In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0290

In re the Marriage of:

Jessica Suzanne Cross, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Drew Cross,
Appellant.

Filed September 23, 2024
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-535

Jessica Suzanne Cross, Hudson, Wisconsin (pro se respondent)

Joseph Drew Cross, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant-father Joseph Drew Cross challenges the district court’s order modifying
custody and parenting time to award respondent-mother Jessica Suzanne Cross sole legal
and sole physical custody of their three children, and to award father parenting time with
two of the three children. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Mother and father are biological parents of three minor children— A.C., S.C., and
E.C.1 The parties dissolved their marriage via a stipulated judgment and decree in April
2019. The decree awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody, set a
parenting-time schedule, and mandated the use of a parenting consultant for any disputes.
Beginning in 2021 and extending into 2023, the parties and their children were
involved in several proceedings: (1) a request from mother for an order for protection on
behalf of the children against father, which was denied; (2) a petition for a child in need of
protection or services and a petition for termination of parental rights (TPR) against father
concerning sexual abuse allegations, which were both dismissed; and (3) a criminal-sexual-
conduct charge against father involving one of the children, which ended in an acquittal.
In January 2023, mother and father both filed motions. Mother
requested: (1) approval of the move mother made to Hudson, Wisconsin during the
pendency of the TPR proceeding; (2) an award to mother of sole legal and physical custody
of all three children ; (3) modifications to the parenting-time schedule; and (4) an order
directing father to complete a parenting evaluation, a psychological evaluation, and to
participate in parent/child reunification therapy. Father requested that the district
court: (1) order that Wisconsin law enforcement accompany him to retrieve E.C. and S.C.
from Wisconsin; (2) hold mother in constructive civil contempt of court for denying
father’s custodial rights and interfering with his parenting time; (3) award father sole legal

1 Because respondent did not file a brief, the case will be determined on the merits. Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
3
and physical custody of all three children ; (4) modify the parenting-time schedule;
(5) award father compensatory parenting time; (6) restrain mother from having contact
with A.C.; and (7) award father conduct-based attorney fees.
After the district court determined that both parties had met their burden to present
a prima facie case for modification of legal custody, physical custody, and parenting time,
it set the matter for a trial. After the first day of trial, the district court awarded father
unsupervised parenting time with S.C. and E.C., pending its final order. After trial, t he
court later modified custody and parenting time, awarded sole legal and physical custody
of the children to mother, and granted father parenting time with S.C. and E.C., but not
with A.C. The court also granted mother’s request to relocate.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s order largely granting mother’s motion and
denying father relief. Our “review of custody determinations is limited to whether the trial
court abused its discretion[.]” Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). “A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation and
citation omitted). “[W]e review the [district court’s] findings [of fact] for clear error,
giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility and
reversing only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted).
4
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021). When applying the clear -error standard of review,
this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings;
does not reweigh the evidence; does not engage in fact-finding; does not reconcile
conflicting evidence; and “need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove
or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” Id. at 222 (quotations
omitted); see also Ewald v. Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing
Kenney in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024).
Father argues the district court: (1) abused its discretion by awarding sole physical
and sole legal custody to mother; (2) violated his procedural due-process rights; (3) erred
in finding he had engaged in domestic abuse; and (4) abused its discretion by determining
that relocating the children was in their best interests. We address each argument in turn.
I. The custody modification was within the district court’s discretion.

Father argues that the district court constructively terminated his parental rights to
A.C. by granting sole physical and legal custody of A.C. to mother. We disagree.
TPRs and custody modification are distinct legal processes. Compare Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.317, subd. 1 (2022) (TPR), with Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3 (2022) (custody).
A TPR permanently ends the legal parent-child relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.317,
subd. 1. In contrast, a custody modification adjusts the terms and limitations that govern a
parent’s ability to interact with and make decisions about the child. Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subd. 3(a), (c); Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2022) (addressing custody modification).
5
Regarding A.C., the district court modified parenting time and custody. But father’s
parental rights remain intact. Contrary to father’s argument, the district court did not
determine that father will never have parenting time with A.C. Instead, the court noted that
father will have no parenting time “for now.” The court scheduled a review hearing in six
months “to see the progress that has been made in family therapy and [A.C.’s] individual
therapy and determine whether it is appropriate to start awarding parenting time at that
time.” Thus, the court did not terminate father’s parental rights.
Father also argues that the district court clearly erred by granting modifying custody
because the court failed to identify the specific actions that endangered the children. The
existence of endangerment is a question of fact that we review for clear error.
Sharp v. Bilbro, 614 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26,
2000).
In its order, the district court found that the children “experienced a significant
degree of emotional danger from father’s actions, and that this harm is ongoing.” The
district court also extensively outlined father’s actions and described, in great detail, how
that conduct led to various petitions and criminal proceedings, all of which—the court
found—adversely affected the children. The district court’s findings are supported by the
record and are not, therefore, clearly erroneous.2

