State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0061

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Drew Williams,
Appellant.

Filed December 30, 2024
Affirmed; motion denied
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-21-1007

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Special
Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree assault and
threats of violence , appellant Michael Drew Williams argues that (1) his conviction for
second-degree assault must be reversed because respondent State of Minnesota failed to
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prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened the complaining party with a dangerous
weapon and (2) his conviction for threats of violence must be reversed, and a new trial
ordered, because the district court erred by admitting digital messages without proper
authentication. In a pro se supplement al brief, Williams additionally argues that (3) his
right to a speedy trial was violated, (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and
(5) his counsel had a conflict of interest . The state moved to strike factual statements
asserted by Williams in his pro se supplemental brief that were unsupported by the record.
We affirm Williams’s convictions and deny the motion to strike as unnecessary.
FACTS
The following facts were proved at trial. On May 23, 2021, Williams’s ex-girlfriend,
M.W., received messages through Facebook from a profile that was named “Mike
Williams” and contained a profile photograph. The Facebook messages stated that the
sender “[had] no choice but to kill [M.W.] or [her] family or one of [her] friends”; that he
was coming to find her “right now” and she would be “f-cking dead”; and that she could
not “have sex with anyone” before having sex with him again “one last time ,” otherwise
he would “cut[] [her] t-ts off.” The messages made M.W. scared and nervous.
M.W. was at her friend N.A.’s house that night. After M.W. received the messages,
Williams drove to N.A.’s house and parked across the street . M.W. received another
Facebook message from “Mike Williams,” stating that he was outside, telling her to come
talk to him, and warning that she was “putting [her] friends in danger.” M.W. also received
text messages to her phone number, from the number under the contact name “Michael,”
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stating, “[S]o you want to incite violence what the f-ck is your problem” and “I’m outside.
Coming in.” M.W. did not see the messages at that time.
N.A.’s brother, T.A., was outside N.A.’s house when he saw a truck drive up and
park across the street . T.A. walked over to investigate who it was . T.A. recognized
Williams as the occupant and began talking to him. Williams was seated in the driver’s
seat of the truck, facing N.A.’s house across the street. T.A. stood by the driver’s door of
the truck w hile talking to Williams . According to T.A., Williams was upset about his
relationship with M.W. At one point, Williams showed T.A. a knife that he had in the truck.
M.W., not having seen the most recent messages and unaware that Williams was
outside, exited N.A.’s home and walked down the driveway toward her car. As she reached
the end of the driveway, she realized that Williams was across the street and she stopped
walking. Three things then happened virtually simultaneously: Williams jumped out of the
truck and advanced toward M.W. ; M.W. began walking backwards up N.A.’s driveway
away from Williams ; and T.A., worried for his safety , ran down the street about 20 feet
before stopping and turning back to see what was happening.
As M.W. continued backing up the driveway, Williams rushed toward her and
grabbed her by the neck with his left hand. As M.W. later testified, when Williams grabbed
her neck with his left hand, he had a knife in his right hand and drew that hand back as if
“he was gonna’ stab [her].” Neither N.A., who had come outside during the altercation, nor
T.A. saw whether Williams had a knife in his hand . N.A.’s view was obstructed by her
own car, which was parked in the driveway, and T.A. could not tell whether Williams had
the knife in his hand when Williams got out of the vehicle. The force of Williams grabbing
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M.W.’s neck pushed M.W. back, after which Williams went back to his truck and drove
away.
M.W. then saw the Facebook message from “Mike Williams” that had said that he
was outside. M.W. stayed with N.A. and called the police that night. When officers arrived,
M.W. showed them the Facebook messages and an officer took photos of them on M.W.’s
phone. N.A. showed the officers security footage from a camera that was installed on her
house facing the driveway, which captured Williams’s altercation with M.W. The video,
which was taken at night and shows Williams’s right hand only for a few seconds, does not
conclusively show whether Williams had a knife in his hand when he confronted M.W.
That night, after the officers left, M.W. received additional messages. She received
another text message to her phone from her contact “Michael,” saying that he “need[ed] to
hear from [her].” She also received messages through Facebook from “Mike Williams,”
stating: “[I]f the cops come looking for me, I’ll have no choice but to end your life . . . .”;
“I should’ve slashed your throat. But I love you.”; “You’re only going to get people hurt.
I nearly stabbed [T.A.] to death and [N.A.] would’ve been next.”; “I’ll come and get you
at the opportune time.”; “I’m coming to kill you on my schedule. I never should’ve let you
live.”; and “[U]nless you get right with me soon, you and others will be in pieces.” M.W.
took screenshots of these additional Facebook messages and the text messages that she had
received from “Michael” throughout the night and sent them to an officer.
The state charged Williams with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.222, subdivision 1 (2020) , and threats of
violence in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2020). A jury
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trial took place , and t he jury found Williams guilty on both counts . The district court
convicted Williams of both counts and sentenced him to a 54 -month prison term for the
assault conviction and a concurrent 21 -month prison term for the threats -of-violence
conviction.
Williams appeals.
DECISION
We address, in turn, the five challenges that Williams raises in his counseled and
supplemental briefs and then address the state’s motion to strike.
I. The evidence is sufficient to convict Williams of second-degree assault.

