In re the Matter of Joseph Rued, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1420

In re the Matter of Joseph Rued,
Appellant,

vs.

the Commissioner of Human Services,
Respondent.

Filed June 26, 2023
Vacated; motion denied
Johnson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-22-7318

William J. Mauzy, William R. Dooling, Mauzy Law Office, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
A person commencing a proceeding pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
256.045, subdivision 7 (2022), must serve the notice of appeal on the commissioner of
human services and “any adverse party of record.” If the person commencing the
proceeding does not serve the notice of appeal on each adverse party of record, the district
court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding.

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OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Joseph Rued is the father of a young child. Rued seeks a hearing before a human-
services judge to challenge Scott County’s determination that the child has not been
sexually abused. Rued commenced this proceeding in the district court pursuant to a statute
authorizing judicial review of a decision of the commissioner of human services. The
district court ruled that Rued is not entitled to a hearing before a human-services judge.
We do not reach the merits of the district court’s decision. Rather, we conclude that the
district court did n ot have subject-matter jurisdiction over the proceeding because Rued
did not serve his initial pleading on Scott County, as required by the statute authorizing the
proceeding. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s decision.
FACTS
Sometime before January 18, 2022, Rued made a report to Scott County that his
child may have been sexually abused. The Scott County Health and Human Services
Division conducted an investigation to determine whether maltreatment has occurred and
whether child-protective services are necessary. The county interviewed family members
and other persons and reviewed documents relating to prior child- protection cases and
related court cases.
The county informed Rued by letter that it determined that maltreatment has not
occurred and that child-protective services are not necessary. The letter states that the
county previously had received 11 reports of alleged maltreatment and had conducted four
prior investigations, all of which had resulted in the conclusion that no maltreatment has
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occurred. The letter also states that, in 2019, the county determined that the child had
suffered from “the detrimental psychological effects [of] being subjected to repeated
questioning and investigation.” The county’s letter concludes by stating, “If you do not
agree with the county’s determination regarding maltreatment, you may ask the county to
reconsider its determination.”
Rued requested reconsideration of the county’s determination of no maltreatment.
Two weeks later, the county informed Rued by letter that the county had conducted “[a]n
independent review of the record” and had determined that its “ determination of no
maltreatment was appropriate.” The county’s letter concludes by stating, “You have the
right to appeal the maltreatment determination by requesting a fair hearing under
Minnesota Statutes, section 256.045” with a written request to the Minnesota Department
of Human Services (DHS).
In March 2022, Rued submitted a request to DHS for a fair hearing pursuant to
section 256.045. The request was assigned to a human -services judge (HSJ), who held a
pre-hearing conference in April 2022. Rued was present at the pre-hearing conference and
was represented by two attorneys. Two Scott County employees were present, as was an
Assistant Scott County Attorney. The county argued that Rued is not entitled to a fair
hearing on a determination that maltreatment has not occurred (as opposed to a
determination that maltreatment has occurred). The HSJ requested that Rued and the
county submit briefs on that issue, and they did so.
In May 2022, the HSJ issued a six-page decision recommending that the
commissioner of human services dismiss Rued’s request for a fair hearing on the ground
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that Rued is not entitled to such a hearing with respect to a no-maltreatment determination.
A representative of the commissioner adopted the HSJ’s decision as the final decision of
DHS.
Rued then commenced this action to challenge the commissioner’s decision. He
filed a document captioned “notice of appeal” with the Scott County District Court. He
served his initial pleading on the commissioner of human services. He did not serve it on
Scott County.1
The district court conducted a hearing in early August 2022. Rued was present at
the hearing and was represented by an attorney. An Assistant Scott County Attorney also
appeared. After the hearing, Rued submitted a letter brief in which he summarized the
reasons why he is entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ. Rued also argued, apparently
in response to an argument made by the county at the hearing, that he was not required to
serve his initial pleading on the county. The county submitted a responsive letter brief in
which it argued, among other things, that the district court did not have jurisdiction because
Rued did not serve his initial pleading on the county. The county argued in the alternative
that the HSJ correctly decided that Rued is not entitled to a fair hearing.

