State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1692

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jesus Nava Carranza,
Appellant.

Filed September 16, 2024
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-79

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M. , Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
After a court trial, the district court found appellant guilty of first -, second-, and
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct against his niece, who was in kindergarten at the time
of the abuse. Appellant challenges the district court’s guilty verdicts, arguing that the
2
evidence was insufficient to prove sexual penetration, an element of the first -degree
offense. Appellant more generally asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all three offenses, arguing that the victim’s testimony
was not credible and uncorroborated. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jesus Nava Carranza with first -,
second-, and fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct against his niece, who was five-to-six
years old when the alleged abuse occurred. Carranza waived his right to trial by jury and
agreed to a court trial. Nine witnesses testified at trial: the alleged victim, DR; DR’s
mother; a retired Minneapolis Police Department officer who took DR’s initial report; the
lead investigator; another of DR’s uncles, MCO; Carranza’s two daughters; Carranza’s
wife; and Carranza. The court also received two screenshots of messages between
Carranza and DR’s uncle MCO into evidence. The district court found the facts to be as
follows.
When she was three years old, DR moved to the U.S. from Mexico with her mother
and brother. They stayed with a friend of DR’s mother before moving in with DR’s aunt,
her aunt’s husband (Carranza), and their two daughters at their Minneapolis apartment. DR
lived in the apartment during her kindergarten year when she was five and six years old.
On occasion, when DR’s mother and Carranza’s wife left the apartment, the children
were left alone in Carranza’s care. When they were too loud, Carranza would banish them
to their rooms and prohibit them from being in the living room . As to the alleged sexual
abuse, Carranza would sit on a couch in the living room and pull down DR’s pants and
3
underwear while she stood in front of him. More than once, he “caressed” DR’s bare skin
outside her labia and her vagina in between the labia. Carranza sometimes told DR that he
was “just checking” her. These incidents happened several times during DR’s kindergarten
year. The district court inferred that Carranza had acted with sexual intent during th ese
incidents.
On one occasion, Carranza brought DR into the bathroom when the lights were off.
DR was seated on the toilet, and when Carranza turned on the lights, he was standing in
front of her with his erect penis outside of his pants.
During her kindergarten year, DR touched her uncle MCO’s genitals over his pants.
When she was asked why she did that, DR said that Carranza taught her to do it . DR’s
uncle and her aunt told DR’s mother about this incident, and DR’s mother immediately
moved DR out of Carranza’s apartment.
No one reported the abuse to law enforcement; DR’s family was undocumented at
that time. In May 2021, when she was 19, DR decided to report the abuse to police. Her
mother advised against it, but one of her aunts supported DR. DR made a police report on
May 21. Later in May, Carranza messaged DR’s uncle MCO regarding DR and her aunt
stating, “b-tches bark a lot at night,” and “when the dog dies, the rabies does too.” MCO
responded that DR had already gone to the police. Carranza did not ask w hat DR ha d
reported. An investigator interviewed DR in June 2021.
At the time of the trial, DR was 21 years old. The district court found that her
testimony at trial was consistent with the initial police report, with her statement to the
investigator, and with evidence produced at trial. The district court found that DR’s
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testimony was “entirely credible,” noting that DR “indicated when she did not know or did
not remember an answer to a question from counsel.” As to the credibility of the other
witnesses at trial, the district court found that although DR’s mother’s recol lection was
limited, her testimony was credible; that the professional witnesses’ testimony was
credible; and that the testimony of Carranza’s daughters was generally credible on
background matters, but not regarding Carranza’s supervision of the children.
The court found that Carranza’s testimony and his wife’s testimony were not
credible. The court noted that Carranza was evasive and “gave entirely incredible, detailed
accounts” of events from over a decade ago. The court “gave no credence” to Carranza’s
claim that he had only been left alone with his daughters and DR twice during the period
at issue. The court also “found not credible and unpersuasive the defense’s apparent
theory” that DR “fabricated allegations . . . because [Carranza] had threatened to report her
for driving while intoxicated or because of [a] dispute between [ Carranza] and [DR’s]
mother over payment for car repairs.”
The court found Carranza guilty of all three counts of criminal sexual conduct. The
court entered judgment of conviction for the first- and fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
offenses and sentenced Carranza to serve executed concurrent sentences of 144 months and
364 days respectively, as well as ten years of conditional release after confinement.
Carranza appeals.
DECISION
Carranza challenges the district court’s ruling, claiming that the evidence was
insufficient to support the court’s finding s of guilt. When considering a claim of
5
insufficient evidence, an appellate court carefully analyzes the record to determine whether
the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to
permit the fact-finder to reach the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430
(Minn. 1989). An appellate court assumes that the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses
and disbelieved the defense witnesses. State v. Tscheu , 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn.
2008). The court will not disturb a guilty verdict if the fact -finder, acting with due regard
for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
could reasonably conclude that the defendan t was proved guilty of the offense charged.
Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). An appellate court “review[s]
criminal bench trials the same as jury trials when determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain convictions.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1998).
I.
Carranza first argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the
proved conduct met the definition of “sexual penetration” as required under the first-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2006)
(classifying multiple acts of sexual penetration of a child under sixteen with whom the
actor has a significant relationship as first-degree criminal sexual conduct).1
“When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the statute under
which a defendant has been convicted, [appellate courts] are presented with a question of

