In re Petition for Reinstatement of Adam W. Klotz, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0390925

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0523

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Dissenting, Anderson, Thissen, JJ.
Took no part, Procaccini, J.

In re Petition for Reinstatement of Filed: October 4, 2023
Adam W. Klotz, a Minnesota Attorney, Office of Appellate Courts
Registration No. 0390925.

________________________

Nicholas M. Ryan, Eric T. Cooperstein, Law Office of Eric T. Cooperstein, PLLC,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Joshua H. Brand, Senior Assistant Director, Office of
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

SYLLABUS

Based on our independent review of the record, the panel’s conclusion that

petitioner has not undergone the requisite moral change was not clearly erroneous.

Petition denied.

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 OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Adam W. Klotz filed a petition for reinstatement following his indefinite

suspension from the practice of law. After a hearing, a panel of the Lawyers Professional

Responsibility Board recommended against Klotz’s reinstatement. The panel concluded

that Klotz failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he had undergone

the requisite moral change for reinstatement. Klotz contests the panel’s findings,

conclusions, and recommendation, and asserts that he should be reinstated. The Director

of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Director) agrees with the panel’s

recommendation.

After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that Klotz should not be

reinstated to the practice of law because he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he underwent the requisite moral change required for reinstatement.

FACTS

Klotz was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 2010. In 2018, we indefinitely

suspended Klotz with no right to petition for reinstatement for a minimum of 18 months

for misappropriating client funds; making false statements to the Director and attempting

to conceal from the Director the full scope of his misconduct; creating a false and

misleading document; failing to maintain required trust account records; failing to

safeguard and promptly refund an unearned retainer; making false statements to clients;

neglecting client matters; and failing to communicate with clients. In re Klotz, 909 N.W.2d

327, 330–31, 335 (Minn. 2018). We concluded that Klotz violated many rules of

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professional conduct by his misconduct. Id. at 337. We explained that several stressors in

Klotz’s life, his inexperience in the practice of law and a lack of a selfish motive, were

mitigating factors. Id. at 338–40. Because of the “long duration and severity of Klotz’s

misconduct,” we held that the referee’s recommended suspension (minimum of 1 year)

would be insufficient and instead imposed an indefinite suspension with no right to petition

for reinstatement for 18 months. Id. at 341.

Klotz filed a petition for reinstatement in February 2020. The Director investigated

and provided Klotz with a draft report summarizing the investigation. After receiving the

Director’s report, Klotz withdrew his petition on September 30, 2021.

About 7 months later, in April 2022, Klotz filed his current reinstatement petition.

The panel conducted a 2-day hearing. Klotz testified on his own behalf and called four

witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Director announced her opposition to

Klotz’s reinstatement.

In December 2022, the panel issued its findings, conclusions, and recommendation.

The panel concluded that Klotz failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence moral

change and that the public would be at risk if Klotz were to be readmitted to the practice

of law, and as a result, it recommended not reinstating Klotz. Klotz ordered a hearing

transcript, and he asks us to reinstate him to the practice of law in Minnesota.

ANALYSIS

We are responsible for determining whether an attorney will be reinstated. In re

Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1999). When deciding whether to reinstate an

attorney, we “conduct an independent review of the entire record; although we consider a

3
panel’s recommendation, we are not bound by it.” In re Tigue, 960 N.W.2d 694, 699

(Minn. 2021). When an attorney orders a transcript, like Klotz did here, we will uphold

the panel’s findings so long as the record supports them and they are not clearly erroneous.

In re Stockman, 896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017).

To be reinstated, the attorney must prove: “(1) moral change; (2) the intellectual

competence to practice law; (3) compliance with the conditions of suspension; and

(4) compliance with the requirements of Rule 18, RLPR. In re Mose (Mose III),

993 N.W.2d 251, 261 n.5 (Minn. 2023). We further weigh four additional factors

when considering reinstatement: “the attorney’s recognition that the conduct was wrong,

the length of time since the misconduct and suspension, the seriousness of the

misconduct, and any physical or mental pressures susceptible to correction.” Id. Because

the key issue here is whether Klotz has demonstrated the requisite moral change, we focus

on that requirement.

