In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0477

In re the Marriage of:

Jessica Suzanne Cross, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Drew Cross,
Appellant

Filed November 12, 2024
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-17-535

Jessica Suzanne Cross, Hudson, Wisconsin (pro se respondent)

Joseph Drew Cross, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s findings of fact and order modifying his
child-support obligation, arguing that the court (1) abused its discretion by declining to
deduct certain transportation costs from the calculation of his gross- income as necessary
and ordinary business expenses, (2) erred by including overtime self-employment earnings
in calculating his gross income, and (3) erred in determining respondent’s gross income by
2
disregarding income she received from her joint operation of a business. We affirm in part
because, in calculating appellant’s gross income, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining his request for deduction of transportation costs and did not err by
including overtime earnings. But we reverse in part and remand because the district court
erred in calculating respondent’s gross income.
FACTS
Appellant Joseph Drew Cross (father) and respondent Jessica Suzanne Cross
(mother) married in 2009 and separated in October 2016. The parties have three minor
children. Mother petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in 2017. In an April 2019 order
for judgment and decree, the district court granted the parties joint legal and physica l
custody of the children and ordered father to pay $1,032 per month in basic child support
to mother. Underlying that child-support order was the parties’ stipulation that father’s
gross monthly income from his self-employment as a personal trainer was $5,833 and that
mother had potential gross monthly income of $3,333.
Father later moved the district court to modify the child-support order. In a financial
affidavit supporting his motion, father reported that he had “just started working for a faith-
based non-profit,” which required that he take a “vow of poverty and . . . [that he] raise
money for [his] salary.” Father also disclosed the 2020 earnings he had received from his
personal-training business. After mother failed to appear at a February 2021 motion
hearing, the district court issued an order for continuance, rescheduling the hearing.
Mother also did not appear at the rescheduled hearing, which proceeded in her
absence. Father testified that his current child-support obligation of $1,032 per month had
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“placed a severe financial burden on him, in light of his reduced income.” In particular,
father stated that he earned $1,500 per month from his employment with “Global Service
Associates (Jesus Film Project)” and that he also remained self -employed as a personal
trainer, estimating that his gross monthly income for that work was $1,700. In a March
2021 order, the district court determined that father’s total gross monthly income for
calculating child support was $3,481. Without updated financial information from mother,
the district court determined that mother continued to have a total gross monthly income
of $3,333 and that her gross monthly income for calculating child support was $3,015. The
district court granted father’s motion to modify the child-support order, ordered that he pay
basic child support in the amount of $408 per month, and set a review hearing.
Father appeared at that review hearing, but mother again did not attend. After the
hearing, the district court found that the parties’ circumstances had not changed since
March, determined that it would not amend the March 2021 order, and reiterated its order
that father pay “$408 per month as ongoing basic child support.”
Mother later moved for modification, requesting an increase in basic child support
and the establishment of medical support. In an affidavit supporting her motion, mother
reported that, beginning in early October 2023, she would be employed as a “retail store
manager” for a business called “Graydon Home.” Mother also stated that her supervisor
would be her current spouse and that her hourly wage would be $20, paid monthly.
In a responsive motion, father alleged that mother had understated her income.
Father submitted a supporting affidavit, to which he attached a local newspaper article
about mother’s business, as well as a spreadsheet reflecting that he received $23,790 in
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total income from his personal-training business over the preceding 12 months. The same
table showed $850 in “vehicle expenses” relating to father’s self-employment.
The parties appeared for a motion hearing before a child support magistrate (CSM).
At the hearing, mother was represented by counsel and father represented himself.
Mother’s attorney explained that mother was “asking for a modification of child support
given [a] change of circumstance” —specifically, that mother was awarded “significantly
more” parenting time. 1 Among other things, father countered that mother jointly ran a
home-renovation business with her spouse. Father also asserted that, if mother jointly ran
the Graydon Home retail store, “then [she was] also an income earner related to” the entire
Graydon Home renovation business. At the end of the hearing, “[s]ince both parties ha[d]
self-employment income that [could ]not be verified by the County’s DEED[
2] wage
summary, the record was held open . . . for both parties to provide documentation of their
income.” The district court ordered that mother submit documentation verifying her
income, including “her 2022 individual tax return” and “profit-and-loss statement from her
business, Market by Graydon Home.” Although mother later “filed her 2022 individual tax
return and commissions from Young Living Essential Oils[,]” she did not file a profit-and-
loss statement for Market by Graydon Home.

1 In August 2023, the district court awarded mother sole legal and sole physical custody of
the parties’ children. Father appealed the order and we affirmed in a nonprecedential
opinion. See In re the Marriage of Cross, No. A24-0290, 2024 WL 4260419, at *1 (Minn.
App. Sept. 23, 2024).

