State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1557

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Regina Marie White,
Appellant.

Filed August 21, 2023
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-22-114

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jonathan Frieden, Hubbard County Attorney, John A. Olson, Assistant County Attorney,
Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max Brady Kittel, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from a conviction for aiding and abetting a first -degree burglary,
appellant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish
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criminal knowledge and intent , (2) the district court committed reversible error by
erroneously instructing the jury on accomplice liability, (3) the district court abused its
discretion in its evidentiary rulings, and (4) the district court abused its discretion by
sentencing her to a significantly longer term of imprisonment than the principal actor. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Regina Marie White with one
count of aiding and abetting first-degree burglary assault in violation of Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.582, subd. 1(c), .05, subd. 1 (2020), and first-degree burglary of an occupied
dwelling in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2020). The principal actor, J.L.,
pleaded guilty to first- degree burglary. White’s case proceeded to a jury trial where the
following facts were elicited.
On the morning of the offense, White went to G.R.’s apartment because G.R. had
previously offered ten dollars to White. But when White asked for the money, G.R. did
not give it to her and instead made unwanted sexual advances toward White, which upset
her. White left the apartment and told others what had happened. Of the people she told,
only J.L., a juvenile, “had [her] back.”
Around an hour after White left G.R.’s apartment, White and J.L. together returned
to G.R.’s apartment building. As they entered the building, J.L. rolled up his sleeves and
the hood of White’s sweatshirt obscured her face. White pointed in the direction of G.R.’s
apartment. J.L. broke the door to G.R.’s apartment, entered the apartment, beat G.R., and
took $30 from G.R.’s bed. White remained outside the apartment while the burglary and
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assault occurred. J.L. exited G.R.’s apart ment and handed the cash to White. White
accepted the cash, and White and J.L. exited the building together. The entire incident
lasted approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
G.R. reported the incident to the police and identified White as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. An investigating officer reviewed security footage that captured
White and J.L.’s actions immediately before and after the offense. The officer was familiar
with White from hearing her name during “previous law enforcement contacts.”
A few days after the offense, a different officer responding to an unrelated incident
arrested White. This officer was also acquainted with White. The officer interviewed
White, and White admitted to going to G.R.’s apartment. White explained that she told
J.L. not to kick down the door, and she maintained that she told him not to do that. She
admitted that both she and J.L. wanted money from G.R. The officer’s body-worn camera
recorded this interaction.
Neither White nor J.L. testified at trial, and White did not call any witnesses or offer
any exhibits. The district court instructed the jury using instructions agreed upon by both
parties. The jury found White guilty of aiding and abetting first -degree burglary assault
but not guilty of first -degree burglary as a principal actor. The district court imposed a
guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. White appeals.

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DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to convict White of aiding and abetting first-degree
burglary assault.

White argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that she knew J.L. was
going to commit a burglary-assault at G.R.’s apartment or that she intended to aid J.L. in
committing that crime. A person is criminally liable as an accomplice “for a crime
committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires
with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1.
An accomplice is “also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended
crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or
attempting to commit the crime intended.” Id., subd. 2 (2020). “[T]he [s]tate must prove
that the defendant knew [their] alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the
defendant intended [their] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”
State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “When
determining whether a person played a knowing role in the commission of the crime, we
may infer criminal intent from the person’s presence, companionship, and conduct both
before and after the crime.” State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 549 (Minn. 2012); see also
State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 659 (Minn. 2006) (“Jurors can infer the necessary
intent from factors including: defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, defendant’s
close association with the principal before and after the crime, defendant’s lack of objection
or surprise under the circumstances, and defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime with
the principal.” (quotation omitted)). Likewise, “intent is a subjective state of mind usually
5
established only by reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.” State v.
Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an
element of an offense, we apply a heightened standard of review to the evidence underlying
that element. State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013) (citing State v.
Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-75 (Minn. 2010)). The parties agree that we apply our
heightened standard of review to determine whether the state met its burden of proof to
establish White’s knowledge and intent.
We review the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence by conducting a two- step
analysis. State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. App. 2019) (citing State v.
Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011)). First, we identify the circumstances proved.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). “[W]e assume that the [fact-finder]
resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent” with the verdict. State v.
Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). Second, we determine “ whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). We do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. We will reverse a conviction “[i]f a reasonable
inference other than guilt exists.” Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643. But we will uphold the
verdict if the circumstantial evidence forms “a complete chain” which leads “so directly to
6
the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference
other than guilt.” State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
We first resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether the state was required to prove
that White intended to aid and abet J.L. in the commission of a burglary-assault or whether
the state need only prove that White intended to aid and abet J.L. in the commission of any
crime. We agree with the state that, under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2, White is liable
for the burglary-assault committed by J.L. under an accomplice theory of liability if the
circumstances proved establish that she intentionally aided J.L. in committing any crime,
the burglary-assault was committed in furtherance of that crime, and it was reasonably
foreseeable to White that a burglary-assault was a probable consequence of that crime. See
State v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 52-53 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that the defendant was
liable under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2, for any crimes committed in pursuit of the crime
the defendant intended to aid).
McAllister provides the framework for analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence of accomplice liability under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2. In McAllister, a
defendant was charged with and found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and first-
degree felony murder during the commission of an aggravated robbery under an
accomplice theory of liability after the defendant’s nephew shot and killed a man who the
defendant had brutally beaten during a robbery. 862 N.W.2d at 51-52. The defendant’s
“sufficiency-of-the-evidence argume nt focuse[d] exclusively on the fact that he did not
intend to aid a murder.” Id. at 53. The supreme court explained that, even if the defendant
did not intend to aid a murder, he could still be liable under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2,
7
for any crime committed while pursuing the crime he intended to commit: aggravated
robbery. Id. The supreme court stated that sufficient evidence would exist to sustain the
conviction, even if the defendant lacked specific knowledge that his nephew was going to
kill the victim, if the defendant “was an accomplice in the aggravated robbery,” “the murder
was committed in furtherance of the aggravated robbery,” and “the murder was reasonably
foreseeable as a probable consequence of the aggravated robbery.” Id. It then analyzed
whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of intentionally aiding the
aggravated robbery. Id. at 53-55. Based on the circumstances proved, the supreme court
concluded that “it was reasonable for the jury to have concluded that [the defendant] both
knew that [his nephews] were going to commit a crime and intended his presence and
actions to further the commission of that crime.” Id. at 55.
The supreme court then concluded that sufficient evidence established that “the
murder was committed in furtherance of the aggravated robbery,” and that “a reasonably
foreseeable and probable consequence of the brutal beating was that [the victim] would
die.” Id. at 56. In so doing, the supreme court emphasized that Minn. Stat. § 609.05,
subd. 2, does not create an independent state- of-mind requirement for the charged crime;
once the circumstances proved establish the defendant’s state of mind for the intended
crime, the defendant may be liable for any other reasonably foreseeable crime committed
while pursuing the intended crime. Id. at 58. Because the defendant intended to aid his
nephew in committing an aggravated robbery, his nephew killed the victim in furtherance
of the aggravated robbery, and it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that his
nephew would do so, the supreme court held that sufficient evidence supported the
8
defendant’s murder convictions based on a theory of accomplice liability under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.05, subd. 2. See id.at 53-58.
Here, the state asserts that the circumstantial evidence establishes that White
intended, at the very least, to aid J.L. in committing a theft at G.R.’s apartment. Pursuant
to the framework set forth in McAllister, we therefore evaluate whether the circumstances
proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than that White knew J.L. would
commit a theft and intended to aid him in doing so, J.L. committed the burglary-assault in
furtherance of the theft, and it was reasonably foreseeable that the theft would lead to a
burglary-assault.
The following circumstances were proved at trial. Around an hour before the
burglary-assault, White went to G.R.’s apartment to collect money she believed he had
promised to her. G.R. did not give her the money and instead made unwanted sexual
advances toward her, which White rejected. White left G.R.’s apartment and told others
about the incident. Of the people she told, only J.L “had [her] back.” White and J.L.
together went back to G.R.’s apartment. The hood on White’s sweatshirt partially obscured
her face, J.L. rolled up his sleeves, and White pointed in the direction of G.R.’s apartment.
When they arrive d at G.R.’s apartment, J.L. kicked the door down, entered G.R.’s
apartment, beat G.R., and took $30 off the bed. White remained outside the apartment. 1

