State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0246

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donald Dequai Crenshaw,
Appellant.

Filed January 16, 2024
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge *

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-21-2245

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for conspiracy to commi t
aggravated first -degree controlled -substance possession, appellant argues that his
conviction must be reversed because the state failed to meet its burden to prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged a ppellant Donald Dequai Crenshaw by
amended complaint with conspiracy to commit aggravated first -degree controlled -
substance possession, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2b(2), 152.096, subd. 1
(2020), and conspiracy to commit first-degree controlled-substance possession, in violation
of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1), 152.096, subd. 1 (2020). The following factual
summary is based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial.
On November 17, 2021, law enforcement officers were tracking a cellphone
associated with Crenshaw. 1 The officers learned that the cellphone left the Detroit Lakes
area in the evening hours, traveled to the Twin Cities, remained there for a short duration,
and then headed b ack toward s the Detroit Lakes area in the early morning hours of
November 18, 2021. Officers identified the vehicle in which the phone was traveling .

1 Law enforcement officers were investigating Crenshaw for drug -related activity and
obtained a search warrant for his cell phone. In a pretrial ruling, the district court permitted
officers to testify that they were monitoring Crenshaw’s phone but not to testify to any
details regarding why they were monitoring Crenshaw’s phone.

3
Officers stopped the vehicle after it crossed into Becker County believing that Crenshaw
would be in the vehicle and that the vehicle contained narcotics. Three people were in the
vehicle: C .H. was the driver, Crenshaw was the front -seat passenger, and C .B. was the
back-seat passenger.
The vehicle’s occupants were arrested and taken to jail. Crenshaw tol d police that
prior to being arrested, he had been in Wadena “shooting hoops.” C.H. told police that he
had just driven Crenshaw to a house in St. Paul so that Crenshaw could pick up
methamphetamine. Police obtained a search warrant to search the vehicle and found C.H.’s
backpack, which contained a digital scale and small plastic baggies. Also in the trunk,
police found a blue pillowcase that contained plastic grocery bags which contained 219
grams of methamphetamine.
The state charged C.H. and Crenshaw with aggravated first -degree controlled -
substance possession and first -degree controlled -substance possession. The state later
amended the complaint a nd charged Crenshaw with conspiracy to commit those crimes.
C.H. pleaded guilty to first -degree controlled -substance possession, received a
probationary disposition and treatment through drug court, and testified against Crenshaw
at his trial. The following excerpts are taken from C.H.’s testimony:
Q: And how did the plan of going to the Twin Cities on the
17th of November come to fruition?

A: Just kind of asked me if I would go, he offered me some
money to go, money and drugs. I was a drug addict at the time
so I took the offer.

. . .

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Q: And at that time did you know why Mr. Crenshaw wanted
to go to the cities?

A: Yeah.

Q. And wh y was that?

A. Well, I mean I knew that he had to pick some stuff up,
but I also assumed that we had to pick up some drugs. We
went to pick up drugs.