To convict Williams of second-degree assault, the state needed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Williams “assault[ed] another with a dangerous weapon.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1; State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. 2019) (describing the
state’s burden in a criminal trial). Williams argues that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his conviction because it fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
holding a knife when he assaulted M.W.1
Williams’s possession of the knife was established through direct evidence —
specifically, M.W.’s testimony. When reviewing the sufficiency of direct evidence ,
appellate courts “conduct a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” Lapenotiere v. State, 916

1 Williams does not dispute that a knife is a dangerous weapon.
6
N.W.2d 351, 360 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted); State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 40
(Minn. 2016) . Th e reviewing court must “assume that the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.
1998). The reviewing court will affirm a guilty verdict “if the jury, acting with due regard
for the [ defendant’s] presumption of innocence and [ the state’s burden of proof], could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” State v.
Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120, 133 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
A guilty verdict may be sufficiently supported by “the uncorroborated testimony of
a single credible witness.” State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004) (quotation
omitted). Appellate courts defer to the jury to assess witness credibility. State v. Robinson,
921 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Minn. 201 9). Only in certain exceptional circumstances has a
reviewing court, after a conviction, determine d that a witness was not credible and that
their testimony alone was insufficient, such as when the witness’s presen ce in the area
where the offense occurred was questionable and unexplained, State v. Langteau , 268
N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978), or when an expert testified that the sole child witness, who
struggled to identify the defendant and recall his alleged acts, had been exposed to highly
suggestive material that could have caused false statements, State v. Huss , 506 N.W.2d
290, 292-93 (Minn. 1993).
Williams argues that this is a case in which a witness’s testimony alone is
insufficient to prove guilt and that corroboration was required. He advances two arguments,
neither of which is persuasive.
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First, Williams argues that M.W.’s testimony that Williams had a knife in his hand
is insufficient because it was contradicted by the other evidence—specifically, T.A.’s and
N.A.’s testimonies and the surveillance video. To contradict M.W.’s testimony that
Williams had a knife, the evidence must show that Williams did not have a knife. N.A.
testified that she could not see the altercation from her viewpoint , and T.A. testified that
he could not tell whether Williams had the knife in his hand when he got out of the vehicle.
The surveillance video is of poor quality and does not clearly show Williams’s right hand.
In sum, all three pieces of evidence are inconclusive as to whether Williams had a knife,
which is not the same as evidence showing that Williams did not have a knife. Thus, we
disagree that the other witness testimony and the videotape contradict M.W.’s testimony
and that corroboration of M.W.’s testimony is required on that basis.
Second, Williams argues that M.W.’s testimony that she experiences auditory
hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia makes her testimony not credible and thus demands
corroboration. The record shows that , from the night of the incident through trial, M.W.
presented a consistent and cohesive story about what happened. At trial , M.W. did not
struggle to identify Williams and testified on direct examination that Williams came at her
with a knife. Williams argues that the initial messages that he would “cut” M.W. were
“highly suggestive material” and could have caused M.W. to hallucinate the knife in
William’s hand. But M.W. testified that she had never experienced visual hallucinations.
The jury heard M.W. testify about her mental-health diagnoses and implicitly found M.W.
credible. We disagree that M.W.’s mental -health conditions are an exceptional
8
circumstance that requires corroboration in order to accept the jury’s assessment of M.W.’s
credibility.
Although we conclude that M.W.’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain the
conviction, we observe that other evidence corroborate s M.W.’s testimony. T.A. testified
that Williams had a knife in the vehicle before the altercation, and one of the Facebook
messages from “Mike Williams” that M.W. received after the altercation stated, “I nearly
stabbed [T.A.] to death and [N.A.] would have been next .” The presence of a knife at the
scene and a message from “Mike Williams” talking about nearly stabbing two people who
were at the scene reasonably corroborate M.W.’s testimony that Williams was, in fact,
holding a knife when he confronted her.
When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, the
evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams possessed a knife
when he confronted M.W. Williams’s challenge to his assault conviction therefore fails.
II. The messages were properly authenticated.

