In the Matter of the Welfare of: E.W.H., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0771

In the Matter of the Welfare of: E.W.H., Child.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-24-8217

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant E.W.H.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, Carrie J. Osowski, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
E.W.H. was adjudicated delinquent after he pleaded guilty to spray- painting and
vandalizing several public and private spaces in Rochester, Minnesota. The district court
denied his motion to continue adjudication and E.W.H. appeals, advancing two arguments.
E.W.H. argues first that the district court exceeded its authority by considering factors

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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beyond the plain language of the continuance statute. Second, E.W.H. contends that the
court failed to meaningfully consider evidence of public safety and his best interests.
Because the district court properly exercised its discretion and its decision was supported
by the record, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2024, E.W.H. and two codefendants spray-painted and vandalized two
businesses, a food truck, and a wall at a public park. E.W.H. stole the spray paint from a
local store and, while under the influence of a cannabis product with his codefendants,
wrote disparaging messages that cost nearly $13,000 to remove. Police responded to the
vandalism and apprehended E.W.H. Because E.W.H. was then 15 years old, the state
charged E.W.H. with felony property damage and petitioned for the district court to
adjudicate him delinquent. E.W.H. then entered a guilty plea to an amended count of gross
misdemeanor property damage. The district court accepted E.W.H.’s plea and ordered a
predisposition report.
The predisposition report reflected a pattern of behavioral issues that began after the
death of E.W.H.’s mother.1 His mother passed away two years before the incident, leaving
E.W.H. and his sister in the care of different guardians. His sister remained in Owatonna,
Minnesota with their stepfather, but E.W.H. relocated to Rochester to live with his

1 Materials filed as confidential in the district court remain nonpublic on appeal. Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 112.02, subd. 1. But we are not precluded from mentioning the contents of
confidential information when it is “relevant to the particular issues or legal argument being
addressed in the proceeding.” Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 4. We
limit our recitation of the facts set forth in the predisposition report to information that is
relevant to the issues and arguments present in this appeal.
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biological father. E.W.H. struggled in his new environment and transitioned to online
learning to mitigate his behavioral issues at school. The predisposition report concluded
that E.W.H. manifested a moderate risk of reoffending and recommended that the district
court stay adjudication, order probation, and impose conditions for restitution.
During his dispositional hearing in April 2025, E.W.H. moved the district court to
continue the matter without adjudication on the grounds that he lacked a prior criminal
history, expressed remorse, and took up boxing as a positive hobby. He also contended that
he proactively sold some of his possessions and that he applied to jobs to satisfy restitution.
E.W.H. personally addressed the district court to express remorse and acknowledge his
mistake. The state moved to adjudicate E.W.H. delinquent, advancing three arguments.
First, the amount of restitution was “significant,” and second, it was unlikely to be paid
within the statutory period for a continuance without adjudication. Moreover, the state
pointed to the “nature of the offense” and that E.W.H. had needs that “go beyond just this
one incident[.]”2
The district court adjudicated E.W.H. delinquent, placed him on probation, and
ordered him to pay restitution. The court acknowledged E.W.H.’s remorse and
sympathized with his emotional difficulties, indicating that it would favorably consider a
petition to expunge or to seal his records. E.W.H. made a “dumb kid decision” and “child-
like mistake,” the court observed. But the court concluded that the amount of restitution,

2 The state, in making these arguments for adjudication, also contended that, given the non-
violent nature of E.W.H.’s offense , adjudication would not collaterally affect his best
interests.
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the impact upon the victims, and the adjudication of one of his codefendants weighed
against a continuance.
E.W.H.’s counsel challenged the ruling, arguing that the primary consideration was
E.W.H.’s best interests, not his ability to pay restitution or the uniformity of his
adjudication with a codefendant. The district court stated that it had fully considered
E.W.H.’s best interests and the relevance of a proportional disposition.
E.W.H. appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not exceed its statutory authority by considering factors
other than public safety and E.W.H.’s best interests.

We first address E.W.H.’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by
considering factors—restitution and proportional adjudication— beyond public safety and
E.W.H.’s best interests, which are listed in the statutory language, when adjudicating
E.W.H. delinquent. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7(a) (2024); see also Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4. Given that this issue involves interpretation of statutes and
procedural rules, we review it de novo. In re Welfare of C.J.H., 878 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn.
2016); Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020).
Our de novo review begins with the statute and underlying rules. After a child enters
a plea of guilty, the district court has two options: it may adjudicate the juvenile delinquent
or continue the case without adjudication. The first avenue is governed by Minnesota
Statute section 260B.198, subdivision 1(b) (2024), which provides that the district court
must support its adjudication with an order that contains specific findings enumerated in
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Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 15.05, subdivision 2. Alternatively,
the district court may continue the case without adjudication. This avenue is governed by
Minnesota Statute section 260B.198, subdivision 7(a), which provides that the district court
may continue adjudication if it is in the child’s best interests and not inimical to public
safety.
Caselaw has addressed several issues involving the statutory choice between
adjudication and a continuance. When selecting between the two options, the district court
is not required to take the least drastic step necessary regarding the child. In re Welfare of
C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. May 19, 2020). Nor
must the court, if it chooses to adjudicate the child delinquent, explain why adjudication is
the least restrictive alternative. In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. App.
2002). And while a district court making an adjudication order must include certain written
findings to support that decision, these findings are not required to support the decision to
continue adjudication. In re Welfare of J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999),
rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 28, 1999), and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000).
No legal authority—neither the statute, rule nor caselaw—requires the district court
to consider only two factors and to exclude others in considering a motion to continue
adjudication. Nor is the district court required to support its decision with written findings.
Our careful consideration of these rules and the present case lead us to conclude that the
district court did not exceed its statutory authority by considering restitution and
proportional adjudication in its decision-making.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to continue the case
without adjudication.

