State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1476

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deavion Ladell Beasley, Sr.,
Appellant.

Filed July 22, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-22-35

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge;
and Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Following a court trial on stipulated evidence, appellant was found guilty of
third-degree controlled-substance crime and obstructing legal process. This appeal from
the final judgment of conviction concerns the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress
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evidence obtained pursuant to two warrants: a warrant authorizing the tracking of
appellant’s cellphone, dated November 23, 2021 (the tracking warrant), and a warrant
authorizing the search of his person and vehicles, dated December 30, 2021 (the search
warrant). The events from which appellant’s controlled-substance conviction arose
occurred on January 3, 2022, when appellant was making a drug-supply trip from the Twin
Cities to Bemidji. Appellant argues that the warrants are not supported by probable cause.
Because the district court reasonably evaluated the warrant affidavits based on the totality
of the circumstances and properly found them to be supported by probable cause, we
affirm.
FACTS
In November 2021, a special agent applied for a “Tracking Warrant authorizing the
installation and use of: an electronic tracking device, and/or cellular tower location and
service information, including services such as Global Positioning System (GPS)
technology, precision location related technologies, and/or a tracking warrant” on the
cellphone number assigned to appellant Deavion Ladell Beasley Sr. The tracking-warrant
application requested GPS information for Beasley’s cellphone for 60 days, including all
“cellular tower location and service information, and call detail or toll records.”
The district court granted the tracking warrant as requested on November 23, citing
Minn. Stat. §§ 626A.37, .42 (2020). The agent, and the Paul Bunyan Drug Task Force he
was working with, proceeded to execute the tracking warrant for about one month.
As part of its surveillance, the task force first observed Beasley travel from the Twin
Cities to Bemidji on December 22, 2021. The task force followed Beasley, who was
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traveling with D.A.-R., as they drove around Bemidji in Beasley’s vehicle and visited the
residence of “a known user of controlled substances.” The task force then observed a “hand
to hand transaction between [D.A.-R. ] and a male through the passenger side window of
[Beasley’s] vehicle.” That same night, a confidential reliable informant (CRI) “advised
that Beasley and [D.A. -R.] were in the Bemidji area and distributing cocaine.” This trip
was the only time the task force observed Beasley travel between the Twin Cities and
Bemidji, although D.A.-R. was observed making this trip four other times.
In part based on data obtained through execution of the tracking warrant, the agent
applied for an anticipatory search warrant of Beasley. The agent’s search-warrant affidavit,
in addition to repeating facts supporting the tracking warrant, added details about the
transaction the task force observed on December 22, and some additional information
provided by the CRI, including “that [D.A.-R.] will hide controlled substances on his body
in his genital area when he is transporting controlled substances.” The search-warrant
affidavit requested authorization for a search of Beasley’s person for controlled substances
and paraphernalia and for the use of a body scanner at the Beltrami County Jail “to assist
in the search of persons.” The agent described the “triggering event” for executing the
anticipatory search warrant as occurring when agents “are able to identify through
electronic surveillance that Beasley and/or [ D.A.-R.] are traveling northbound towards
Bemidji, and agents are able to articulate a vehicle in which they are traveling in, and the
vehicle arrives into Beltrami County.” The district court granted the search warrant as
requested the same day, on December 30, authorizing a search of Beasley’s person using
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the body scanner, thre e vehicles associated with him, and “[a]ny other vehicle” he was
found to be utilizing, at any time of day.
On January 3, 2022, officers executed the search warrant. Early in the afternoon at
around 1:30 p.m., the agent “observed through electronic surveillance that Beasley and
[D.A.-R.] were traveling north bound to Bemidji from the [Twin Cities] area.” The officers
started physically following Beasley’s vehicle while it traveled northbound. After
continued visual monitoring of the vehicle as it traveled north through Beltrami County,
officers conducted a “felony traffic stop” in Bemidji at about 4:30 p.m. D.A.-R. was
driving, and Beasley was the passenger. Beasley cooperated with officers as they asked
him to exit the vehicle, walk backwards, and then was handcuffed and frisked for weapons
before officers placed him in the back of a squad car for transport to the jail.
