State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1269

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stephanie Hope Smith,
Appellant.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-22-8044

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Michael Hayek, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Stephen Foertsch, Samantha Foertsch, Bruno Law, PLLC, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction for mistreatment of
animals, appellant Stephanie Hope Smith challenges the district court’s order denying her
motion to suppress evidence found during multiple searches of a barn where she kept
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rabbits. Smith also argues that respondent State of Minnesota presented insufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she mistreated animals by failing to
provide a change of air for the rabbits. We affirm.
FACTS
Smith operated a nonprofit rabbit rescue in a section of a barn she rented from the
barn’s owner. The owner, a former volunteer with Smith’s nonprofit, had purchased the
barn and the surrounding property with the intention of allowing Smith to continue
operating the rabbit rescue. Smith and the owner entered into a lease agreement on June
10, 2022, under which Smith would rent two-thirds of the barn and the owner would retain
the remaining third. To create that division in the barn, plastic tarps were hung from the
ceiling rafters.
Shortly after executing the lease agreement, the owner found a rabbit on her side of
the barn that had escaped from Smith’s side. When the owner returned the escaped rabbit
to Smith’s side of the barn, the owner became concerned about Smith’s rabbits. The owner
saw dead rabbits, rabbits with apparent medical issues or injuries, empty water containers,
and rabbits escaping their enclosures. The owner noted a strong smell of feces and urine
inside the barn.
A few days later, the owner contacted the Minnesota Federated Humane Societies
(MFHS)—a nonprofit corporation created by statute but operated independently of the
state, see Minn. Stat. § 343.01, subds. 1, 1b (2024)—for guidance on appropriate rabbit
care. The owner told an MFHS investigator that she saw dead rabbits, rabbits with cuts on
their ears, rabbits without water, piles of feces, rabbits burrowing into those piles, and other
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“possibly unsanitary conditions.” She also stated that the “smell [in the barn] made her
eyes water.” The owner contacted MFHS again a few days later, on June 27, asking if the
investigator could stop by because, while volunteers with the nonprofit were in the barn,
the owner “could see all the way back [into Smith’s side of the barn] and was disturbed by
what she saw and smelled.” MFHS agreed to investigate the owner’s concerns and
contacted a private rabbit rescue group for assistance.
Representatives from both groups arrived at the barn later that day, and the owner
allowed them to enter her side of the barn. The MFHS investigator noted that “[t]he tarp
that had once divided the spaces was on the ground.” The MFHS investigator observed the
following while in the barn: “an overpowering smell of rabbit urine and feces,” the smell
of “moldy straw,” “rabbit feces everywhere on the grounds and on surfaces and in boxes,”
“flies buzzing around,” “[two] operational fans,” rabbits in the owner’s side of the barn, a
rabbit with “its head tilted as if it were injured or possibly sick,” young rabbits that “did
not appear to be okay,” “rabbits going in and out from under the concrete floors,” several
rabbits breathing abnormally, several rabbit cages without water, a rabbit with a potential
eye condition, rabbits with other apparent medical needs, and unsecured enclosures. The
MFHS investigator also noted generally that “[e]verything appeared dirty and unkempt.”
After investigating for about an hour, the MFHS investigator called 911.
Community Service Officer Z.J. and an investigator from 4Paws Animal Control,
which has a contract with the city to provide animal-control services, were dispatched to
the barn. The 4Paws investigator searched the barn and found two rabbits in need of
immediate veterinary care, one of which died later that day. The 4Paws investigator told
4
an officer at the scene that she observed a “god awful smell” in the barn, some rabbits with
respiratory issues, a rabbit “with a massive eye wound,” “dreadful cage conditions that
were filthy,” and many rabbits experiencing “heat distress and dehydration.”
While driving to the barn, Officer Z.J. contacted an investigator from the Animal
Humane Society (AHS) (the AHS agent) to discuss “all the possible scenarios that [she]
could encounter.” The AHS agent said that he would be at the scene later that day. Upon
arriving at the barn, Officer Z.J. met with the owner, who shared information about the
rabbits and the conditions inside. Officer Z.J. then learned that the MFHS investigator had
been on scene and inside the barn for over an hour. The owner led Officer Z.J. and another
officer to the barn, where they entered through a door on the owner’s side. Footage from
Officer Z.J.’s body-worn camera (BWC) shows the dividing tarp was partially down when
she entered the barn. Officer Z.J. and the other officer then crossed from the owner’s side
of the barn to Smith’s side.
