State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1711

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Manasseh Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed October 30, 2023
Affirmed; motion granted
Hooten, Judge *

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-CR-22-841

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joel Martin Holstad, Albert Lea City Prosecutor, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this direct appeal f rom the judgment of conviction, appellant Joseph Manasseh
Johnson argues that (1) his conviction for depriving animals of nourishment and shelter
under Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2 (2022) should be reversed and remanded because he
was denied his right to present a complete defense when his trial continuance requests were
denied and because his waiver of his right to counsel was inadequate . Johnson also argues
that his conviction for having inadequate enclosures under Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 3
(2022) should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the animals
were deprived of free change of air. We grant Johnson’s motion to strike portions of State
of Minnesota’s brief that references websites because the websites were not contained in
the record on appeal. And because the district court did not clearly err in denying Johnson
a trial continuance, Johnson’s waiver of his right to counsel was valid, and the record
contains sufficient evidence to sustain Johnson’s conviction for inadequate enclosures, we
affirm.
DECISION
I. Motion to Strike
“The documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01. This court is “bound to the trial court record.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582-83 (Minn. 1988). The court of appeals “may not base its decision on matters outside
the record on appeal and may not consider matters not produced and received in evide nce
3
below.” Id. at 582-83. Johnson is correct that the state relies on several websites in its
briefing that were not presented to the district court. The motion to strike portions of the
state’s brief is granted. This court will not rely on the content of the websites cited in the
state’s brief in deciding this appeal. The facts of the case will be determined solely through
review of the documents and transcripts which constitute the appellate record.
II. Right to a Complete Defense
A. Trial Continuance
Johnson argues that the district court’s denial of his continuance requests deprived
him of prepared counsel and an opportunity to present a complete def ense.1 Despite being
appointed counsel at his arraignment, Johnson directly asked the district court for a pretrial
evidentiary “ Rasmussen hearing.” The district court told Johnson to consult with, and
make motions through, his lawyer. Johnson then asked for a speedy trial date. A different
attorney appeared with Johnson at the pretrial hearing. Over Johnson’s objection, d efense
counsel filed a trial continuance request, “to gather the information [needed] to prepare an
effective defense. ” Counsel noted that he had not “received the information necessary” to
make Johnson’s requested arguments by trial scheduled the following week, “despite
requesting it multiple times .” The court denied the continuance request, noting Johnson’s
speedy trial request. Before trial began, the district court again addressed the issue of a
continuance when Johnson’s counsel stated that Johnson’s “main defense in this c ase” is

1 Johnson’s counsel argued that the pretrial continuance request was for the purpose of
investigating Johnson’s requested arguments and possible defenses . Johnson’s subsequent
pro se trial continuance request only argued that time was necessary to find new counsel,
not to craft a complete defense.
4
that “he paid people to take care of animals” but that those people were not on the witness
list. Nonetheless, Johnson did not waive or revoke his speedy trial demand and proceeded
to trial. During trial, Johnson fired his counsel, noting that he did not know if counsel was
ready, but that Johnson was ready for trial. He then asked for a continuance to find new
counsel but did not have an idea as to how he would go about doing that. The district court
denied the request since it advised Johnson that he could continue the trial after counsel
“said he needed more time to prepare . . . at least twice, once in writing,” but Johnson
insisted on proceeding to trial.
The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and by Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6, includes a fair opportunity for a defendant to
secure counsel of their choice. State v. Fagerstrom, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1970).
But “[a] defendant may not obtain a continuance by discharging his counsel for purpose s
of delay or by arbitrarily choosing to substitute counsel at the time of trial.” Id. Whether
to grant a continuance to permit substitution of counsel is within the discretion of the
district court, whose “decision is to be based on the facts and circumstances surrounding
the request.” Id. One factor that appellate courts have looked at when determining whether
a denial of a motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion is “whether the defendant
was prejudiced in preparing and presenting hi s defense.” Id. at 264-65. Thus, a defendant
must show he was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance to warrant appellate relief.
See State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 81 (Minn. 2005).
Johnson asserted his speedy trial right at his arraignment and, even after his counsel
requested a continuance for more time to prepare for trial, Johnson did not revoke or
5
temporarily waive his right for a speedy trial. The district court empathized with counsel
but accommodated Johnson’s request by scheduling an out-of-custody speedy trial date. It
was not until after Dr. Smith testified at trial that Johnson fired his counsel and requested
time to hire a new lawyer. The district court allowed Johnson to try his case but refused to
continue the trial because they were in the middle of trial. Johnson insisted on a speedy
trial u ntil he was dissatisfied with defense counsel’s strategy during trial and fired his
counsel. Johnson then tried to stop the trial by asking for a continuance to find new
counsel. The dist rict court’s denial of Johnson’s pretrial continuance requests could not
have denied Johnson the right to present a complete defense because it was Johnson who
insisted on going forward with his speedy trial demand despite defense counsel requesting
more time to prepare . Moreover, the district court’s denial of the mid -trial continuance
request could not have denied Johnson the right to present a complete defense because after
Johnson fired counsel, he proceeded pr o se and testified to his main defense that other
people were responsible for maintaining the animal enclosures. Thus, the district court di d
not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s continuance requests.
B. Waiver of Counsel
Johnson argues that the district court did not ensure that he understood that firing
his lawyer waived his right to counsel. More specifically, that the district court’s colloquy
with Johnson was lacking and cannot show that Johnson knowingly and int elligent ly
waived his right to counsel. We disagree.
After defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Smith, Johnson asked to fire his counsel :
6
THE COURT: Counsel, do we need to address anything on the
record before we take our recess?

