State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1475

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tracy Allen Mitchell,
Appellant.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-21-2050

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Kathleen J. Schur, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to being
an ineligible person in possession of a firearm, arguing that he did not admit at the plea
hearing that he knew that his 1995 conviction of a crime in Colorado would be a crime of
violence in Minnesota that rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1995, appellant Tracy Mitchell was convicted of second-degree burglary for theft
from a dwelling in Colorado. In 2021, he was found to be in possession of a firearm at his
Minnesota residence. He was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person and one count of receiving stolen property.
At his plea hearing, appellant testified that he had been convicted of second-degree
burglary in Colorado in 1995; that he agreed that, in Minnesota, this would be a crime of
violence; and that he was ineligible to possess a firearm when a firearm was found in his
residence in 2021. He did not testify whether he knew when he possessed the firearm that
the Colorado conviction rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm in Minnesota. The
state dismissed the count of receiving stolen property, and appellant noted his intent to
move for a sentencing departure. At the sentencing hearing, appellant’s motion for a
sentencing departure was denied, and he received the guideline sentence of 60 months in
prison.
He challenges the denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his
plea was not accurate.
3
DECISION
[A] court must allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. . . . A
manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be
constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of
showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the validity of a plea
presents a question of law that we review de novo.

State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93-94 (Minn. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).
The district court judge must ensure that there are
sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that
defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires
to plead guilty. We do not require that a defendant expressly
admit each essential element of the crime; all that is required is
that the defendant admit facts that are adequate to allow the
district court to reasonably infer an essential element of the
crime from the record.

Bonnell v. State, 984 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Minn. 2022) (quotation and citations omitted).
Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not
admit and the state did not prove that appellant knew his 1995 Colorado conviction made
him ineligible to possess a firearm at the time he was found to be in possession of the
firearm. For this argument, he relies on Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200
(2019) (concluding that, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (providing that it is unlawful for
certain individuals to possess firearms), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2018) (providing that
anyone who knowingly violates § 922(g) shall be fined or imprisoned for up to ten years),
the government “must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that
he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a
firearm”). Here, appellant asserts that, because the state did not prove and appellant did
4
not admit that he knew he belonged to the category of those barred from possessing a
firearm at the time he was found in possession of a firearm, his plea was inaccurate and
therefore invalid.
But Rehaif is distinguishable because there is no mens rea element in the relevant
Minnesota statutes: Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020), provides that those not
entitled to possess firearms include “a person who has been convicted of . . . in this state
or elsewhere, a crime of violence . . . [which] includes crimes in other states . . . which
would have been crimes of violence as herein defined if they had been committed in this
state,” and Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2(b) (2020), provides that such persons who
possess firearms are “guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.” Appellant argues
that this court should read a mens rea requirement into the statute, but that is beyond the
scope of this court’s authority. See State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 304-05 (Minn. 2015)
(holding that, when the statute does not include a mens rea requirement, the court will not
supply one because courts cannot supply what the legislature either purposely omits or
inadvertently overlooks).
Moreover, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 3(a) (2020), provides that, although the
court shall inform defendants convicted of violent crimes that they are prohibited from
possessing firearms and that doing so is a felony, the court’s failure to inform them of this
“does not affect the applicability of the . . . possession prohibition or the felony penalty.”
Thus, the legislature did not intend to require the state to prove that a defendant knew of
his ineligibility.
5
In any event, the Supreme Court has limited Rehaif in Greer v. United States, 141
S. Ct. 2090 (2021), a consolidated case involving two defendants, Gregory Greer and
Michael Gary.
In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government must
prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm,
but also that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the
firearm.
As many courts have recognized and as common sense
suggests, individuals who are convicted felons ordinarily know
that they are convicted felons. That simple point turns out to
be important in the two cases before us.

. . . .

. . . Felony status is simply not the kind of thing that one
forgets. . . .

. . . .

. . . Neither defendant has ever disputed the fact of their
prior convictions. At trial, Greer stipulated to the fact that he
was a felon. And Gary admitted that he was a felon when he
pled guilty. Importantly, on appeal neither Greer nor Gary has
argued or made a representation that they would have
presented evidence at trial that they did not in fact know they
were felons when they possessed firearms. . . .

. . . .

. . . [D]emonstrating prejudice under Rehaif will be
difficult for most convicted felons for one simple reason:
Convicted felons typically know they’re convicted felons.

Greer, 141 S. Ct. 2095, 2097-98 (quotations and citations omitted). Appellant, like Greer
and Gary, has not argued that he did not know he was a felon, only that he did not admit to
the district court that he knew he was a felon.
6
In his reply brief, appellant attempts to distinguish Greer on the ground that the
Minnesota statute prohibits only those convicted of a crime of violence from possessing
firearms, while the federal statute prohibits any felon from possessing a firearm, and that
appellant “may never have known—and at the very least did not admit that he knew —that
that [Colorado 1995] felony prohibited him from possessing a firearm in Minnesota in
2021.” But the Minnesota statute does not require that appellant knew or admit that he
knew his prior felony prohibited him from possessing a firearm: Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 3(a), provides that the court’s failure to inform a defendant of this does not make the
statute or the penalty inapplicable.
Appellant has not shown that his guilty plea was inaccurate.
Affirmed.