In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. R. J., Jr., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1785

In the Matter of the Welfare of: T. R. J., Jr., Child.

Filed July 29, 2024
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court
File No. 17-JV-23-65
Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-JV-23-99

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant T.R.J., Jr.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Nicholas Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota;

Jenna Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant Redwood County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for
respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from a juvenile-delinquency adjudication, appellant argues that the
district court abused its discretion by adjudicating him delinquent for threats of violence
without considering certain factors. We conclude that the district court properly exercised
its discretion when it adjudicated appellant delinquent. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In June 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged 13- year-old appellant T.R.J.
Jr. with felony threats of violence in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.713,
subdivision 1 (2022). The petition alleged that T.R.J. called an unknown number and left
a voicemail in which he stated, “I know you have a family because you just went on
vacation with them,” and then threatened to kill the person’s family and rape the person
whom he called. T.R.J. pleaded guilty to felony threats of violence. The district court then
transferred the case from Redwood County, where the petition was filed, to Cottonwood
County, where T.R.J. lived, for a disposition hearing.
At the disposition hearing, the state requested that the district court adjudicate T.R.J.
delinquent and impose supervised probation for an indefinite period with the following
conditions: perform 16 hours of community service, attend school regularly, attend
therapy, maintain good behavior, avoid violating the law, and refrain from contacting the
victim. Defense counsel requested that the district court continue the case without
adjudication but agreed to the disposition proposed by the state.
3
T.R.J. and his mother testified at the hearing. T.R.J. stated that it was his first time
being in trouble with the law. He said that he did not know the identity of the person whom
he called and that he “never meant to do it.” He said he gets As and Bs in school, which
his mother corroborated. T.R.J.’s mother said the call happened in school and that T.R.J.
was “trying to be a funny guy with all the other kids.” She testified that she revoked
T.R.J.’s phone privileges indefinitely and enrolled him in therapy.
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court adjudicated T.R.J.
delinquent and ordered the agreed-upon disposition. Explaining its decision, the district
court noted that it “see[s] a lot of terroristic threat charges” and that “the things that were
said in this particular [case] are rather severe and pretty chilling. ” The district court told
T.R.J. that his conduct is not “something that kids normally do.” The court said it was
“glad” that T.R.J. was in therapy and that T.R.J. was lucky to have a mother who takes an
“active effort.” The court explained that “the goal is that we won’t see you back here for
anything like this, that this is just a one-time thing” in T.R.J.’s life.
After the hearing, the district court issued a written disposition order which recited
the charges, stated that T.R.J. was “convicted,” and set forth the disposition announced at
the hearing. The order contained no factual findings or legal memorandum.
T.R.J. appeals.
DECISION
T.R.J. challenges the district court’s decision to adjudicate him delinquent rather
than continuing the case without adjudication, arguing the district court did not “conduct
the proper analysis” when it decided to adjudicate him delinquent.
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Under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure, for “each of the
charges found by the [district] court to be proved, the court shall either: (A) adjudicate the
child delinquent . . . or (B) continue the case without adjudicating the child delinquent.”
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. We review a district court’s decision to adjudicate
a juvenile delinquent for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d 420,
422 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. May 19, 2020). District courts have broad
discretion in determining whether to adjudicate or continue without adjudication. Id.
T.R.J. argues the district court abused its discretion in two ways. We address each
argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding whether to adjudicate
without expressly considering T.R.J.’s best interests and public safety.