Williams argues that his threats-of-violence conviction must be reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial on that count because the district court erred by admitting
messages that were purportedly from him without proper foundation authenticating that
Williams was the person who sent the messages.
Williams did not object to the messages being admitted during M.W.’s testimony.
Appellate courts review unobjected-to challenges to the admission of evidence under the
plain-error standard. State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 650 (Minn. 2018). “[T]o meet the
plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the
9
error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant ’s substantial rights.” State v.
Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016) . If any prong is not met, the appellate court
need not consider the others . State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 78 6 (Minn. 2017). If all
the prongs are met, the appellate court may grant relief to correct the error if “failure to do
so will cause the public to seriously question the fairness and integrity of our judicial
system.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 359 (Minn. 2022).
Authentication is “a condition precedent to admissibility [and] is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). Authentication may occur through testimony by a witness
with knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). A
district court has “considerable discretion under Minn. R. Evid. 901(a) in deciding whether
evidence has been adequately authenticated.” State v. Dulak, 348 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn.
1984).
During M.W.’s testimony, t he state presented nine exhibits that were either
photographs that the police took of M.W.’s phone or screenshots that M.W. took of her
phone and sent to the police. The photos and screenshots captured Facebook messages from
the profile “Mike Williams” and text messages to M.W.’s phone that were associated with
her contact “Michael.” M.W. testified that the exhibits were true and accurate photographs
that an officer took of the messages on her phone or true and correct copies of screenshots
of additional messages that she provided to law enforcement. She testified that all the
messages came from Williams.
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Williams argues that all the messages were erroneously admitted because they were
not properly authenticated as having come from him. He contends that more needed to be
done to connect the messages with a phone number that was established as belonging to
him.
We disagree that the district court erred, much less plainly erred, in admitting the
exhibits. In State v. Stone , the state introduced , through a police officer, photos that the
officer had taken of text messages that a person associated with the appellant had received
on his phone. 982 N.W.2d 500, 505 -06, 511 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d 617
(Minn. 2023). Those text messages appeared to be from the appellant because they were
on the recipient’s phone under a contact name that was a nickname used by the appellant.
Id. at 505. The appellant argued that the photos were inadmissible because the state did not
offer foundation to establish the identity of the contact name as the appellant or to link the
contact with the appellant’s phone. Id. at 511. We held that the district court acted within
its discretion when it determined that photos of text messages were properly authenticated
because the officer’s testimony—that he recognized the photo s as the ones he took of
messages he saw on another individual’s phone—was sufficient to establish that the photos
were what the state claimed them to be . Id. We agreed with the district court that the
appellant’s objection “went to the weight of the evidence, and not its admissibility.” Id.
Here, the foundation for the exhibits is even stronger than in Stone. In this case, it
was not merely a police officer who testified about photos that they took of messages on a
person’s phone. Rather, it was the actual owner of the phone that received the messages—
a person who had a past relationship with Williams—who testified about what the exhibits
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were. M.W. testified that she recognized the photos as the messages she received on her
phone that night from Williams. Because Williams never objected, the district court never
explained why it determined that the evidence was admissible. But, based on our holding
in Stone, the district court had discretion to admit the messages based on M.W.’s testimony
and without additional foundation establishing the identity of the sender. See id. As a result,
Williams’s plain-error argument for reversal fails.
III. Williams’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

In his pro se supplemental brief, Williams argues that his right to a speedy trial was
violated by a 10-month delay between when the state filed the complaint-warrant and when
they arrested Williams and a 16-month delay between when Williams was arrested and
when the jury trial was held. Williams notes that he made a speedy-trial demand in
May 2023—7 1 days before the trial began.2
The federal and state constitutions provide criminal defendants the right to a speedy
trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A defendant’s right to a speedy trial
“acts as a ‘safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to
minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.’” State
v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 244 (Minn. 2021) (quoting United States v. Ewell , 383 U.S.