2 “DEED” is an acronym for the Department of Employment and Economic Development.
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After the hearing, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an
order modifying father’s child -support obligation. 3 We summarize the district court’s
factual findings relating to the parties’ gross incomes as follows.
Father’s Income
Father was self-employed as a personal trainer and separately worked for the Jesus
Film Project, a nonprofit organization. Father averaged $2,600 per month in earnings from
his work as a personal trainer and received a $2,000 monthly housing allowance thro ugh
Global Service Network, a missionary alliance that raised funds for father’s work with the
Jesus Film Project. Father also received $327 per month in veteran disability benefits.
The district court determined that, “based on [f]ather’s submissions, his income
from personal training [was] similar to what the Court determined in 2021.” And “[w]ithout
any other evidence of [f]ather’s income,” the district court decided to “use [father’s]
earnings from personal training”—“$1,844 per month”—“along with his veteran[] benefits
of $327 and the $2,000 housing allowance.” The district court found that, for the purpose
of calculating his child-support obligation, father’s gross monthly income was $4,171.

3 Although the CSM signed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order modifying
father’s child-support obligation, “[w]hen a district court affirms a CSM’s ruling, the
CSM’s ruling becomes the ruling of the district court, and we review the CSM’s decision,
to the extent it is affirmed by the district court, as if it were made by the district court.”
Welsh v. Welsh , 775 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Minn. App. 2009). Because the district court
ultimately affirmed the relevant rulings by the CSM, we refer to the CSM’s decisions as
those of the district court.
6
Mother’s Income
Although mother was a licensed real estate agent, she did not earn income from real
estate transactions in 2023. And mother’s “ 2022 tax return shows [that] she had gross
earnings from [her work as a] real estate [agent] of $2,954 and gross sales of $1,995 from
[her] Young Living Essential Oils” business.
Mother intended to begin serving as the retail store manager for a shop owned by
Graydon Home LLC, a limited liability company registered in mother’s name that she was
using to develop an interior-design business and from which she expected to receive $20
per hour. At the same time, mother’s spouse had a general-contracting business, also owned
by Graydon Home LLC, that had an office inside the interior- design shop. Mother denied
participating in her spouse’s general-contracting business. The interior-design and general-
contracting businesses were two ventures operated by mother and her spouse under
Graydon Home LLC. While m other admitted that the Graydon Home LLC shop had
recently opened, she claimed that she had not yet earned any “income.” Mother did not,
however, provide the district court with “any documentation of her profit[s] and losses for
the store.” Considering this record, the district court noted mother’s testimony and affidavit
stating “that her spouse contribute[d] to the monthly living expenses and [was] the main
provider[,]” cited Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(f) (2022), and determined that it
could not consider mother’s “spouse’s income in the calculation of [her] income.”
Mother nonetheless agreed that she had the ability to earn income. The district court
determined that mother was “voluntarily underemployed and [that] child support [would]
be based on a determination of potential gross income.” The district court found that mother
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had “the ability to work full-time and earn $20 per hour for a gross monthly income of
$3,464.” Applying a deduction for two “nonjoint children,” the district court determined
that mother’s gross monthly income for determining child support was $2,965.
Based on these findings, the district court ultimately modified father’s child-support
obligation by ordering him to pay “$972 per month as ongoing basic support.” Father
appeals.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s factual findings and order modifying his child-
support obligation. Father contends that the district court (1) abused its discretion by
declining to deduct from father’s gross-income calculation certain transportation costs as
necessary and ordinary business expenses, (2) erred by including overtime self-
employment earnings in calculating father’s gross income, and (3) erred by disregarding
mother’s jointly operated business in calculating her gross income.
4
Whether to modify support is within the discretion of the district court, and we will
not reverse a district court’s support-modification decision absent an abuse of discretion.
Johnson v. Johnson, 232 N.W.2d 204, 205 (Minn. 1975). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). “A determination of the

4 Mother did not file an appellate brief. We decide this case on the merits. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 142.03 (“If the respondent fails or neglects to serve and file its brief, the case
shall be determined on the merits.”).
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amount of an obligor’s income for purposes of child support is a finding of fact and will
not be altered on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d
15, 23 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005).
Generally, an appellate court will not set aside a district court’s finding of fact unless
that finding is clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see also Gully v. Gully, 599
N.W.2d 814, 824 n.3 (Minn. 1999) (citing rule 52.01 in a support-modification appeal).
The clear-error standard requires “a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to
support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn.
2021); see also Bayer v. Bayer, 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn. App. 2022) (applying Kenney
on appeal in a family-law appeal). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at
issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for
inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). When applying the
clear error standard of review, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence; (3) do not find their own facts;
and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations omitted); see also Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472,
474 (Minn. App. 2000) (making similar observations about the clear-error standard of
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review). But “the designation of a particular source of funds as income for child-support
purposes is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Hubbard Cnty. Health & Hum.
Servs. v. Zacher, 742 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Below, we address each of father’s arguments.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to deduct
transportation costs in calculating father’s gross income.

