an inability to
communicate effectively with child 1, difficulty in reading child 2’s cues, and failure to
take direction on feeding the children and modifying the foods she provides to meet their
dietary needs and allergy restrictions. These findings are supported by the record. The
children’s pediatrician testified that child 1’s weight was in the range considere d to be
obese while in mother’s care, and a hospital social worker testified that mother had
difficulty following instructions on an infant -feeding schedule for child 2. The county
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social worker testified that despite numerous conversations about child 2’s intolerance of
certain foods, including dairy products, mother continued to bring those foods to parenting
visits for child 2, and that throughout the proceedings, mother continued to miss child 2’s
cues and seemed not to engage with child 1 during supervised visits. One of the foster
parents testified about child 1’s inability to perform basic age-appropriate self-care and
hygiene functions—she was unable to appropriately toilet and use utensils to eat—and
child 1’s improvements in those areas since leaving mother’s care.
Mother asserts that because she made progress on the issues of boundaries,
codependency, and appropriate relationships, the district court’s finding that reasonable
efforts failed to correct the conditions on which the petition was based is inconsistent with
the great weight of the evidence. We acknowledge that mother’s mental-health practitioner
testified that mother was making progress in appropriate decision-making and socialization
skills and intended not to date anyone in order to focus on her personal development, and
that mother’s social worker indicated that mother largely complied with scheduling and
completing recommended mental -health interventions. But in reviewing for clear error,
our role is not to reweigh the evidence; rather, we “review . . . the record to confirm that
evidence exists to support the decision” of the district court. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221-22. While mother does seem to have participated in the recommended services, there
is evidence contrary to mother’s claim of significant improvement in the conditions that
formed the basis of the initial petition. Testimony from the social worker indicated that,
while open to hearing suggestions, mother would often revert to former parenting behaviors
or offer excuses or rationalizations; that mother’s progress throughout the case has been
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“limited”; and that mother participated in the services as required, but “[i]t’s implementing
the skills that she has learned in those services that has been a struggle.”
The district court’s findings that mother demonstrated an inability or unwillingness
to keep children safe, an inability to appropriately communicate with the children and to
provide for their physical and emotional development, and an inability to apply the skills
learned through the provided services are supported by the record. The continuation of
these problems supports the district court’s determination that mother “has substantially,
continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including . . . care and control necessary
for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development,” and that
“reasonable efforts by the social services agency have failed to correct the conditions that
formed the basis of the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. l(b)(2). We perceive no clear error in
the district court’s findings of fact regarding the statutory basis for termination of parental
rights pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). We also conclude that the district
court did not abu se its discretion in determining that at least one statutory ground for
terminating mother’s parental rights exists.
III. The district court acted within its discretion by determining that termination
of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

Mother argues that it was not in the best interests of the children to terminate her
parental rights, asserting that (1) the district court should have given less weight to the
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opinion of child 1, given her age and developmental delays , and (2) some of the service
providers indicated that mother was a safe parent. Again, we disagree.
In any termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, the best interests of the child must
be the “paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020); In re Welfare
of Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) . Thus, if it finds that a
statutory ground for termination exists, the district court must still determine that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the c hild. J.R.B., 805 N .W.2d at
905. To analyze whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the
district court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship, and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). Competing interests may include a stable environment, health
considerations, and the child’s preferences, and the interests of the parent and child are not
necessarily given equal weight during the balancing process. In re Welfare of R.T.B. ,
492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). We review the district court’s determination that
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion. J.H.,
968 N.W.2d at 600.
When the district court determined that termination of mother’s parental rights was
in the best interests of child 1 and child 2, it considered the children’s physical, emotional,
cultural, spiritual, and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
children’s needs and development and found that “[t]he children’s needs, primarily the
need for protection from harm from others and a responsive parent, weighs in favor” of
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terminating mother’s parental rights. The district court noted the children’s young ages
and their strong bond with each other, finding that the children “should have the
opportunity to reach their full and complete physical well-being and emotional
development” but that “[m]other cannot provide this opportunity and continues to have
relationships and friendships with inappropriate men who have criminal backgrounds,
including criminal sexual conduct and child protection history.”
The district court also considered child 1’s mental-health needs as a victim of sexual
abuse and reasoned that this weighed in favor of terminating mother’s rights. The district
court found that mother was unable or unwilling to protect the children from sexual abuse,
unable to communicate with child 1 as would a supportive parent who believes the child
was a victim of sexual abuse, and unable to provide for the children’s physical well-being
and emotional development. The district court further found that because mother failed to
make necessary changes to her parenting during her work with the service providers,
waiting to give mother additional time to correct the deficiencies was not in the children’s
best interests.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. The GAL testified that
mother’s failure to build trust with child 1 would make it difficult for the child to report
any future sexual abuse to mother. Mother testified that, even months after G.R.’s
admitting to having abused child 1, mother had difficulty believing that the abuse had
actually occurred. The social worker testified that, just days before the final date of the
termination trial, mother failed to respect child 1’s physical and emotional boundaries as a
sexual-abuse victim, relating that mother “forced” a hug on child 1 by approaching the
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child from behind as she was walking away from mother, even though child 1 had told
mother she did not want a hug and despite earlier discussions between mother and the
social worker.
Child 1 expressed a preference not to return to mother’s care, testifying to feeling
safe in the current placement and that her basic needs for care, connection, and engagement
were being met there, in contrast with child 1’s stated feelings about the care received in
mother’s home—that she was often alone and without interaction from caregivers and that
mother “let [her] get hurt.” Mother asserts that child 1’s preference should be given less
weight due to the child’s age and developmental delays and because the child stated to the
court that she “like[s] lying.” The record shows, however, that before considering child 1’s
preferences, the district court inquired into the child’s ability to discern between
truthfulness and dishonesty and confirmed that the child knew the importance of
truthfulness to the court and was competent to testify. Again, we decline to reweigh the
district court’s findings in making this determination, as that is not the appellate court’s
role. See J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6.
Mother directs us to the testimony of her family therapist about mother’s bond with
child 1 and the public-health nurse’s testimony that mother could be an appropriate parent
to child 2. The district court, however, found the testimony of those two witnesses worthy
of only limited evidentiary value. In contrast, the social worker and GAL both testified
that they believed it to be in the children’s best interests to discontinue the case plan and
terminate mother’s parental rights.
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The district court’s detailed order includes a thorough analysis of the best-interests
factors and provides more than 17 pages of factual findings supporting its various
determinations. The record supports the district court’s determination that termination of
mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it made that determination.
Affirmed.