[JOHNSON]: I would like to address something on the record,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I’m talking to counsel now. If you want
to discharge your counsel, you can try your case; if you want
your lawyer to represent you, he will be the one talking to the
court.

COUNSEL: No, Your Honor.

[JOHNSON]: I want to fire [counsel].

THE COURT: You want to fire [counsel]?

JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. I’m going to give you and [counsel]
a moment to talk, and then we will make a record of that. Go
ahead and use—

[JOHNSON]: And I want to put on the record that I’ve asked
and fired him. I’ve asked for a motion of Rasmussen; I’ve
asked for a motion of dismissal; I have also asked that he cross-
examine the witnesses to a greater extent —which he hasn’t —
to prove my innocence on the record. 2

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Johnson, we are going to go
through the process, but I want you and [counsel] to take a
moment to talk first. I think that it is prudent, and so we’re
going to make sure that happens. Go ahead and use the
conference room, and then come on back in when you are ready
to go.

2 As the district court noted, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 12.01, the law permits addressing the
pretrial motions for a misdemeanor trial on the day of trial. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 12.01.
7
Johnson and defense counsel took a three -minute recess to talk in the conference
room before Johnson renewed his request , the district court discharged counsel , and
Johnson proceeded to trial pro se.
A defendant may waive their right to counsel if the waiver is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn. 1998) ; State v. Rhoads, 813
N.W.2d 880, 884-85 (Minn. 2012). The validity of a waiver “depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.” Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 884. To ensure a valid waiver, district courts “should
comprehensively examine the defendant regarding the defendant’s comprehension of the
charges, the possible punishments, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts relevant
to the defendant’s understanding of the consequences of the waiver.” Id. at 885- 86
(quotation omitted). “When a defendant has consulted with an attorney prior to w aiver, a
[district] court could ‘reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance and the risks
of proceeding without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel.’” Worthy,
583 N.W.2d at 276 (quoting State v. Jones , 266 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. 1978)). A
defendant’s history of felony convictions and his familiarity with the criminal process may
diminish the need for a detailed, on -the-record colloquy regarding the defendant’s choice
to waive counsel. See id. Appellate courts review a district court’s finding that a defendant
has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel for clear error. Id.
at 885.
Johnson did not sign a written waiver of counsel. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd.
1(3) (stating d efendants charged with misdemeanors punishable by incarceration must
8
waive counsel in writing or on the record, and the court must not accept the waiver unless
the court is satisfied that it is voluntary). Because of this, Johnson contends that the
circumstances surrounding his counsel’s discharge do not support the conclusion that
Johnson wanted to waive his right to counsel. This argument is unpersuasive.
Whether the waiver of the right to counsel is valid depends on “the particular facts
and circumstan ces surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.” Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 275-76 (quotation omitted ). “When a
defendant has consulted with an attorney prior to waiver, a [district] court could
‘reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance and the risks of proceeding
without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel.’” Id. at 276 (quoting State
v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. 1978)). A defendant’s history of felony convictions
and his familiarity with the criminal process may diminish the need for a detailed, on -the-
record colloquy regarding the defendant’s choice to waive counsel. See id
In this case, the district court did not need to appoint Johnson counsel for the limited
purpose of advising and consulting with Johnson about the waiver because Johnson already
had counsel at the time of the waiver and the court stopped the proceedings so Johnson and
his counsel could confer before he discharged counsel . See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd.
1(3). After that break, Johnson insisted on firing his attorney and proceeding pro se and
