State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0035

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Carlos Boyd,
Appellant.

Filed December 15, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge
Dissenting, Johnson, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-22-339

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Jeffrey L.H. Boucher, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his first-degree drug-possession and obstructing-legal-process
convictions, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
2
because law enforcement failed to meet the anticipatory warrant’s triggering condition
before its execution. We agree, and reverse and remand.
FACTS
The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) investigated appellant Antonio
Carlos Boyd for selling methamphetamine. Law enforcement conducted controlled buys
using a confidential and reliable informant (CRI). Law enforcement corroborated
information provided by the CRI, including Boyd’s residence and the vehicles he drove.
On or about March 1, 2022, the CRI informed the BCA that, within 24 hours, Boyd
would be traveling from his Duluth residence to transport methamphetamine to D.B.’s
residence in Cloquet. A judge granted an anticipatory search warrant with the condition
precedent:
Anticipating that surveillance units (law enforcement
officials) observe BOYD leave the city of Duluth on March 1,
2022[,] and travel toward[] Cloquet, MN, your Affiant is
requesting the court[’]s permission to conduct a traffic stop in
Carlton County and search the vehicle BOYD is driving, as
well as his person.

Soon after the judge issued the warrant, officers observed Boyd traveling south on
Interstate 35 (I-35) from Duluth. Officers stopped Boyd on I-35 approximately one mile
before an exit leading toward Cloquet. Law enforcement searched Boyd’s vehicle and
found multiple baggies of methamphetamine.
Boyd moved the district court to suppress the evidence, arguing that, because he had
not exited I-35, the triggering condition necessary to execute the anticipatory warrant did
not occur. The district court denied the motion, finding that the “triggering event is not
3
exiting the freeway to Cloquet[,] it is the [d]efendant leaving Duluth and traveling toward[]
Cloquet on March 1, 2022.”
A jury found Boyd guilty of first-degree drug possession and obstructing legal
process, and the district court sentenced Boyd to 98 months in prison. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
Boyd argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence.
In a pretrial suppression order, when the facts are not in dispute, we review the suppression
decision de novo. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 484 (Minn. 2016).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions require a warrant based on probable
cause for governmental searches and seizures. State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 839
(Minn. App. 2008). Probable cause exists when the totality of the circumstances,
articulated in the affidavit, indicates a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in the place to be searched. Id. It cannot be based on uncertain or
vague information, nor mere suspicion. State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67, 71
(Minn. App. 1998). A district court must exclude from trial evidence seized during an
unconstitutional search. See, e.g., State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995).
An anticipatory warrant recognizes that probable cause does not yet exist, but that
it will arise once a condition precedent—a triggering condition—occurs. United States v.
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006). “I f the government were to execute an anticipatory
warrant before the triggering condition occurred, there would be no reason to believe the
4
item described in the warrant could be found at the searched location . . . .” Id. The
affidavit, not the issued warrant, identifies the triggering condition. Id.
No Minnesota caselaw addresses anticipatory warrants. A handful of
nonprecedential opinions exist on anticipatory warrants, which are persuasive and guide
our analysis. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P . 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating nonprecedential
opinions may be cited as persuasive authority). In those cases, we recognized that the
triggering condition must be “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid
misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents .” State v. Hughes,
No. C7-02-1624, 2003 WL 1702 140, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting United
States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989)) 1; see also State v. Beasley,
No. A23-1476, 2024 WL 3493888, at *5 (Minn. App. July 22, 2024) (recognizing that,
despite a warrant’s “admittedly expansive” scope, its triggering condition was
appropriately specific), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 2024). We have stated:
[I]f the [anticipatory] warrant is executed after some aspect of
the triggering condition is satisfied, we are left with the
question of whether enough of the condition has been met to
permit the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found. If that question can be answered in the affirmative, then
probable cause to support the warrant and the search exists.

