Tina Goede, Relator,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1320

Tina Goede,
Relator,

vs.

Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 12, 2023
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 48747325-3

James V. F. Dickey, Douglas P. Seaton, Upper Midwest Law Center, Golden Valley,
Minnesota (for relator)

Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, Wilmington, Delaware (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Lossom Allen, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. An assertion on appeal by the Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development that the decision of an unemployment-law judge sho uld be
reversed does not alter this court’s standard of review under Minnesota Statutes section
268.105, subdivision 7(d) (2022).
2
2. An unemployment-law judge’s denial of unemployment benefits based on an
applicant’s refusal to comply with an employer’s CO VID-19 vaccination policy violates
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and must be reversed, if the applicant’s
vaccine refusal was based on sincerely held religious beliefs. This court will not disturb a
factual finding that an applicant’s vaccine refusal was based on purely secular reasons, and
not sincerely held religious beliefs, if that finding is supported by substantial evidence.
OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Relator Tina Goede was discharged from her job because she refused to comply
with her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. She applied for unemployment
benefits asserting that her refusal to comply was based on her religious beliefs. The
unemployment-law judge (ULJ) found that Goede’s refusal to be vaccinated was based on
purely secular concerns about the efficacy and safety of the COVID -19 vaccine, not on a
sincerely held religious belief, and that she was therefore not eligible for unemployment
benefits.
On certiorari review, Goede argues that the ULJ’s determination lacks support in
the record and violates her rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Because the ULJ’s factual finding that Goede’s reasons were purely secular, not religious,
is supported by substantial evidence, we discern no violation of Goede’s free-exercise
rights and affirm.
3
FACTS
Goede was employed by respondent Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals LP as an account
sales manager. This position required her to meet with customers in-person at hospitals
and clinics. Some of these customers, including large health systems, required proof of
COVID-19 vaccination as a prerequisite to entering their facilities. Astra Zeneca had a
policy requiring employees to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine. The company’s policy allowed
for religious and medical exemptions. Goede requested but was denied a religious
exemption from the COVID-19 vaccination policy on the grounds of her religious beliefs.
Astra Zeneca terminated Goede’s employment on April 29, 2022, for failing to comply
with the company’s COVID-19 vaccination policy.
Goede applied for unemployment benefits, asserting that she had refused the
COVID-19 vaccination because of her religious beliefs. Respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development ( DEED) issued a determination
of ineligibility, which Goede appealed administratively to a ULJ.
Goede testified at the hearing held before the ULJ that she is Catholic and attends
church at least once a week. Goede further testified that she “uphold[s] a Christian
worldview” and that “vaccines can violate the scripture.” She explained that her “body is
a temple of the Holy Spirit, . . . so vaccines that contain neurotoxins, hazardous substances,
viruses, animal parts, foreign DNA, any of that, blood carcinogens, chemical waste is very
harmful to [her] body.” She testified that her religion prevents her from getting “[s]ome
vaccines depending what they’re made out of,” such as fetal cell lines or tissue. She
testified that she has not had any vaccinations as an adult except the tetanus vaccination.
4
Asked how she determines whether she can take a medication or vaccine, Goede testified
that she researches it. But Goede also testified that she did not research whether fetal cell
lines or tissue have been used in relation to the tetanus vaccination.
When questioned about her concerns specific to the COVID-19 vaccines, Goede
testified that she had learned that fetal cell lines or tissue were involved and that “any
aborted tissues, anything that is utilized with any of the vaccines, I will not, I will not use.”
She acknowledged that the Pope had approved of Catholics receiving the COVID- 19
vaccine but testified that she does not believe that the Pope is “a true Catholic” and was
advised by her priest not to get the vaccine.
Goede explained that she would use medications that had been developed using fetal
cell lines if it were a matter of “life or death.” She testified that she has a blood-clotting
disorder that caused her to have a pulmonary embolism. She stated that she has taken
Eliquis regularly for the last 20 years to prevent another embolism. She acknowledged she
did not research whether Eliquis involved the use of fetal cell lines because taking Eliquis
was “necessary.” She stated:
[I]t’s necessary in my view [because] if I don’t do anything and
I can have another clot and die tomorrow. . . . Because I know
there’s nothing natural that I can take to prevent this from
happening. I always go the natural route first, and if there isn’t
anything [then] I have a conversation, and I make sure that
what the conversation that I have is, is worth doing what I
either need to do or have to do, then that’s the only time that I
would ever go against my religion.