the district court could reasonably presume that Johnson discussed with his attorney the
risks of proceeding pro se. See id. The district court also warned Johnson that if he insisted
on firing his counsel, it would not grant a continuance , but instead, that Johnson would
have to represent himself and the trial would continue. Nonetheless, Johnson was steadfast
9
in his decision to fire his counsel. Although the district court’s colloquy was limited, the
fact that the court accepted the waiver suggests that the district court was satisfied that
Johnson’s choice to fire counsel wa s voluntary. See id. Johnson decided to fire counsel
because he was dissatisfied with defense counsel’s strategy during cross -examination of a
witness. Plus, other circumstances , such as Johnson requesting a pretrial Rasmussen
hearing and making a speedy trial demand, show Johnson’s familiarity and experience with
the criminal justice system and procedures such that the need for an extensive on-the-record
colloquy regarding his decision to waive his right to counsel was unnecessary. Worthy,
583 at 276. As such, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Johnson knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The parties generally agree on the circumstances proved at trial, with one notable
exception: that the evidence is consistent with a rational hypothesis of guilt with respect to
the animals being deprived of an adequate change of air under Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd.
3. For the offense of having inadequate enclosures, the state is requi red to prove that a
person kept an animal in an enclosure without providing wholesome exercise and exchange
of air. See id. The level of scrutiny this court applies when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence depends on whether the elements of an offe nse are supported by direct or
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013).
“[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation.” State
v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is defined
as “evidence from which the fact [-]finder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or
10
did not exist.” Id. “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step that is
not required with direct evidence.” Id.
Johnson argues that the convictions hinge on circumstantial evidence for proof of
the fact that the animal enclosures did not have an adequate change of air. We disagree.
Multiple witnesses testified to the conditions of the animal enclosures. That testimony
constitutes direct evidence, based on their personal knowledge and observations. Id. When
an element of an offense is supported by direct evidence, this court’s review is limited to
an “analysis of the record to determ ine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). This court
assumes that “the jury believed [one party or the other] and disbelieved any evidence to
the contrary.” State v. Caldwell , 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“[W]e will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Ortega, 813
N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted).
This court will not disturb the jury’s verdict because the jury could reasonably
conclude that Johnson was guilty of the charged offense based on the direct evidence
presented by the officers, humane society volunteers, and veterinarians testifying to the
conditions of the enclosures . For example, Dr. Wessling did not think the enclosures
provided for wholesome exercise because the length of the dogs’ nails when they were
found in a small and crowded closet suggested they were not getting enough exercise. The
11
overwhelming smell of urine and feces when entering the building suggests a lack of fresh
air that , in Dr. Wessling’s expert opinion, could lead to ammonia build -up causing
respiratory breathing issues and irritation of the eyes. While Johnson argued that air would
have come in through the door to the building or even the open window in the closet where
the dogs were found, this argument is undercut by the direct evidence that there was no
fresh air throughout the building. Thus, this court assumes that the jury believed the state
and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. Caldwell, 803 at 384.
In sum, because the state’s brief references websites not contained in the record on
appeal, we grant Johnson’s motion to strike . And because the record contains sufficient
evidence to sustain Johnson’s conviction of depriving his animals of adequate enclosures,
the district court did not clearly err in denying the trial continuance requests, and Johnson’s
waiver of his right to counsel was adequate, we affirm.
Affirmed; motion granted.