1 The dissent questions the nonprecedential Hughes opinion. To be clear, the Supreme
Court’s discussion in Grubbs concerned the magistrate’s duties in issuing an anticipatory
warrant—not the affiant’s obligations in drafting the supporting affidavit. Grubbs, 547
U.S. at 97-98. The overall purpose of an “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn” triggering
condition is to avoid premature execution through “misunderstanding or manipulation by
government agents.” Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04. Although the validity of the triggering
condition is not at issue, the principle is equally relevant: had law enforcement articulated
a more specific triggering condition, the present dispute would not have arisen.
5
State v. Hansen, No. A09-1700, 2010 WL 2572521, at *3 (Minn. App. June 29, 2010). We
also noted that the triggering condition must support a nexus between the evidence sought
and the place searched. See State v. Dixon , No. A24-1164, 2025 WL 2029901, at *7
(Minn. App. July 21, 2025) (concluding that parcel of drugs, addressed to specific
residence, with triggering condition preventing execution until someone brought the parcel
into the home, “provided a sufficient nexus between the home and suspected drug
activity”).
Here, the triggering condition, “travel toward[] Cloquet,” is ambiguous because
reasonable minds could differ as to when it is satisfied. Cf. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d
914, 920 (Minn. 2019) (stating that when a statute is “subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation,” it is ambiguous). Multiple dictionary definitions define toward as “in the
direction of.” See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1795 (11th ed. 2019); American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1838 (5th ed. 2018); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 1322 (11th ed. 2014) ; The New Oxford American Dictionary 1832 (3d ed.
2010). Under the definition of toward, police could stop Boyd at any point within Carlton
County on the theory that, regardless of his actual destination, he could divert onto a
connecting road leading to Cloquet. That is precisely what occurred here. Boyd was
stopped on I-35, an interstate that does not itself enter Cloquet, before he reached any exit
that would have taken him into Cloquet. Nonetheless, because he could have intended to
take an upcoming exit toward Cloquet, he was deemed to be “traveling toward” Cloquet.
Ambiguity arises not only when a term carries multiple definitions, but also when a
definition fails to impose discernible limits on the conduct at issue. Cf. In re Welfare of
6
B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 164 (Minn. 2014) (“[A] statute is unconstitutionally vague if it
affords no guidance to enforcement officials limiting their discretion in determining
whether certain conduct is allowed or prohibited.” (quotation omitted)). However, the
parties do not dispute the warrant’s validity. And we grant “great deference” to the issuing
court’s factual findings related to probable cause. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804
(Minn. 2001). Consequently, we look to the warrant’s supporting affidavit to discern the
point at which the issuing judge believed the “travel[ing] toward Cloquet” condition would
be satisfied to support probable cause for the stop and search. See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97.
The affidavit stated that the CRI had conducted controlled buys from Boyd and had
provided information, corroborated by law enforcement, about where Boyd lived and what
vehicle he drove.
2 However, the affidavit did not specify where those controlled buys
occurred. Moreover, the only portion of the affidavit supporting the assertion that Boyd
transported drugs in his car was the CRI’s statement that Boyd “would be travelling from
his residence to a residence in Cloquet.” That statement, describing travel to Cloquet, not
merely toward Cloquet, was the linchpin connecting Boyd’s anticipated travel to the
transportation of drugs. See State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 748-50 (Minn. 1998) (finding
insufficient nexus where affidavit lacked information showing the defendant was a drug
trafficker, “much less that she performed such acts from her home”). In other words, the
probable-cause determination in the warrant rested on the condition that Boyd was

2 A subsequent warrant for Boyd’s cellphone data raised questions about whether law
enforcement corroborated the vehicles Boyd drove. Boyd’s attorney did not reopen the
omnibus to address the question. Because of counsel’s failure to reopen the omnibus, Boyd
also raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on appeal.
7
traveling to D.B.’s home in Cloquet, not simply driving in Cloquet’s general direction.
Viewing the totality of the affidavit, it follows that, without a substantial inference that
Boyd was traveling to Cloquet, the triggering condition identified in the affidavit could not
have been fulfilled.
When law enforcement stopped Boyd before any of the I-35 exits leading to
Cloquet, they lacked a substantial basis to infer that Boyd was destined for Cloquet. And
without that basis, not “enough of the condition has been met to permit the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” See Hansen, 2010 WL 2572521, at *3.
The district court therefore erred in not suppressing the evidence because law enforcement
executed the warrant without sufficient probable cause. Based on this conclusion, we do
not need to consider Boyd’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See State v. Hill,
23 N.W.3d 824, 837 (Minn. 2025).
Reversed and remanded.