2 We calculated all delays using the date that voir dire started, which was August 1, 2023,
a day after the trial was scheduled to begin. See State v. Randall, No. A21-0191, 2021 WL
5764586, at *8 (Minn. App. Dec. 6, 2021) (reasoning that, for the purposes of speedy trial,
a trial begins at the commencement of voir dire), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 2022); Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating nonprecedential cases may be persuasive
authority).
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116, 120 (1966)). Whether there is a violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial is subject to de novo review. State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn.
2017).
To determine whether a speedy-trial violation occurred, a reviewing court balances
four factors known as the Barker factors: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the
delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether
the delay prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 530- 33 (1972 ). No single factor is dispositive. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245. The
reviewing court must carefully balance these factors on a case -by-case basis to determine
whether the trial proceeded “quickly enough to avoid endangering the values that the right
to a speedy trial protects.” Id.
A. Length of Delay
“The length of the delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ which determines whether
further review is necessary.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999) (quoting
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). There are two periods in which a delay may become
presumptively prejudicial. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246. The first is the time between when
a defendant’s right to a speedy trial attaches—which is when the defendant is charged or
arrested, whichever occurs first —and the beginning of trial . Id.; Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at
627. The second is a delay exceeding 60 days after the defendant makes a demand for a
speedy trial after entering a plea other than guilty under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11.09(b). Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246.
13
Here, the delay between the time of charging and the beginning of trial was just over
26 months. A 26-month delay is presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger further
inquiry. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246 (citing State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn.
1978)) (determining that a six-month delay without any speedy -trial demand is sufficient
to trigger the consideration of the other Barker factors). The 71-day delay between
Williams’s speedy trial demand and the start of his trial is also presumptively prejudicial.
The state concedes, and we agree, that th ese delays require the consideration of the other
Barker factors.
B. Reason for Delay
We look at whether the state or Williams was responsible for the delay. See Mikell,
960 N.W.2d at 250- 51. The state is responsible for bringing the case to trial, and any
deliberate delays by the state weigh heavily against it. State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 30
(Minn. App. 2011) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 531) , rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24,
2011). Calendar congestion, while usually not considered a good cause for delay, is
insufficient to violate a speedy-trial right if the state did not act in bad faith. Id. at 32; State
v. Cham, 680 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. App. 2004) (determining that, without bad faith by
the state to delay the proceeding, a 23-month delay due to court congestion did not weigh
against the state), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2004).
Williams argues, without support from the record, that the state acted negligently in
causing the 10-month delay between when the state filed the complaint-warrant and when
they arrested Williams and served him with the complaint -warrant. Because the record is
silent about the reason for this delay and Williams’s assertions for why the delay occurred
14
are unsupported by the appellate record, we decline to give Williams’s assertion weight .
See State v. Taylor, 910 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. App. 2018) (declining to address arguments
in appellant’s pro se supplemental brief because appellant “[did] not cite any evidence in
the record or relevant legal authority to support [his] claims”), rev. denied (Minn. June 19,
2018). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the 10 -month delay in serving Williams with
the complaint -warrant is the state’s responsibility because the state is responsible for
bringing the defendant to trial. See Hahn , 799 N.W.2d at 30. But we note that there is no
suggestion in the record that the state acted deliberately to delay service of the complaint-
warrant or otherwise hamper the defense. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251.
After Williams was arrested and served with the complaint -warrant, Williams
argues that there were six delays over the 16 months between his arrest and trial. Based on
our review of the record, the trial date was delayed seven times over that period: (1) a 162-
day delay between Williams’s arrest in April 2022 and his original trial date in September
2022; (2) a 147-day delay after Williams discharged his public defender on the day his trial
was scheduled to begin; (3 ) a 21-day delay after the public defender, who m Williams
applied to have reappointed, requested additional time to prepare for the trial; (4) a 63-day
delay after Williams’s counsel raised concerns to the state that more time may be needed
for trial than what the district court had scheduled and the state agreed and requested new
dates for a longer trial; (5) a 21-day delay after the state requested a continuance due to
witness availability; (6) a 112-day delay after Williams ’s counsel stated that new dates
were needed , which was reduced to a 5 6-day delay after Williams filed a speedy -trial
15
demand later that same day ; and (7) a 15-day delay due to the district court’s scheduling
concerns.
On our review of the record, t he 162-day delay between Williams’s arrest and his
original trial date in September 2022 is the state’s responsibility, but there is no evidence
that the state acted deliberately to delay the trial date . From the time of the original trial
date in September 2022 until the trial actually began in August 2023 , the majority of the
delays resulted from Williams’s own actions or those of his counsel. 3 See State v. Chute,
887 N.W.2d 834 , 845 (Minn. App. 2016) (holding that the appellant is responsible for
delays caused by changing counsel as well as his counsel’s requests for continuances,
unavailability, and decision to select later trial dates), aff’d, 908 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 2018).
Only one delay during that time was requested by the state without agreement from
Williams’s counsel, and the result was a 21-day delay due to the unavailability of a material
witness, which is considered a delay for good cause. See Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 251. The
only other delay during that time was the 15-day delay in July 2023 resulting from court
congestion—again, with no indication that the state acted deliberately to cause that delay
or impede Williams’s defense in any way.