First, we consider father’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by
declining to deduct $850 in annual “vehicle expenses” when calculating father’s gross
income. Father contends that “[t]he Internal Revenue Code allows for mileage deductions
required for business travel precisely because they do not compare to the cost of an
employee getting to and from work.” We are not persuaded by father’s arguments.
District courts determine a basic child-support obligation by, among other things,
“determin[ing] the gross income of each parent under section 518A.29[.]” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.34(b)(1) (Supp. 2023). 5 Subject to certain exclusions and deductions, “gross
income includes any form of periodic payment to an individual, including, but not limited
to, salaries, wages, commissions, [and] self- employment income under section 518A.30.”
Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2022). “For purposes of section 518A.29, income from self-
employment or operation of a business . . . is defined as gross receipts minus costs of goods
sold minus ordinary and necessary expenses required for self-employment or business

5 We cite the most recent version of Minnesota Statutes section 518A.34(b)(1) because it
has not been amended in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts
apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”). For the same reason, we also cite
the current versions of other statutes cited in this opinion.
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operation.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.30 (2022). “Specifically excluded from ordinary and
necessary expenses are . . . any . . . business expenses determined by the court to be
inappropriate or excessive for determining gross income for purposes of calculating child
support.” Id. The party “seeking to deduct an expense . . . has the burden of proving, if
challenged, that the expense is ordinary and necessary.” Id. “The plain language of Minn.
Stat. § 518A.30 gives the district court broad discretion to determine whether to allow a
parent to deduct an expense, even an otherwise ordinary and necessary expense, from
income.” Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. 2013).
In considering father’s self-employment income, the district court determined that
it would “use [father’s] earnings from personal training of $1,844 per month.” The district
court based this figure on father’s reported gross annual earnings of $23,790 “minus
reasonable business expenses”— “$154 for certification and $1,510 for facility rental
expenses.” But the district court found that “the claimed [annual] vehicle expenses” of
$850 were “inappropriate based upon the nature of father’s business.” In particular, the
district court determined that, “although [father] may have [had] travel costs related to
getting to and from client appointments, this [was] not an ordinary and necessary business
expense for purposes of determining [father’s] income for child support.” The district court
found that “[v]ehicle or transportation expenses are common and necessary for most
employees getting to and from work.”
Based on the above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad
discretion to determine whether to allow father to deduct transportation expenses from
income. See Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 713. Applying the statutory formula to determine
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gross income to calculate child support for a self-employed obligor, the district court
subtracted only the expenses it found that father proved to be ordinary and necessary for
father’s personal-training business. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.30. The record also reflects that
father, as the party seeking to deduct transportation costs, failed to carry his burden of
proving that those expenses were ordinary and necessary because the parties did not discuss
the disputed vehicle expenses at the motion hearing and there was no mileage
documentation included with the exhibits that father submitted to the district court. See id.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to deduct transportation costs from its calculation of father’s gross income. See Haefele,
837 N.W.2d at 708.
II. The district court did not err by including father’s overtime earnings in
calculating his gross income.

Second, we address father’s contention that “the district court erred by including
[his] compensation in excess of a 40-hour work week in[] its calculation of gross income.”
In support of this argument, father asserts that he “maintained his personal-train ing
business by training clients in excess of the 40 hours per week [he] spent in employment
through Global Service Network.” Reviewing de novo the designation of father’s overtime
earnings as income for child-support purposes, see Zacher, 742 N.W.2d at 22 7, we
conclude that the district court did not err by including father’s personal-training earnings
as gross income.
“Gross income does not include compensation received by a party for employment
in excess of a 40-hour work week, provided that . . . child support is ordered in an amount
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at least equal to the guideline amount based on gross income not excluded under this
clause[.]” Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(b)(1) (2022). To qualify for this exclusion from gross
income, Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(b)(2) (2022) requires that a party
demonstrate, and the district court find, that:
(i) the excess employment began after the filing of the petition
for dissolution or legal separation or a petition related to
custody, parenting time, or support;
(ii) the excess employment reflects an increase in the work
schedule or hours worked over that of the two years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
(iii) the excess employment is voluntary and not a condition of
employment;
(iv) the excess employment is in the nature of additional, part-
time or overtime employment compensable by the hour or
fraction of an hour; and
(v) the party’s compensation structure has not been changed
for the purpose of affecting a support or maintenance
obligation.

