State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1141

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kaleffa Steven Mann,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-21-9005

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin Peralta, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Stearns County jury found Kaleffa Steven Mann guilty of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct based on evidence that he sexually penetrated a woman who was physically
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helpless because she was asleep. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2021, the state charged Mann with third- degree criminal sexual
conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (Supp. 2021). The case was tried
to a jury on two days in February 2022. The state’s primary witness was the complainant,
D.W. She testified to the following facts.
D.W. met Mann in October 2021 at a Halloween party. In the following weeks, she
and Mann sporadically exchanged messages on a social-media application. On
December 4, 2021, Mann sent her a message saying, “let’s throw a party.” They agreed to
do so that evening. Mann agreed to host the party at his apartment, and D.W. agreed to
recruit guests.
D.W. went to Mann’s apartment at approximately 11:00 p.m. Mann and a few other
people were present. D.W. drank multiple shots of liquor before going to downtown St.
Cloud to tell friends about the party. She continued drinking while downtown.
D.W. returned to Mann’s apartment a few hours later. Guests began arriving at
approximately 2:00 a.m. D.W. continued drinking and also smoked marijuana until
approximately 4:00 a.m., when police officers responded to a noise complaint and broke
up the party.
After guests left, four persons remained at Mann’s apartment: D.W., Mann, another
man whom D.W. knew only by a nickname with the initials M.M., and a third man whose
name is unknown. The group of four went to a nearby convenience store. On their way
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back, D.W. stopped at a female friend’s nearby apartment, where she had planned to sleep,
but the friend’s apartment was locked and D.W. was unable to contact her. D.W. returned
to Mann’s apartment, where she, Mann, M.M., and the unnamed man talked and smoked
marijuana.
D.W. eventually fell asleep on a couch, covering herself with a blanket that Mann
had provided to her. Mann later woke her and asked whether she wanted to use his bed.
D.W. agreed, walked to Mann’s bedroom, lay on top of a comforter on one side of the bed,
covered herself with the blanket that Mann had provided her, and fell asleep.
D.W. later awoke and realized that Mann was on top of her while she was lying on
her stomach and that he was penetrating her vagina with his penis. She testified, “He was
. . . already having sex with me when I woke up.” She pretended to still be asleep and did
not move. Mann stopped penetrating her shortly thereafter. She heard a sound like a rubber
band, which she believed was the sound of Mann removing a condom.
After Mann lay down on the bed next to D.W., she got up and left the bedroom. She
asked M.M. to go into Mann’s bedroom to retrieve her shorts and her cell phone. M.M.
went into Mann’s bedroom and talked to him. Mann walked out of the bedroom and gave
D.W. her belongings. Mann asked her what was wrong and assured her that “nothing
happened.” After she told him that she had been “awake, ” Mann changed his tone. He
asked her whether she was going to call the police. D.W. was afraid because Mann was
“starting to get a little aggressive.” D.W. used her cell phone to surreptitiously record a
portion of her conversation with Mann, and t he audio-recording was played for the jury.
During the conversation, Mann said numerous times that he was “not that type” of person.
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He also said, “I thought you was up,” and “Maybe you was asleep, I didn’t know you were
asleep.”
At D.W.’s request, M.M. drove her to her mother’s home. D .W. told her mother
about the incident with Mann. D.W.’s mother called the police.
The state called five other witnesses. Officer Musielewicz testified that he
responded to the report made by D.W.’s mother and interviewed D.W. that afternoon at
her mother’s home. He drove D.W. to a local hospital for a sexual-assault examination. A
forensic nurse examiner testified that D.W. said that she had “vaginal tenderness and pain.”
The nurse conducted a sexual-assault examination, which revealed a bleeding cervix,
which could be attributable to either sexual activity or other causes. A forensic analyst
employed by the bureau of criminal apprehension testified about DNA testing of swabs
taken from D.W.’s body, which were inconclusive. Another police officer testified that
investigators obtained and executed a warrant for a search of Mann’s apartment, where
they found some items belonging to D.W. that she had left behind.
Mann did not testify or present any other evidence. The jury found him guilty. The
district court imposed a sentence of 48 months of imprisonment. Mann appeals.
DECISION
Mann argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the offense of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
In analyzing an argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction,
this court undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient. ” State
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v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We “carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the [factfinder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d
895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the
jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v.
Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
A person is guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct if he “engages in sexual
penetration with another person” and “knows or has reason to know that the complainant
is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344, subd. 1(b). In this case, the state sought to prove only the third alternative: that
D.W. was physically helpless. The term “physically helpless” is defined by statute to mean
“that a person is (a) asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold consent or to withdraw
consent because of a physical condition, or (c) unable to communicate nonconsent and the
condition is known or reasonably should have been known to the actor.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.341, subd. 9 (20 20). In this case, the prosecutor argued to the jury that D.W. was
physically helpless because she was asleep.
Mann contends that the state’s evidence is insufficient on the ground that there are
reasons to question D.W.’s credibility and a lack of corroborating evidence. He
acknowledges that, in any criminal prosecution, the credibility of a witness is a matter for
the jury. He also acknowledges that, in a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, “the
testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (Supp.
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2021). But he relies on caselaw that, he asserts, requires corroborating evidence if there
are reasons to question a complainant’s testimony.