D-1

JOHNSON, Judge (dissenting)
The anticipatory search warrant in this case was subject to a condition precedent
that law-enforcement officers “observe Boyd leave the city of Duluth on March 1, 2022
and travel towards Cloquet,” in which event officers were authorized “to conduct a traffic
stop in Carlton County and search the vehicle.” On March 1, 2022, Boyd left Duluth in a
Buick Lucerne driven by his girlfriend and traveled in the southbound lane of interstate
highway 35 until law-enforcement officers stopped the car in Carlton County shortly before
it reached the first of two exits that lead to Cloquet. Law-enforcement officers justifiably
executed the warrant because the condition precedent had been satisfied. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.
A.
At the outset, it is important to clarify what is and is not at issue on appeal. In short,
Boyd does not challenge the issuance of the search warrant. Rather, he challenges only
the execution of the search warrant.
First, Boyd expressly disclaims “any issues with the probable cause underlying the
search warrant.” Boyd asserts that “information as to why law enforcement believed there
would be drugs in the car on that particular date . . . does not go to whether the triggering
condition occurred.” Similarly, Boyd asserts that information about “whether the
triggering condition was likely to occur . . . is not the issue presented to this court.”
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider “where . . . controlled buys occurred,” see
supra 6, or whether there is a “‘ nexus between the evidence sought and the place

D-2

searched,’” see supra 5 (citing State v. Dixon, No. A24-1164, 2025 WL 2029901, at *7
(Minn. App. July 21, 2025)).
Second, Boyd expressly disclaims any argument “that the triggering condition was
overbroad.” Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider whether the condition precedent is
sufficiently “‘“explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or
manipulation by government agents.”’” See supra 4 (quoting State v. Hughes,
No. C7-02-1624, 2003 WL 1702140, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 1, 2003) (quoting United
States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989))).1
Third, neither Boyd nor the state argues that the condition precedent was only
partially satisfied or partially triggered. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for the court to
consider “‘whether enough of the condition has been met to permit the belief that

1The Hughes opinion is nonprecedential and, thus, not binding. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). In any event , Hughes should not be read to recognize a rule
that an anticipatory search warrant may be deemed invalid if the condition precedent is not
“explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn.” 2003 WL 1702140, at *1 (quotation omitted). Such
a rule should not be derived from Hughes because, in making that statement, Hughes
quoted a statement in Garcia that is mere dicta. See id. The primary issue in Garcia was
whether anticipatory warrants are per se unconstitutional. 882 F.2d at 702-04. The Garcia
court held that they are not. Id. at 703. After reaching that conclusion, the Garcia court
proactively cautioned magistrates to “protect against . . . premature execution” by
imposing conditions that “avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.”
Id. at 703-04. That cautionary statement was not necessary to the resolution of the issue
presented by the parties. The leading Supreme Court opinion on anticipatory warrants,
which was decided after Garcia, does not say that a search conducted pursuant to an
anticipatory warrant is invalid if the condition precedent is not explicit, clear, or narrowly
drawn. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94-99 (2006).

D-3

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’” See supra 4 (quoting State v. Hansen,
No. A09-1700, 2010 WL 2572521, at *3 (Minn. App. June 29, 2010)). 2
In Boyd’s principal brief, he makes a single, narrow argument with respect to the
anticipatory warrant: “The state failed to prove that the triggering event . . . occurred.” In
his reply brief, Boyd clarifies that his argument boils down to a single, narrow issue:
“whether the triggering condition occurred.” Thus, the court need consider only one issue:
whether the condition precedent was triggered. If so, the search is valid; if not, the search
is invalid.
B.
The anticipatory search warrant authorized a stop and a search of the Buick Lucerne
in Carlton County if law-enforcement officers were to “ observe Boyd leave the city of
Duluth on March 1, 2022 and travel towards Cloquet.” The court concludes that the
condition precedent was not triggered. See supra 5-7.
As an initial matter, the court reasons that the word “towards” is ambiguous. See
supra 5. But multiple lay dictionaries provide the same primary definition of “toward” or

2The Hansen opinion is nonprecedential and, thus, not binding. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). The appellant in that case argued that the triggering event had
not occurred. 2010 WL 2572521, at *2, 3. It is questionable whether the Hansen court
properly considered the issue of probable cause and properly allowed the existence of
probable cause to overcome the fact that only “some aspect of the triggering condition is
satisfied.” Id. at *3. The Hansen opinion cites no authority for the proposition that, “if the
warrant is executed after some aspect of the triggering condition is satisfied, we are left
with the question of whether enough of the condition has been met to permit the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” and that, “[i]f that question can be
answered in the affirmative, then probable cause to support the warrant and the search
exists.” Id.