In determining whether to reinstate an attorney, “[s]howing a moral change is the

most important factor.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857. In general, “to prove moral change

a lawyer must show remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the misconduct, a change

in the lawyer’s conduct and state of mind that corrects the underlying misconduct that led

to the suspension, and a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.” In re Mose

(Mose II), 843 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn. 2014). Evidence of moral change must come from

“an observed record of appropriate conduct” and “the [attorney’s] own state of mind and

his values.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

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 Here, the panel made thorough findings in evaluating Klotz’s remorse and

acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct, his change in conduct and state of mind,

and his renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law. Ultimately, the panel

concluded that Klotz did not undergo the requisite moral change that would allow him to

practice law.

Remorse and Acceptance of Responsibility for the Misconduct

To establish a moral change, Klotz must first prove that he “show[s] remorse and

acceptance of responsibility for the misconduct.” Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at 575. The panel

determined that Klotz did not express the requisite remorse and acceptance of

responsibility for his misconduct. Klotz contends that the record, as a whole, shows that

he expressed remorse and accepted responsibility.

The panel found that even though Klotz expressed remorse to his witnesses, the

actual remorse that Klotz conveyed failed to fully consider the totality of his misconduct,

and the evidence showed that Klotz felt a general sense of remorse overall for having been

suspended. Notably, the panel found that Klotz’s inconsistent statements and minimization

of his conduct at the hearing countered any expressions of remorse and acceptance of

responsibility for his misconduct. 1

1
We acknowledge that Klotz challenged some of the findings regarding his moral
change, such as that Klotz failed to disclose to “several” witnesses the nature of his
misconduct until shortly before the reinstatement hearing, that Klotz excused his
misconduct as not as “nefarious” as it seemed, or that Klotz continues to view his
misconduct as an “accounting mistake.” But even if these findings are clearly erroneous,
as the dissent contends, they do not undermine the panel’s other factual findings and overall
determination that Klotz did not demonstrate the requisite remorse or accept responsibility
for his misconduct.

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 The panel addressed the witnesses’ testimony regarding Klotz’s remorse and

acceptance of responsibility. The panel found that even though the witnesses’ testimony

was credible, based on Klotz’s own testimony and demeanor at the hearing, the panel did

not find that Klotz’s statements to his witnesses that he accepted responsibility or expressed

remorse for his conduct were credible. Specifically, the panel found that even though one

witness’s testimony was helpful and credible, it was not enough to overcome the panel’s

direct observations regarding Klotz’s behavior.

Klotz contends that the panel erred because it did not view the evidence of his

remorse as a whole. Klotz emphasizes his own transparency and honesty about his

misconduct. Yet the panel found that Klotz’s testimony regarding accepting responsibility

for his misconduct or expressing remorse was not credible. The record supports these

findings, and we defer to the panel’s credibility determinations and findings. In re Mose

(Mose I), 754 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2008); Tigue, 960 N.W.2d at 701.

The record supports the panel’s finding that Klotz did not express the requisite

remorse or accept responsibility because he minimized his misconduct. 2 The panel found

that Klotz minimized his misconduct when he referred to his dishonesty toward the

2
Klotz relies on the referee’s April 3, 2017 findings and recommendation from his
disciplinary hearing. In 2017, we acknowledged that Klotz’s remorse was a mitigating
factor but did not heavily weigh it. Klotz, 909 N.W.2d at 340. Klotz contends that this
finding shows that Klotz was remorseful for his conduct, and the panel would have to
find that the earlier remorse finding was wrong or that he had become less remorseful.
The panel focuses on the attorney’s mental state at the time of the reinstatement
hearing, however. In re Trombley, 947 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Minn. 2020). Given the
several-year-delay between the referee’s findings and the reinstatement hearing, the panel
appropriately evaluated and determined Klotz’s present-day remorse at the time of the
reinstatement hearing.

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Director as an “accounting mistake.” See In re Holker, 765 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2009)

(finding that because the petitioner had minimized his misconduct, his showing of remorse

was not credible). We acknowledge that Klotz referred to his misconduct as an “accounting

mistake” when describing how he used to think of it. The comments regarding Klotz’s

attitude before the reinstatement hearing should not be considered. See In re Dedefo,

781 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the proper inquiry is not whether the petitioner

has undergone a moral change before the suspension or immediately subsequent; instead,

the court looks at the petitioner’s mental state and values at the time of the reinstatement

hearing).