First, Mann cites State v. Gluff, 172 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1969), a case of aggravated
robbery in which the supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the
victim “had a limited opportunity to observe the robber briefly during a time when her
attention was concentrated on a gun pointed at her” and there was “no corroboration of the
identification” of the defendant. Id. at 65. Second, Mann cites State v. Langteau, 268
N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1978), a case of aggravated robbery in which the supreme court reversed
a guilty verdict because the state’s evidence did not explain defendant’s presence at the
scene of the crime or his motive. Id. at 77. Third, Mann cites State v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d
699 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam), a criminal-sexual-conduct case in which the supreme court
affirmed the conviction. Id. at 700. Fourth, Mann cites State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290
(Minn. 1993), a case of criminal sexual conduct in which the supreme court reversed a
guilty verdict because it was based solely on the testimony of a three-year-old child, which
was “contradictory as to whether any abuse occurred at all, and was inconsistent with her
prior statements and other verifiable facts.” Id. at 292. In addition, the child had reported
sexual abuse only after her mother had repeatedly exposed her to a “highly suggestive
book” and a related audiotape, which “may have improperly influenced the child’ s
subsequent report.” Id. at 293.
We begin by noting that two of the opinions Mann cites—Gluff and Langteau—do
not apply to this case because they concern convictions of aggravated robbery, not criminal
sexual conduct. See Langteau, 268 N.W.2d at 77; Gluff, 172 N.W.2d at 65. Consequently,
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in both cases, the supreme court had no need to consider the statute that expressly states
that, in a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, “the testimony of a victim need not be
corroborated.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1.
We also note that, even though Huss concerned a conviction of criminal sexual
conduct, the supreme court did not mention section 609.3 47, subdivision 1. 506 N.W.2d
at 292-93. The supreme court apparently determined that the statute was not implicated
because the evidence was insufficient for a reason other than a lack of corroboration. Id.
That leaves Ani, which does concern criminal sexual conduct and does mention
section 609.347, subdivision 1. 257 N.W.2d at 700. The appellant in Ani argued that the
statute was unconstitutional on the ground that corroboration is constitutionally required.
Id. The supreme court rejected that argument, reasoning that there was no such requirement
at common law and no such requirement in the text of the United States Constitution. Id.
But the supreme court stated that, in a particular case, the “‘absence of corroboration . . .
may well call for a holding that there is insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Note, The Rape
Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J. 1365, 1391 (1972)). While
allowing for the possibility that corroboration might be constitutionally required in a
particular case, the supreme court stated that the case before it was “not such a case”
because “the victim’s testimony was positive and not contradicted, and was strongly
corroborated by other evidence.” Id.
The same can be said of the evidence in this case. D.W. testified without
equivocation that Mann sexually penetrated her while she was asleep. She testified, “He
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was . . . already having sex with me when I woke up.” That testimony was not contradicted
by any other evidence. Thus, this case is not the hypothetical case described in Ani, in
which corroborating evidence is constitutionally required despite the statute providing that
the testimony of a victim of criminal sexual conduct need not be corroborated. See id.
In addition, D.W.’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence. D.W. gave a
statement to Officer Musielewicz only a few hours after the incident that was very similar
to her trial testimony. A forensic nurse examiner testified that D.W.’s cervix was bleeding
in a manner that is consistent with a sexual assault. When police officers searched Mann’s
home, they found items that D.W. had described (such as marijuana roaches, a blue and
gray flower-printed comforter, and a bottle of a particular brand of liquor) and also found
some of D.W.’s belongings (including a pair of leggings that she wore earlier in the
evening, the drawstring of her shorts, and her second cell phone ). In addition, the state
introduced an audio-recording of statements Mann made shortly after D.W. awoke,
including the statement, “Maybe you was asleep, I didn’t know you were asleep.” That
evidence allows an inference that Mann impliedly admitted to D.W. that he sexually
penetrated her, leaving only the question whether Mann knew or had reason to know that
she was asleep. See Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b). If corroboration of D.W.’s
testimony were necessary for the reasons stated in Ani, it would be present.
Mann also relies on State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2004), in which the
supreme court cited Gluff, Langteau, Huss, and Ani in the course of affirming a conviction
of domestic assault. Id. at 538-39. The state introduced evidence that, during an argument,
the appellant pointed a rifle at his wife and threatened to kill her. Id. at 537. The victim
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recanted her accusation before trial but apparently testified at trial consistently with her
initial report. Id. at 537-38. In analyzing the appellant’s argument that the state’s evidence
was insufficient, the supreme court reasoned that “there were no other reasons to question
[the victim]’s credibility and her testimony at trial was not contradicted.” Id. at 539.
The Foreman opinion does not apply to this case because, like Gluff and Langteau,
it does not concern a conviction of criminal sexual conduct and, thus, does not consider
section 609.347, subdivision 1. Even if we were to apply Foreman, we would conclude
that there are “no other reasons to question [ D.W.’s] credibility.” See id. D.W. never
wavered from her initial statement that Mann penetrated her vagina with his penis while
she was asleep. Mann identifies some facts that could be used to raise doubt about her
testimony, such as the fact that D.W. had been drinking alcoholic beverages and smoking
marijuana and the fact that she did not immediately call police. Mann asserts that D.W.
might have “falsely accused Mann of sexual misconduct” or might have been “too impaired
to remember what really happened in the bed with Mann.” Mann’s argument is
unconvincing. The reasons he identifies for doubting D.W.’s credibility are far less
significant than the attempted recantation in Foreman. Accordingly, Foreman does not
support Mann’s argument that there are special reasons to doubt D.W.’s testimony such
that corroborating evidence is required.
Before concluding, we note that Mann filed a pro se supplemental brief, which
mostly reiterates the arguments made by his appellate attorney. His pro se supplemental
brief alludes to two other potential arguments: that he was not convicted by a jury of his
peers and that his trial attorney provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel. But
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we do not construe Mann’s pro se supplemental brief to actually make such arguments or
to request reversal on those grounds.
In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support Mann’s conviction of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct.
Affirmed.