T.R.J. first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it did not
expressly consider whether a continuance without adjudication was in T.R.J.’s best
interests and in the interests of public safety. This argument is unavailing.
When charges against a juvenile have been proved, a district court has the authority
to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A district
court “may” also continue a juvenile case without adjudication “[w]hen it is in the best
interests of the child and not inimical to public safety.” Id. , subd. 4(a); Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 7(a) (2022). But a district court is not required to make particularized
findings regarding its decision to “impose or withhold adjudication of delinquency.” In re
Welfare of J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 28,
1999) and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000).
5
Because the district court was not required to make findings regarding best interests
or public safety when adjudicating T.R.J. delinquent, we discern no abuse of discretion on
that basis. As this court explained in J.L.Y., “[i]mposing an adjudication within the limits
prescribed by the legislature is not an abuse of discretion.” Id.
To convince us otherwise, T.R.J. analogizes this case to two adult criminal cases
decided by this court in which we concluded that the district court failed to properly
exercise its sentencing discretion. In State v. Curtiss, we concluded that the district court
failed to exercise its discretion because it declined to weigh defendant’s stated reasons for
his requested sentencing departure. 353 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984) . And in
State v. Mendoza, we held that the district court erred in denying a sentencing
departure because it improperly considered collateral consequences—specifically, the
co-defendants’ immigration status and possible deportation. 638 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.
App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002).
Relying on Curtiss and Mendoza, T.R.J. argues that the district court abused its
discretion because it did not adequately consider his best interests when it decided to
adjudicate him. To support his argument , he asserts “it was certainly in [T.R.J.’s] best
interest to avoid having a juvenile delinquency adjudication” because an adjudication “can
result in collateral consequences.” T.R.J. also contends that the district court did not
consider public-safety related factors in determining whether to adjudicate or continue the
case, including T.R.J.’s juvenile-delinquency history, his likelihood to reoffend, and his
mother’s proactive actions in enrolling T.R.J. in therapy and taking his phone away.
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While we understand T.R.J.’s concerns about potential collateral consequences of
an adjudication, we are not persuaded that T.R.J. has demonstrated that the district court
abused its discretion. First, T.R.J. did not raise his argument about collateral consequences
before the district court. Because the argument was not raised below, we decline to
consider it on appeal. In re Welfare of I.N.A. , 902 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. App. 2017)
(“Ordinarily, appellate courts will not decide issues which were not raised before the
district court.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 28, 2017). Second, we
disagree that the district court did not consider T.R.J.’s juvenile-delinquency history, his
likelihood to reoffend, and his mother’s actions. The record reflects that the district court
acknowledged that this offense was T.R.J.’s first offense and that his mother had been
proactive. The district court also stated that the “goal” of its decision was to prevent T.R.J.
from reoffending. Moreover, the district court considered the severity of the offense, which
is probative of the public safety implications of adjudication. Cf. C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d at
423 (affirming decision to adjudicate when district court considered “seriousness” of a new
offense). Through its consideration of these facts, the court weighed the arguments for and
against the two alternatives presented —adjudication or continuing the case— and decided
to adjudicate T.R.J. delinquent, a decision which is well within its discretion. See Minn.
R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1; Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7(a).
We also are not persuaded by T.R.J.’s reliance on Curtiss and Mendoza for other
reasons. First, those cases involve sentencing questions arising under a different legal
framework applicable to adults. See Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d at262; Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d at
480. Furthermore, the cases cited are factually distinguishable . In this case, u nlike in
7
Curtiss, the district court did consider the arguments when it adjudicated T.R.J. delinquent.
See 353 N.W.2d at 263-64. This is not a case where the district court “erred in putting
aside” the defendant’s arguments. Id. at 264. And, unlike in Mendoza, T.R.J. does not
contend that the district court considered any improper factors, like immigration status and
potential deportation, in deciding to adjudicate him delinquent. 638 N.W.2d at 483-84.
Finally, we note that T.R.J. cites no cases involving a juvenile adjudication in support of
his argument. For these reasons, we reject T.R.J.’s argument that the district court abused
its discretion by not expressly considering T.R.J.’s best interests and public safety when it
adjudicated T.R.J. delinquent.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider whether
adjudication was necessary and proportional to restore T.R.J. to law-abiding
conduct.

T.R.J. also argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not
consider whether adjudication was necessary and proportional to his circumstances. In
support of his argument, he relies on Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure
15.05, subdivision 2, which requires a district court to address factors relating to necessity
and proportionality when imposing a disposition. See also Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd.
1(b) (2022).
T.R.J. seems to conflate the standard for adjudications and dispositions. We have
held that “[e]ach constitutes a distinct inquiry.” In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241,
246 (Minn. App. 2002) . In the adjudication inquiry, the district court may adjudicate the
juvenile delinquent or continue the case without adjudication. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P.
15.05, subd. 1. The disposition inquiry occurs once the district court has decided either to
8
adjudicate the juvenile delinquent or to continue the case . Minn. Stat. § 260B.198,
subd. 1(a), subd. 7(a) (2022); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The disposition can
include probation, counseling, or other outcomes listed in Minnesota Statutes section
260B.198, subdivision 1(a). In imposing a disposition, the district court must issue written
findings of fact supporting the disposition and “consider . . . established principles of
dispositions,” including whether the disposition is necessary to restore law-abiding conduct
and whether the disposition is proportional to the child’s circumstances. Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B).
We conclude that T.R.J.’s argument— that the district court abused its discretion by
adjudicating delinquent without considering whether adjudication was necessary and
proportional to his circumstances—is not persuasive because his argument relies solely on
rule 15.05, subdivision 2. As discussed above, rule 15.05, subdivision 2, does not apply to
adjudications. J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d at 695. Rather, rule 15.05, subdivision 2, applies to
dispositions. And nothing in rule 15.05, subdivision 1, which applies to adjudications,
requires consideration of necessity or proportionality. Accordingly, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by adjudicating T.R.J. delinquent without explaining why
adjudication was necessary and proportional.
1

1 In its disposition order, the district court did not include written factual findings about
why the disposition ordered is necessary and proportional to restore T.R.J. to law- abiding
conduct. Written dispositional findings “are essential to meaningful appellate review,” and
failure to make sufficient written findings constitutes reversible error. In re Welfare of
N.T.K., 619 N.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Minn. App. 2000); see also Minn. Stat. § 260B.198,
subd. 1(b) (requiring order with written findings of fact to support the disposition,
including why the best interests of the child are served and what alternatives were

9
Conclusion
In sum, the district court’s adjudication of T.R.J.’s delinquency was a valid exercise
of the discretion afforded to it under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure
15.05. While there may have been reasons to continue the case without adjudication, the
district court implicitly considered those reasons in deciding to adjudicate. The district
court was not required to issue “particularized findings” supporting its adjudication
decision regarding T.R.J.’s best interests or public safety. See J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d at 695.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by not explaining whether adjudication was
necessary and proportional because no such requirement exists for adjudications. Minn.
R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1; see also J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 245-46. We therefore
conclude that the district court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in adjudicating T.R.J.
delinquent. C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d at 422 (quotation omitted).
Affirmed.

considered); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2 (setting out requirement of findings).
T.R.J. agreed to the disposition at the hearing. On appeal, he does not assign error to the
district court’s failure to make findings regarding the disposition, and we will not do so on
our own volition. See State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780-81 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting
that inadequately briefed issues are waived), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997).