2 Father also contends that the best-interests factors, as defined in Minn. Stat. § 518.17
(2022), are facially unconstitutional. However, father forfeited this constitutional
argument because he did not raise it before the district court. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
6
II. The district court did not violate father’s procedural due-process rights.

Father argues that the district court violated his procedural due-process rights by
preventing him from presenting evidence to refute mother’s claims. “Procedural due
process analyzes whether fair procedures were used in depriving an individual of life,
liberty, or property.” In re Welfare of Child of F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d 525, 537 n.4 (Minn.
App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 5, 2024). “Due process requires reasonable notice, a
timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the opportunity to present evidence,
the right to an impartial decision-maker, and the right to a reasonable decision based solely
on the record.” In re Welfare of Child of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. 2008). Whether
a parent’s due-process rights have been violated is a question of law, which we review
de novo. Id.
At the end of trial, father requested to present rebuttal testimony regarding his
parenting time. The district court raised concerns about the repetitive nature of the
testimony but allowed father to testify for fifteen minutes. Father now argues the limitation
on his testimony violated his procedural due-process rights. We are not persuaded.
Father was able to provide rebuttal testimony, over mother’s objection. Despite the
concerns about the nature of the testimony, the district court allowed father the opportunity
to be heard. Father neither objected to the court’s limitation on his testimony, nor made an
offer of proof of what, if any, testimony he was unable to present. Thus, father failed to
demonstrate that the district court deprived him of his procedural due-process rights.

7
III. The court did not clearly err in finding father engaged in domestic abuse.
Father argues the district court clearly erred by finding he committed domestic
abuse. We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Welfare of J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A finding is
clearly erroneous when there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when a
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court made a
mistake. In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Minn. 2014). We defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).
Father argues the district court made clearly erroneous factual findings about father
committing domestic abuse and related to how many instances of abuse took place. 3 This
argument is unavailing. In making its factual findings, the district court relied on mother’s
testimony in which she testified to several instances of domestic abuse. The district court
also found mother’s testimony to be credible, and we must defer to that credibility
determination. See Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The district court neither clearly erred in
making findings of domestic abuse that are based on evidence in the record, nor abused its
discretion in using those findings to decide the custody modification motion.

3 Father also argues that the district court violated the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel when it considered the past incidents of abuse. But father forfeited that
argument because he failed to raise it to the district court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
8
IV. The district court acted well within its discretion in determining that mother’s
relocation of the children was in their best interests.

Father argues the district court abused its discretion by granting mother’s motion to
relocate the children. In considering a parent’s motion to relocate children, a district court
“shall apply a best interests standard [.]” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b)(1)-(8) (2022).
We review a court’s determination that relocation is in the best interests of a child for an
abuse of discretion. Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. App. 2010).
Father argues the district court abused its discretion by granting mother’s motion
because mother relocated with the children without first informing the court or father. But
our review of the record reveals that mother took the proper steps to relocate with the
children. As the district court explained, the juvenile court had “original and exclusive
jurisdiction” over the parties and the children at the time mother moved to Wisconsin. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 1 (2022). The juvenile court transferred custody of the
children to mother’s care, which granted mother the right to make decisions related to the
“routine daily care and control and the residence of the child[ren].” Minn. Stat. § 518.003,
subd. 3(c). In addition, the district court determined that both the juvenile court and the
county were aware of mother’s plans at the time she moved to Wisconsin. Accordingly,
mother was not required to alert the family court of her plans to relocate.
Father also challenges five factual findings, arguing the district court clearly erred
by relying on mother’s testimony and ignoring father’s testimony. However, the court
found mother’s testimony credible and found parts of father’s testimony to not be credible.
We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210.
9
Insofar as father requests that we reweigh the evidence and find in his favor, we may not
do so. See Ewald, 999 N.W.2d at 551. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by granting the motion to relocate and determining that relocating with mother was in the
children’s best interests.
Affirmed.