State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1595

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Louis Meek,
Appellant.

Filed October 9, 2023
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-21-1260

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin , Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for first -degree aggravated robbery, arguing
that the victim’s trial testimony was not credible. We affirm.

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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charg ed appellant Joshua Louis Meek with
first-degree aggravated robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2020), felony theft
under Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), and fifth -degree misdemeanor assault
under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2020). The case was tried to a jury.
The trial evidence showed that Meek and the victim, TT, knew each other. On May
9, 2021, at around 4:30 a.m., Meek went to TT’s apartment. TT testified that they both
smoked something that caused them to “get high” and “crash.” When TT woke, Meek was
still sleeping. While he slept, TT removed a package of methamphetamine from Meek’s
jacket pocket. TT testified that he flushed the methamphetamine down the toilet and left
the apartment.
After Meek awoke, he sent TT a series of instant messages, demanding that TT
return his “stuff.” TT returned to his apartment after confirming that Meek had left. He
testified that several items were missing.
The following morning around 1:30 a.m., TT perceived that someone was ramming
his apartment door. He believed it to be Meek. After sunrise, TT crawled out of his
apartment window and onto the roof of a nearby shed to protect himself. TT saw Meek by
the exterior door of his apartment. TT testified that Meek shot him with a BB gun several
times. TT crawled back into his apartment and entered his bathroom to clean his wounds
from the BB gun pellets. When TT walked out of the bathroom, Meek was in the
apartment. TT testified that Meek grabbed him, punched him several times in the face,
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causing him to bleed, and then searched him. TT testified that Meek took over $300 from
his pocket and left.
TT did not immediately report the incident to the police or seek medical attention.
TT testified that he has had trouble communicating with police in the past because they did
not provide an interpreter . TT is deaf and communicates through sign language. About
one week later, TT went to an emergency room and reported that he had been assaulted.
Specifically, he told medical staff that he had been struck with fists and shot with a BB
gun. Medical records were received as evidence at trial, which noted “[s]mall circular BB
shot wounds” on TT’s right arm and left wrists, and “dry debris” in his ear canal that may
have been blood.
TT reported the incident to the police the day after he went to the emergency room.
The police took pictures of TT’s remaining injuries, which were consistent with BB gun
shots. And TT gave the police a photograph of a necklace that he believed that Meek had
taken from his apartment. TT also provided a written statement to the police. The
photographs of TT’s injuries and neckl ace were received as evidence at trial, as well as
TT’s written statement. A police sergeant testified that while Meek was held in custody,
the sergeant found a necklace in Meek’s personal property that matched the necklace that
TT was wearing in the photograph. TT also identified the necklace at trial.
At trial, defense counsel challenged the adequacy of law enforcement’s
investigation of the alleged offense and emphasized the differences between TT’s trial
testimony and the written statement that he provided to the police. Meek did not testify.
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The jury found Meek guilty as charged. The court sentenced Meek to 68 months in
prison for first -degree aggravated robbery, stayed execution of the sentence, and placed
him on probation.1
Meek appeals.
DECISION
Meek contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of
guilt. He generally argues that the state failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he
robbed, stole from, and assaulted TT. Meek does not argue that the state fa iled to present
evidence regarding any element of the charged offenses. Instead, Meek challenges TT’s
credibility as a witness, arguing that his “credibility was significantly undermined by his
testimony, which was inconsistent with his prior statement to law enforcement and with
the other evidence in the case, leading to grave doubts that [he] actually committed the
offenses.”
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty
verdict based solely on direct evidence, we carefully analyze the record to determine
whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient
to permit the fact -finder to reach its verdict. 2 State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426,

1 The state indicates that the district court treated the felony theft and misdemeanor assault
offenses as lesser -included offenses and “properly avoided entering convictions and
imposing sentences” for those offenses. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2022) (“Upon
prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an
included offense, but not both.”).
2 Neither party argues that the heightened circumstantial -evidence standard of review
applies here. See State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Minn. 2010) (stating that
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430 (Minn. 1989). We assume the fact -finder believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998). We
defer to the fact -finder’s credibility determinations and will not reweigh the evidence on
appeal. State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009); State v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d
738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002). We will not disturb a guilty verdict if the fact -finder, acting
with due regard for the presumption of innocence and requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could have reasonably concluded that the state proved the defendant’s
guilt. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
Meek acknowledges that witness -credibility determinations and the weight to
accord a witness’s testimony are “normally jury questions to which a reviewing court
defers.” He also acknowledges that “[a] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated
testimony of a single credible witness.” State v. Hill, 172 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Minn. 1969).
But Meek argues that if there are reaso ns to question a victim’s credibility and the state
presented no corroborating evidence, “Minnesota’s appellate courts will reverse
convictions.”
As support, Meek cites several Minnesota Supreme Court cases and argues that
“[t]his case fits in the small ca tegory of cases where this Court should have grave doubts
that the convicted defendant committed the alleged offenses.” But each case that Meek
cites is readily distinguishable from this case. See State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 537,
539 (Minn. 2004) (holding that testimony of victim was sufficient to support conviction

