State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0054

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joel Armen Underwood, III,
Appellant.

Filed January 16, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-22-4094

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
In this direct appeal from his conviction and appeal from the denial of a petition for
postconviction relief, appellant Joel Armen Underwood argues his conviction violated due
process and that he entered an inaccurate and unintelligent plea. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In 1999, a Dakota County district court convicted Underwood of third-degree
assault—a crime of violence—and placed him on probation. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712,
subd. 5 (1996)1 (defining “crime of violence” to include third-degree assault). In 2000, the
district court discharged Underwood from probation and issued an order that restored all
his “civil rights” and “full citizenship” (the discharge order). The discharge order, correctly
stating the law at the time, prohibited Underwood from possess ing a firearm “until [ten]
years” after the court restored his civil rights because he committed a crime of violence.
See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2000). Three years later, the Minnesota legislature
amended the statute to replace the ten-year ban with a lifetime ban for individuals who
commit a crime of violence. See 2003 Minn. Laws, ch. 28, art. 3, §§ 8, at 293- 94; 10, at
296.
In May 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged Underwood in Anoka County
with unlawful firearm possession under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020), based on
his 1999 third-degree-assault conviction. About 10 months later, law-enforcement officers
in Scott County found Underwood with a handgun. The state again charged Underwood
with unlawful firearm possession under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2).
In April 2022, Underwood pleaded guilty to the Scott County charge. During his
plea hearing, the prosecutor asked Underwood whether he understood: (1) the 1999 third-

1 We note that the definition of “crime of violence” continued to include third-degree
assault at the time Underwood was accused of firearm possession in March 2022 in Scott
County. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2020).
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degree-assault conviction was a crime of violence and (2) that his conviction made it
unlawful for him to possess a firearm. Underwood responded that he did “understand that,”
but then said, “at the time [he] did everything [he] was told” and that “[he] thought it would
be dropped to a—like a gross misdemeanor.” Underwood later pleaded guilty to the Anoka
County charge as well.
Underwood directly appealed his Scott County conviction. After filing his appeal,
Underwood discovered a copy of the discharge order from 2000. We then granted
Underwood’s motion to stay his appeal, allowing Underwood to petition for postconviction
relief so the postconviction court could consider the import of the discharge order.
In his postconviction petition, Underwood argued that due process prohibited his
conviction because the discharge order stated that he would regain his right to possess a
firearm after ten years. The postconviction court rejected Underwood’s petition, reasoning,
in part, that Underwood knew he was ineligible to possess a firearm after the state charged
him in Anoka County, which occurred before his conduct in Scott County. This appeal
follows.
DECISION
Underwood challenges both his conviction in Scott County and the postconviction
court’s decision to deny his petition for postconviction relief. Underwood argues: (1) his
conviction for unlawful firearm possession violated due process because, in 2000, the
district court informed him in the discharge order that he could possess a firearm after
ten years and (2) he did not enter an accurate and intelligent plea. We address
Underwood’s arguments in turn.
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I.
Underwood argues that his conviction for unlawful firearm possession violated due
process and, therefore, the postconviction court abused its discretion when it denied his
petition for postconviction relief. We review a decision to deny postconviction relief for
an abuse of discretion. Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. 2020). An abuse of
discretion means the postconviction court’s decision was based “on an erroneous view of
the law” or was “against logic and th e facts in the record.” Id. at 263-64 (quotation
omitted). To determine whether a postconviction court abused its discretion, we review
“legal conclusions de novo” and factual findings for clear error. Id. at 264.
Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the government from denying “life,
liberty, or property” absent due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 7. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that due process prohibits the government
from affirmatively misleading people about their legal rights and then punishing them for
exercising those legal rights. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26, 437-39 (1959); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965). We recognize the same due-process protections
under the Minnesota Constitution. See Whitten v. State, 690 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. App.
2005) (citing State v. White, 464 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 15, 1991)).
Underwood relies on Whitten to argue that his conviction under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713 violated due process because the district court informed him in the discharge
order that he was eligible to possess a firearm after ten years. We disagree.
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Under section 624.713, a person cannot possess a firearm if they receive a
conviction for a violent crime. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). In Whitten, we
established that, when a district court affirmatively misstates to a defendant that their right
to possess a firearm is restored, a conviction for unlawful possession violates due process.
690 N.W.2d at 565-66. However , in State v. Linville, we concluded that, once the state
corrects the misstatement, a defense under Whitten is no longer available. 755 N.W.2d
314, 316 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2008). There, we reasoned that,
when the state had previously charged and arraigned a defendant for illegal possession of
a firearm, the state “clearly communicated to [him] that he was ineligible to possess
firearms.” Id. As a result, Whitten did not provide a valid defense against a subsequent
charge for unlawful firearm possession. Id.
Similarly here, the state informed Underwood that he was ineligible to possess a
firearm when it charged him in Anoka County. By bringing this charge, the state clearly
communicated to Underwood that he was ineligible to possess a firearm. Thus, ten months
later when officers arrested Underwood for possessing a second firearm in Scott County, a
defense under Whitten based on the discharge order was no longer available to him.
Underwood argues Linville is distinguishable. First, Underwood notes that in
Linville, after the defendant posted bond for his first unlawful-firearm-possession charge,
his release order stated that he could not possess any firearms. Id. at 315. Second,
Underwood observes that the defendant in Linville successfully challenged his initial
charge on due-process grounds. Id. We disagree with Underwood that these distinctions
change the analysis. In Linville, we concluded the defendant’s arraignment and receipt of
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his complaint corrected the earlier misstatement, not his release order or his successful due-
process challenge. See id. at 316. Here, likewise, the state corrected any misstatement in
the discharge order when it charged Underwood with unlawful firearm possession in
Anoka County. A Whitten due-process challenge was not available for Underwood’s
subsequent Scott County charge. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Underwood’s petition for postconviction relief.
II.