3 Williams argues that the delay resulting from discharging his public defender and seeking
new counsel should only be minimally weighed against him because the delay resulted
from his desire to seek conflict-free counsel. Because Williams fails to cite legal authority
supporting this argument, we decline to give it weight. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d
8, 22-23 (Minn. 2008).
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C. Assertion of Right
A defendant need not continuously reassert a speedy -trial demand, but this court
will consider “the frequency and force of a demand” because “the strength of the demand
is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of the prejudice which has resulted .” State v.
Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989) (citing Barker, 407 U. S. at 529 , 531).
Repeated requests demonstrate prejudice, but actions that delay the trial undermine the
weight of the request. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252.
Because there is no evidence in the record that shows whether Williams knew, or
had reason to know, about the charges against him until his arrest in April 2022, we focus
our analysis on the demands made, or lack thereof, after that time. See Osorio, 891 N.W.2d
at 629 (citing Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 653-54 (1992)) (noting that a
defendant who is “not aware of the charges against him prior to his arrest . . . [can] not be
blamed for failing to assert his right to a speedy trial prior to his arrest”).
Williams contends that his right to a speedy trial was asserted when the state made
a demand for a speedy trial 187 days before the trial began, when Williams filed a speedy-
trial demand 71 days before the trial began, and when Williams objected on record to the
district court’s decision in July 2023 to continue the trial for two weeks due to scheduling
concerns.
The state made a speedy trial demand in January 2023 and then waived its demand
in May 2023. Williams argue s that the state’s demand for a speedy trial should be
considered as his own because Williams was the one on trial. But Williams’s argument is
17
unsupported by the record or law, so we decline to give it weight.4 See Taylor, 910 N.W.2d
at 71.
Williams first made a speedy-trial demand in May 2023, over a year after being
served the complaint- warrant. The demand involved filing a one -sentence notice stating
that he asserted his right to a speedy trial. After Williams made his demand, the district
court rescheduled his trial dates to fit within the 60 -day timeframe mandated by the
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.09. The only delay that occurred after
Williams’s demand was a 15-day delay due to the district court’s scheduling concerns. The
district court made its decision to continue the trial on the record at a July 2023 hearing,
during which Williams orally objected to the continuance as “unacceptable” but did not
affirmatively demand a speedy trial. Williams’s delay in bringing a speedy-trial demand as
well as the minimal effort put into his demand suggests that Williams did not suffer serious
prejudice from the delay. See Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515.
D. Prejudice
Appellate courts consider three interests when assessing prejudice: “(1) preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Mikell , 960 N.W.2d