Nevertheless, we note that even if Klotz used “accounting mistake” to refer to his

thoughts regarding his misconduct before the reinstatement hearing, Klotz used the word

“mistake” at other points during his testimony, which shows how he currently views his

misconduct. For example, Klotz stated that he called P.C. after he realized his “mistakes”

and that he drew up false records to the Director to hide his mistakes. Notably, Klotz never

acknowledged that he intentionally put a client’s money into his business account or spoke

of this misconduct as “misappropriation” until cross-examination. Calling intentional

misappropriation of client funds and intentional creation of false records to disguise

misconduct a “mistake” certainly minimizes Klotz’s dishonesty.

Moreover, Klotz minimized the seriousness of his repeated misconduct in other

ways. For instance, Klotz explained that his dishonesty toward the Director—lying to the

Director and covering up his misconduct with a false document—was “the path of least

resistance.” And Klotz continued to give context for this misconduct. He suggested that

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part of his dishonesty toward the Director stemmed from their written communication,

which made his dishonesty “a little easier” than if he had personally spoken with someone.

He stated that he wanted “people to understand the context, that it wasn’t like [he] was on

the phone with an investigator and lying.” Additionally, Klotz suggested at the

reinstatement hearing that, regarding his misconduct toward D.R.M., he had likely mailed

out her complaint. This statement is contrary to Klotz’s testimony (and what the referee

found) at his suspension hearing—that Klotz never actually mailed out the complaint.

These are only some of the examples showing that Klotz minimized and did not recognize

the seriousness of his misconduct throughout the reinstatement hearing.

Furthermore, the panel found that Klotz did not demonstrate remorse for the

improper loans to clients, in part because Klotz never apologized to them and testified that

he did not even know their names. And in response to his misconduct regarding D.R.M.,

Klotz noted that he did not neglect her case because she was unrealistic with her timeline

expectations. In doing so, Klotz shifted the blame of the misconduct to D.R.M. This shift

shows a lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the client neglect. See Holker,

765 N.W.2d at 638 (finding that the petitioner’s shifting of blame to others made his

supposed acceptance of responsibility less credible). The record supports these findings.

Change in Conduct and State of Mind

Next, Klotz must prove “a change in his conduct and state of mind that corrects the

underlying misconduct that led to the suspension.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 859 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The panel determined that Klotz did not

establish a change in his conduct and state of mind. The panel found that even though

8
Klotz claimed to have identified and corrected his tendencies that led to his misconduct, he

actually demonstrated those tendencies in his testimony. For example, the panel found that

much of Klotz’s testimony “sounded arrogant and lacking in humility.” Klotz did not

challenge this finding. In our review of the record, we see examples of this attitude, an

attitude that Klotz admitted contributed to his misconduct in that he was reluctant to ask

for help or to admit that he had undertaken more than he could handle. 3

The panel also found that, in response to the panel’s questions about whether he

could assure the panel that he would not engage in misconduct again, Klotz provided a

“rambling” response and could not promise or guarantee that he would not engage in the

type of dishonest misconduct—lying, falsifying documents, and misappropriating client

funds—that led to his suspension. Because the record supports this finding, we defer to

the panel’s credibility determinations and findings. Mose I, 754 N.W.2d at 362.

Additionally, the record shows that the witness testimony did not demonstrate that

Klotz had changed his conduct and state of mind. The witnesses testified that Klotz had

reflected on his shortcomings and had thought about how to be a better person. But the

witnesses generally focused on the circumstances that led to Klotz’s dishonesty, such as

3
Here, the panel had the opportunity to evaluate Klotz’s demeanor and the import of
his explanations and assertions. For example, Klotz said, “I know this is kind of like a pat
on my own back kind of thing” before he asserted that he handled more than 1,000 matters
and that from those matters, only one client, D.R.M., was upset with him. Additionally,
Klotz boasted that he was part of a “select few” and an “inner circle” of lawyers working
on Children in Need of Protection Services (CHIPS) cases and that he was the “go-to
person” for court administration on CHIPS cases. He also claimed that he always had a lot
of matters open at the public defender’s office and that he handled them “very well.” These
are a few examples that support the panel’s determination that Klotz did not prove a change
in his state of mind that had led to his previous misconduct.