At one point during the hearing , the ULJ asked whether Goede would ever be
willing to take a COVID-19 vaccine if it was “developed without the use of fetal cells in
5
any way.” Goede answered no and stated: “I don’t take vaccinations.” The ULJ reminded
her that she has received the tetanus vaccination and asked, “[W]hy would a COVID-19
vaccine never be okay to take regardless of its development?” Goede responded: “Because
the vaccine doesn’t work.” She continued: “The vaccine has killed more people than it’s
saving and I haven’t had the vaccination and I had COVID once. More people that have
been vaccinated have gotten COVID multiple times. It doesn’t work. What’s the point?”
And she said: “If I was on my deathbed I wouldn’t take it because it doesn’t work.” The
following colloquy between the ULJ and Goede then ensued:
Q: So it sounds like you would never take the COVID-19
vaccine regardless of the development because you don’t feel
it’s necessary, is that correct?
A: I won’t take any vaccine if I don’t need it. It’s called natural
immunity.

Q: Sure. But am I understanding your testimony correctly that
you would never take any COVID-19 vaccine regardless of the
development of it.
A: If I have a reason to, but no, there is no reason.

Q: If COVID-19 would, would likely kill you, would you take
one of the COVID-19 vaccines if it was effective?
A: No, no, because it hasn’t killed me.

Q: Sure, but that’s, I think the thing I’m trying to understand
better and maybe my logic is off, Ms. Goede, [but] it sounds
like your pulmonary embolism hasn’t killed you yet either,
correct?
A: That’s completely different. Completely different.

Q: Well, it’s something but I, that’s what I want to understand
better. If you, you won’t take something because it hasn’t
killed you yet, you are taking something even though
something hasn’t killed you yet. So explain the difference so I
can understand.
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A: So my pulmonary embolism is completely different.
[T]aking the COVID vaccine is, is supposed to help and
prevent from you getting the COVID sickness, and this, my
pulmonary embolism is something that I will have . . . they are
two separate things altogether, completely, so I need to be on
Eliquis unless I want to have another pulmonary embolism and
perhaps die. I’m not going to die . . . because of COVID and
the vaccine . . . doesn’t work.

Q: Sure, but if the vaccine worked, would you take it?
A: No.

Q: And why not?
A: Because COVID is the flu, it’s just like the flu.

Following the hearing, the ULJ decided that Goede was not eligible for
unemployment benefits on the ground of employment misconduct because she failed to
comply with Astra Zeneca’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The ULJ found that “Goede
does not have a sincerely held religious belief that prevents her from receiving a COVID-
19 vaccine.” The ULJ explained: “Goede’s testimony, when viewed as a whole, shows by
a preponderance of the evidence that Goede’s concern is about some vaccines, and that she
is declining to take them because she does not trust them, not because of a religious belief.”
The ULJ further stated that “[w]hen looking at the totality of the circumstances, Goede’s
belief that COVID-19 vaccines are not oka y to put in her body is a personal belief not
rooted in religion.” Goede sought reconsideration, and the ULJ upheld the decision that
Goede was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
This certiorari appeal follows.
1

1 After Goede filed a brief, DEED filed a motion, asserting that the ULJ’s decision should
be reversed and requesting that the matter be scheduled for expedited consideration by a
special term panel. Goede filed a response in support of the motion. We granted the
7
ISSUES
I. Does DEED’s assertion that the ULJ’s decision should be reversed alter this court’s
standard of review?

II. Does substantial evidence support the ULJ’s finding that Goede’s refusal of the
COVID-19 vaccine was based on purely secular reasons, not sincerely held religious
beliefs?

ANALYSIS
I.
Under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law, Minn. Stat. §§ 268.001-.23
(2022), a person seeking unemployment benefits begins by filing an application with
DEED. Minn. Stat. § 268.07, subd. 1. Based on information received from an applicant
or an employer, DEED might issue a determination of ineligibility—a preliminary decision
that the applicant does not meet one of the requirements to be eligible for benefits. See
Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2. An applicant can appeal a determination of ineligibility
and obtain a de novo hearing before a ULJ. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1. The ULJ will
issue a decision following the hearing, and any party can seek reconsideration of that
decision. Id., subds. 1a, 2. The ULJ’s decision on reconsideration is the final agency
decision. Id., subd. 2.
The ULJ’s decision on reconsideration is subject to certiorari review by this court.
Id., subd. 7(a). Upon timely filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, this court
may affirm the decision of the unemployment law judge or
remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or
modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner

motion, and the matter was submitted on an expedited basis for nonoral consideration at
special term.
8
may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences,
conclusion, or decision are:
(1) in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the department;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
hearing record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.