D-4

“towards” when used as a preposition: “[i]n the direction of.” See The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1838 (5th ed. 2018); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 1322 (11th ed. 2014 ); New Oxford American Dictionary 1832 (3d ed. 2010) .
Another lay dictionary explains that the word “denotes the relation of direction or approach
without arrival or attainment.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2678 (2d ed.
1950) (emphasis added). The ordinary meaning of the word “towards” easily may be
applied to the facts of this case.
At the omnibus hearing in the district court, the sole witness (a special agent of the
bureau of criminal apprehension) identified two driving routes from Duluth to Cloquet,
which appear to be the most direct routes and, thus, the routes most likely to be taken by a
person wishing to drive from Duluth to Cloquet. Both routes make use of interstate
highway 35, which generally runs southwest from Duluth. A driver taking the first route
from Duluth to Cloquet would turn off interstate highway 35 at exit 239 and drive north on
county road 45 through the city of Scanlon before entering the city of Cloquet. A driver
taking the second route would drive past exit 239, turn off interstate highway 35 at exit
237, and drive north on state highway 33 before entering the city of Cloquet.
When law-enforcement officers stopped and searched the Buick Lucerne, it had left
Duluth, was in Carlton County, was traveling in the southbound lane of interstate highway
35, and was approaching exits 239 and 237. Boyd plainly was traveling “towards Cloquet”
because he was driving in the direction of, and on a course leading to, Cloquet, even though
he had not yet arrived there. See American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1838; Merriam-

D-5

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra, at 1332; New Oxford American Dictionary, supra,
at 1832; Webster’s New International Dictionary, supra, at 2678.
The conclusion that the condition precedent was not triggered can be obtained only
by adding language to the condition precedent, or substituting language, to make the
condition precedent more restrictive. For example, Boyd repeatedly argues that law-
enforcement officers did not have reason to believe that he was traveling “to” Cloquet. But
the condition precedent does not use the word “to”; it uses the word “towards.” Similarly,
the court, in essence, rewrites the condition precedent to require that Boyd travel to
Cloquet. See supra 6-7. The condition precedent does not require that Boyd travel towards
Cloquet and only Cloquet. That the Buick Lucerne was traveling towards Cloquet and
multiple other places that lie beyond exits 239 and 237 does not negate the fact that the car
was traveling towards Cloquet.
It is true that the warrant application could have been written to describe a more
restrictive condition precedent. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, No. A23-1476, 2024 WL
3493888, at *1 (Minn. App. July 22, 2024) (anticipatory search warrant to be triggered if
agents observe “that Beasley and/or [accomplice] are traveling northbound towards
Bemidji . . . and the vehicle arrives into Beltrami County”) (emphasis added), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 30, 2024). But the officer who applied for the warrant did not do so, and the
issuing judge approved the warrant without a more restrictive condition precedent. The
question presented in this appeal is not whether a more restrictive condition precedent
would have been more appropriate. The pertinent question is whether the condition
precedent was triggered. Given its plain language, the condition precedent was triggered

D-6

before the warrant was executed because Boyd left Duluth, was in Carlton County, and
was traveling towards Cloquet.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that, if it were relevant, the record would
support a conclusion that both the “travel towards Cloquet” language and the execution of
the warrant were reasonable. See State v. Brown, 932 N.W.2d 283, 288-89 (Minn. 2019)
(reviewing search conducted pursuant to warrant and stating that “ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”) (quotation omitted). The BCA special agent,
who prepared the warrant application, testified that there were “tactical” reasons why law-
enforcement officers chose to execute the warrant on interstate highway 35, before the
Buick Lucerne took either exit that leads to Cloquet. Specifically, the BCA special agent
testified that “our operational plan” was to stop the car on interstate highway 35 instead of
waiting until the car had exited because it is less dangerous to conduct a traffic stop on a
four-lane highway and because the roadways between the exits and Cloquet would be
“more congested” with “more vehicles.” The BCA special agent also testified that the
segment of county road 45 between exit 239 and Cloquet includes “one of the busiest”
intersections in the county, with two gas stations, a liquor store, a trucking yard, and a
restaurant nearby. The special agent’s testimony indicates that the location of the execution
of the warrant was the result of deliberation and caution, not impatience or manipulation.
For these reasons, I would affirm the district court’s denial of Boyd’s motion to
suppress evidence.