Officer Z.J. did not make many immediate observations recorded on her BWC, but
her initial report noted rabbits “running loose in the barn,” the overwhelming “smell of
feces and urine,” “rabbit feces all over the floor,” a rabbit with eye discharge, empty food
and water bowls, dirty water in water troughs, and rabbit feces in the feeding bowls.
Another officer reported, “Immediately upon entry, I could smell a horrific smell that was
a combination of death, feces, and other unknown foul odors. I put a N95 mask on, but
even with the mask on, the smell was unbearable and I eventually had to leave the barn.”
He also noted that the floor was covered in rabbit feces. Officer Z.J.’s BWC footage shows
a running fan that is visible immediately upon her entry into the owner’s side of the barn.
5
After walking through Smith’s side and taking pictures for about ten minutes, Officer Z.J.
directed everyone to leave the barn. About one hour later , the AHS agent arrived and
interviewed the owner.
Several hours later, volunteers with Smith’s nonprofit arrived to perform their
chores. When asked by an officer and the AHS agent, one volunteer said that they had not
noticed sick or dead rabbits while performing chores that morning or previously. The
volunteers were allowed to complete their chores under law- enforcement supervision.
Those chores included feeding and watering the rabbits and opening the barn’s doors. The
property was then secured, and an officer was posted overnight.
The next morning, on June 28, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for the
barn. The warrant application included information from the animal-welfare groups, the
lease agreement, and a summary of the owner’s observations. That summary stated:
[The owner] stated she had not heard from [Smith] for several
days so she went to the property to check on the animals. When
[the owner] entered the barn she found 200+ animals in various
states of health. Some of the animals were dead and others were
sick and possibly injured.

Law enforcement, accompanied by the AHS agent and veterinarians , executed the
search warrant. The veterinarians secured two sick rabbits and 16 baby rabbits for further
care. They also found an estimated 30 to 40 dead rabbits in various stages of
decomposition. Two rabbits were euthanized on scene. In its report, AHS noted that the
rabbits were “living in unsanitary conditions with urine-soaked hay and feces throughout
the space,” “[t]here was a heavy ammonia smell due to lack of ventilation and temperatures
6
were uncontrolled,” and “[f]ans were present on site but not plugged in and covered in dust
and cobwebs.”
The state charged Smith with 13 counts of overwork or mistreatment of animals
under Minnesota Statutes section 343.21 (2020) related to the conditions in which she kept
the rabbits. Smith moved to suppress evidence obtained during both the warrantless
June 27 search and the warranted June 28 search and to dismiss the charges against her for
lack of probable cause. The district court denied Smith’s motion to suppress evidence but
granted the motion to dismiss as to three counts. The state then amended its complaint to
reflect the ten remaining counts. The case proceeded to an eight- day bench trial, during
which the district court heard testimony from 14 witnesses and received more than 160
exhibits. After the state’s case-in-chief, Smith moved for judgment of acquittal. The district
court then acquitted Smith of four counts. Following trial, the district court found Smith
not guilty of five of the remaining six counts but convicted her of a single misdemeanor
count of mistreatment of animals by providing an unwholesome enclosure under Minnesota
Statutes section 343.21, subdivision 3.
Smith appeals.
DECISION
I.
Smith first argues that her conviction must be reversed because the district court
erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during the June 27 and 28
searches of the barn. She contends that those searches violated her constitutional right to
7
be free from unreasonable searches because they were conducted without a valid warrant
and without a valid exception to the warrant requirement.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A warrantless search is
generally unreasonable, unless it falls into one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015). “Evidence obtained
from an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible.” State
v. Rohde, 852 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. 2014). When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion
to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the
court’s legal determinations de novo. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012).
Although law enforcement obtained a warrant for the June 28 search, Smith
contends that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information provided by the
barn owner and animal-welfare groups, who were acting as agents of the government.
Smith also argues that any evidence of the conditions in the barn and health of the rabbits
collected by both law enforcement and animal-welfare groups during the warrantless
June 27 search should have been suppressed because no exception to the warrant
requirement applies. We address each of these issues in turn.
A.
