State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0400

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Wilford Fields, III,
Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-20086

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this direct appeal from his convictions for first-degree aggravated robbery and
theft, appellant argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence that he used force or
threatened the imminent use of force to support his conviction for aggravated robbery,
2
(2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law and misleading the jury
during closing arguments, and (3) his theft conviction should be vacated because theft is a
lesser included offense of first-degree aggravated robbery. Because the state presented
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict on the first-degree
aggravated-robbery charge and the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct, we affirm the
first-degree aggravated-robbery conviction. But because theft is a lesser included offense
of first- degree aggravated robbery, we reverse the theft conviction and remand to the
district court to amend the warrant of commitment.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Robert Wilford Fields III with
first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2020), and
misdemeanor theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), based on an
incident that occurred in October 2021. The state presented the following evidence at trial.
On October 27, 2021, B.W. was working at a Home Depot in St. Louis Park as an
asset-protection specialist whose job was to catch or deter shoplifting. A man later
identified as Fields entered the store and walked directly toward a holiday-gift display. A
short time after entering the store, Fields placed a set of Husky tool bags, two DeWalt
power tools, paint markers, and a pen light in his cart.
Because Fields had selected what B.W. described as “high-theft items” so quickly,
B.W. watched Fields and took a photo of him with the items in his cart. Fields proceeded
to a self-checkout register. B.W. watched Fields from the vestibule between the first and
second sets of doors to the store that exit to the parking lot. At the register, Fields scanned
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the items, placed them in bags, and pushed buttons on the pin pad. B.W. observed that
Fields did not swipe or scan a card to pay for the items before proceeding to the exit and
that no receipt printed from the self-checkout station.
When Fields walked through the first set of exit doors into the vestibule with the
cart, B.W. approached him, showed Fields his badge, and identified himself as “Home
Depot Asset Protection.” He asked Fields to leave the shopping cart and reenter the store
to talk in the office. B.W. and Fields were standing close together, with Fields standing
behind the cart and B.W. standing in front of it. No one else was in the vestibule. Fields
shoved the cart toward B.W., and B.W. stopp ed the cart by bracing it with his hand and
asked Fields to release the cart. While B.W. was still holding on to the cart, Fields pushed
it toward B.W. again.
Fields then reached toward his right front pants pocket, retrieved a four-inch
pocketknife, and began to unfold it. As soon as B.W. saw the pocketknife, he exited the
store to the parking lot and went around the corner to stay clear of Fields’s path to the exit.
As he stood outside, B.W. called 911 within seconds and told the dispatcher that he was
reporting a robbery. B.W. stated three times that Fields had “pulled a knife” on him.
During this time, B.W. watched Fields push the cart into the parking lot and get into the
passenger seat of a black Jeep Cherokee, which immediately took a U-turn from its parking
spot, hit a curb, and sped off. When B.W. returned to the self-checkout station Fields had
used, he printed a “suspended transaction receipt” showing that Fields had scanned
merchandise but had not paid for it. Officers responded to B.W.’s 911 call and
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apprehended Fields after the driver crashed the vehicle and Fields fled on foot. The
arresting officer found a four-inch pocketknife clipped to Fields’s front pants pocket.
At trial, B.W. testified that he let Fields go because it was Home Depot’s policy and
because, he said, it was “common sense, you know, it’s definitely a situation where I felt
like I should back off, disengage and let him pass me.” When asked if he was fearful that
something would happen if he did not let Fields go, B.W. testified, “I definitely felt like
had I not disengaged there was a potential he could have used that weapon on me.” B.W.
did not make another attempt to stop Fields after Fields unfolded the knife in front of him,
explaining that he would not do so “at that point just for my own safety and also for the,
you know, policy of my job.” He explained that, according to Home Depot’s policy, “[i]f
we ever feel that there’s anything unsafe about the situation we’re to immediately
disengage.”
In his testimony, Fields admitted to shoplifting and possessing the pocketknife, but
denied showing B.W. his pocketknife or threatening B.W. According to Fields, B.W.
stopped him in the vestibule and grabbed his cart. Fields tried to get B.W. to let go of the
cart, and when B.W. did not let go, Fields decided to wipe his fingerprints off the cart with
his bandana so he could leave the cart in the store without leaving evidence that he had
attempted to shoplift. The bandana was tied to his right beltloop next to his pocketknife,
which was clipped to his right front pants pocket. As soon as Fields reached for the
bandana, B.W. jumped to the side with his hands up. Fields then exited the store with the
cart, loaded the items into the Jeep, and left. Fields testified that he intended only to shoplift
and did not “pull a knife” on B.W. or threaten B.W. with a knife.
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The jury found Fields guilty of first- degree aggravated robbery and theft. The
district court entered judgments of conviction on both counts, sentenced Fields to 60
months’ imprisonment for the first-degree aggravated-robbery conviction, and did not
impose a sentence for the theft conviction.
Fields appeals.
DECISION
Fields argues that (1) his first-degree aggravated-robbery conviction must be
reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove that he used or threatened the
imminent use of force; (2) alternatively, he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct by misstating the law and misleading the jury during closing
arguments; and (3) his misdemeanor theft conviction must be reversed because theft is a
lesser included offense of first-degree aggravated robbery. We address each argument in
turn.
I. The evidence was sufficient to support Fields’s first-degr ee
aggravated-robbery conviction.
Fields argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
threatened the use of imminent force because it did not present evidence showing anything
more than his possession of the pocketknife. He argues that caselaw requires the state to
prove that he “brandished” or “waved” the weapon and that his conduct in taking the
pocketknife out of his pocket and beginning to unfold it does not constitute brandishing or
waving. Whether a defendant’s conduct is prohibited by a statute is an issue of statutory
6
interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Minn. App.
2012), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013).
Minnesota law defines simple robbery as follows:
Whoever, having knowledge of not being entitled
thereto, takes personal property from the person or in the
presence of another and uses or threatens the imminent use of
force against any person to overcome the person’s resistance
or powers of resistance to, or to compel acquiescence in, the
taking or carrying away of the property is guilty of [simple]
robbery . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2020) (emphasis added). Simple robbery becomes first-degree
aggravated robbery when, “while committing a robbery, [the person] is armed with a
dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to
reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, or inflicts bodily harm upon another.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1. The district court instructed the jury that “[t]hreat of
imminent force” means “the intentional creation in the alleged victim’s mind of an
understanding that if he resisted or refused to cooperate, force would immediately be used
against him.”
1
In support of his argument, Fields cites cases in which, he asserts, Minnesota
appellate courts have held that brandishing or waving a knife was sufficient to prove a
threat of imminent force. State v. Slaughter , 691 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Minn. 2005); Smith,