Upon arrival, jail staff conducted an x-ray scan of Beasley’s person using the body
scanner. The scan showed a “discrepancy in the genital or groin area” that concerned
officers, and Beasley was strip searched in a private cell. During the strip search, officers
noticed Beasley was trying to hold something between his legs near his groin—a plastic
baggie with white powder in it. Beasley grabbed the baggie and tried to get rid of it, spilling
some of the white powder on the floor and flushing some down the toilet in the cell before
officers restrained him. The white powder tested positive for cocaine. Officers recovered
20 grams of cocaine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Beasley with third-degree
controlled-substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), and
obstruction of legal process in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2020).
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In March 2022, Beasley moved to suppress evidence obtained from the November
23, 2021 tracking warrant, and from the December 30, 2021 search warrant and associated
stop of his vehicle. The district court determined that the warrants were supported by
probable cause and therefore denied the suppression motion.
On April 5, 2023, a stipulated-evidence trial proceeded pursuant to Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 3(a).1 The district court found Beasley guilty and entered judgment of
conviction for third- degree possession of a controlled substance and obstruction of legal
process. The district court then stayed execution of Beasley’s prison sentence and placed
him on probation for five years. Beasley appeals.
DECISION
Beasley challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained through (1) the tracking warrant and (2) the search warrant authorizing a search
of his person using a body scanner at the county jail. Appellate courts review the district
court’s factual findings in a suppression -motion denial for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012).
Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information
generated by their cellphone, or in their cell-site location information (CSLI), pursuant to
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296,
313 (2018). A search of a person’s CSLI is therefore only authorized upon issuance of a

1 We note that the stipulated-evidence trial was pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 3,
despite Beasley’s written stipulation to the prosecution’s case pursuant to subdivision 4.
This discrepancy is not raised on appeal.
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warrant supported by probable cause. Id. at 316. “If a search warrant is not supported by
probable cause, then it is unreasonable.” State v. Wiggins , 4 N.W.3d 138, 145 (Minn.
2024).
To determine whether a warrant is supported by probable cause, this court reviews
whether “the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). Our
review is limited to “the warrant application and supporting affidavits.” Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d
at 145; State v. Hill, 918 N.W.2d 237, 242 (Minn. App. 2018) (reviewing a challenge to
the “four corners” of the warrant affidavit) . Issuing judges must “make a practical,
common-sense decision, whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . ,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). We afford “great deference” to a
judge’s probable-cause finding. State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1999)
(quoting State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998)). We also recognize “doubtful
or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference accorded to warrants.”
Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at 145-46 (quotation omitted). Whether probable cause exists is based
on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 223 (Minn. 2010).
Tracking Warrant
In contesting the district court’s probable-cause determination, Beasley mainly
challenges the confidential informants’ reliability. When assessing whether there is
sufficient probable cause to support a warrant, issuing judges consider the “veracity,” or
reliability of the confidential informant, the informant’s “basis of knowledge,” and whether
7
law enforcement sufficiently corroborated the informant’s tip. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238;
State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 892 (Minn. 2023). These considerations are not a rigid
“two-prong test” but are based upon the totality of the circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at
233.
At issue is information from two different informants, a confidential informant (CI)
and the CRI. The CI provided names of individuals suspected to be involved in
controlled-substance crimes and advised that Beasley sold the CI controlled substances
over 100 times. The information from the CI was from September 2018. Because this tip
is from 2018, it is stale as of the date the tracking warrant was issued in November 2021.
See Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750 (stating that facts must be “closely related to the time of the
issue of the warrant [] to justify a finding of probable cause at that time” (quotation
omitted)); see also State v. Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 14, 1985).
Dated June 2021, the CRI’s information is closer in time to the issuance of the
warrant and is therefore not stale. The CRI “advised that [Beasley] is selling
methamphetamine and fentanyl in Bemidji.” The CRI also stated that Beasley had recently
asked if the CRI knew anyone who wanted to buy “Perc 30’s pills,” which the affiant stated
he knew to contain fentanyl, and “advised that Beasley has been transporting controlled
substances to Bemidji from the [Twin Cities] area since Beasley got out of prison.”