1Throughout this opinion, we refer to the district-court proceeding as an “action”
rather than an “appeal” because the supreme court did so in In re Skyline Materials, Ltd.,
835 N.W.2d 472, 473-78 (Minn. 2013), because doing so tends to avoid confusion with an
appeal to an appellate court, and because the term “action” is used in the rules of civil
procedure, which apply to a proceeding authorized by Minnesota Statutes section 256.045,
subdivision 7, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 1, 2, 81, app. A; Reynolds v. Minnesota Dep’t of Human
Servs., 737 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. App. 2007). We refer to the document that
commences the district-court proceeding as the “initial pleading” rather than a “notice of
appeal” for similar reasons.
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One week after the hearing, the district court filed a two-page order denying Rued’s
appeal. The district court resolved the jurisdictional issue by reasoning that Rued was
required to serve his initial pleading on the county but the county waived the jurisdictional
defect—which the district court deemed a matter of personal jurisdiction—by appearing at
the hearing. The district court resolved the merits of Rued’s appeal by reasoning that he is
not permitted to challenge a determination of no maltreatment.
Rued appeals. He argues that the district court erred by denying his appeal. He
contends that a statute gives him a right to a fair hearing before the HSJ.2 In response, the
county makes two arguments. The county first argues that Rued was required to serve his

2After briefing but before oral argument, Rued moved to strike certain portions of
the county’s brief that refer to prior opinions of this court in related cases . See Rued v.
Rued, No. A22-0812, 2023 WL 193669 (Minn. App. Jan. 17, 2023 ); Rued v. Rued, No.
A21-0798, 2022 WL 2298992 (Minn. App. J une 27, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28,
2022). In general, the record on appeal consists of “documents filed in the trial court, the
exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. “We
generally will not consider matters outside the record on appeal or evidence not produced
and received in the district court.” MacDonald v. Brodkorb, 939 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn.
App. 2020). But we generally may consider public records, even if they are not part of the
district court record. See, e.g., Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 168-
69 n.1 (Minn. 2021). It is not uncommon for appellate courts to cite prior appellate
opinions in related cases. See, e.g., Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233-34
& n.2 (Minn. 2007) (relying on prior opinion in related case when reciting relevant facts).
Rued has not cited any authority for the proposition that it is improper for an appellate
court to do so. It is notable that, in his own brief, Rued cited our opinion in Rued, 2022
WL 2298992, in the course of explaining that he seeks a fair hearing because the custody
proceeding in that case “ did not allow him to properly develop a record regarding [the
child]’s maltreatment.” Having cited that prior opinion in his own brief, he cannot
complain about the county’s use of prior opinions in a similar manner. In any event, we
have resolved this appeal based solely on the facts contained in the district court record in
this case. See Drewitz, 728 N.W.2d at 233 n.2 (denying motion to strike because court did
not rely on facts stated in objected-to portions of brief). Thus, we deny Rued’s motion to
strike.