C.H. agreed he did not know “exactly, specifically” what was in the bag and that is why he
“used the word assuming.” When asked how much Crenshaw paid him to drive, he
testified, “I think it was about $500 and then there was drugs too, so when we would ’ve
got back I’m sure I would’ve gotten some drugs out of it too.” C.H. testified that Crenshaw
directed him to a house in St. Paul; without Crenshaw ’s direction , C.H. would not “have
known where to get those drugs or what house to go to.” According to C.H., he dropped
off Crenshaw at the house then he and C.B. drove to Taco Bell. When they returned to the
house, Crenshaw walked out with a bag, put the bag in the trunk, and got into the car. They
then drove back toward s Detroit Lakes and were stopped by police once they entered
Becker County at approximately 2:00 a.m.
The state ’s only other trial witnesses were law enforcement officers. Agent D .S.
testified that he was tracking the cellphone that was associated with Crenshaw on
November 17-18, 2021, and that tracking data showed that the phone “had left the Detroit
Lakes area and it traveled to the Minneapolis -St. Paul area for a short time and then
returned.” He also testified that he personally observed C.H.’s vehicle in an area consistent
with the tracking information and that Crenshaw’s statement that he was “shooting hoops”
5
in Wadena that evening was inconsistent with what the tracking data showed and the
officer’s physical visual surveillance of the vehicle. Agent D.S. stated that when he
arrested Crenshaw, he conducted a pat -frisk search and discovered “a glass smoking
device” generally used for “smoking controlled substances” on Crenshaw’s person. Agent
D.S. relayed the information about the device to Deputy C .B. because D.S. did not have
rubber gloves accessible. Deputy C.B. testified that he transported Crenshaw to the jail
and that, when he searched Crenshaw, he found a glass pipe that tested positive for
methamphetamine residue, a small baggie also containing methamphetamine residue, a few
unidentified pills, and two $100 bills in Crenshaw’s pockets. Agent D.S. testified that a
digital scale, commonly used for weighing out narcotics, and “some other packaging items
like plastic baggies,” commonly used for “[e]ither transporting or di stributing—or
distribution of the narcotics,” were found in the vehicle Crenshaw was in.
Agent D.C. testified that Crenshaw was holding a cellphone when he was removed
from the vehicle, and there was an ongoing call on the cellphone. He testified that, based
on his training and experience, when people get stopped in vehicles they often “contact
either the person they had just met with, such as a source, or other people that are involved.”
He also testified that C.H.’s statements to police after his arrest regarding the route he drove
matched what the tracking data showed. He testified that while the typical
methamphetamine user will possess between one and two grams of methamphetamine at
any given time, 219 grams of methamphetamine was found in the larger of the two grocery
bags found in the trunk of the vehicle. He noted that the average price for a gram of
methamphetamine is “[u]sually $100.”
6
The jury found Crenshaw guilty of both charges . The district court adjudicated
Crenshaw on count one and sentenced him to prison for 158 months. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Crenshaw argues that his conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated first -
degree controlled substance possession, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2b(2),
152.096, subd. 1, must be reversed because the accomplice testimony was insufficiently
corroborated. Alternatively, Crenshaw argues that his conviction must be reversed because
the state failed to prove the requisite aggravating factor. In a pro se supplemental br ief,
Crenshaw argues that (1) the district court erred in denying his pretrial challenge to the
search warrant, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) the district court
erred in instructing the jury.
When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court ’s review is “limited to
a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in
[the] light most favorable to the conviction, [is] sufficient ” to sustain the verdict. State v.
Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). This court must “determine whether the facts
and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Griffin, 887
N.W.2d 257, 263 (Mi nn. 2016) (quotation omitted). This court must assume “the jury
believed the state’ s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. ” State v.
Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). Appellate courts will not disturb the verdict
if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of
7
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of
the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476- 77 (Minn. 2004).
I. Accomplice Testimony
Crenshaw argues that, because the only evidence presented that Crenshaw conspired
with C.H. to possess the methamphetamine came from C.H.’s accomplice testimony , and
because C.H.’s accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated as required by
Minn. Stat. § 634.04 (2020), the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Accomplice testimony is considered untrustworthy due to concerns that the
accomplice may testify ag ainst the defendant “in the hope of obtaining clemency.” State
v. Thoresen, 921 N.W.2d 547, 551 (Minn. 2019) . As such, Minnesota law provides that a
“conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated
by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of the commission of the offense.”
Minn. Stat. § 634.04. Appellate courts review the sufficiency of evidence corroborating
an accomplice’s testimony in the same way they review a sufficiency challenge: “in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, and with all conflicts in the evidence resolved in
favor of the verdict.” State v. Nelson, 632 N.W.2d 193, 202 (Minn. 2001).
“[C]orroborative evidence [of the accomplice testimony] does not need to be
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of the defendant ’s guilt or sustain a conviction,”
but rather, the corroborative evidence “need only link the defendant to the crime in some
substantial degree [that] tends to affirm the truth of [the accomplice’s] testimony and point
to the guilt of the defendant.” Staunton v. State , 784 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. 2010)
(quoting State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 253-54 (Minn. 2008)). “The precise quantum of
8
corroborative evidence” that is required to support a guilty verdict “depends on the
circumstances of each case.” Clark, 755 N.W.2d at 253 (quotation omitted). One such
circumstance is whether “ there is a significant danger that [the accomplice] has been
induced to offer incriminating testimony [against the defendant] based on self -serving
motives.” Id. at 256.
In this case, the evidence presented at trial sufficiently corroborates C.H.’s
testimony. First, there was sufficient evidence that affirmed the truth of C.H.’s testimony.
Staunton, 784 N.W.2d at 297. The state presented evidence that the cellphone police were
tracking traveled on Interstate 94 to Sauk Centre, then came up Highway 71 to Wadena .
When C.H. talked to police immediately after h is arrest, he described the route he drove
matching the tracking data and did so without knowing that a cellphone in the vehicle he
was driving was being tracked. C.H.’s testimony also included his description of the route
he drove that day —this testimony was consistent with the route shown via the cellphone
tracking data. This evidence “tends in some reasonable degree to confirm the truth of the
accomplice’s testimony as to [Crenshaw ’s] guilt.” State v. LaJambe, 219 N.W.2d 917, 919
(Minn. 1974).
The state also presented evidence of drug paraphernalia found in C.H.’s backpack,
within the car C.H. was driving, and in Crenshaw ’s pockets. This evidence corroborated
C.H.’s testimony that he was a methamphetamine addict in November 2021, and that he
met Crenshaw “through mutual friends ” who were also “drug users.” See State v. Adams,
295 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 1980) (claiming that the court can find corroborating
evidence “from the defendant’s association with those involved in the crime in such a way
9
as to suggest joint participation, as well as from the defendant’s opportunity and motive to
commit the crime”). This evidence also supported the inference that Crenshaw, who was
found with drug paraphernalia in his pockets, was connected to the crime. Evidence is
sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony if, from that evidence, “the connection
of the accused with the crime may fairly be inferred .” Thoresen, 921 N.W.2d at 552
(quotation omitted) . Furthermore, C.H. testified that he was served a subpoena to testify
and was not given a favorable disposition in his case in exchange for his testimony.
Therefore, it is less likely that C.H. had “been induced to offer i ncriminating testimony
[against the defendant] based on self -serving motives.” Clark, 755 N.W.2d at 253
(quotation omitted) .
Second, there was sufficient corroborating testimony pointing to Crenshaw’s guilt.
Staunton, 784 N.W.2d at 297. The defendant ’s “entire conduct may be looked to for
corroborating circumstances.” Clark, 755 N.W.2d at 254. A defendant may be linked to
a crime through:
participation in the preparation for the criminal act;
opportunity and motive; proximity of the defendant to the place
where the crime was committed under unusual circumstances;
association with persons involved in the crime in such a way
as to suggest joint participation; possession of an instrument or
instruments probably used to commit the offense; and
unexplained affluence or possession of the fruits of criminal
conduct.