Underwood argues on direct appeal that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea on constitutional grounds. An appellant may challenge a guilty plea’s validity in the
first instance on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). We
review whether a defendant entered a valid guilty plea de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). If a defendant entered an invalid guilty plea, we reverse and
remand for the district court to allow the defendant to withdraw their guilty plea. State v.
Davenport, 948 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Minn. App. 2020).
“To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31
(1970)). “To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis.” Id. The
record must “support[] the conclusion that the defendant actually committed an offense at
least as serious as the crime to which [the defendant] is pleading guilty.” State v. Trott,
338 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (Minn. 1983). Voluntariness refers to “what the parties
reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement” and whether the defendant
pleaded “guilty due to improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
7
Intelligence “ensures that a defendant underst[ood] the charges against him, the rights he
[waived], and the consequences of his plea.” Id.
Underwood first argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because it was
inaccurate. Underwood contends his plea was inaccurate because it lacked a factual basis
to establish the mens rea element that he knew his firearm possession was unlawful. For
support, Underwood points to Rehaif v. United States, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted a federal statutory scheme— barring certain individuals from firearm
possession—to require proof that the defendant knew their possession was unlawful at the
time of possession. See 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194-98 (2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g),
924(a)(2)).
The statute at issue in Rehaif is distinguishable from section 624.713. First, unlike
the statute in Rehaif, section 624.713 does not explicitly include a mens rea element in the
text. Compare Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195 (“‘Whoever knowingly violates ’ certain
subsections . . . ‘shall be’ subject to penalties of up to [ten] years’ imprisonment.”
(alteration omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2))), with Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subds. 1(2), 2(b) (providing that those not entitled to possess firearms include “a person
who has been convicted of . . . a crime of violence” and that such persons who possess
firearms are “guilty of a felony”). And to the extent Minnesota courts have inferred a mens
rea element in section 624.713, they have required a defendant to knowingly exercise
dominion over a firearm, not to knowingly violate the law. See State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d
592, 601 (Minn. 2017); In re Welfare of S.J.J., 755 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. App. 2008).
8
Moreover, although a district court must inform defendants convicted of a crime of
violence that they cannot possess firearms, a district court’s failure to inform a defendant
“does not affect the applicability of the . . . possession prohibition or the felony penalty.”
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 3(a). Thus, the legislature did not intend to require the state
to prove that Underwood knew he was ineligible. For these reasons, Underwood failed to
show that his guilty plea was inaccurate.2
Underwood also argues that his plea was unintelligent because he reasonably
believed that he could possess a firearm after ten years. But to have an intelligent plea, a
defendant need only understand the charges, his waived rights, and the consequences of
the plea. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Here, the record shows Underwood
acknowledged that he understood the charges, committed the acts that constituted the
offense, understood the consequences of his plea, and waived his rights. Specifically,
Underwood stated that he understood his third-degree assault conviction made him
ineligible to possess a firearm and he admitted to possessing the firearm. Underwood failed
to show his guilty plea was unintelligent.
Because he entered a constitutionally valid guilty plea, Underwood is not entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Affirmed.

2 Two nonprecedential opinions from this court also reject the argument Underwood
presents. See State v. Mitchell, No. A22-1475, 2023 WL 4167862, at *1-2 (Minn. App.
June 26, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2023); Bo v. State, No. A20-0497, 2020 WL
6266353, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Oct. 26, 2020). We cite these nonprecedential opinions for
their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).