1 This instruction mirrors the model jury instruction. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG
14.03 (Supp. 2022). We note that while the jury-instruction guides are not binding law,
Rowe v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729, 734 n.1 (Minn. 2005), this instruction is consistent with
the statute and “does not contravene existing case law,” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782,
787 (Minn. 2017).
7
825 N.W.2d at 136; State v. Bryan, No. A12-2039, 2013 WL 6389581, at *2 (Minn. App.
Dec. 9, 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). Fields then cites a dictionary definition
of “brandish” and argues that his conduct in taking the pocketknife out of his pocket and
beginning to unfold it does not meet that definition and that, therefore, the state failed to
prove the threat-of-imminent-force element.
But the statute imposes no such requirement. The relevant question under the statute
is whether Fields used or threatened the imminent use of force against B.W. to overcome
B.W.’s resistance to Fields taking the merchandise from Home Depot. If the legislature
sought to impose a waved-or-brandished requirement to prove the threat element, it would
have done so. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1d(b) (2022) (criminalizing the “use[]”
or “brandish[ing]” of a replica firearm on school property), with Minn. Stat. § 609.2 4
(criminalizing the use or threat of imminent use of force against another person to
accomplish the offense of robbery). And “it is impermissible to add words or phrases to
an unambiguous statute.” State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 178 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). We are therefore not persuaded by Fields’s argument that his conduct could not,
as a matter of law, fall within the ambit of the first-degree aggravated-robbery statute.
Moreover, Fields’s reliance on the cases he cites is misplaced. None of the cases
Fields cites addresses whether something less than “brandishing” or “waving” a knife is
sufficient to prove a threat of imminent force; rather, in each cited case, the defendant did
brandish or wave a knife. See Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d at 76 (determining that the
defendant’s conduct of brandishing a knife- like object was sufficient to support his
first-degree aggravated-robbery conviction); Smith, 825 N.W.2d at 136 (rejecting a
8
challenge to a terroristic-threats conviction in which the defendant argued that “his conduct
of waving a knife at [the victim] conveyed a threat of immediate violence” rather than a
threat of future violence); Bryan, 2013 WL 6389581, at *2 (rejecting the argument that the
defendant’s conduct in brandishing a knife after, rather than before or simultaneous to, the
taking was insufficient to prove first-degree aggravated robbery).2
Having addressed Fields’s statutory-interpretation argument about whether the
robbery statute prohibits his conduct, we review whether the evidence was sufficient on
the threat-of-imminent-force element. Fields argues that he did not intend to communicate
a threat of imminent force. Because intent is a state of mind, evidence of intent is typically
circumstantial. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Therefore, we
analyze Fields’s suffic iency claim using the circumstantial-evidence test. See State v.
Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d 280, 291 (Minn. 2023).
When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we “carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). To
evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we apply a two-step standard of
review. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the
circumstances proved at trial. Id. In doing so, we view conflicting evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2010).