Id., subd. 7(d). Thus, our authority to reverse a ULJ’s decision is contingent on our
determination that one or more of the six statutory grounds in subdivision 7(d) are satisfied.
DEED is the “primary responding party to any judicial action involving [a ULJ’s]
decision.” Id., subd. 7(e). 2 In most cases, DEED seeks affirmance of a ULJ’s decision.
But in some cases, like this one, DEED argues that the ULJ’s decision should be reversed.
DEED’s request for reversal presents us with the preliminary question of whether DEED’s
request alters our standard for reviewing the ULJ’s decision under Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d).
We conclude that we are bound by the statutory grounds for review set out in
subdivision 7(d) of Minnesota Statutes section 268.105 and must apply that statutory
standard in assessing whether to affirm or reverse the ULJ’s determination regardless of
the position taken by DEED before this court. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2 (stating

2 In appeals by applicants, employers who are parties to the proceedings before the ULJ
are also proper respondents. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(a) (requiring service of
petition for writ of certiorari on DEED and “any other party”); Larson v. Le Mere, 18
N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 1945) (“Any party who would be prejudiced by a reversal or
modification of an order, award, or judgment is an adverse party on whom a writ of
certiorari or notice of appeal must be served.”).
9
that the ULJ’s decision on reconsideration is “binding on the parties unless judicial review
is sought”); Rowe v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev., 704 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Minn. App. 2005)
(holding that the ULJ’s “decision is final as to the relator and as to the department” after
appeal period expires); cf. Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 4 (allowing commissioner to amend
determination of eligibility or ineligibility that has not become final if no appeal has been
filed).
There is no authority in the statute for us to reverse the ULJ’s decision based merely
on DEED’s request. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d).3 To the contrary, our statutory
mandate remains the same: We may reverse the decision of the ULJ only if one of the six
statutory grounds is satisfied. See id. Accordingly, we now turn our attention to a review
of the merits of this appeal.
II.
An applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits if she was discharged because
of employment misconduct. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1). Misconduct is defined as
“any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious
violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of

3 The parties to an appeal may settle their dispute and stipulate to dismissal. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 142.01. Or an appeal may become moot if the appealing party obtains the
requested relief. See, e.g., Sprenger v. Jacobs, 305 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. 1981)
(dismissing as moot appeal challenging condemnation orders that had been vacated). In
this appeal, notwithstanding DEED’s concession, there remains a live controversy because
Goede has not been paid the unemployment benefits to which she asserts she is entitled.
Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 758 (2013) (holding that standing existed
where government did not intend to defend Defense of Marriage Act but had not issued tax
refund sought in suit seeking to declare act unconstitutional).
10
the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a). “[A]n employee’s decision to violate knowingly a
reasonable policy of the employer is misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644
N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 2002). But even when the definition of misconduct is satisfied,
a decision denying unemployment benefits may be subject to reversal if it violates
constitutional rights. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(1).
A decision denying unemployment benefits infringes an applicant’s free-exercise
rights under the First Amendment if the employee is forced to choose between her sincerely
held religious beliefs and her employment. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S.
829, 832 (1989); see also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981) (explaining that “a person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of
a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program”).
Such an infringement is subject to strict scrutiny and thus can only be sustained upon
demonstration that it is the least-restrictive means to meet a compelling government
interest. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. 4 DEED has not asserted a government interest in

4 A similar test applies to claims asserted under the Freedom of Conscience Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. I, § 16. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d
393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (stating that “once a claimant has demonstrated a sincere religious
belief . . . the state should be required to demonstrate that public safety cannot be achieved
by proposed alternative means”). Hershberger is often cited for the proposition that the
Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection than the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. That is because the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on the Minnesota
Constitution to apply strict scrutiny to a religious infringement after the United States
Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of federal constitutional analysis in light of
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith held that strict
scrutiny did not apply to neutral laws of general application. 494 U.S. at 884 -85. But
Smith recognized and did not overrule the application of strict scrutiny in Thomas and other
cases addressing unemployment benefits. Id. at 883. The Court explained that

11
denying unemployment benefits based on vaccine refusal. Thus, we conclude that a ULJ’s
denial of unemployment benefits based on an applicant’s refusal to comply with an
employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy violates the Free Exercise Clause—and must be
reversed—if the applicant’s vaccine refusal was based on sincerely held religious beliefs.
See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(1).
However, “only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause,” and the Supreme Court has recognized the “difficulty of distinguishing between
religious and secular convictions and in determining whether a professed belief is sincerely
held.” Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833 (quotation omitted). The Court has further noted: “States
are clearly entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for invoking the
Free Exercise Clause.” Id.
The question of whether an applicant’s alleged employment misconduct is based on
sincerely held religious beliefs is a fact issue. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (instructing
that the “function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there was an
appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that
such work was forbidden by his religion”); see also In re Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d 88,

a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs
is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the
particular circumstances behind an applicant’s unemployment
. . . . [O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system
to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason.