We first consider the validity of the June 28 search warrant. Smith contends the
warrant was not valid because it was supported by evidence unlawfully obtained during the
June 27 searches. The state counters that the facts supporting probable cause for the June 28
8
search warrant were provided by private parties whose information gathering was not
subject to constitutional limitations.
A search warrant may not be issued except upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend.
IV; Minn. Const. art. I , § 10. Probable cause exists when there is a “fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Wiggins, 4
N.W.3d 138, 145 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “This is a common-sense, nontechnical
concept that involves the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d
164, 169 (Minn. 2023) (quotations omitted). When reviewing a decision to issue a search
warrant, “our only consideration is whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted).
To establish probable cause to search the barn, the search-warrant application
included statements from two witnesses: (1) the barn owner and (2) the MFHS investigator
who searched the barn before law enforcement’s arrival on June 27. The search- warrant
application also included a brief description of other animal-welfare groups’ activities at
the scene. But the search-warrant application did not rely on any information provided by
law-enforcement officers who were present during the June 27 search.
The barn owner’s statement included in the warrant application was that she “had
not heard from [the rabbit rescue] for several days,” so she went to the barn, where she
personally observed “200+ animals in various states of health. Some of the animals were
dead and others were sick and possibly injured.” Smith contends that this “brief,
9
uncorroborated” statement is inadequate to establish probable cause and “could very well
describe any other type of farm or animal rescue dedicated to caring for animals in varying
degrees of age, health, etc.” We disagree. Observations that unattended rabbits were in
medical distress and some were already dead established a fair probability of animal
mistreatment in the barn. In that respect, the reasoning in our nonprecedential decision
State v. Fitzgerald, No. C2-00 -666, 2000 WL 1664883 (Minn. App. Nov. 7, 2000), is
persuasive.1 In Fitzgerald, we reasoned that a search warrant for a residence was supported
by probable cause because it was based on personal observations of possible mistreatment
of animals, including a neighbor’s observations of four dogs in defendant’s yard, “an
estimated twenty dogs barking inside the house,” law-enforcement observations of a van
loaded with animal carriers and the “strong smell of feces coming from the property,” and
a complaint of six dogs barking in the defendant’s backyard. 2000 WL 1664883, at * 2.
Whereas the warrant in Fitzgerald was supported solely by statements indicating the
presence of a large number of dogs on the property, the barn owner’s statement here
contains more. The owner indicated not only that she had directly observed a large number
of unattended animals but also that many of those animals were in poor health or distress.
These observations were sufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant.
If the owner’s statement had not been enough, the MFHS investigator’s statement
further supported probable cause. But Smith argues that any information collected by the
MFHS investigator on June 27 should have been suppressed, and therefore excluded as

1 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding but “may be cited as persuasive authority.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
10
support for the warrant, because the MFHS investigator was acting as a government agent
and was subject to constitutional requirements. Again, we disagree.
A private party cannot violate the constitution, so a search conducted by a private
party that would be unreasonable if conducted by law enforcement “will not result in
evidence seized being suppressed.” State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614, 617-18 (Minn.
1990). But whether a private party should be deemed an agent of the government for Fourth
Amendment purposes depends on “(a) whether the State knew of and acquiesced in the
search; and (b) whether the search was conducted to assist law enforcement’s interests or
the interests of the private party.” State v. Pauli, 979 N.W.2d 39, 51 (Minn. 2022). “If the
government does not know of and acquiesce in the search, the search cannot be attributed
to the government and the inquiry ends.” State v. Jorgensen, 660 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn.
2003). The barn owner contacted the MFHS investigator directly and asked her to come to
the barn. The MFHS investigator arrived at the barn before law enforcement and conducted
much of her investigation before law enforcement arrived. In fact, it was the MFHS
investigator who ultimately contacted law enforcement. The record contains no indication
that law enforcement was aware of or acquiesced in the MFHS investigator’s search.
Consequently, that search cannot be attributed to the government, and the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the MFHS investigator’s search.
Because the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed, the district court did not err in denying Smith’s motion to suppress evidence
discovered pursuant to the June 28 search warrant.

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B.