The agent explained why the CRI was considered reliable in the tracking-warrant
application. The CRI had a proven t rack record of reliability because they previously
provided “names of individuals suspected to be involved in controlled substance crimes,”
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which has “led to the seizure of controlled substances and multiple arrests for controlled
substances in the past.” See State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (“Having
a proven track record is one of the primary indicia of an informant’s veracity.”).
There was also a sufficient basis for the CRI’s knowledge, which law enforcement
corroborated. Beasley argues that the basis for the CRI’s knowledge was not established,
as the CRI never personally observed Beasley buy, possess, or sell drugs, and law
enforcement did not corroborate the CRI’s information. But law enforcement did
corroborate the CRI’s tip, even though they had no need to because the CRI was presumed
reliable. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 892 (“[W]hen an informant gives police information based
on the informant’s personal knowledge, police do not need to corroborate significant details
in the tip for the tip to be sufficient to support probable cause.”). The agent knew Beasley
had a criminal history involving controlled substances and attested to his personal
observations that Beasley and an associate of his, D.A.-R., both posted photographs of “a
green leafy substance” to their respective Facebook accounts and were seen together in a
video with large stacks of U.S. currency. The affiant also included information from
another law-enforcement officer, who observed “Beasley and [D.A.-R.] conduct a hand to
hand transaction in the window of a vehicle” on November 16, 2021, and recovered
controlled substances after searching the vehicle. Based on the reliability of the CRI and
law enforcement’s corroboration, the warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for
concluding that tracking Beasley through his cellphone, which is likely near to him at most
times, would yield information about controlled-substance trafficking. See id.
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The search was also limited to Beasley ’s location information and did not involve
other cellphone data like Beasley’s text messages. Cf. State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666,
674-75 (Minn. 2015) (using defendant’s cellphone data to determine whether he was near
his wife when she was murdered). And there is no stretch in logic to conclude that a
person’s cellphone is likely indicative of their location. See Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 311.
There was therefore a “fair probability” that tracking Beasley’s CSLI would lead to
information about his transport of controlled substances between the Twin Cities and
Bemidji. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622-24 (Minn. 2014).
Beasley further challenges the tracking warrant as overbroad. A warrant is
overbroad and lacks particularity if it does not specify the area, things, or persons for which
there is probable cause to search. State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 386-87 (Minn. 2016);
State v. Contreras-Sanchez, 5 N.W.3d 151, 166 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. granted (Minn.
May 29, 2024). We acknowledge the tracking warrant was broad in its duration because it
permitted two months of surveillance. But the tracking warrant did specify the individual
to be searched— Beasley—and the things and area to search—Beasley’s CSLI, particularly
for any evidence of travel between the Twin Cities and Bemidji. See State v. Harvey, 932
N.W.2d 792, 796-97 (Minn. 2019) (affirming a search warrant tracking the defendant’s
CSLI); Contreras-Sanchez, 5 N.W.3d at 155, 167 (affirming use of a geofence warrant to
gather CSLI for about one month). We also note that Minnesota Statutes section 626A.42,
subdivision 2, allows law enforcement to utilize electronic surveillance to track a person’s
CSLI if there is probable cause to believe a person “is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a crime.” Based upon the CRI’s information, law enforcement had reason
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to believe Beasley was about to commit a crime, and the tracking warrant was sufficiently
particularized as to Beasley’s CSLI. Any incidental intrusion on Beasley’s privacy was
reasonable.
In sum, when considering the totality of the circumstances set forth in the warrant
application and the circumstances supporting the CRI’s tip, there was sufficient probable
cause to support the issuance of the tracking warrant. The district court, therefore, did not
err in denying Beasley’s motion to suppress.
Search Warrant
Turning to the search warrant, we similarly conclude that there was a substantial
basis to support the issuing judge’s probable-cause determination. Beasley argues that
there is an insufficient nexus between the crime investigated and the search of his person
using the jail’s body scanner, that the warrant was overbroad and lacking in particularity,
and that the CRI did not provide reliable information.