Id. at 884 (citations omitted). Thus, at least in this context, state and federal constitutional
protections are coextensive.
12
91 (Minn. App. 1991) (reviewing for clear error district court finding that religious belief
was sincerely held). This court defers to the factual findings of a ULJ if the record
“reasonably tends to sustain those findings.” Schmidgall , 644 N.W.2d at 804; see also
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5). “We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most
favorable to the decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the
ULJ” and “will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially
sustains them.” Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. App. 2012)
(quotation omitted); see also Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn.
2016).
In determining that Goede was ineligible for unemployment benefits, the ULJ found
that Goede did not have a sincerely held religious belief that precluded her from complying
with her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. In reviewing that finding, we apply
the same standard that we ap ply to any other ULJ finding— affirming or reversing the
finding depending on whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5).
In this case, the ULJ found that “Goede’s testimony, when viewed as a whole, shows
by a preponderance of the evidence that Goede[] . . . declin[ed] to take [the vaccine]
because she does not trust [it], not because of a religious belief.” This finding is supported
in the record by Goede’s testimony that she would not take the vaccine even if she was on
her “deathbed” and no fetal cell lines had been used in its development “because it doesn’t
work” and “has killed more people than it’s saving.” The ULJ credited this testimony as
setting out Goede’s real reason for refusing to be vaccinated. And the ULJ found Goede’s
13
assertion of religious reasons for refusing the vaccine was not credible because her
testimony was “contradictory and illogical.”
The record supports th ese credibility findings of the ULJ. For example, Goede
testified that she researches whether a medical intervention is consistent with her religious
beliefs, but she then testified that she did not research the tetanus vaccination before
receiving it. 5 Goede also testified that she would take medications that had been tested
using fetal cell lines if it were “life or death,” but then testified that she would not take the
COVID-19 vaccine even if it were developed without the use of fetal cell lines or if
COVID-19 would likely kill her. When pressed on these inconsistencies, Goede responded
that she would not take the COVID-19 vaccine because it “doesn’t work,” COVID-19 is
“just like the flu,” and the vaccine does more harm than good.
Goede argues that it was improper for the ULJ to rely o n these types of
inconsistencies. To the extent that Goede’s argument references inconsistencies in
Goede’s religious practices, we agree that the courts are not to weigh whether a set of
religious beliefs or practices are internally consistent and logical. The Supreme Court has
observed that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or