1 The state presented conflicting evidence as to whether White entered G.R.’s apartment.
The jury acquitted White of committing first- degree burglary, which is consistent with a
reasonable inference that White did not enter the apartment during the incident. See Moore,
846 N.W.2d at 88 (stating that we assume that the jury resolved any factual disputes in a
manner that is consistent with the verdict when determining the circumstances proved);
9
Around 2 minutes and 30 seconds after entering the apartment building, White and J.L.
exited. Their demeanor was calm. J.L. handed cash to White. White accepted the money.
White did not call the police or return to G.R.’s apartment to render aid, and she did not
appear upset.
The circumstances proved form a complete chain leading to White’s guilt and
exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt. White knew
J.L. would commit a theft and intended to aid him in doing so. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 2(a)(1) (2020) (stating that whoever “intentionally and without claim of right takes,
uses, transfers, conceals or retains possession of movable property of another without the
other’s consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the
property” commits a theft). White believed that G.R. had promised her money. About an
hour after White asked G.R. for money and G.R. made sexual advances toward her, White
returned to G.R.’s apartment with J.L., White pointed toward G.R.’s apartment, J.L. broke
into G.R.’s apartment and took money off the bed, and J.L. gave money to White as they
were exiting G.R’s apartment building. White accepted the money from J.L. The totality
of the circumstances proved leads only to the rational inference that White intended for
J.L. to obtain money from G.R. for her after she failed to obtain it on her own.2

Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (requiring a defendant to “enter[]” a building to be liable
as a principal).

2 White argues that despite being present for the offense, she took no action in furtherance
of the offense and therefore could not have aided or abetted J.L. in committing any crime.
While White took no direct actions while the offense was occurring, the circumstances
proved indicate that she enlisted J.L. to assist her with stealing money from G.R. See Minn.
10
White argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational inference
other than guilt, namely that she went to G.R.’s apartment with J.L. to try to convince G.R.
to voluntarily part with the money he allegedly promised her. But this theory is not
reasonable in light of the circumstances proved. White was unsuccessful in obtaining
money from G.R. G.R. had made unwanted sexual advances toward White. White
believed that J.L. “had [her] back.” J.L. rolled up his sleeves before committing the
burglary-assault. After J.L. forcibly took money from G.R., White left the apartment
building with J.L. and did not appear bothered or upset by J.L.’s violent actions. J.L.
handed White money, which she readily accepted. The mere possibility of an alternate
explanation does not equate to a reasonable inference from the circumstances proved. See
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008) (“ [P]ossibilities of innocence do not
require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such
theories seem unreasonable.”).
The circumstances proved also establish that J.L. committed the burglary-assault in
furtherance of the theft and that it was reasonably foreseeable to White that J.L. would
commit a burglary-assault in furtherance of the theft. Whether an act is reasonably
foreseeable is an objective question “based only on what would be reasonably foreseeable
to a person in the defendant’s shoes.” McAllister, 862 N.W.2d at 56. It was reasonably
foreseeable to White that J.L. would commit a burglary-assault in furtherance of the theft.
White reported to J.L. that an hour earlier G.R. had made unwanted sexual advances toward

Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (including procuring another to commit a crime as an act leading to
liability for the crime).
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her and did not give her the money she sought. White was with J.L. because he “had [her]
back.” White obscured her face with her sweatshirt hood, J.L. rolled up his sleeves, and
J.L. forced entry into G.R.’s apartment, all before J.L. assaulted G.R. The only rational
inference from these circumstances proved is that it was reasonably foreseeable to White
that J.L. would commit a burglary-assault to accomplish the theft.
Accordingly, we conclude that the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.
II. We discern no error in the district court’s jury instructions or evidentiary
rulings.