1 The 2006 version of the statute would have been in place at the beginning of the abuse
period. Carranza concedes that, “[f]or purposes of this argument, the 2007 version does
not differ materially from the 2006 version” and relies on the 2006 statute.
6
statutory interpretation that [they] review de novo.” State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623,
625 (Minn. 2018). In such circumstances, an appellate court uses a two-step process: first,
it uses statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the relevant statutory language;
and second, it determines whether the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt using that
interpretation. See State v. Robinson , 921 N.W.2d 755, 756 -58, 761 -62 (Minn. 2019)
(interpreting Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b) (2018) to define “significant romantic or
sexual relationship” and concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction
using that definition).
The provision at issue—Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii)—states:
A person who engages in sexual penetration with
another person, or in sexual contact with a person under 13
years of age as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 11,
paragraph (c), is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree if any of the following circumstances exists: . . . (h) the
actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the
complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual
penetration, and: . . . (iii) the sexual abuse involved multiple
acts committed over an extended period of time.

(Emphasis added.)
“Sexual penetration” is defined to include “acts committed without the
complainant’s consent, except in those cases where consent is not a defense,” including
“any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings . . . of the complainant’s
body by any part of the actor’s body.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(2)(i) (2006)
(emphasis added). Although Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd . 12(2)(i), defines “sexual
penetration” as used in Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii), it does not define the meaning
of intrusion or genital opening as used in the definition.
7
Carranza turns to dictionary definitions to define “intrusion .” Next, he asserts that
“[t]he vaginal canal, not the labia, is the medically recognized genital opening for the
female body,” citing an article entitled “Vagina: Anatomy, Function, Conditions & What’s
Normal.”2 Based on that understanding of the phrase “genital opening,” Carranza argues
that the district court’s finding that he caressed DR’s vagina in between her labia does not
establish an “intrusion . . . into the genital or anal openings.” See id. Carranza further
argues that “to be guilty of sexually penetrating [DR], [he] must have put a part of his body
in [her] vaginal canal.” Thus, Carranza contends that the state did not prove that he
sexually penetrated DR, and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the district court’s
guilty verdict on the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense.
We reject Carranza’s approach because it is inconsistent with precedent. In State v.
Shamp, we held that the victim’s testimony that her father “would rub his fingers between
the folds of skin over her vagina, but not insert his fingers ‘all the way’” was “sufficient
evidence for the jury to reasonably find penetration.” 422 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Minn. App.
1988), rev. denied (Minn. June 10, 1988) . We did not require proof that the defendant ’s
finger(s) intruded into the victim’s vaginal canal. The district court’s finding in this case
that Carranza “caressed [DR’s] bare skin . . . on the vagina in between the labia” is
consistent with the language supporting our finding of sexual penetration in Shamp. See
id. Indeed, the district court cited Shamp in finding that there was sexual penetration in
this case.