The search warrant was supported by the same information from the CRI that is
reflected in the tracking-warrant affidavit. In the search-warrant affidavit, law enforcement
added two more tips from the CRI. First, a tip about D.A.-R.:
In November of 2021, Your Affiant spoke with CRI
who advised that [D.A.-R.] is selling cocaine and other
controlled substances around Bemidji. . . . CRI said that they
were in [D.A.-R.’s] residence the day prior, and observed
ounces of cocaine in [D.A.- R.]’s possession. CRI then
observed a controlled substance transaction between [D.A.-R.]
and another person for an amount of cocaine. CRI said that
[D.A.-R.] supplies several individuals with controlled
substances in Bemidji, and travels to the [Twin Cities] area
often to re-stock his controlled substance supply. . . . CRI also
advised that [D.A.-R.] will hide controlled substances on his
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body in his genital area when he is transporting controlled
substances.

Second, the “CRI advised [law enforcement] that Beasley and [D.A.-R.] were in the
Bemidji area and distributing cocaine” on December 22, 2021.
As stated above, the CRI’s information is presumed reliable and corroboration is
not, therefore, required . Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136 (“Having a proven track record is
one of the primary indicia of an informant’s veracity . . . [and] further elaboration
concerning the specifics of the CRI’s veracity is not typically required.”). But on the same
night reported by the CRI, law enforcement also independently observed D.A.-R. conduct
a hand-to-hand controlled-substance transaction from the passenger side of Beasley’s
vehicle, which Beasley was driving, and also travel to the residence of “a known user of
controlled substances.” Law enforcement thus sufficiently corroborated the CRI’s
information.
Besides a reliable tip from law enforcement’s CRI, the search-warrant affidavit
provided a sufficient nexus between the property searched—Beasley’s person and
vehicles—and the crime investigated. Law enforcement observed that D.A.-R. and
Beasley were associated with each other in a manner related to controlled-substance sales
through Facebook photos and surveillance. It was thus reasonable to conclude that
Beasley, like D.A.-R., might also “hide controlled substances on his body in h is genital
area,” and that a body-scan search of Beasley would yield evidence of a
controlled-substance crime. And although Beasley’s relationship to other individuals
involved in controlled-substance sales is likely insufficient to establish probable cause, the
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circumstances here present more than mere propinquity. Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 88-91 (1979) (concluding a search of all individuals frequenting a bar was not
supported by probable cause based merely upon the persons’ proximity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity and presence at a known
controlled-substance-trafficking location). In the search- warrant affidavit, law
enforcement attested to their personal observations of suspected controlled-substance
transactions linked to Beasley in November and December 2021. Based on the totality of
the circumstances, there was a substantial basis for the district court to conclude that
probable cause existed to support issuing the search warrant. See Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at
145-46.
We also disagree with Beasley that, given the nature of the crime, the search warrant
was overbroad and lacked particularity. The scope of the search warrant was admittedly
expansive, as it allowed officers to search any vehicle Beasley was found to be utilizing
without specifying a date or time for that search. But the search warrant specified a
triggering event appropriate for an anticipatory search warrant—when Beasley entered the
county traveling northbound from the Twin Cities—and it was likely that contraband or
evidence of a crime would be found on Beasley’s person or in the vehicle he was in, should
law enforcement conduct a search. See State v. Hansen, No. A09-1700, 2010 WL 2572521,
at *3-4 (Minn. App. June 29, 2010) (persuasively analyzing probable cause based on
appellant’s assertion that the triggering condition of an anticipatory search warrant was not
met); see also United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006) (articulating the
13
requirements for anticipatory warrants). And a warrant is not overbroad if it specifies the
place to search. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 386-87.
We must grant the issuing judge “considerable deference” in its consideration of the
controlled-substance crime under investigation. Contreras-Sanchez, 5 N.W.3d at 167
(quotation omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding the search
warrant valid and in denying Beasley’s motion to suppress.
Finally, Beasley argues that law enforcement’s execution of the search warrant
amounted to a “de facto arrest.” Law enforcement did effectively arrest Beasley as they
conducted a felony stop of Beasley at gun point, handcuffed him, and detained him in the
back of a squad car for transport to the jail. Beasley, however, fails to cite to any authority
stating that it is unconstitutional to detain an individual to execute a legally obtained search
warrant. See State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn. 2011) (stating we do not
consider arguments lacking a citation to support legal authority). We discern no error in
how law enforcement executed the search warrant.
Affirmed.