We next consider whether evidence obtained during law enforcement’s warrantless
June 27 search should have been suppressed. Smith contends that all the evidence of the
conditions in the barn and health of the rabbits collected on June 27 by both law
enforcement and the animal-welfare groups violated her Fourth Amendment rights and
should be suppressed. The state argues, consistent with the district court’s conclusion, that
evidence obtained without a warrant on June 27 was admissible under the inevitable-
discovery doctrine, and alternatively, that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.
The inevitable-discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule rather
than the warrant requirement; that is, when the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies,
evidence seized in violation of the warrant requirement need not be excluded at trial. State
v. Steeprock, 28 N.W.3d 417, 433 (Minn. 2025). “If the state can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of a challenged search ‘ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,’ then the seized evidence is
admissible even if the search violated the warrant requirement.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d
243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)). “The inevitable
discovery doctrine involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical
facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Id. (quotation omitted). The state
bears the burden to show the inevitable-discovery exception applies. State v. Diede, 795
N.W.2d 836, 849-50 (Minn. 2011). Appellate courts review the district court’ s factual
findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d
670, 677 (Minn. 2015).
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The record supports that conditions in the barn remained unchanged between
June 27 and 28, and even if not for their June 27 warrantless search, law enforcement would
inevitably have discovered thos e conditions when they executed the June 28 search
warrant. The district court found that the barn was secured by law enforcement overnight
on June 27, and the volunteers were closely supervised by law enforcement while
performing their evening chores. The heat and odor inside the barn remained unchanged
between June 27 and June 28, and the witnesses from law enforcement and the animal-
welfare groups who searched the barn on June 27 and June 28 noted a strong odor of feces
and urine on both days. Any evidence related to air ventilation, whether permanently
attached features of the barn’s structure or floor fans in and around Smith’s side of the barn,
was visible and accessible on June 27 and remained so the next day. Smith has not pointed
to any evidence in the record from which we could conclude that the district court’s
findings were clearly erroneous. Based on its factual findings, the district court determined
that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies. We agree. That is, assuming law
enforcement’s challenged June 27 search of the barn was unlawful, we nevertheless
conclude that the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence of
inadequate ventilation would inevitably have been discovered during the warranted
June 28 search.
Smith contends that “the ultimate discovery of the evidence at issue came only after
a search warrant based almost entirely on that unlawfully obtained evidence.” In other
words, Smith argues that the June 28 warrant was unsupported by lawfully obtained
information, so the state cannot show that the fruits of the search would have been
13
“ultimately or inevitably . . . discovered by lawful means.” See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 254
(quotation omitted). Smith does not otherwise dispute the applicability of the inevitable-
discovery doctrine. Having already concluded that the June 28 warrant was supported by
probable cause independent of law enforcement’s observations on June 27, we further
conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the conditions in the barn on
June 27 would inevitably have been discovered on June 28 and that the evidence collected
by law enforcement on June 27 is admissible.
Because we conclude that the inevitable-discovery doctrine applies , we need not
address the parties’ alternative arguments as to whether an exception to the warrant
requirement might apply. See State v. Schell, 994 N.W.2d 326, 330 n.1 (Minn. App. 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2023).
II.
Smith next argues that her conviction must be reversed because the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not
provide an adequate change of air in the barn on June 27. The parties dispute whether the
standard of review for circumstantial or direct evidence applies. Smith contends that,
because the state relied on both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove an inadequate
change of air in the barn, we should apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.
But if an element was sufficiently supported by direct evidence, even if circumstantial
evidence also exists, the traditional direct-evidence standard applies, and we need not
engage in a review under the heightened circumstantial-evidence standard. See State v.
Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 n.2 (Minn. 2010). Testimony based on the personal
14
knowledge and observations of witnesses constitutes direct evidence. State v. Harris, 895
N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017); see also Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11
(Minn. 2004) (defining direct evidence as “evidence that is based on personal knowledge
or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption” (quotation
omitted)). Here, multiple witnesses testified to their observations of the conditions inside
the barn, including the lack of ventilation. That testimony is direct evidence, so if that
evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, we need not address the circumstantial-
evidence standard.
When reviewing the sufficiency of direct evidence to prove an element of an
offense, we conduct “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit
the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40
(Minn. 2016). We assume that “the fact-finder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with
that verdict.” State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022). Accordingly, we “will not
overturn a verdict if, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the [state’s]
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the [fact-finder] could reasonably have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 551
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). We apply the same standard of review to a sufficiency-
of-the-evidence challenge following a bench trial as applied following a jury trial. State v.
Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009).
To obtain a conviction under the unwholesome-enclosure statute, the state had to
prove that Smith kept an “animal in any enclosure without providing wholesome exercise
15
and change of air.” 2 Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 3. The state offered direct evidence that
Smith failed to provide a change of air in the form of testimony from the barn owner, law-
enforcement officers, the AHS agent, veterinarians, and other witnesses that the barn lacked
adequate ventilation on June 27.
The barn owner testified about the ongoing issues related to the smell coming from
Smith’s side of the barn, the fact that the barn was usually closed and locked, and the lack
of a ventilation system installed in the barn for the exchange of air. The owner further
testified that she contacted MFHS about her concerns, that she showed the investigator her
side of the barn, that the inside of the barn smelled like manure, and that “the smell of urine
was very strong.” She also testified that the barn had doors and windows, but they were
often closed; that an overhead door was sometimes opened for circulation; that some
standing circular fans were on; and that the barn was completely sealed when no one was
there.
Other witnesses who personally observed the conditions in the barn also testified to
the lack of ventilation. Officer Z.J. testified that “there [were] no open windows. The
ventilation was poor,” and there was “just one ceiling fan in the top of the barn.” And

2 We have addressed this statutory provision on only one other occasion, in our
nonprecedential decision in State v. Johnson, No. A22-1711, 2023 WL 7122598 (Minn.
App. Oct. 30, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). In Johnson, we explained that direct
evidence supported the defendant’s conviction of depriving animals of an adequate change
of air based on testimony from multiple witnesses as to “the conditions of the animal
enclosures.” Johnson, 2023 WL 7122598, at *4. Although we are not bound by Johnson,
we likewise conclude here that witness testimony regarding personal observations of the
animal enclosures at issue constitutes direct evidence of whether the animals were provided
“change of air.”
16
although the ceiling fan was running when she entered the barn, no other fans were running.
Later, Officer Z.J. testified that, from outside the barn, she could not recall hearing a fan
running and most of the windows were sealed, though she agreed that a fan can be heard
in the footage from her BWC. The AHS agent testified that “most of the fans and capability
of ventilation weren’t being utilized”; the smell, heat, humidity, and amount of ammonia
in the air suggested a lack of ventilation; and there “didn’t appear to be any available
mechanical [ventilation].” One of the veterinarians assisting law enforcement with the
June 28 search observed that “[t]he barn itself was warm and muggy. There was no
ventilation going. There [were] no fans going.” Although Smith did not testify, Officer
Z.J.’s BWC recorded her stating that the barn needed more ventilation and that she intended
to renovate the barn for that purpose.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we assume the
district court believed the testimony that the barn lacked adequate ventilation and
“disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384
(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). The personal observations of multiple witnesses that the
barn lacked ventilation or had only minimal ventilation are direct evidence that Smith failed
to provide an adequate change of air for the rabbits she kept in the barn. These observations
are strengthened by Smith’s recorded acknowledgment that the barn needed more
ventilation. We therefore conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Smith provided an unwholesome enclosure because she deprived the rabbits of a change
of air. And because direct evidence sufficiently supports the conviction, we need not apply
the circumstantial-evidence standard. See Flowers, 788 N.W.2d at 133 n.2.
17
Smith contends the state’s evidence is insufficient because witnesses testified
inconsistently about the odor and heat in the barn, the district court wrongly disregarded
air-quality readings, and the district court failed to adequately consider that Smith directed
trained volunteers to complete chores to care for the rabbits in her absence. But these
arguments ask us to substitute our own judgment regarding the credibility of witnesses for
that of the district court and to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do . See State v.
Isaac, 9 N.W.3d 812, 815 (Minn. 2024). Thus, these arguments are not a basis on which
we can conclude that the evidence presented was insufficient to support Smith’s
conviction.3
Affirmed.

3 Smith separately argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of probable cause. But such an argument is “irrelevant” in an appeal
after trial because the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support the
conviction is much higher than probable cause. State v. Holmberg, 527 N.W.2d 100, 103
(Minn. App. 1995) (citing State ex rel. Hastings v. Bailey, 116 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Minn.
1962)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 21, 1995). We therefore do not address Smith’s probable-
cause argument.