2 Cleveland Clinic, Health Library, Vagina [https://perma.cc/3GE8-AWPF].
8
Shamp is not an anomaly: this court has ruled similarly in previous nonprecedential
opinions, which, although nonbinding, are persuasive.3 See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c) (stating that “nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority”) ;
Cerrito v. State , No. A21 -1430, 2022 WL 1446783, at *4 (Minn. App. May 9, 2022)
(holding that the child’s demonstration with an anatomical doll that appellant’s “ ‘fingers
went in between kind of the lips of [the child’s] vulva ’” supported a finding of vaginal
penetration), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2022); State v. Zapata, No. A17-1085, 2018 WL
3097735, at *2 (Minn. App. June 25, 2018) (ruling that “[e]ven if the jury interpre ted [the
child’s] statements to mean that [appellant’s] hand went inside the folds of skin over her
vagina, that evidence would still be sufficient to sustain his conviction”); Blevins, 2008
WL 942578, at *3 (holding that the district court reasonably found appellant digitally
penetrated the victim in part because the victim testified to “three separate times at which
[appellant] rubbed her vagina”); State v. Robinson , No. A20 -0159, 2021 WL 416700 , at
*2-3 (Minn. App. Feb. 8, 2021) (rejecting argument that “‘genital opening’ must mean only
the vaginal opening”).

3 In addition, in other jurisdictions “courts in numerous cases have stated or recognized
that, although the vagina is intact and not penetrated in the least, entry of the anterior of
the female genital organ, known as the vulva or labia, is sufficient penetration to constitute
rape.” James J. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Penetration in Prosecution
for Rape or Statutory Rape , 76 A.L.R. 3d 163 , 178 § 3 (1977); see State v. Blevins, No.
A06-2199, 2008 WL 942578, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 8, 2008) (“Several state courts have
specifically held, in the context of digital or object rape, that penetration of the ‘genital
opening’ is satisfied by penetration of the vulva or labia.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied
(Minn. June 18, 2008).
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Finally, as the state argues, the legislature did not define sexual penetration as an
intrusion of the “vaginal canal,” but instead defined the phrase as “any intrusion however
slight into the genital . . . opening[].” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(2) (emphasis added).
“This court cannot supply language that the legislature has purposefully omitted or
overlooked.” State v. Coonrod , 652 N.W.2d 715, 723 (Minn. App. 2002) , rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 21, 2003); see Auringer v. State, 695 N.W.2d 640, 645 (Minn. App. 2005) (“If
the presence of clothing were a relevant factor justifying distinct treatment in cases of
penetration, there is no question that the legislature would have so stated.”) , rev. denied
(Minn. July 19, 2005).
In sum, under Shamp, the facts found by the district court establish that Carranza
engaged in sexual penetration within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(2)(i),
when he “caressed” DR’s vagina “in between the labia.”
II.