2 Fields concedes that Bryan is nonprecedential. Nonprecedential cases are not binding on
this court. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
Second, we “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at
599 (quotations omitted). At this step of the analysis, we consider the circumstantial
evidence “as a whole,” giving “no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable
inferences.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[W]e do not review each circumstance proved in
isolation.” Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332 (quotation omitted).
We first determine what circumstances were proved. Viewing the conflicting
evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, we determine that the state proved
the following circumstances:
• Fields was walking out of Home Depot with a cart containing
merchandise for which he had not paid.
• B.W. stopped Fields in the vestibule before Fields reached the
exterior doors to the parking lot, identified himself as “Home
Depot Asset Protection,” and told Fields to leave the shopping
cart and reenter the store.
• Fields and B.W. were standing a few feet apart , facing each
other across a shopping cart in a confined area with no other
witnesses.
• Fields understood that B.W. was trying to prevent him from
shoplifting.
• Fields pushed the cart into B.W. twice: first when B.W. asked
him to go back into the store and again when B.W. asked him
to release the cart.
• Fields removed a four-inch folding pocketknife from his
pocket and began to unfold it.
• B.W. saw Fields begin to unfold the pocketknife and
immediately disengaged by exiting the vestibule into the
parking lot and moving away from Fields.
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• B.W. was fearful that Fields would use the pocketknife on him.
• It is Home Depot’s policy for employees to disengage when a
situation is unsafe.
• Fields exited the store with the merchandise.
• B.W. called 911 as soon as he stepped around the corner of the
exterior doors away from Fields and told the dispatcher three
times that Fields had “pulled a knife” on him.
• Fields fled the scene in a vehicle.
• When officers arrested Fields, he had a pocketknife clipped to
his pants pocket.
Next, we examine whether the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than
guilt. See Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. Regarding the threat of imminent force, it is
reasonable to infer from these circumstances that Fields intended to communicate to B.W.
that Fields would immediately use force against B.W. with the pocketknife if B.W.
continued to resist him. Fields argues that the only evidence the state introduced to prove
the threat-of-imminent-force element was that he took the pocketknife out of his pocket
and began to unfold it. But Fields’s argument ignores that he pushed the cart toward B.W.
twice and refused to comply with B.W.’s requests, that a pocketknife is capable of inflicting
bodily harm, and that B.W. disengaged because he felt unsafe and immediately called 911
to report that Fields had “pulled a knife” on him. These circumstances, viewed as a whole,
support a reasonable inference that Fields intended to communicate a threat. Fields does
not present a hypothesis other than guilt, and we do not discern one.
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We thus conclude that the s tate presented sufficient evidence to support Fields’s
first-degree aggravated-robbery conviction.
II. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments.
Fields argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct during closing arguments by misstating the law and misleading the jury about
the inferences it could draw from the evidence. Fields concedes that, because he did not
object to the challenged statements at trial, his argument is subject to plain-error review.
In cases of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a modified plain-error
test. State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Minn. 2021). Under the modified plain-error
test, the appellant bears the burden to show both that the prosecutor committed error and
that the error is plain. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). If the appellant
makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the error did not
prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights. Id. And if the state fails to meet that burden,
we determine whether reversal is required to uphold the fairness and integrity of the judicial
proceedings. Id. Because we conclude that Fields has not met his burden to show plain
error, we do not address the other requirements. See State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780,
785 (Minn. 2017).
A prosecutor’s error is plain if it is “clear or obvious.” State v. Strommen,
648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). Plain error can be shown in a
prosecutor’s action or statement that clearly “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of
conduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 393 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). A
prosecutor “may present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences
12
that can be drawn from that evidence in its closing argument,” State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d
569, 587 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted), but engages in misconduct by misstating the
law, misstating the facts, or misleading the jury about the inferences it may draw from the
facts, State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 805 (Minn. 2016).
Fields asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making the following
statements during closing argument:
• “Mr. Fields testified and admitted to every element of the
offense except the one where he pulls the knife out. So this
case is now very simple, did he pull the knife out?”