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the external factors occurring in his life at the time of the misconduct, instead of his

dishonest and negligent misconduct itself. For example, the panel made several findings

regarding Klotz’s therapist, which Klotz does not challenge. Klotz’s therapist testified that

Klotz has shifted his focus from just thinking about his career to thinking about who he is

as a whole person. The panel, however, found that the therapist’s testimony did not address

whether Klotz has gained insight or learned through therapy how to be an ethical lawyer

who does not lie, who does not neglect his clients, and who does not misappropriate client

funds by mismanaging trust accounts. Most importantly, although the panel found one

witness’s testimony regarding Klotz’s change of conduct helpful, the testimony of the

witnesses was not sufficient to overcome the panel’s direct observations of Klotz.

Renewed Commitment to the Ethical Practice of Law

Finally, the panel concluded that Klotz did not demonstrate a renewed commitment

to the ethical practice of law. 4 The panel made a series of findings about Klotz’s proposed

mentoring and professional network as possible evidence of a renewed commitment to the

ethical practice of law. The panel ultimately concluded that his mentoring and professional

network was too vague and undefined, so the panel did not give much weight to it in

determining whether Klotz has demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice

of law. Klotz does not challenge these findings.

4
We acknowledge that Klotz has a concrete plan to continue therapy and testified
that he will reach out to other friends and colleagues to ask for their support if he is
reinstated. Although this general plan represents a good step in returning to the ethical
practice of law, it falls short of a plan that shows that Klotz will not again engage in the
type of misconduct that led to his suspension.

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 We do not require that an attorney show an airtight plan to return to the practice of

law; rather, “an attorney’s plan to return to the practice of law or implement systems to

avoid future misconduct are factors that may be relevant to whether an attorney has shown

a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.” In re Severson, 923 N.W.2d 23, 32

(Minn. 2019). In Mose II, the petitioning attorney’s disciplinary history involved client

neglect, failure to follow through on commitments, and failure to represent his clients

diligently. 843 N.W.2d at 576. We concluded that the petitioning attorney needed to

“provide evidence of a deliberate plan to return to the practice of law and have systems in

place to avoid future misconduct.” Id.

Here, Klotz’s misconduct included client neglect and a failure to represent his

clients diligently, as well as misappropriation of client funds and trust fund

mismanagement. Even though Klotz has expressed that he is trying to change—by

understanding what led to his misconduct—Klotz has not shown a renewed commitment

to the ethical practice of law.

The record supports the panel’s findings (that Klotz does not challenge) that Klotz

did not have a formal mentor selected, 5 and that most of the proposed members in his

professional network were not peers in the legal profession who could give him objective

advice regarding practice management, trust account management, or dealing with his

5
Klotz generally mentions two possible mentors, but he does not provide additional
details, and neither mentor submitted an affidavit nor testified at the reinstatement hearing.
The possible mentors were not identified as witnesses in the current petition because Klotz
“had not spoken to them in some time.” He also said that he had not advised the two that
he had withdrawn his initial petition.

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obligations under the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct—all of which contributed

to the misconduct that led to his suspension. 6

Klotz bears the burden of proof to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he

meets the requirements for reinstatement. Klotz minimized his misconduct and failed to

accept responsibility for the misconduct. Even though Klotz’s witnesses provided positive

testimony, the panel found that their testimony was not enough to outweigh his own

testimony. The panel made many findings about whether Klotz changed his conduct and

state of mind that led to the underlying misconduct; most critically, the panel found that

Klotz’s testimony was not credible. Notably, the panel determined that Klotz has not

demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law, and Klotz does not

challenge those findings.

Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that Klotz did not meet

his heavy burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has undergone the

requisite moral change. Accordingly, we deny his petition for reinstatement.

Petition denied.

PROCACCINI, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

6
Klotz testified that, if reinstated, he would neither practice civil law again nor “have
anything to do with trust accounts.” This limitation of future practice to criminal law,
however, does not alleviate our concerns that Klotz’s identified system of support is too
disconnected from the practice of law and undefined to demonstrate a renewed
commitment to the ethical practice of law.

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 DISSENT

ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).

Petitioner Adam W. Klotz has not practiced law since 2018 when we suspended him

for misappropriating client funds, dishonesty toward the Director of the Office of Lawyers

Professional Responsibility (Director), creating a false and misleading document, and

neglecting and lying to clients. In re Klotz, 909 N.W.2d 327, 330–31, 335 (Minn. 2018).

