State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1456

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Krista Michelle Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed August 7, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-20-1942

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Lindsey S. Lindstrom, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the use of a prior impaired-driving- related license revocation
as an aggravating factor enhancing her driving while impaired (DWI) conviction to a
third-degree offense. Because this is not a unique case justifying a collateral attack on the
prior impaired-driving-related license revocation, we affirm.
FACTS
Following a May 28, 2020 traffic stop, respondent State of Minnesota charged
appellant Krista Michelle Wilson with, among other crimes not challenged in this appeal,
third-degree DWI, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2018), based on a
positive blood test for methamphetamine. The charge was enhanced to a third-degree
offense because Wilson’s driver’s license had been revoked two months earlier based on a
November 24, 2019 DWI-related traffic stop. Wilson did not seek judicial review of the
revocation within the statutory 60-day period. After the judicial review period to contest
the driver’s-license revocation had ended, Wilson successfully moved to suppress the
evidence of impairment in the related criminal DWI proceeding.
In the present case, which is based on the May 28 stop, Wilson moved to exclude
evidence of the license revocation from being used to enhance the DWI charge. She argued
that the state could not use the revocation as an aggravating factor because the evidence of
impairment had been suppressed in the criminal case related to the November 24 stop. The
district court denied Wilson’s motion and, in a stipulated-facts trial, found Wilson guilty
of third-degree DWI. Wilson appeals.
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DECISION
Minnesota law prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle with any amount
of methamphetamine in the person’s body. Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7), 152.02,
subd. 3(d) (2018). A person who violates this provision “is guilty of third-degree driving
while impaired if one aggravating factor was present when the violation was committed. ”
Minn. Stat. § 169A.26, subd. 1(a) (2018). Aggravating factors include “a qualified prior
impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately preceding the current offense.”
Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 3(1) (2018). A “‘[q]ualified impaired driving incident’
includes prior impaired driving convictions and prior impaired driving-related losses of
license.” Id., subd. 22 (2018).
We review de novo legal conclusions regarding the use of a prior license revocation
to enhance DWI charges. State v. Goharbawang, 705 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Minn. App. 2005),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2006); see also Thole v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d
17, 19 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 2013) (reviewing de novo
due-process challenge to license revocation).
Use of an unreviewed license revocation as an aggravating DWI factor does not
violate a defendant’s due-process rights. State v. Coleman, 661 N.W.2d 296, 301 (Minn.
App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003). A challenge to the validity of the underlying
revocation used as an aggravating factor is a collateral challenge to the revocation.
Anderson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 878 N.W.2d 926, 930 (Minn. App. 2016). A collateral
challenge attacks the final outcome of another proceeding which is being used as an
element of a charged offense. Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 509 N.W.2d 380, 391- 92
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(Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 517 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1994). Because collateral challenges
weaken the finality of judgments, they are allowed only in “unique cases.” State v. Warren,
419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988); Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 930 (citing this aspect of
Warren in the implied-consent context).
Wilson argues that hers is a unique case because she was indigent and unable to
afford counsel to help her seek rev iew of the driver’s-license revocation. Wilson
additionally argues that, had she been able to afford counsel and sought judicial review of
the driver’s-license revocation, her license revocation would have been rescinded because
evidence of intoxication in the related criminal proceeding was suppressed. We are not
persuaded that Wilson presents a unique case.
First, parties in civil implied-consent proceedings do not have the right to
court-appointed counsel. Thole, 831 N.W.2d at 22. Thus, Wilson’s indigency and lack of
counsel do not present a unique case.
Second, license revocation “is a civil penalty imposed administratively regardless
of the outcome of any criminal proceeding [for DWI] arising from the same incident.”
State v. Hanson, 356 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d
650, 663 (Minn. 2007) (holding that “collateral estoppel is inapplicable to issues litigated
in DWI prosecutions that were previously litigated in implied consent proceedings because
the Commissioner of Public Safety and the state are not in privity, and in this instance the
state did not have a full and fair opportunity to be heard”). Because the proceedings for
license revocation and DWI are separate such that issues decided in one proceeding are not
precluded from being relitigated in the other, suppression of the evidence and dismissal of
5
the DWI charges related to the November 24 stop do not indicate that revocation of
Wilson’s license would have been rescinded, had she challenged it.
Additionally, Wilson mistakenly relies on Anderson as support for her claim. There,
we concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition
for judicial review of a license revocation and the petitioner’s due-process rights were not
violated because he had adequate notice of the revocation despite alleged mental
incompetence. Anderson, 878 N.W.2d at 927-28. In dicta, we also noted that arguments
about the use of prior revocation as an enhancement “should be raised at the time a person
is charged with a crime,” not in an implied- consent proceeding. Id. at 930 (quotation
omitted). Like in Anderson, Wilson did not ti mely challenge her license revocation, and,
as discussed, allowing a collateral challenge is not warranted in her case.
Affirmed.