White argues that she is entitled to a new trial as a result of unobjected-to errors
made by the district court. First, she argues that the district court’s aiding-and-abetting
jury instruction erroneously did not inform the jury as to the specific elements of the
underlying crime to which she aided J.L. Second, she argues that the district court plainly
erred by allowing evidence that White was previously known to law enforcement.
Because White did not object to either the jury instruction or the admission of
evidence, we review these unobjected-to errors under our plain-error standard of review .
See State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (reviewing unobjected-to jury
instructions for plain error); State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 650 (Minn. 2018)
(reviewing an unobjected-to evidentiary ruling for plain error). Under this standard, White
must establish that the district court committed an error, the error was plain, and the error
affected her substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Even
so, we “may correct the error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
12
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn.
2022).
A. The district court did not erroneously instruct the jury on accomplice
liability.

White argues that the district court committed plain error in instructing the jury
because it did not specify the crime that she intentionally aided. A district court has
“considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions, including the specific language of
those instructions.” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). However, “jury
instructions must fairly and adequately explain the law of the case.” Id. We review jury
instructions for an abuse of discretion, and a district court abuses its discretion when it s
instructions contain a material misstatement of the law. See id.; State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d
566, 581 (Minn. 2009) (stating that a district court errs in instructing the jury when its
instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law”). “We review the
instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law.”
Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 797.
The district court gave the following instruction:
The defendant is guilty of the crime of Burglary in the First
Degree-Assault committed by another person when the
defendant has played an intentional role in aiding the
commission of the crime of Burglary in the First Degree -
Assault and made no reasonable effort to prevent the crime
before it was committed. Intentional role includes aiding,
advising, hiring, counseling, conspiring with, or procuring
another to commit the crime. A defendant’s presence
constitutes aiding if: first, the defendant knew her alleged
accomplices were going to or were committing a crime; and
second, the defendant intended that her presence or actions aid
the commission of the crime. If the defendant intentionally
13
aided another person in committing a crime, or intentionally
advised, hired, counseled, conspired with, or otherwise
procured the other person to commit it, the defendant is also
guilty of any other crime the other person commits while trying
to commit the intended crime, if that crime was reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant as a probable consequence of
trying to commit the intended crime.

(Emphasis added.) We discern no misstatement of law in this instruction. A jury
instruction setting forth a theory of accomplice liability “must explain to the jury that in
order to find a defendant guilty as an accomplice, the jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the
defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.”
Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 808 (emphasis added); see also State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269,
275 (Minn. 2014) (applying Milton). Likewise, “a defendant is criminally liable under
Minn. Stat. § 609.05 for crimes committed by another if she intends her presence or actions
to aid the other in committing an offense that she knows is criminal.” State v. Smith, 901
N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn. App. 2017) (emphasis added), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017).
The district court’s instruction on White’s accomplice liability comports with Minn. Stat.
§ 609.05, subds. 1-2, and binding precedent; the instruction to the jury did not need to
specify what crime White intended to aid J.L. in committing.
White points to no Minnesota authority requiring a district court to instruct the jury
on accomplice liability with specificity as to the crime or crimes a defendant intended to
aid and abet, and we are aware of none. She instead cites Rosemond v. United States, 572
U.S. 65 (2014), a United States Supreme Court case analyzing whether such specificity is
a required element of accomplice liability under a federal statute. That statute provides
14
that “[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal” and that
“[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another
would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2018).3 In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court reasoned that the intent element of
the crime under an accomplice theory of liability “must go to the specific and entire crime
charged” and that “[a]n intent to advance some different or lesser offense is not, or at least
not usually, sufficient.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added). As such, for crimes
charged under this statute, an accomplice liability jury instruction must contain the
requisite specificity to comply with the statutory mandate. See id. at 81-82 (concluding
that jury instruction on aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in a drug trafficking crime
was inadequate because it did not require the government to prove that the defendant had
advance knowledge that a firearm would be used during the offense). But Minnesota’s
accomplice-liability statute is different than the federal statute at issue in Rosemond. Our
accomplice-liability statute includes expanded liability for crimes “committed in pursuance
of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of
committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.” Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.05,
subd. 2, with 18 U.S.C. § 2. Stated differently, although federal law may require a
defendant to have advance knowledge of the specific crime committed by the principal,
Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2, does not include an independent state- of-mind requirement

3 We cite to the current version of the statute, which has remained unchanged since the
2014 Rosemond decision.
15
for the charged crime and instead allows for liability for any other reasonably foreseeable
crime committed in pursuit of the intended crime. See McAllister, 862 N.W.2d at 58
(reiterating that “Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 , does not impose an independent state- of-
mind requirement”). We therefore conclude that Rosemond is inapposite, and the district
court did not commit plain error in instructing the jury on accomplice liability. 4
B. The admission of evidence regarding law enforcement’s familiarity with
White did not affect her substantial rights.