During the time that Klotz has not practiced law, he has started therapy, taken several

continuing legal education courses related to the area of misconduct, and worked to

understand what led him to commit professional misconduct.

Klotz now seeks reinstatement to the practice of law. The Director primarily

opposes Klotz’s reinstatement petition because the Lawyers Professional Responsibility

Board panel concluded that Klotz should not be reinstated because he did not demonstrate

the requisite moral change. I disagree. I conclude that the record shows that Klotz

demonstrated the requisite remorse and acceptance of responsibility, a change in conduct,

and a working plan to return to the ethical practice of law. Because I would grant Klotz’s

petition for reinstatement, subject to probation conditions regarding Klotz’s professional

support system and the type of law that Klotz can practice, I respectfully dissent.

In reinstatement cases, we “independently review the entire record,” and “consider,

but are not bound by, the panel’s recommendations.” In re Trombley, 947 N.W.2d 242,

245 (Minn. 2020) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Klotz

ordered a transcript, the factual findings of the panel must have support in the record and

the factual findings must not be clearly erroneous. In re Mose, 843 N.W.2d 570, 573

D-1
(Minn. 2014). That said, “we have rejected a panel’s factual finding that had some support

in the record when the overwhelming evidence presented at the hearing shows the

contrary.” Trombley, 947 N.W.2d at 245 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A petitioning attorney seeking reinstatement must prove that he has undergone

“moral change.” In re Stockman, 896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017). Critically, we must

be assured that the petitioning attorney “has undergone such a moral change as now to

render [the petitioner] a fit person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited.”

In re Tigue, 960 N.W.2d 694, 700 (Minn. 2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). A panel determination that a petitioner lacks moral

change because of a lack of credibility cannot be upheld if the facts and circumstances

prove moral change. Trombley, 947 N.W.2d at 250. Here, I conclude that Klotz has

demonstrated the requisite moral change. Consequently, I would reinstate him to the

practice of law, subject to probation conditions.

Remorse and Acceptance of Responsibility for the Misconduct

Klotz must prove that he “show[s] remorse and acceptance of responsibility for [his]

misconduct” in order to demonstrate moral change. Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575. Shifting

blame to another or minimizing misconduct can make a purported acceptance of

responsibility less credible. See In re Holker, 765 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2009). The

panel found that Klotz failed to accept responsibility for his actions and minimized his

misconduct. Klotz challenges a number of the panel’s findings and argues that the evidence

D-2
at the hearing, as a whole, shows that he proved by clear and convincing evidence that he

accepted responsibility and demonstrated remorse. I agree with Klotz.

The Director contends that Klotz should not be reinstated because he did not show

by clear and convincing evidence that he accepted responsibility for his actions. The panel

found that Klotz did not accept responsibility because Klotz did not disclose the full details

of his misconduct to several of his witnesses until shortly before the reinstatement

hearing. This finding is clearly erroneous. Klotz shared the details of the misconduct with

all but one of his witnesses well in advance of the reinstatement hearing. Moreover, every

witness, including Klotz, testified that Klotz took sole responsibility for his actions and did

not blame anyone else. Accordingly, I would conclude that the panel inappropriately relied

on this fact in determining that Klotz failed to accept responsibility for his actions.

The Director also argues that Klotz failed to come to terms with the impact of the

wrongfulness of his misconduct because he minimized his conduct toward the Director,

calling his actions a “mistake,” and failing to use the word “misappropriation” to describe

his misconduct. The panel found that Klotz’s testimony showed that he minimized his

misconduct, in part based on these findings. This conclusion, too, however, also rested on

partially erroneous findings. First, the panel found that Klotz had excused his conduct by

saying it was not as “nefarious” as it seemed. There is no support in the record that Klotz

made that statement. Second, the panel focused on Klotz’s characterization of his

misconduct as an “accounting mistake.” In doing so, the panel improperly considered

Klotz’s previous thoughts in finding that he minimized his misconduct. We have held that

the proper inquiry into remorse consists of looking at the petitioner’s “mental state and

D-3
values” at the time of the reinstatement hearing. In re Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d 1, 9

(Minn. 2010). Klotz did at times call his misconduct an “accounting mistake,” but he only

did so when referring to how he viewed his misconduct at the time he committed

it. Accordingly, this testimony should not bear on the panel’s findings regarding Klotz’s

mental state at the time of the hearing.