4 The record indicates that the state made its demand on behalf of the victim because the
prosecutor, when waiving the state’s demand, stated, “I’ll be meeting with the victim as
soon as I can, and we’ll discuss whether we re -assert.” See Minn. Stat. § 611A.033(a)
(Supp. 2023) (“A victim has the right to request that the prosecutor make a demand under
rule 11.09 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that the trial be commenced within 60 days
of the demand.”).
18
at 253 (quotation omitted). “Prejudice due to t he impairment of the defense is the most
serious.” State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 192 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Williams concedes that he was not incarcerated while awaiting trial and claims the
other two types of prejudice . First, he asserts that he experienced anxiety because of the
uncertainty of awaiting trial and the restrictions placed on him as part of his pretrial release
after his arrest in April 2022 , which he claims included probation check-ins, drug tests, a
prohibition on alcohol use, and a requirement to check-in before leaving the state. He also
contends that he was inconvenienced by attending multiple hearings in relation to this
matter, which occurred at a courthouse far from his home. Second, Williams argues that
the delay impaired his defense . Williams claims that, d ue to the delay between charging
and arrest, he lost access to an exculpatory video that would have shown him 50 miles
away at the time of the crime in addition to other “unknown quantities of evidence lost.”
He also argues that, d ue to the delay between his arrest and trial, a witness who did not
testify at trial developed issues remembering the day of the offense.
An inspection of the record does not sustain Williams’s claim of prejudice .
Williams’s assertion that he suffered anxiety and was inconvenienced by the delay is
insufficient to establish prejudice because he failed to allege stress, anxiety, or
inconvenience different from any other defendant awaiting trial. See Hahn, 799 N.W.2d at
33 (citing Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515). Williams’s contention that he was prejudiced by
the loss of a video that would have shown him miles away at the time of the crime is
unconvincing in light of the security footage shown at trial, which three witnesses watched
and, while doing so, identified Williams as the individual in the footage . See Mikell, 960
19
N.W.2d at 254 & n.16 (considering the strength of the state’s evidence when evaluating
whether the delay hampered the defendant ’s ability to present a defense ). Finally,
Williams’s assertion that he was prejudiced by a witness losing memory of the day of the
offense is unpersuasive because he fails to explain how this person— who did not testify—
might have helped his defense. See id.
E. Balancing
Balancing all the Barker factors, we conclude that Williams was not deprived of his
right to a speedy trial. While a 26-month delay between charging and trial is considerable,
it is not dispositive. See, e.g., Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 632-33 (determining that a 21-month
delay between charging and arrest did not violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial);
Chute, 887 N.W.2d at 846 (determining that a 33-month delay between filing the complaint
and trial was not a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial). Breaking the 26 -
month delay into two periods, the initial 10-month delay between charging and Williams’s
arrest was considerable, but the reason for the delay is unknown and Williams has made
no compelling claim of prejudice arising from that delay. And, though the subsequent 16-
month delay between arrest and trial was also considerable, Williams either was
responsible for or acquiesced in the majority of the delays , no delay was a result of bad
faith by the state , Williams made only one affirmative demand for a speedy trial over a
year after his arrest , and there is no compelling argument that William s experienced
prejudice because of that delay. Weighing all the Barker factors, we conclude that
Williams’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
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IV. Williams’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail.

