State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0232

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Solon Schaefer-Bonovsky,
Appellant.

Filed February 3, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-21-695

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for second- degree criminal
sexual conduct, appellant Scott Solon Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony over his objection. In a self-represented
2
brief, Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial and
appellate counsel. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the challenged expert testimony, but we decline to reach the merits of Schaefer-
Bonovsky’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and preserve them for review in a
postconviction proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the district court’s findings following a court
trial and from other relevant parts of the district court record.
Schaefer-Bonovsky’s conviction stems from his sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s
minor daughter. At the time of the abuse, Schaefer-Bonovsky lived with the child’s mother,
the child, and the child’s three other siblings. The abuse began in mid-March 2017, when
the child was 5 years old and Schaefer-Bonovsky was between 30 and 31 years old.
According to the child, who testified at trial, Schaefer-Bonovsky used his hand to
touch and rub her chest and pubic region on multiple occasions while she was bathing. The
child also testified that Schaefer -Bonovsky squeezed and grabbed her “butt” and rubbed
her chest while she was clothed in the living room. The child additionally stated that her
mother and siblings did not witness the abuse. Schaefer-Bonovsky stopped living at the
apartment in August 2017.
In September 2017, after their mother entered substance-abuse treatment, the child
and her siblings entered foster care and were eventually placed with relatives.1 Their foster

1 The children left foster care to live with their mother between June 2018 and July 2019
but, in July 2019, returned, along with their mother, to live with the foster parents.
3
father was the child’s mother’s cousin. Their foster mother had worked with children in
educational settings for several years and in child protection for approximately 20 years.
While the child was in foster care, the foster mother and others observed the child
exhibiting concerning and unusual behaviors. These behaviors included the child
frequently wetting the bed at night and soiling herself during the day. The child also showed
strong reactions toward men, showing fear around some men and a desire for physical
contact and attention around others. Further, the child wore revealing clothing and
masturbated or rubbed against objects sexually. She also needed to sleep with multiple
lights on and with either her foster mother or siblings nearby.
In the summer of 2019, the foster mother, concerned by these behaviors, encouraged
the child to disclose if anything had happened to her. The child told the foster mother that
Schaefer-Bonovsky had touched her inappropriately. The foster mother reported this
information to Kandiyohi County Social Services. A police investigator with specialized
training in sexual-abuse forensic interviewing interviewed the child and twice interviewed
Schaefer-Bonovsky.
Following the police investigation, respondent State of Minnesota charged
Schaefer-Bonovsky with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.343, subdivision 1(a) and (h)(iii) (2016). The matter was
scheduled for a jury trial.
Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine, seeking to present expert testimony
addressing “the nature of child sexual abuse disclosures, an abuser’s methods of
maintaining a child’s silence, the phenomenon of bed wetting and other behaviors and their
4
association with sexual trauma.” Schaefer-Bonovsky objected, asserting that the testimony
would be improper opinion testimony. The district court granted the state’s motion over
Schaefer-Bonovsky’s objection, allowing the state to present expert testimony on this topic.
Immediately before trial, Schaefer-Bonovsky waived his right to a jury trial. At the
bench trial that followed, Schaefer-Bonovsky moved the district court to reconsider the
admissibility of the expert testimony. He argued that, because the case was going to be
tried to the court rather than to a jury, the testimony would no longer be helpful to the trier
of fact. The district court denied the motion. At trial, the state presented th e expert
testimony through Mindy Mitnick, who provided general testimony about delays by child
sexual-abuse victims in disclosing abuse and common behaviors of child sexual-abuse
victims. Mitnick did not review materials related to th is case nor did she testify about this
child’s specific behavior.
The district court found Schaefer -Bonovsky guilty of both counts, entered a
judgment of conviction for only one of the offenses, and sentenced Schaefer-Bonovsky to
300 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Mitnick’s expert
testimony.

Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing
Mitnick’s expert testimony because the testimony did not meet the requirements for
admissibility under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702.2
Appellate courts will not reverse a district court’s evidentiary ruling on the
admissibility of expert testimony “unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or it
is an abuse of discretion.” Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 757, 760
(Minn. 1998). Rule 702 allows expert testimony “[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue,” provided that the witness is appropriately qualified and the opinion has
foundational reliability. See also State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 799 (Minn. 2014)
(describing rule 702).
When granting the state’s motion in limine to admit Mitnick’s expert testimony, the
district court ruled that the evidence was admissible “regarding the nature of child sexual
abuse disclosures, methods of obtaining silences, and other behaviors seen in cases of
sexual trauma.” The district court found that Mitnick’s testimony “is outside the knowledge

2 In the district court, Schaefer-Bonovsky also argued—unsuccessfully—that the expert
testimony constituted vouching testimony. To the extent that Schaefer-Bonovsky raises
this issue in his self-represented brief, and assuming that this issue is properly before us on
the merits, we conclude that Mitnick did not present vouching testimony because her
testimony, which provided insight into the conduct of child sexual -abuse victims, was
within the scope of expert testimony permitted under State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610
(Minn. 1984).
6
of laypersons and would be helpful to the jury in evaluating the testimony of the alleged
victim and others regarding the alleged victim’s behaviors and the delayed reporting of
sexual abuse.” When Schaefer-Bonovsky renewed his objection after waiving his right to
a jury trial, the district court rejected Schaefer-Bonovsky’s objection, explaining:
I think I perhaps, just having presided over other cases, have
more knowledge than a layperson who had never been exposed
to that type of testimony before, but I am also sensitive to each
party being able to make the record that they wish to make, and
the Court being able to rely on what’s in the record in this case
and setting aside anything this Court might know from other
cases, whether it be other crim sex cases or other cases
involving this defendant.

I think I have to set aside everything that I know and
focus only what’s on the record before me in this case. I do
think that I am not an expert in disclosure, delayed disclosure,
or counter-intuitive victim behavior.

I’ve heard testimony before, but not from this
expert. . . . I am not going to exclude Ms. Mitnick’s testimony
as being unhelpful to me because I am now the trier of fact. I
haven’t heard her testify before, and I would like to allow both
parties to make whatever record that they would like to make.
The Court will give her testimony the appropriate weight and
consideration.

As Schaefer-Bonovsky recognizes, Minnesota courts have regularly upheld the
admission of expert testimony to provide context to behaviors exhibited by minor victims
of sexual abuse when the testimony is helpful to the trier of fact. In Myers, the supreme
court held that “[b]ackground data providing a relevant insight into puzzling aspects of [a]
child’s conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of
[the child’s] credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children.” 359
N.W.2d at 610. Similarly, the supreme court in State v. Hall held that the district court did
7
not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony addressing the reporting conduct of
adolescent children. 406 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. 1987).
But Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the testimony in the court trial here because (1) the district court found only that
the testimony was not “unhelpful” rather than finding that it was “helpful”; (2) Mitnick’s
testimony could not be helpful to the district court because the district court, through
experience, already had knowledge of the subject matter of the expert testimony; (3) the
district court applied an incorrect standard under rule 702 when it stated that it was not an
“expert” in the field of the expert’s testimony because the standard is not whether the trier
of fact is an “expert”; and (4) the district court applied an improper standard under rule 702
when it noted that it had not previously heard Mitnick testify and that it wanted “to allow
both parties to make whatever record that they would like to make.”
The arguments are unconvincing. First, we disagree that the district court failed to
find that the testimony would be “helpful.” It is true that the district court, in rejecting
Schaefer-Bonovsky’s renewed objection to the testimony, said that it was “not going to
exclude Ms. Mitnick’s testimony as being unhelpful . . . because [the district court was]
now the trier of fact.” But the district court had explicitly found that the expert testimony
would be “helpful” to the jury when it ruled the testimony admissible in the first instance,
and, by admitting the testimony over Schaefer-Bonovsky’s renewed objection, the district
court implicitly found that the testimony would be helpful to the district court as the trier
of fact as well. Second, we disagree that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
the expert testimony even though it had experience in sexual-assault cases. Given Mitnick’s
8
extensive experience and training in the area, the district court could reasonably conclude
that her testimony could provide it with helpful context in this case. Third, we disagree that
the district court erroneously believed the standard under rule 702 to be whether the trier
of fact is an “expert” rather than whether the testimony would assist the trier of fact. The
issue of admissibility under rule 702 was thoroughly briefed and argued, and it is evident
from the record that the district court fully understood the rule. Fourth, for the same reason,
we reject the argument that the district court misunderstood rule 702 when it stated that it
had not heard Mitnick testify and decided to let the parties create the record in this case.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court deciding to admit helpful expert
testimony rather than rely on expert testimony that it heard in other cases. In sum, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Mitnick’s expert testimony.3
II. We decline to address Schaefer- Bonovsky’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In his self-represented brief, Schaefer-Bonovsky claims that he received ineffective
assistance from his trial counsel because his trial counsel (1) did not give an opening