5 Goede argues that the ULJ should not have considered her testimony that she was
vaccinated against tetanus without researching it because there is no evidence in the record
connecting that vaccine with fetal cell lines. But the point is not whether there is such a
connection, but that Goede did not research whether there was such a connection. Goede’s
failure to conduct any research regarding the tetanus vaccination, or another medication
she takes, contradicted her testimony that she researches medications and vaccines before
taking them. And this was a legitimate fact for the ULJ to consider in assessing credibility,
particularly when combined with Goede’s straightforward declaration that she would
refuse to take the vaccine even if the vaccine had no connection to fetal cell lines or tissue.
14
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection” and has
admonished that “[c]ourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs.” Thomas, 450
U.S. at 714-15. But w e do not read the ULJ’s decision as engaging in such a dissection.
Rather, the ULJ’s finding relied not on inconsistencies in her religious beliefs or practices,
but on inconsistencies in Goede’s testimony concerning her reasons for refusing to be
vaccinated. I nconsistencies in her testimony about her reasons for refusing to be
vaccinated are appropriate considerations when, as here, the ULJ was tasked with assessing
credibility. This is a significant distinction.
The applicable standard of review dictates that “[w]e view the ULJ’s factual
findings in the light most favorable to the decision, giving due deference to the credibility
determinations made by the ULJ.” Rowan, 812 N.W.2d at 882 (quotation omitted). “If
[the ULJ] engages in reasoned decisionmaking, the court will affirm, even though it may
have reached a different conclusion had it been the factfinder. ” Cable Commc’ns Bd. v.
Nor-West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn. 1984); see also Swenson
v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 151 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Minn. 1967) (explaining that courts must
“refrain from substituting their judgment concerning the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence for that of the agency”). Staying true to that standard of review, we conclude that
there is substantial evidence in this record to support the ULJ’s finding that Goede refused
to be vaccinated not because of her religious beliefs, but because of her purely secular
concern about safety and efficacy, namely that the vaccine “killed more people than it[]
sav[ed]” and “doesn’t work.” And, as such, we further conclude that the ULJ’s decision
15
that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits does not violate Goede’s rights under
the Free Exercise Clause.
Goede argues that the ULJ’s finding must nevertheless be reversed because Goede
cited religious reasons for her refusal, regardless of whether she also gave testimony
concerning the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. Goede maintains that, as long as she
testified that religious beliefs played a role in her decision to refuse to be vaccinated, then
her refusal is protected under the First Amendment and the ULJ’s decision must be
reversed. The ULJ, however, rejected on credibility grounds Goede’s testimony that her
refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine was based on her religious beliefs, and we have
concluded that that credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. Consequently,
this is not a case implicating a violation of the Free Exercise Clause when we give due
deference to the ULJ’s credibility determination.
Both Goede and DEED cite to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Wiggins v. Sargent,
753 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1985), as authority for reversing the ULJ’s decision.
But we
do not read Wiggins as being inconsistent with the ULJ’s decision here.
Wiggins involved a claim by a group of prisoners that they were denied the right to
practice their religion while in prison. They alleged that they were followers of the Church
of Jesus Christ Christian, an organization that existed outside the prison, and that they were
students of the Sword of Christ Good News Ministries, which preaches that “the white race
consists of God’s chosen people” and that the members of the church “are the literal and
spiritual descendants of Abraham and the ‘lost tribes’ of Israel.” 753 F.2d at 665. The
district court ruled that, while it
16
did not doubt the religious sincerity of the individual plaintiffs,
. . . it nevertheless . . . found that the notion of white supremacy
was secular and that making such a notion more palatable by
cloaking it in the garb of fundamentalist Christianity may result
in attracting followers and creating the appearance of spiritual
credibility, but it does not warrant the protection of the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment.

Id. at 665-66 (quotations omitted).
The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for reconsideration. The court reasoned that, even though “the notion of white supremacy
may be, and perhaps usually is, secular, in the sense that it is a racist idea, [that] does not
necessarily preclude it from also being religious in nature, in the sense that it may be based
upon a literal interpretation of Biblical teachings.” Id. at 667. The Eighth Circuit further
explained that the district court may have been “under the mistaken impression that an idea
or belief cannot be both secular and religious” and that “a belief can be both”; “[ t]he
categories are not mutually exclusive.” Id. at 666. The court thus sent the case back to the
district court to “reexamine the entire issue of whether the inmates’ beliefs are religious
and whether they are therefore entitled to some free exercise clause protection.” Id. at 667.
In Wiggins, the Eighth Circuit’s basis for reversing and remanding the case was that
the district court had rejected out of hand the prisoners’ claims that their religion was a
religion within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, instead of a purely secular dogma
of white supremacy. By contrast here, the ULJ’s determination did not reject the notion
that Goede’s religious beliefs were entitled to First Amendment protection. Instead, the
ULJ found that Goede’s reasons for refusing the vaccination were purely secular—her lack
of trust in the safety and efficacy of the vaccine. This finding was thus based on the ULJ’s
17
assessment of which parts of Goede’s testimony concerning her reasons for refusing the
vaccine should be credited, not the legitima cy of Catholicism as a religion or Goede’s
particular application of that religion . We thus reject Goede’s argument that the ULJ’s
decision is inconsistent with Wiggins.
DECISION
Notwithstanding DEED’s assertion in this appeal that the ULJ’s decision should be
reversed, we must review the ULJ’s decision under the standard set out in Minnesota
Statutes section 268.105, subdivision 7(d). Applying that standard, we conclude that
substantial evidence in the record supports the ULJ’s finding that Goede engaged in
employment misconduct when she refused to comply with her employer’s COVID-19
vaccination policy because her reasons for refusing to be vaccinated were secular and not
due to a sincerely held religious belief. Accordingly, the ULJ’s decision to deny
unemployment benefits did not violate Goede’s free-exercise rights and was not arbitrary
and capricious.
Affirmed.