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initial pleading on both the commissioner and the county, that his failure to serve the county
deprived the district court of subject- matter jurisdiction, and that the district court should
have dismissed Rued’s appeal for that reason . The county argues in the alternative that
Rued is not entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ. Because we have an obligation to
ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction exists before we review the merits of the district
court’s decision, see, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 820 N.W.2d 807, 812- 13 (Minn. 2012), we
begin by considering the county’s jurisdictional argument. Because the county’s
jurisdictional argument is dispositive, we do not reach the parties’ arguments concerning
whether Rued has a right to a fair hearing before the HSJ.
ISSUE
Did the district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over Rued’s action in light of
the fact that Rued did not serve his initial pleading on Scott County?
ANALYSIS
A.
To provide context for our analysis of the county’s jurisdictional argument, we
begin by reciting the law that applies to Rued’s action.
This case arises from chapter 260E of the Minnesota Statutes, which is captioned
“reporting of maltreatment of minors.” Under the act, “Any person may voluntarily report
to the local welfare agency, agency responsible for assessing or investigating the report,
police department, county sheriff, tribal social services agency, or tribal police department
if the person knows, has reason to believe, or suspects a child is being or has been
maltreated.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.06, subd. 2 (2022). Local welfare agencies are responsible
7
for investigating allegations of sexual abuse of a child by family members, relatives, and
other persons with a significant relationship to the child. Minn. Stat. § 260E.14, subd. 2(a)
(2022). The local welfare agency must conclude its investigation within 45 days and must
determine “whether maltreatment occurred” and “whether child protective services are
needed.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.24, subds. 1, 3(a) (2022). Within ten business days of the
conclusion of an investigation , the local welfare agency must communicate its
determination, with “a summary of the specific reasons for the determination,” to the
parents or guardians of a child who is the subject of a report and to “the person determined
to be maltreating the child.” Id., subd. 5(a).
A request for reconsideration may be submitted by either a person who was
determined to have maltreated a child or “an interested person acting on behalf of the child,
regardless of the determination, who contests the investigating agency’s final
determination regarding maltreatment.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.33, subd. 2(a) (2022). If the
local welfare agency denies a request for reconsideration, a “person . . . entitled to a fair
hearing under section 256.045” may submit a written request for such a hearing to the
commissioner of human services. Id., subd. 3(a). A person is “entitled to a fair hearing
under section 256.045” if the person satisfies any one of 14 criteria in that statute. Id.; see
also Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 3(a)(1)-(14). The sixth criterion confers a right to a fair
hearing on “any person to whom a right of appeal according to this section is given by other
provision of law.” Id., subd. 3(a)(6). In Fosselman v. Commissioner of Human Services,
612 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. App. 2000), this court reasoned that the sixth criterion confers a
right to a fair hearing on any person who has a constitutional right to a hearing. Id. at 459-
8
60. We concluded that “Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 3(a)(6), affords a statutory right to a
hearing where due process rights would otherwise be violated.” Id. at 465.
The commissioner of human services may accept or refuse to accept the
recommendation of an HSJ. Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 5. “A party aggrieved by an
order of the commissioner may appeal under subdivision 7.” Id. Subdivision 7 provides,
in relevant part:
[A]ny party who is aggrieved by an order of the commissioner
of human services, . . . may appeal the order to the district court
of . . . , in appeals under subdivision 3b, the county where the
maltreatment occurred, by serving a written copy of a notice of
appeal upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record
within 30 days after the date the commissioner issued the order,
the amended order, or order affirming the original order, and
by filing the original notice and proof of service with the court
administrator of the district court. . . . The commissioner may
elect to become a party to the proceedings in the district court.

Id., subd. 7; see also Chorolec v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Human Servs., 990 N.W.2d
474, 476-78 (Minn. App. 2023) (concluding that plaintiff properly commenced action by
serving initial pleading on commissioner within 30 days despite filing it with district court
after more than 30 days).
On appeal, Rued relies on the sixth criterion in section 256.045, subdivision 3(a),
and Fosselman in arguing that he is entitled to a fair hearing before the HSJ to challenge
Scott County’s no-maltreatment determination because he has a constitutional right to a
hearing under the Due Process Clause.