• “It’s the aggravated robbery when you pull a knife out, right,
and that’s the part where he doesn’t admit to.”

• “What I think is most important for you is that this case is now
extremely simple[;] it’s did this knife get pulled.”

• “Yeah, Mr. Fields did admit to shoplifting. Shoplifting isn’t
aggravated robbery, one involves a weapon, one involves
threats, the other is just shoplifting; right? So he admits to
everything but the knife. Awfully convenient.”

• “I still have to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the elements of the offense. I’m not saying I don’t. I’m not
saying, hey, it just comes down to did he have a knife or didn’t
he, because I still have to prove every element, I’ve still got to
prove it happened in Hennepin County, that Mr. Fields did it,
that a knife is a dangerous weapon. So I still have to prove all
of those things to you beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Fields argues that the prosecutor misstated the law by merging two separate
elements of first- degree aggravated robbery—possess ion of a dangerous weapon and the
threat of force— and that the prosecutor misled the jury by implying that if the jury found
that Fields took the pocketknife out of his pocket and opened it, then the jury was required
13
to infer that he threatened the use of imminent force with it. 3 The state argues that the
prosecutor’s statements did not misstate the law or mislead the jury because the prosecutor
did not state that possession of a knife necessarily proved a threat of imminent force ,
reminded the jury that the state was required to prove each element of the offense,
emphasized B.W.’s statements that Fields “pulled a knife on him,” and merely
distinguished Fields’s version of events from B.W.’s. We agree with the state.
The prosecutor did not misstate the law. The prosecutor reminded the jury of the
difference between first-degree aggravated robbery and theft, stating that first-degree
aggravated robbery involves a weapon and threats. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.245, subd. 1,
.24. And “pulling the knife” was relevant to both of those elements because, in the context
of this case, it demonstrates that Fields possessed the knife and that he threatened B.W. by
“pulling” it.
In addition, “the State may, in closing argument, argue that a witness was or was
not credible.” State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 123 (Minn. 2009). And comments that
address a central issue in a case are permissible when the comment “merely summariz[es]
the key issue that would impact the jury’s determination of g uilt.” State v. McDaniel,
777 N.W.2d 739, 751 (Minn. 2010). W hether Fields pulled the pocketknife was the only
disputed fact that went to the only disputed element of the offense of first- degree

3 Fields’s second argument relies on the same premise as his sufficiency argument —that
the state did not introduce evidence of a threat beyond his unfolding the pocketknife and
that the single act of unfolding the pocketknife is insufficient to prove a threat. We reject
this argument because, as we have already concluded, the state proved other circumstances
that support the reasonable inference that Fields intended to communicate a threat.
14
aggravated robbery— whether Fields threatened the imminent use of force against B.W.
And the fact-finder’s determination of that fact came down to witness credibility because
Fields’s and B.W.’s testimonies, as well as B.W.’s prior consistent statements to the 911
dispatcher, were the only evidence relevant to this point and their versions of events
directly conflicted.
We thus conclude that Fields has not established that the prosecutor plainly erred in
the state’s closing argument and that Fields is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of
prosecutorial misconduct.
III. Fields’s theft conviction must be vacated as a lesser included offense of
aggravated robbery.
The parties agree that Fields’s conviction for theft under Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 2(a)(1), should be vacated because theft is a lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1. A person “may be convicted of either the
crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020).
“[T]heft is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.” State v. McClenton ,
781 N.W.2d 181, 187 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Nunn, 351 N.W.2d 16, 19
(Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987)), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2010).
When the district court’s order includes convictions for an offense and a lesser
included offense, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the erroneous
conviction and retain the guilty verdict on th at offense. State v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d
244, 248 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2014); see State v. Pflepsen ,
590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999) . Because the warrant of commitment includes
15
convictions for both first-degree aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor theft, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the theft conviction
while preserving the guilty verdict on that offense.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.