Rachel Millington, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1369

Rachel Millington,
Relator,

vs.

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 12, 2023
Reversed
Segal, Chief Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 48752311-2

James V. F. Dickey, Douglas P. Seaton, Upper Midwest Law Center, Golden Valley,
Minnesota (for relator)

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Lossom Allen, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Relator Rachel Millington refused to comply with her employer’s COVID-19
vaccination policy and was required to terminate her employment. An unemployment-law
2
judge (ULJ) denied her subsequent application for unemployment benefits finding that her
refusal to comply with her employer’s policy constituted employment misconduct that
rendered her ineligible for benefits.
Millington contends that the record supports that her refusal to be vaccinated was
based on a sincerely held religious belief and that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment requires us to reverse the ULJ’s determination. Respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) agrees that the ULJ’s
determination should be reversed.1 We conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence
to support the ULJ’s finding that Millington’s vaccine refusal was not based on a sincerely
held religious belief. We therefore reverse the ULJ’s decision denying Millington
unemployment benefits.
FACTS
Millington was employed by respondent Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
(FRB) as a business analyst until February 28, 2022. Millington resigned her employment
after refusing to comply with FRB’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. Millington had been
granted a religious accommodation from the policy while working remotely. But as FRB
prepared to return its workforce to the office, it revisited Millington’s accommodation and
determined that continuing the accommodation would be unduly burdensome. FRB

1 Even though DEED agrees that the ULJ’s determination must be reversed, “we are bound
by the statutory grounds for review set out in subdivision 7(d) of Minnesota Statutes section
268.105 and must apply that statutory standard in assessing whether to affirm or reverse
the ULJ’s determination regardless of the position taken by DEED before this court.”
Goede v. Astra Zeneca Pharms., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A22-1320, slip op. at 8 (Minn.
App. June 12, 2023).
3
notified Millington that her employment would be terminated if she remained
unvaccinated. Millington resigned her employment in order to receive a payout of her
accrued paid-time-off benefit.
2
Millington applied for unemployment benefits, asserting that she had refused the
COVID-19 vaccination because of her religious beliefs.3 DEED issued a determination of
ineligibility. Millington filed an administrative appeal, and a hearing was scheduled before
a ULJ.
In written answers to questions posed by DEED, Millington explained her reasons
for refusing the COVID-19 vaccination:
I cannot receive the COVID-19 vaccine because of my
religious beliefs for two reasons. First, my body is a temple
unto my creator, as the Bible instructs me. 1 Corinthians 6:19-
22. Based on my understanding of the Bible, it is my God
given right to refuse to introduce any foreign substances into
my body that might be unnecessary or unsafe. . . . Second, I
cannot receive the vaccine because it was developed and tested
using cell lines from an aborted fetus. As a Christian, I believe
that abortion is the murder of an unborn child. To me, the use
of cells from an aborted fetus to develop and test the vaccine
makes anyone who takes the vaccine complicit in the murder
of that child.

2 Although she resigned, the ULJ found that Millington was discharged for purposes of the
unemployment-benefits determination. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(a) (2022)
(defining discharge to occur “when any words or actions by an employer would lead a
reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the employee to
work for the employer in any capacity”). That finding is not at issue on appeal.

3 Millington also asserted in her unemployment-benefits application and before the ULJ
that she had been discharged because of her age and FRB’s desire to avoid paying her
retirement benefits. The ULJ found that Millington was not discharged because of her age,
and Millington does not challenge this finding on appeal.
4
Millington stated that she had not received other vaccinations as an adult and that her
“church does not specifically teach about vaccines but teaches that Bible-believing
Christians should follow the dictates of their conscience and decide whether to get
vaccinated based on prayerful consideration.”
Millington also testified regarding her religious beliefs at the hearing before the
ULJ. She testified that she belongs to the Assemblies of God and attends church once
every couple of months, but that she daily practices her “own way of worship” with her
Bible and prayer time. She explained that, although no church leader had advised her not
to take the COVID-19 vaccine, she made her own decision because “[i]t’s between the
person and God I believe.” She testified that she did not get the vaccine because she
believed it to be “morally wrong.” At the hearing, Millington testified that taking the
vaccine “felt sinful” to her. She explained:
I’m a pro-life Christian. I’m against abortion. I have been
against abortion since the beginning. And when I started
researching the vaccine, I found out they used fetal cells from
abortion and that didn’t sit well with me at all. I felt like I
would be complicit to abortion if I participated in that.

She further testified:
I’m very much against injecting anything into my body. And
one of those reasons, I mean there’s a Bible verse that says, my
body’s my temple. But it’s not just that one verse. I truly
believe I lived that my entire life. Keeping, you know, being
healthy, maintaining my health, exercising, healthy eating.
Just not [injecting] any kind of chemicals has been almost, you
know, a religion my entire life.

In response to questioning by the ULJ, Millington acknowledged that she is not
against all medical interventions and takes over-the-counter medications including Tylenol
5
when needed. Asked whether she had done any research on Tylenol in relation to fetal cell
lines, Millington answered “no” and explained: “It’s not my goal right now to like find,
you know, what fetal cells are in all kinds of medications.” Millington answered “yes”
when her counsel asked her whether she would stop using Tylenol if she found out it “was
made using fetal cells.” Millington also testified that she drinks wine, which she believes
has health benefits, but very rarely drinks other forms of alcohol.
Millington acknowledged in her testimony that she had concerns about the safety
and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccine. She testified that she believed that she did not need
a vaccine because she had already contracted COVID-19. But she answered “no” in
response to the ULJ’s question: “So if you had not had COVID, would you have gotten the
vaccine?” She expressed her concern that people were getting sick from the vaccine and
explained that that was related to her religion because she is “religiously in favor of
maintaining [her] health.”
In response to questioning from her counsel, Millington testified that her “number
one reason” for not getting vaccinated was “because it’s against my religion, it’s against
what I believe about abortion, and I believe abortion is murder.” Her counsel concluded
by asking: “So if you found, if you were convinced that COVID vaccine was 100% safe, it
never made anyone sick, but it still contained fetal cells, you wouldn’t take it?”
[4] She
answered: “Correct.”