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B.
We next consider Scott County’s argument that Rued was required to serve his
initial pleading on the county.
It is undisputed that section 256.045, subdivision 7, expressly required Rued to serve
his initial pleading on the commissioner and that he did so. T he county argues that Rued
also was required to serve his initial pleading on the county. The county focuses on the
statutory language requiring service on “the commissioner and any adverse party of
record.” See Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7 (emphasis added). In an appeal arising from
a different statute with similar language, the supreme court defined the term “adverse
party” to mean a “party whose interest in relation to the subject of the appeal is in direct
conflict with a reversal or modification of the order or judgment appealed from” or a party
who “will be prejudiced or adversely affected by reversal or modification of judgment
appealed from.” In re Estate of Meyer, 186 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Minn. 1971) (quotations
omitted) (applying Minn. Stat. § 525.712).
In this case, the county previously appeared at the pre-hearing conference conducted
by the HSJ through two employees and an assistant county attorney. If the HSJ were to
conduct a fair hearing, he would determine whether a preponderance of the evidence
supports the county’s determination that Rued’s child was not maltreated. Accordingly,
the county has an interest in the matter that would be considered by the HSJ and, thus, an
interest in the commissioner’s decision. If the HSJ were to determine that the evidence
does not support the county’s determination, the HSJ presumably would recommend that
the commissioner require the county to take appropriate action on Rued’s report. In that
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event, the county’s interest would be “in direct conflict with a reversal or modification of
the order or judgment appealed from ,” and the county would be “prejudiced or adversely
affected by reversal or modification of judgment appealed from.” See id. Consequently,
the county was an “adverse party of record” in the proceedings that led to the
commissioner’s decision, which is the decision under review. See Minn. Stat. § 256.045,
subd. 7.
Thus, Rued was required to serve his initial pleading on the county.
C.
We now consider Scott County’s argument that Rued’s failure to serve his initial
pleading on the county deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The concept of subject-matter jurisdiction “refers to a court’s authority ‘to hear and
determine a particular class of actions and the particular questions’ presented to the court
for its decisi on.” Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc., 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012)
(quoting Robinette v. Price, 8 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. 1943)). Whether a court has
subject-matter jurisdiction “generally depends on the scope of the constitutional and
statutory grant of authority to the court.” McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais
Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016). A party may raise a question of subject-
matter jurisdiction “at any time.” Dead Lake Ass’n, Inc. v. Otter Tail County, 695 N.W.2d
129, 134 (Minn. 2005). Furthermore, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or
forfeited by a party. Seehus v. Bor-Son Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010).
Not every use of the word “jurisdiction” implicates the concept of subject-matter
jurisdiction. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “Jurisdiction . . . is a word
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of many, too many, meanings.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006)
(quotation omitted). For example, a time limitation that might be described as “mandatory
and jurisdictional” is, nonetheless, “not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’” Id. (quotations
omitted). Such time limitations generally “do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction”
but, rather, “are claim -processing rules that do not delineate what cases . . . courts are
competent to adjudicate.” Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443 , 453-54 (2004) (quotation
omitted). Similarly, statutes that define the elements of a cause of action generally do not
affect a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510-16. A statute or rule
is deemed jurisdictional “only if Congress clearly states that it is. ” Santos- Zacaria v.
Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2023) (quotations omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that its own caselaw concerning
jurisdiction also has been “at best . . . confusing.” Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421
(Minn. 2006). But the supreme court has he ld that a district court does not lose subject-
matter jurisdiction by not complying with a statutory requirement to conduct a hearing on
a civil-commitment petition within 90 days. In re Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d
422, 426-30 (Minn. 2007) (citing Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 1 (2006)). Similarly, the
supreme court has held that a district court does not lack subject -matter jurisdiction if a
party seeking judicial review of a city’s special assessment failed to object within the time
period required by statute. McCullough, 883 N.W.2d at 587-90 (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 429.061, subd. 2 (2014)). The supreme court has used the term “claim-processing rules”
to describe such statutory requirements. Id. at 588.
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In addition, the supreme court stated in McCullough that statutory or rules-based
requirements concerning service of process generally do not affect subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 590. This is so because “service of process is the means by which a
court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. at 590 (emphasis added). As an
example, the McCullough court cited In re Skyline Materials, Ltd., 835 N.W.2d 472 (Minn.
2013). Id. In Skyline, the district court dismissed an action under Minnesota Statutes
section 394.27, subdivision 9, for judicial review of a county board of adjustment’s zoning-
variance decision because the plaintiffs, who owned property adjacent to the variance
applicant’s property, did not serve the county in the manner required by rule 4.03 of the
rules of civil procedure. 835 N.W.2d at 473-78. The supreme court concluded in Skyline
that “the district court lacked jurisdiction.” I d. at 477. The supreme court later clarified
that the jurisdictional defect in Skyline was a matter of “personal jurisdiction, not subject-
matter jurisdiction.” McCullough, 883 N.W.2d at 590 n.3. A defect in personal jurisdiction
(unlike a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction) can be waived or forfeited by a party.
Shamrock Development, Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 381- 82 (Minn. 2008); Patterson
v. Wu Fam. Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 866-67 (Minn. 2000).
The supreme court applied Skyline in Schulz v. Town of Duluth, 936 N.W.2d 334
(Minn. 2019), which concerned an action under Minnesota Statutes section 462.361,
subdivision 1, fo r judicial review of a township board’s zoning- variance decision. Id. at
336-38. The plaintiffs in Schulz served process on the township but did not serve process
on the variance applicants, who were interested parties. Id. at 337-38. The supreme court
noted that both the statute authorizing the action and the applicable township ordinance
13
were silent as to who must be served. Id. at 338-39. The supreme court noted that the
township had made the decision that was under review and that the statute expressly
allowed the township to assert an affirmative defense, which indicated that the township
was a party in any action under the statute. Id. at 339. For those reasons, the supreme court
held that “a district court retains jurisdiction when the municipality is served, regardless of
whether a necessary party is also served” and that the plaintiffs’ “failure to serve [the
variance applicants] and make them parties to the action does not mean that the district
court loses jurisdiction over the entire action.” Id. at 340.
The Schulz case is similar to the present case, but another supreme court opinion is
more closely on point. In Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2007), two property
owners appealed condemnation awards to the district court. Id. at 359. The statute
authorizing the appeals specified that a party to a condemnation proceeding “may appeal
to the district court from any award of damages” by doing two things:
(1) filing with the court administrator a notice of such appeal,
and (2) serving by mail a copy of such notice on all respondents
and all other parties to the proceedings having an interest in
any parcel described in the appeal who are shown in the
petitioner’s affidavit of mailing, required by section 117.115,
subdivision 2, as having been mailed a notice of the report of
the commissioners.