Id. (quotation omitted).
Moreover, corroborating evidence may include “inadequacies and admissions in a
defendant ’s testimony, and suspicious and unexplained conduct of an accused bef ore or
10
after the crime.” State v. Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn. 2000) (citation omitted).
In this case , the evidence presented establishes that, when asked about what he had been
doing that night , Crenshaw told officers that he had been playing basketball in Wadena.
The officers knew this to be false because the officers had been tracking Crenshaw through
the cellphone data and had been physically tracking the vehicle Crenshaw was in.
Crenshaw was holding a cellphone with an ongoing call when he was arrested. Agent D.C.
testified this was suspicious and that, based on his training and experience, when people
get stopped in vehicles they often “contact either the person they had just met with, such
as like a source, or other people that are involved.” Id. (noting that corroborating evidence
may also include “suspicious and unexplained conduct of an accused before or after the
crime”). Crenshaw was also carrying a glass pipe when he was arrested . A field test on
the pipe tested positive for methamphetamine. See id.
This evidence corroborates C.H.’s testimony, that Crenshaw was a
methamphetamine user, while also indicating Crenshaw ’s motive to commit the crime .
The cellphone placed Crenshaw in immediate proximity to the crime under suspicious
circumstances and suggested Crenshaw’s joint participation in the crime. While
corroborating evidence must tend to point to the defendant ’s guilt, it need not corroborate
“every point or element of the crime.” State v. Lemire, 315 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. 1982).
When taken as a whole, and when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the
corroborating evidence was sufficient to confirm C.H.’ s accomplice testimony . Nelson ,
632 N.W.2d at 202.

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II. Aggravating Factor
Crenshaw alternatively requests that his conviction be reversed because the state
failed to prove the requisite aggravating factor . To convict Crenshaw of conspiracy to
commit aggravated first-degree controlled-substance possession in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.021, subdivision 2b(2), the state was required to prove two aggravating factors.
Crenshaw stipulated to one of the alleged aggravating factors. The second aggravating
factor alleged by the state, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 24(10) (2020), was that:
the defendant or an accomplice possessed equipment, drug
paraphernalia, documents, or money evidencing that the
offense involved the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, or
possession of controlled substances in quantities substantially
larger than the minimum threshold amount for the offense.