4 We note that there is no evidence in the record to support counsel’s assertion that “fetal
cells” were contained in any COVID- 19 vaccine. We nevertheless accept Millington’s
assertion as a statement of her beliefs, not as an established fact.
6
Following the hearing, the ULJ issued a decision determining that Millington had
committed employment misconduct by refusing to comply with her employer’s COVID-19
vaccination policy and that she was therefore ineligible for benefits. The ULJ found that
“Millington did not have a sincerely held religious belief that prevented her from getting
vaccinated against COVID-19.” The ULJ reasoned:
Based on Millington’s testimony . . . including that she
uses over-the-counter medications and alcohol, and no
religious leader has advised Millington against receiving the
COVID-19 vaccine, it is not credible that Millington has a
sincerely held religious belief that prevented her from getting
vaccinated against COVID-19. The more likely explanation is
that Millington made a personal decision not to get vaccinated
against COVID-19 because she is pro-life.

The ULJ noted that Millington had not researched whether fetal cell lines were used in
other medications she uses and that it was not her goal to do so. Millington sought
reconsideration, and the ULJ upheld the decision that Millington was not eligible for
unemployment benefits.
DECISION
We may affirm the decision of a ULJ or remand the case for further proceedings, or
we “may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the [relator] may have
been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are,” among other
things, in violation of constitutional provisions or unsupported by substantial evidence.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2022).
A ULJ’s decision denying unemployment benefits based on an applicant’s refusal
to comply with an employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy violates the Free Exercise
7
Clause of the First Amendment if the applicant’s vaccine refusal was based on sincerely
held religious beliefs. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981) (explaining that “a person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of
a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program”). We
will not disturb a ULJ’s factual finding that an applicant’s vaccine refusal was not based
on sincerely held religious beliefs if that finding is supported by substantial evidence. See
id.; Goede, slip op. at 14-15. “We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most
favorable to the decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the
ULJ” and “will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially
sustains them.” Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. App. 2012)
(quotation omitted); see also Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn.
2016).
Millington and DEED argue that there is not substantial evidence in the record to
support the ULJ’s finding that Millington did not have a sincerely held religious belief that
precluded her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccination. We agree. Millington clearly
and consistently testified regarding her religious reasons for refusing the COVID-19
vaccine. Millington’s testimony concerning personal reasons for refusing the vaccine —
that she already had COVID-19 and believed she did not need the vaccine and that she had
concerns about the safety of the vaccine— are not sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence.
In addition, although we generally defer to a ULJ’s credibility findings, the ULJ’s
credibility finding in this case was based on at least two erroneous considerations. First,
8
the ULJ erred by relying on the absence of direction from a religious leader to support a
finding that Millington did not have a sincerely held religious belief. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t
of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-33 (1989); see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16 (“[T]he
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members
of a religious sect.”). Second, the ULJ failed to explain how Millington’s use of over-the-
counter medications or alcohol is pertinent to her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine based
on its relationship to fetal cell lines. Consequently, the ULJ’s credibility determination is
not entitled to the same deference typically owed by an appellate court.
Finally, while the facts of this case bear similarity to those in our recent precedential
opinion in Goede, where we affirmed a ULJ’s ineligibility determination based on the
relator’s COVID-19 vaccine refusal, the facts leading to our conclusion in that case are
distinguishable from the record here. Goede, slip op. at 17. Both Goede and Millington
asserted that their belief that the COVID-19 vaccine had a connection to fetal cells lines
prevented them from taking the vaccine because of their religious opposition to abortion.
Goede, however, testified that she would not take the COVID-19 vaccine even if it had no
connection to fetal cells or abortion “because it doesn’t work” and “has killed more people
than it’s saving.” Id., slip op. at 12. By contrast, Millington testified that her “number
one” reason for not getting the vaccine was religious. She testified that, even if she was
convinced that the vaccine was 100% safe, she still would not take it because of her belief
that the vaccine used fetal cells and that this was against her religious beliefs as a “pro-life
Christian.”
9
As another example, Millington, like Goede, did not research whether certain
medical treatments were connected to fetal cell lines. Id., slip op. at 3-4. But unlike Goede,
Millington testified that it was not her goal to research all medications and that she would
avoid medications if she became aware of a connection to fetal cell lines. Goede’s
testimony on this point was inconsistent and contradictory. We thus affirmed the ULJ’s
denial of benefits in Goede because substantial evidence supported the ULJ’s credibility
determination that Go ede refused to be vaccinated because of her concerns over the
efficacy and safety of the vaccine, not her religious beliefs. Id., slip op. at 14-15. The
ULJ’s credibility determination in this case lacks that same level of evidentiary support
and, as a consequence, we reach a different result here than in Goede.
We therefore conclude that the ULJ’s finding—that Millington did not have a
sincerely held religious belief that precluded her from getting a COVID-19 vaccine —is
unsupported by substantial evidence.
Reversed.