Id. at 360 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 117.145 (2006)). The property owners
in Woodhall served their respective notices of appeal on the attorney general but not on
other persons who had been identified in the state’s condemnation petitions as having
interests in the described parcels . Id. at 359. The state moved to dismiss the appeals on
the ground that the property owners did not serve their notices of appeal on all parties
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entitled to service. Id. at 359-60. The district court granted the motion, and this court
affirmed. Id. at 360. The supreme court agreed with the lower courts that the property
owners failed to serve all parties entitled to service. Id. at 360-62. The supreme court then
considered “whether the appeal may go forward without the notice of appeal having been
served on all parties required by the statute.” Id. at 362. The supre me court concluded
that, as a consequence of the failure of service, “the district court has no subject matter
jurisdiction over appellants’ condemnation appeals.” Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
In this case, Rued seeks review of the commissioner’s decision pursuant to a statute
that is very similar to the statute in Woodhall. Section 256.045, subdivision 7, expressly
requires an appealing party to do two things: first, “serv [e] a written copy of a notice of
appeal upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record,” and, second, “fil[e] the
original notice and proof of service with the court administrator of the district court.”
Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7. The Woodhall court concluded that, because the plaintiffs
failed to serve their notice of appeal on all persons entitled to service, the district court did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction. 738 N.W.2d at 363. In light of Woodhall, if a plaintiff
fails to serve all persons entitled to service under section 256.045, subdivision 7 —the
commissioner of human services and any adverse party of record— a district court does
not have subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Schulz opinion does not apply here because the statute in that case is
meaningfully different from the statute in this case. The statute in Schulz did not specify
any governmental entity or person that was required to be served. See Minn. Stat.
§ 462.361, subd. 1 (2022). In that situation, the supreme court reasoned that service on the
15
township was “enough to perfect an appeal under section 462.361 and confer jurisdiction
on the district court.” Schulz, 936 N.W.2d at 339. In this case, however, the statute
expressly requires a plaintiff to serve the initial pleading on both the commissioner and
“any adverse party of record,” Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, thus indicating that service
on all adverse parties is necessary to “perfect an appeal.” See Schulz, 936 N.W.2d at 339.
In addition, the statute in this case provides that the commissioner “may elect to become a
party to the proceedings in the district court,” Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, thus
indicating that the commissioner is not automatically a party to an action commenced under
the statute, which makes the presence of an adverse party all the more necessary. See
Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 298-99 (Minn. 2012) (stating that justiciable
controversy requires, among other things, “genuine conflict . . . between parties with
adverse interests”).
Rued served his initial pleading on the commissioner of human services, who made
the decision that is under review. But Rued did not serve his initial pleading on the county,
which is an adverse party because it made the determination about which Rued seeks a
hearing before the HSJ. Rued’s failure to serve his initial pleading on the county deprived
the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. See Woodhall, 738 N.W.2d
at 363.
In light of that conclusion, we do not reach Rued’s argument that he is entitled to a
fair hearing before the HSJ.

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DECISION
The district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Rued’s action for
judicial review of the commissioner’s decision because Rued did not serve his initial
pleading on Scott Cou nty, an adverse party of record. Therefore, we vacate the district
court’s decision. See Howard v. Svoboda, 890 N.W.2d 111, 11 6 (Minn. 2017); Nelson v.
Schlener, 859 N.W.2d 288, 296 (Minn. 2015); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 658 N.W.2d 909,
913 (Minn. App. 2003); Neitzel v. County of Redwood, 521 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn. App.
1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994).
Vacated; motion denied.