White also argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court plainly
erred in allowing evidence that law enforcement was familiar with White. Specifically,
White alleges that the district court erred by allowing two officers to testify that they were
familiar with White, one explaining that she knew her from hearing “her name in previous
law enforcement contacts” and the other stating that he was acquainted with White. Even
assuming the district court plainly erred by allowing this testimony, any error did not affect
White’s substantial rights. A plain error affects a defendant’s substantial rights “if the error
was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741.
Evidence that law enforcement may be familiar with a defendant does not affect a
defendant’s substantial rights when the references are brief and do not explain in detail the

4 White also argues that a case currently pending before the supreme court, State v. Segura,
No. A22-0163, may favorably resolve the question of whether a district court must instruct
the jury as to the specific crime a defendant intended to aid or abet. But the existence of a
currently pending case before the supreme court involving an unresolved issue does not
give rise to an error that we consider to be plain. See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302
(Minn. 2006) (“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious. Usually this is shown if the error
contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” (quotation and citation omitted));
Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 277-78 (explaining that an error must be plain at the time of
appellate review).
16
basis of such familiarity. State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 807- 08 (Minn. App. 2018),
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018).
We conclude that the evidence did not affect White’s substantial rights. The
evidence of White’s accomplice liability was strong. The testimony was brief and not
detailed. Although one officer testified that she had heard White’s name in “previous law
enforcement contacts,” neither officer testified that they knew White due to any
involvement in criminal activity.5 And the jury acquitted White of principal liability. We
cannot conclude that these brief and nonspecific references had any impact on the verdict.
III. The district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion by imposing a
guidelines sentence.

White contends that the district court abused its sentencing discretion because White
received a significantly longer sentence than J.L. despite her minor role in the commission
of the offense. 6 White challenges her sentence under Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subds. 2(b),
3(a)(1) (2022), which allows us to “review the sentence imposed or stayed to determine
whether the sentence is inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable,
inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact

5 White also contends that allowing the state to show body-camera footage without
redacting irrelevant information, such as her arrest and involvement in a separate matter,
prejudiced her. But the footage does not implicate White in any criminal matter; it instead
suggests that White was the potential victim of a domestic disturbance. Although the
investigating officer testified that they were responding to a “disturbance” involving White,
this brief reference did not suggest that White herself was engaged in criminal activity and
did not otherwise affect the outcome of the proceedings.

6 White did not request a downward sentencing departure from the district court. She
instead requested a guidelines sentence of 84 months, at the low end of the presumptive
range.
17
issued by the district court.” See also Minn. R. Crim. P . 28.05, subd. 2. We review a
district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014).
White argues that it is unfair that J.L. received a 21-month stayed sentence with
extended juvenile jurisdiction supervision as the principal actor in the burglary- assault,
while White received a 96-month executed sentence for her actions as an accomplice who
only “stood at the door.” She asks us to modify her sentence to correct this asserted
injustice. We generally will not exercise our authority to modify a sentence unless we are
presented with compelling circumstances to do so. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428
(Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).
We discern no compelling circumstances to interfere with the district court’s
sentencing discretion. The district court imposed a sentence within the presumptive
guidelines range. White had a criminal-history score of five at the time of the offense,
while J.L. had a criminal-history score of zero. And J.L. was a juvenile at the time of the
offense. We also note that the circumstances proved establish that White enlisted J.L. to
collect money on behalf of White and that but for White’s involvement, J.L. would not
have been involved in the crime at all. We therefore see no compelling circumstances to
modify the district court’s imposition of a guidelines sentence as an appropriate exercise
of its sentencing discretion.
Affirmed.