The court brushes aside the panel’s findings, explaining that even if Klotz did not

use the phrase “accounting mistake,” Klotz still minimized his misconduct by calling it a

“mistake.” I disagree. Black’s Law defines “mistake” as “[a]n error, misconception, or

misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Mistake, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

Klotz’s misconduct was certainly the result of an error in judgment. But the word

“mistake” does not refer only to unintentional actions. I concede that his conduct was not

merely a mistake and if Klotz had exclusively referred to his actions as mistakes, I would

consider it a greater cause for concern. But that is not what happened here. While

testifying, Klotz repeatedly used the word “misconduct” in discussing the reasons for his

suspension. But he also called his behavior “wrong,” admitted that he “lied,” and

transparently laid out the actions that led to his misconduct and subsequent suspension.

The panel’s determination and the court’s conclusion that Klotz minimized his misconduct

and was not remorseful does not take into consideration the entire record. I conclude that

the “overwhelming evidence” from the hearing shows that Klotz demonstrated, by clear

and convincing evidence, that he accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his

misconduct. See Trombley, 947 N.W.2d at 245.

D-4
 Change in Conduct and State of Mind

The second requirement of moral change that a petitioner needs to prove is that he

has undergone a “change in [his] conduct and state of mind that corrects the underlying

misconduct that led to the suspension.” Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575. The panel found that

Klotz had not demonstrated a change in conduct or state of mind in part because his

testimony “sounded arrogant and lacking in humility.” We generally defer to the panel’s

credibility determinations and findings. Id. at 573. But, when the panel fails to make

specific findings about a petitioning attorney’s credibility and we find some of the panel’s

findings to be clearly erroneous, it can “create doubt about the Panel’s ultimate

recommendation.” Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d at 9. Although the court points to Klotz’s

testimony describing the number of clients he worked for and the type of work that he did

as an attorney, it wrongly posits Klotz’s explanations of the conditions giving rise to his

misconduct as sufficient support for the panel’s determination that Klotz sounded arrogant.

Crucially, the panel did not point to specific instances in which Klotz acted arrogantly.

Arrogance, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder; it is entirely possible that a petitioning

attorney may show remorse and moral change and also legitimate pride in accomplishment.

Klotz has shown personal growth in the approximately 5 years since he was

suspended. He withdrew his initial petition for reinstatement based on the Director’s

concern with his progress, and he accepted the Director’s recommendation that working

with a therapist could help resolve the underlying issues that led to his misconduct. For

example, leading up to his suspension, Klotz tended to take on too much work, which led

him to neglect clients. He also acted dishonestly when he tried to cover up his misconduct.

D-5
But throughout his testimony, Klotz expressed self-awareness about needing to ask for help

and not engaging in that dishonest behavior again.

Furthermore, several witnesses testified about Klotz’s changed behavior. His

therapist explained that Klotz had an improved ability to handle stress. Crucially, the

therapist stated that Klotz has undergone a “really specific behavioral change” that has

allowed him to recognize when he has the capacity to manage additional complications in

his life. Also, Klotz’s neighbor testified that he believed Klotz had identified the cause of

his misconduct and was in “a different spot” at the time of the reinstatement hearing. Yet

the panel found that even though Klotz’s neighbor was a credible witness, because he was

not a mental health professional, he was “not qualified to express an expert opinion” on

whether Klotz had undergone moral change. The panel found that his testimony was only

“minimally helpful.”

We have never held that a suspended attorney must produce an “expert” on moral

change, and this added “expert” requirement is concerning. I do not discount the value of

an expert witness, but I reject the conclusion that only “experts” (however defined) are the

palace guard in determining whether moral change has occurred. A neighbor or family

member might well have a much deeper, and more accurate, understanding of moral

change, if any, in the petitioning attorney than an expert with more limited exposure to the

attorney. Credible testimony that Klotz had underwent a change in conduct was therefore

erroneously discounted here. Although I acknowledge the existence of some contrary

evidence in the record, I conclude, on balance, that Klotz showed by clear and convincing

D-6
evidence that he had a change in conduct and state of mind that corrected the underlying

misconduct of client neglect and dishonesty.