Carranza next argues that the evidence was insufficient because the court relied
“solely” on DR ’s testimony, “there were reasons to question her credibility ,” and “ the
evidence was uncorroborated.”
“Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s
testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact -finder].” State v. Mems , 708 N.W.2d
526, 531 (Minn. 2006). This court will not consider a witness’s credibility on appeal. State
v. Garrett, 479 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 1992).
The fact-finder “is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.” State v.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013). “When the testimony of the defendant and
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the victim differ sharply, the [fact-finder] is entitled to believe the victim’s account.” State
v. Folley, 378 N.W.2d 21, 26 (Minn. App. 1985).
The district court determined that DR’s testimony was “entirely credible .” The
court found that DR “was articulate and straightforward, and indicated when she did not
know or did not remember an answer to a question from counsel ,” and the court observed
that DR’s “testimony was consistent with her prior out -of-court statements and with other
evidence introduced at trial.” This court defers to the district court’s credibility
determination. Mems, 708 N.W.2d at 531.
Moreover, “[i]t is well -settled that a conviction can rest on the uncorroborated
testimony of a single credible witness.” State v. Hill, 172 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Minn. 1969).
Generally, in a prosecution for first -degree criminal sexual conduct, “the testimony of a
victim need not be corroborated.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2006).
“Corroboration of an allegation of sexual abuse of a child is required only if the evidence
otherwise adduced is insufficient to sustain conviction.” State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604,
608 (Minn. 1984). This court has held that “positive” and “consistent” testimony, even
when not “particularly detailed,” does not require corroboration. State v. Wiskow , 501
N.W.2d 657, 660 (Minn. App. 1993) (quotations omitted).
Carranza notes that t he Minnesota Supreme Court has occasionally reversed
convictions in cases in which there were “additional reasons to question the victim’s
credibility.” State v. F oreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004). Carranza relies on
that caselaw in arguing that his convictions warrant reversal.
11
Carranza cites State v. Huss, a criminal-sexual-conduct case with “unusual facts .”
506 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1993). In Huss, the supreme court reversed because the
alleged victim, a three -year-old child, had been exposed to “repeated use of a highly
suggestive book on sexual abuse.” Id. at 292. The child’s testimony was the only direct
evidence of abuse but “was contradictory as to whether any abuse occurred at all ,” and it
“was inconsistent with her prior statements and other verifiable facts .” Id. Those are not
the circumstances here . DR’s testimony was consistent with her prior out -of-court
statements and with other evidence produced at trial , and there is no evidence that DR’s
memory or testimony was influenced by “the repeated use of a highly suggestive book on
sexual abuse.” Id. The other cases on which Carranza relies are similarly unpersuasive .
See State v. Langteau, 268 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978) (reversing an aggravated robbery
conviction because parts of the complaining witness’s version of events were
“unexplained,” and “[t]he reason why defendant would have held up [ the complaining
witness], with whom he was well acquainted, [was] left a mystery” ); State v. Gluff , 172
N.W.2d 63, 64-66 (Minn. 1969) (reversing aggravated-robbery conviction based on doubt
regarding the accuracy of the complaining witness’s identification of the perpetrator).
Finally, Carranza cites State v. Ani, in which the supreme court stated that lack of
corroboration “may well call for a holding that there is insufficient evidence.” 257 N.W.2d
699, 700 (Minn. 1977) (quotation omitted). However, the Ani court concluded that “even
if there were a constitutional or statutory corroboration requirement it would have been
amply met” because the “victim’s testimony was positive and not contradicted[] and was
strongly corroborated by other evidence.” Id.
12
Like the circumstances in Ani, although corroboration was not necessary in this
case, DR’s testimony was corroborated. As the state argues, “multiple witnesses testified
that [DR] appeared and behaved in a manner consistent with characteristics of children
who have been sexually abused.” The court heard testimony that , on several occasions
during the period of abuse, DR told her mother that her private parts burned; that around
the time of the abuse, DR touched her uncle MC O’s genitals over his pants and said that
Carranza “taught her that”; and that once DR started college, she “didn’t want to see”
Carranza and did not want to go to family reunions if he would be there. In addition, after
DR touched MCO’s genitals over his pants and implicated Carranza, MCO and DR’s aunt
informed DR’s mother, who immediately moved DR out of Carranza’s apartment. Finally,
Carranza’s daughter testified that when Carranza was left alone with his daughters and DR,
he occasionally instructed his daughters that they could not be in the living room . That
testimony is consistent with DR’s testimony indicating that Carranza had the opportunity
to abuse her in the living room.
In sum, there is no basis to reject the district court’s finding that DR’s testimony
accusing Carranza of sexual abuse was credible. And although corroboration was not
required, the evidence corroborated DR’s testimony. Because the district court, sitting as
the fact -finder and acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that Carranza
was proved guilty of the offenses charged, we do not disturb the guilty verdicts.
Affirmed.