In his pro se supplemental brief, Williams also asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. “Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be
raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal.” State v.
Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). However, an ineffective -assistance-of-
counsel claim must be brought on direct appeal if the district court record is sufficient for
this court to decide the issue . Sanchez-Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn. 2008).
We conclude that we can fully address each instance in which Williams claims ineffective
assistance of counsel based on the trial record and, as a result, dispose of his claims on their
merits.
Appellate courts apply a two -prong test referred to as the Strickland test to
determine whether a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 417 (Minn. 2023) ; see Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 ,
687-88, 694 (1984). To satisfy the first prong, the appellant must show “that his attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” King , 990 N.W.2d at
417 (quotation omitted). The objective standard is met when counsel acts with the skill and
diligence customary of a reasonably competent attorney in similar circumstances. Leake v.
State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009) . “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable.” King, 990 N.W.2d at 417 (quotation omitted).
To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the appellant must show that “a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome would be different, but for counsel’s errors.”
State v. Mosley , 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). To determine
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whether there was a reasonable probability of a different result, appellate courts consider
the totality of the evidence presented. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003).
“A court may address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim
on one prong without analyzing the other.” King, 990 N.W.2d at 417.
Williams argues that his attorney’s assistance was ineffective for three reasons. We
address each in turn.
A. Failure to Raise Speedy-Trial Argument
Williams argues that his trial counsel should have argued that his speedy-trial rights
were violated when there was a 10-month delay between when the state charged Williams
and when it arrested him. But, as explained above, Williams has failed to show prejudice
resulting from the delay between his charging and his arrest. That failure undermines any
argument under the first Strickland prong that not raising the speedy -trial issue in the
district court was objectively unreasonable . It also undermines any argument under the
second prong that the result of the proceeding would have been different if a speedy-trial
argument had been made.
B. Failure to Object to Authentication of Messages
Williams argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the admission into
evidence of the messages M.W. received for lack of proper authentication. Appellate courts
“generally do not review a n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that is based on trial
strategy.” Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013) . “Trial strategy” includes
determining what evidence to present, which witnesses to call, and what objections to
make. State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009). Moreover, as discussed above,
22
the district court did not err in admitting the messages during M.W.’s testimony. See Stone,
982 N.W.2d at 511. As a result, Williams’s counsel did not act unreasonably when she did
not object to the authentication of the messages. Because t he decision to object is one of
trial strategy, and Williams has not demonstrated that his counsel’s failure to object to the
messages was unreasonable, Williams’s argument fails to satisfy the first prong of the
Strickland test.
C. Failure to Object to the Absence of a Witness
Williams argues that his trial counsel failed to object to the trial proceeding when a
witness was not present to testify. Which witnesses to call is an issue of trial strategy. Bobo,
770 N.W.2d at 138. Williams does not address what information this witness would have
provided if he testified . The only other mention of this witness in Williams’s brief is in
connection with his speedy-trial claim, in which Williams states that this witness had
trouble remembering the date of the offense. Because Williams has not shown he was
prejudiced by not having this witness appear at trial, Williams’s argument fails to satisfy
the second prong of the Strickland test.
V. Williams’s conflict-of-interest claim fails.

Williams argues that his trial public defender had a conflict of interest because she
was married to a prosecuto r. Conflict of interest is a form of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 160 (Minn. 2024) (analyzing an allegation
of a conflict of interest as an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim). T he claim is thus
analyzed under the Strickland test. See id. “A conflict of interest exists if ‘there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
23
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client , a former client or a third person , or by a
personal interest of the lawyer.’” State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quoting Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2)). “But until a defendant shows that his counsel
actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate
for his claim of ineffective assistance.” Westrom, 6 N.W.3d at 160 (quotation omitted).
Williams argues that there was a conflict of interest because his trial defense counsel
was married to a prosecutor. Williams raised his concerns about a conflict of interest to the
district court on the record in September 2022. The district court, who was familiar with
both Williams ’s counsel and the prosecutor, told Williams on the record , “[I]t’s not
technically a conflict of interest. They have proper procedures in place . . . .” The district
court also explained that, while Williams had a right to counsel, he did not have the right
to choose who was appointed to his case. Williams decided to discharge his public
defender, stating that he would find his own counsel. Four months later, Williams applied
for a public defender, and the same public defender that Williams discharged was
reappointed to Williams’s case and represented him throughout the remainder of the trial
proceedings.
Williams asserts that the prosecutor married to his trial counsel represented the state
at one of Williams’s hearings. Our review of the records before us shows that the prosecutor
does appear on the record in one transcript but he does so only to inform the judge that the
prosecutor assigned to Williams’s case is on his way to the court. There is no indication in
the record that the prosecutor was ever assigned to Williams’s matter. There is no evidence
that any relationship between Williams’s counsel and the prosecutor created a preclusive
24
conflict of interest or that the relationship impaired his counsel’s ability to represent
Williams in any way. As a result, Williams has failed to show that his trial public defender
was actively representing conflicting interests, much less that the alleged conflict was
sufficiently unreasonable or prejudicial so as to meet either prong of the Strickland test.
VI. The state’s motion to strike is unnecessary.

The state moved to strike factual assertions in Williams’s pro se supplemental brief
that were unsupported by the record. Appellate courts do not consider pro se claims that
lack citations to the record or legal authority. Taylor, 910 N.W.2d at 71 (citing Bartylla,
755 N.W.2d at 22) (other citation omitted).
We agree with the state that Williams’s pro se supplemental brief includes
statements that are unsupported by the record. But w e deny the state’s motion to strike as
unnecessary because , to the extent that we have referenced Williams’s unsupported
assertions above, we have declined to consider them in our analysis. See, e.g., State v. Munt,
831 N.W.2d 569, 588 (Minn. 2013) (noting which of the pro se appellant’s claims lacked
support and declining to address them further).
Affirmed; motion denied.