Renewed Commitment to the Ethical Practice of Law

A petitioning attorney “should provide evidence of a deliberate plan to return to

the practice of law and have systems in place to avoid future misconduct.” Mose,

843 N.W.2d at 576. We have never held, however, that a petitioner must secure

employment conditioned on reinstatement or that other lawyers must testify at the

reinstatement hearing. Id. (holding that a suspended attorney did not need to have a job

available to prove he had an adequate plan to return to the practice of law). Yet, here, the

panel weighed both factors heavily in finding that Klotz did not demonstrate an adequate

commitment to the ethical practice of law, and it overlooked the support network Klotz has

set up to avoid future misconduct. A plan to return to the ethical practice of law will look

different for each attorney petitioning for reinstatement. In re Severson, 923 N.W.2d 23,

32–33 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that “our precedent reflects a more nuanced approach,

accounting for each petitioning attorney’s misconduct and circumstances when considering

whether moral change has been proven”).

The Director criticizes Klotz’s plan to return to the practice of law, noting that his

plan is focused on relying on others rather than making appropriate changes himself. Klotz

explained that, if reinstated, he would focus on asking for help and placing guardrails to

ensure he avoids future misconduct. I conclude that Klotz has shown that he has a robust

system in place to avoid future misconduct through his commitment to lean on his support

network, in stark contrast to his previous independent attitude. Klotz testified that he plans

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to have regularly scheduled check-ins with his former neighbor to discuss his professional

life. He and his wife, also an attorney, have said that they will intentionally share with

each other their work challenges and other stressors.

To assuage any concerns that Klotz would not have the assistance of other lawyers,

I would impose on Klotz, as a condition of his probation, that Klotz show that he is in

regular communication with attorneys in his practice area that could guide him and provide

support as he reenters the profession. Notably, we have previously imposed these

conditions on reinstated attorneys. Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d at 12 (holding that the attorney

must be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney as a condition of reinstatement);

Severson, 923 N.W.2d at 35–36 (same). Overall, it is clear that Klotz has sought, and will

continue to seek, others in his life who have made it known that they would help him. This

plan shows that Klotz has worked to identify the sources of his misconduct and

demonstrated his commitment to reform.

In conclusion, the panel in this case seemed to be searching for talismanic language

from Klotz (language that we have never identified or specifically required) that would

demonstrate a moral change. I conclude that the evidence in the record shows that Klotz

has undergone a moral change. In the more than 5 years since Klotz was suspended, he

has experienced significant personal growth and prepared himself for a return to the ethical

practice of law. And to address any concerns regarding Klotz’s future practice, I would

reinstate Klotz subject to limitations on his practice—a ban on solo practice, a regimented

mentorship with another attorney in the same practice area, and significant supervision. If

Klotz were reinstated, we could reasonably conclude that his clients could “submit their

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most intimate and important affairs to him with complete confidence in both his

competence and fidelity.” Severson, 923 N.W.2d at 29 (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

* * *

At its core, the purpose of attorney discipline is to “protect the public, safeguard the

judicial system, and deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney and other

attorneys.” In re Severson, 860 N.W.2d 658, 671 (Minn. 2015). We are to be concerned

with “whether the petitioner will likely recommit the conduct that got him suspended” in

the first place. Tigue, 960 N.W.2d at 711 (Thissen, J., dissenting). Therefore, we must

consider the specific misconduct that gave rise to the petitioner’s suspension and

determine, if the petitioner were to be reinstated, whether we are confident that he would

not repeat that misconduct. See Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575.

We suspended Klotz for misappropriating client funds, dishonesty toward the

Director, creating a false and misleading document, and neglecting and lying to clients.

Consequently, we must decide whether we are confident Klotz will not replicate that

misconduct. In making this determination, we must keep in mind any conditions we

impose on Klotz’s practice of law. Klotz must demonstrate moral change when it comes

to his misconduct that involved dishonesty or “moral turpitude.” See Tigue, 960 N.W.2d

at 715–16 (Thissen, J., dissenting). His dishonesty toward the Director, creation of a false

and misleading document, and lies to clients all are dishonest acts. And, as demonstrated

above, he has shown moral change when it comes to these instances of misconduct.

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 In order to be reinstated, a petitioner bears the burden of proving “moral change.”

Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 856. In my view, Klotz has met this burden.

THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).

I join in the dissent of Justice Anderson.

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