“heightened scrutiny applies to any disputed element of the conviction that is based on
circumstantial evidence”).
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for assault in the second degree, despite victim ’s temporary pretrial recantation of her
accusations); State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290, 292 -93 (Minn. 1993) (reversing conviction
for child sexual abuse based on the victim’s repeated exposure to a highly suggestive book
by the child’s therapist and mother); State v. Langteau, 268 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978)
(reversing in the interest s of justice and stating, “[t]he reason why defendant would have
held up [the victim], with whom he was well acquainted, is left a mystery.” ); State v. Gluff,
172 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Minn. 1969) (reversing because armed robbery victim observed
defendant for fewer than two minutes, during which time her eyes were “riveted on the
gun,” and “there was no evidence whatever to corroborate defendant’s implication in the
crime other than [the victim’s] selection of [his] photograph from a police file”).
We disagree that our customary approach of deferring to a jury’s cr edibility
determination should be abandoned in this case. Weighing the credibility of a complaining
witness who has given conflicting stories is a function for the jury . State v. Castle ,
109 N.W.2d 593 , 595 (Minn. 1961). As the state acknowledges, TT “g ave different
versions of [the] events in his written statement to law enforcement and at trial.” But TT
explained those inconsistencies in his trial testimony. TT testified that those
inconsistencies resulted in part from his “anxiety.” And TT emphasized that, unlike when
he gave his statement to law enforcement, he was “sober” during the trial. TT further
explained that he had “ [t]wo effective” interpreters at trial. In sum, TT’s trial testimony
explained his inconsistent statements and provided a basis for the jury to not weigh them
heavily.
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Moreover, the inconsistencies on which Meek relies do not cause us to have “grave”
concerns regarding his guilt. Meek complains that TT “gave three different versions of
where he went after leaving his apartment on the morning of May 9th.” He also complains
that TT “gave two different irreconcilable versions of when his property was taken.” Meek
argues:
Chronically chemically dependent TT’s testimony that
he flushed the methamphetamine down the toi let to save
children from potentially being exposed to the
methamphetamine was also preposterous given the fact that TT
also admitted to smoking methamphetamine with Meek after
Meek arrived at his apartment, and TT also testified that he
smoked marijuana a t his friend’s house when he left the
apartment [while Meek slept].

We acknowledge that there may have been reasons for the jury to reject TT’s
testimony. But the inconsistencies in this case do not justify a departure from the
well-established rule tha t “ [t]he resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive
function of the jury because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and weigh their credibility.” State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984).
Nor are we persuaded by Meek’s argument that “[t]he state’s case included only
weak and unconvincing corroboration for T T’s testimony.” The state presented evidence
of TT’s and Meek’s instant-message exchange on May 9, 2021, which corroborated TT’s
testimony that he and Meek wer e together that morning. And although motive is not an
element of the charged offenses, TT’s admission that he took Meek’s methamphetamine
explains why Meek would have committed the offenses. See State v. Oates, 611 N.W.2d
580, 586-87 (Minn. App. June 20 , 2000) (noting that eyewitness identifications had been
8
corroborated in part by evidence that the defendant had some motive to commit the crime),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2000). The state presented photographs of TT’s wounds,
which corroborated TT’s t estimony that Meek shot him with a B.B. gun. The state also
presented evidence that a police officer found TT’s necklace in Meek’s personal
belongings, which supports TT’s testimony that Meek took his necklace during the
robbery. Once again, this record does not justify a departure from the well-established rule
that “the weighing of evidence” is a task “reserved to the jury.” State v. Dahlin ,
695 N.W.2d 588, 596 (Minn. 2005).
We note that one of the purposes of a trial is to ascertain the truth. See State v.
Master, 252 N.W.2d 859, 860 (Minn. 1977) (discussing whether certain evidence was
relevant to the “truth -seeking process” of a trial). Consistent with th at truth-seeking
purpose, it is proper for a jury to evaluate a witness’s testimony in light of prior inconsistent
statements to determine where the truth lies. Di-Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d
Cir. 1925) (“The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier statements in
preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real, but we find no difficulty in it.”).
Thus, the jury was free to believe TT’s trial testimony even though he made several prior
inconsistent statements regarding the details of the offense. See State v. Reichenberger ,
182 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1970 ) (noting that “[t]he witness did make some prior
statements which were not consistent with her testimony at trial,” that “[t]he jury was
apprised of those facts,” and that “the task of weighing credibility was for the jury,” and
not the appellate court).
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In sum, we apply our traditional deference to the jury’s credibility determination.
And because Meek does not argue that the evidence was otherwise insufficient to prove
any element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, we do not disturb the jury’s
verdicts.
Affirmed.