E.W.H. challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to continue adjudication
on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court improperly balanced the amount of
restitution as a public safety factor and ignored evidence that otherwise favored his motion.
E.W.H. further contends that the collateral consequences of his adjudication, coupled with
the district court’s arbitrary focus on proportionality, undermined his best interests. In
evaluating these arguments, we review the record for a clear abuse of discretion to
determine whether the district court’s decision was consistent with the facts and the law.
See C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d at 422.
We begin by examining the scope of public safety and a child’s best interests. The
district court maintains broad discretion to assess the record and to determine whether a
child poses a risk to public safety. Id. at 423. These considerations may include the child’s
likelihood of recidivism, his social support system, and the severity of his offense.
In re Welfare of T.J.R. , No. A23-1785, 2024 WL 3565634, at *3 (Minn. App. July 29,
2024), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 19, 2024).
3 The child’s expression of remorse can also
serve as a predictive measure of rehabilitation. In re Welfare of Z.A.W., No. A23-0073,
2023 WL 7122599, at *3 (Minn. App. Oct. 30, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2024).

3 We cite these nonprecedential cases for their persuasive value only. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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When considering whether adjudication may disproportionately affect the child’s best
interests, the district court may observe the stability of his housing and relationship with
his parent. In re Welfare of J.B.A., 581 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 31, 1998). But the child’s best interests cannot outweigh those of public safety.
See C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d at 423. To prevail, E.W.H. must show that the district court’s
findings are unsupported by the record. See T.J.R., 2024 WL 3565634 at *3.
Here, the district court first addressed E.W.H.’s risk to public safety, where it
construed the amount of restitution as probative of victim impact and offense severity.
E.W.H.’s expression of remorse and the court’s recognition that the offense was a “dumb
kid decision” and “child-like mistake” served as counterbalancing factors. But the court’s
consideration of victim impact and offense severity prevailed, warranting E.W.H.’s
adjudication to protect public safety. We observe that the district court assessed restitution
in these limited manners—victim impact and offense severity —without contemplating
E.W.H.’s capacity to pay it. See T.J.R., 2024 WL 3565634 at *3. We also note that the
district court expressly considered E.W.H.’s remorse and the nature of the offense relative
to his age and personal circumstances. See Z.A.W., 2023 WL 7122599 at *3. The
conclusion from weighing these factors that E.W.H. posed a risk to public safety finds
support in the record and our caselaw. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion.
The district court next considered E.W.H.’s best interests , where it expressly
reasoned that adjudication would not hinder E.W.H.’s ability to find employment, complete
probation, and pay restitution. Furthermore, the severity of the offense necessitated
probation to restore E.W.H. to law-abiding conduct. The court concluded that adjudication
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was the appropriate remedy, but it also expressed a willingness to “favorably consider”
E.W.H.’s petition to expunge or seal his records. We note that the district court considered
the collateral effects of adjudication, balancing E.W.H.’s interests in completing probation
and finding employment with rehabilitation. While the district court did not address the
impact of adjudication on E.W.H.’s housing or relationship with his father, the record does
not reflect any interference with these interests. See J.B.A., 581 N.W.2d at 39. Finally, we
observe that the court properly weighed its concern for public safety against E.W.H.’s best
interests in continuing adjudication. Because the district court’s findings are supported by
the record, it acted within its broad discretion here.
Still, E.W.H. argues that the district court’s consideration of his ability to pay
restitution suggests a troubling and arbitrary emphasis on socioeconomic factors for
adjudication. We appreciate this general concern, but here the district court did not assess
E.W.H.’s socioeconomic background. Nor are we persuaded by E.W.H.’s contention that
the district court’s focus on proportional dispositions among each codefendant harmed his
individual best interests. The district court’s focus here, as addressed above, was grounded
in the relationship between E.W.H.’s risk to public safety and his restoration to law-abiding
conduct. We discern no abuse of discretion.
We are not unsympathetic to the challenges of E.W.H.’s circumstances, and we
acknowledge that the evidence, weighed differently, could have supported a continuance
of adjudication. But this court does not exercise its own discretion in substitute for that of
the district court. See id. at 38. Nor can we ignore the district court’s concerns about the
severity of E.W.H.’s offense and its impact on the affected parties. See C.A.R., 941 N.W.2d
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at 423. We therefore do not disturb the district court’s denial of E.W.H.’s motion to
continue the case without adjudication.
Affirmed.