3 In his self-represented brief, Schaefer-Bonovsky argues that it was improper to admit the
expert testimony because the testimony confused the trier of fact, the expert was not
qualified, and the expert relied on unreliable studies involving mere allegations of abuse.
Assuming that Schaefer-Bonovsky properly preserved these issues, these arguments fail
on the merits. First, Schaefer-Bonovsky’s argument that the expert testimony confused the
trier of fact fails because, by explaining behaviors of child sexual-abuse victims, the expert
testimony assisted rather than confused the trier of fact. Second, Schaefer-Bonovsky’s
argument that Mitnick is unqualified is without merit given Mitnick’s extensive
experience. Third, nothing in the record suggests that the district court improperly
determined that Mitnick used reliable methods.
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statement; (2) failed to call witnesses; (3) did not properly develop the record in light of
his alternative theory of the case; (4) failed to appropriately investigate the case; (5) made
arguments in his closing statement that the evidence did not support; (6) told him that he
had a good chance at trial, causing him to take the case to trial rather than accept a plea
deal; (7) neglected to present his theory that the some of the state’s witnesses, who disliked
him, had a motive to lie about the abuse to keep him out of their lives; and (8) failed to
question witnesses about the child’s behaviors before the alleged abuse occurred. Schaefer-
Bonovsky appears to request an evidentiary hearing to further develop these claims.
A criminal defendant raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show
that “(1) his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’ s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v.
Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 193 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 -88, 694 (1984). “[T]here is a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn.
2013).
“When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the
basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.”
Id.4 However, the claim is better brought in a postconviction proceeding when the claim

4 Under State v. Knaffla, all claims that are known but not raised when a direct appeal is
taken “will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” 243
N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976).
10
requires examination of evidence outside of the record or additional fact-finding. See
Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10.
Because it is unclear from the record whether Schaefer- Bonovsky’s ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim succeeds or fails, especially given the interrelatedness of
the arguments that Schaefer-Bonovsky raises in support of this claim, we decline to address
this claim on direct appeal. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are not Knaffla-barred
when the claim “requires examination of evidence outside the trial record or additional
fact-finding by the postconviction court.” Id. Therefore, we preserve Schaefer-Bonovsky’s
right to pursue this claim in a separate postconviction proceeding. See State v. Jackson,
726 N.W.2d 454, 463 (Minn. 2007) (“[The defendant’s] claims about his counsel’s
investigation and witness contacts require consideration of facts not in the trial record.
Accordingly, we deny those claims without prejudice to [the defendant’s] right to raise
them in a postconviction proceeding.”).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
In his self-represented brief, Schaefer-Bonovsky additionally argues that he
received ineffective assistance from his appellate counsel because counsel failed to request
a stay of his appeal to allow him to pursue a postconviction petition to address his
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.
Appellate courts apply the same standards for reviewing claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel and trial counsel. Jama v. State, 756 N.W.2d 107, 113 n.2
(Minn. App. 2008). An ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim based on
appellate counsel’s failure to pursue an ineffective-assistance-of- trial-counsel claim is
11
predicated on the success of the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Schneider v.
State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007). Accordingly, because we decline to address the
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, we additionally decline to reach the merits of
Schaefer-Bonovsky’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim. See also Abdillahi
v. State, No. A12-1477, 2013 WL 2924900, at *8 (Minn. App. June 17, 2013) (holding that
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims should be addressed in postconviction
proceedings), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2013). 5 We again preserve Schaefer -
Bonovsky’s right to pursue this claim in a separate postconviction proceeding. See Jackson,
726 N.W.2d at 463.
Affirmed.

5 We cite to this nonprecedential opinion for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).