Crenshaw concedes that the digital scale and small baggies found in C.H.’s backpack were
“equipment,” but asserts that there is nothing about the nature of the equipment itself
evidencing that this offense involved the distribution of methamphetamine “in quantities
substantially larger” than 100 grams. We are not persuaded.
The state presented evidence that a typical methamphetamine user will posse ss
between one to two grams of methamphetamine at any given time. The state also presented
evidence that a digital scale , commonly used for weighing out narcotics, and “some other
packaging items like plastic baggies ,” commonly used for “[e]ither transpor ting or
distributing . . . narcotics,” were found in the vehicle. The jury also heard testimony that
219 grams of methamphetamine w ere found in the vehicle —more than twice as much as
the minimum threshold amount of 100 grams. Based on the plain language of the statute
and the evidence presented at trial, the jury could reasonably have found that the evidence
12
was sufficient to find that Crenshaw or an accomplice “ possessed equipment, drug
paraphernalia, documents, or money evidencing that the offense invol ved the cultivation,
manufacture, distribution, or possession of controlled substances in quantities substantially
larger than [100 grams] .” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 24(10) ; see also Minn Stat.
§ 152.021, subd. 2b. (2020).
III. Pro Se Arguments
Crenshaw also raises several arguments in a pro se supplemental brief. We address
each argument in turn.
First, Crenshaw argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding
that the police had a basis to stop the vehicle Crenshaw was in. “To conduct a limited stop
for investigatory purposes, a so- called Terry stop, the police must have reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn.
1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). The reasonable suspicion standard is
not high and is less demanding than probable cause. State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164,
173 (Minn. 2023). “To establish reasonable articulable suspicion, the police need only
show that the stop was not the product of m ere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” Munson,
594 N.W.2d at 136 (quotation omitted) .
Here, the police had information that Crenshaw was involved in drug trafficking
and that Crenshaw travels to the Twin Cities to meet with his supplier and then returns to
that Detroit Lakes area . The police were tracking a c ellphone associated with Crenshaw
which showed that, just prior to the stop, Crenshaw had left the Detroit Lakes area and
traveled to the Twin Cities for a short time and then returned. The police identified the
13
vehicle Crenshaw was in as it traveled using the cellphone tracking data. These facts
provided police with reasonable a rticulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the
traffic stop.
Crenshaw also argues the district court erred in its jury instructions on conspiracy.
See Minn. Stat. § 152.096, subd. 1. Specifically, Crenshaw argues that the district court
erred in failing to specify for the jury what overt acts were allege d. Crenshaw did not
object to the jury instructions at trial , so we review the issue for plain error. See State v.
Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Minn. 2013) (providing that unobjected -to jury instructions
are reviewed for plain error) . Under the plain error analysis, we must determine whether
there was error, that was plain, and that affected the defendant ’s substantial rights. State
v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). If each of these prongs is met, we will
address the error only if it seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial
proceedings. Id. Crenshaw makes no argument and cites no authority to support the
conclusion that the district court’s jury instructions amounted to plain error. “Claims in a
pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or citation to legal
authority are forfeited. Such arguments will not be considered unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspecti on.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650- 51 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations and citation omitted).
The district court instructed the jury that “whoever conspires with another to commit
a crime is guilty of conspiracy if one or more of the parties to the cons piracy does some
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,” and that each element had to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. But in describing the elements of conspiracy, the district court failed
14
to specify which overt acts were alleged. Nonetheless, in the state’s closing argument, the
prosecutor listed the alleged overt acts that occurred in Crenshaw’s conspiracy with C.H.:
paying C.H. to drive; giving C.H. directions; acquiring the methamphetamine; and putting
it into the trunk of the vehicle. Although not explicitly stated in the jury instructions, these
were the same overt acts alleged and repeatedly referenced throughout the trial. For these
reasons, we decline to conclude the district court’s jury instructions amounted to prejudicial
error.
Crenshaw also asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a judgment
of acquittal at the end of the state ’s case in chief. 2 T o establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness ”; and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel ’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Fields v. State , 733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687- 88 (1984)). “[M]atters of trial strategy . . . will not be
reviewed later by an appellate court as long as the t rial strategy was reasonable. ” Ives v.
State, 655 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 2003).

2 Crenshaw also asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and obtain
certain evidence and failure to call certain “alibi witnesses.” Because the record is not
adequate for our review of these issues, we decline to address them. See State v. Gustafson,
610 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn. 2000) (“A postconviction hearing provides the court with
additional facts to explain the attorney ’s decisions, so as to properly consider whether a
defense counsel’s performance was deficient ”) (quotation omitted) . Crenshaw’s right to
pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim s in a petition for postconviction relief is
preserved.
15
When analyzing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a district court “does not
consider the weight and credibility of the evidence. ” Allwine v. State , 994 N.W.2d 528,
537 (Minn. 2023) (citing State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Minn. 2005) ). Whether
an accomplice ’s testimony has been sufficiently corroborated for purposes of section
634.04 “is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.” Clark , 755 N.W.2d at 251.
Here, there was evidence to present a fact question to the jury regarding whether C.H.’s
testimony was sufficiently corroborated and credible. Because trial counsel could
reasonably conclude that there was sufficient evidence to pres ent to the jury, Crenshaw ’s
assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for judgment of acquittal
fails. We have carefully reviewed Crenshaw’s remaining claims in light of the record, and
conclude they are without merit or forfeited. See Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357
(Minn. 1996) (stating appellate courts do not decide issues that were not raised in district
court).
Affirmed.