“Where overtime income has been a regular, steady source of income for the past several
years, the [district] court may properly include the overtime income in the income used to
calculate child support, although the opportunity to work overtime in the future may
decrease.” Strauch v. Strauch, 401 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Minn. App. 1987) (construing a prior
version of the child-support statute that contained a similar provision excluding certain
income from the then-existing support calculus).
Here, father testified that he is self-employed as a personal trainer but spends 40
hours per week doing volunteer work for the Jesus Film Project. During cross-examination,
father admitted that the number of personal-training sessions he provides varies per month
but the average monthly income he receives from personal training is $2,600. Father also
13
acknowledged that he typically works only four to six hours per week providing personal-
training services. On appeal, father maintains that the district court should not have
included his personal-training earnings as gross income because it should have found that
the money he receives for that work was excludable as overtime.
The district court did not err in determining that father’s self-employment as a
personal trainer was a regular, steady source of income and that it began before mother
moved to modify child support. In 2019, the parties stipulated that father’s gross monthly
income from his self -employment as a personal trainer was $5,833 and that finding was
incorporated into the final order for judgment and decree. And when father moved to
modify his child-support obligation in 2021, he filed a financial affidavit with the district
court that stated he was self-employed as a personal trainer.
Nor does the record support father’s claim that he worked as a personal trainer in
addition to volunteering 40 hours per week for the Jesus Film Project. Father failed to
produce any evidence substantiating his “volunteer” hours for the Jesus Film Project. And
“[o]n appeal, a party cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in [their] favor
when one of the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district
court with the evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question.”
Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 25, 2003).
Thus, because the district court did not err in determining that father’s self-
employment as a personal trainer was a regular, steady source of income, we conclude that
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the court likewise did not err by including father’s personal-training earnings in gross
income to calculate child support. See Zacher, 742 N.W.2d at 227.
III. The district court erred in calculating mother’s gross income.

Finally, father asserts that the district court erred in calculating mother’s gross
income by disregarding income that she earned from her joint operation of the Graydon
Home LLC business with her spouse. We agree.
As noted above, “[f]or purposes of section 518A.29, income from . . . operation of
a business . . . is defined as gross receipts minus costs of goods sold minus ordinary and
necessary expenses required for . . . business operation.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.30. “Unlike
the general definition of gross income under section 518A.29(a), income under section
518A.30 does not depend on whether a parent has received a ‘periodic payment’ from the
business.” Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 710–11. And “[i]f a parent is voluntarily . . .
underemployed . . . , child support must be calculated based on a determination of potential
income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2022). In other words, under section 518A.29(a),
a party’s gross income includes, but is not limited to: (1) income from that party’s operation
of a business, calculated under the formula set forth in section 518A.30; (2) other periodic
payments to the party; and, if the party is voluntarily underemployed, (3) any potential
income that is attributable to the party under section 518A.32.
Applying de novo review to the district court’s determination of mother’s gross
income, see Zacher, 742 N.W.2d at 227, we conclude that the district court erred by
declining to designate income from mother’s joint operation of the Graydon Home LLC
business as income for child-support purposes and erred in its determination that mother
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was “voluntarily underemployed and [that] child support [would] be based on a
determination of potential gross income.” The district court’s calculation of mother’s gross
income is erroneous because it disregards the statutorily prescribed method for calculating
a self-employed obligor’s child-support obligation. And the district court’s findings of fact
and the underlying record are inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review of the
district court’s voluntary-underemployment and gross-income determinations.
The record reflects that Graydon Home LLC was registered in mother’s name, that
mother jointly operated the business with her spouse, and that mother was to receive funds
from it. Mother testified that she managed “The Market by Graydon Home,” that the shop
sold “home décor” and “[h]ome goods,” and that she planned to offer interior- design
services “in the new year.” While mother claimed that she had not yet received any income
from the interior-design business, her testimony also clarified that when she referred to
“income,” she meant profit: “[T]he sales that we’ve made over the last couple of months
have been less than our rent and other obligations.” Moreover, the newspaper article that
father submitted with the affidavit supporting his responsive motion further describes the
nature of mother’s joint operation of the Graydon Home LLC business with her spouse:
The couple run Graydon Home, a construction and interior-
design business that now has a storefront in downtown
Hudson. [Mother] said the store is a bottled-up version of what
the two want to provide to homes. They sell cups, candles,
baskets, pillows, and more. They also have pop-ups and
seasonal workshops in the new location. And [mother’s
spouse’s] office for general contracting work will be inside.

. . .

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[Mother’s spouse] does the construction parts of the job while
[mother] does the interior design of Graydon Home. They
often take on houses as joint projects.[6]

In Haefele, the Minnesota Supreme Court analogously “conclude[d] that, under
[Minnesota Statutes section 518A.30 (2012)], when determining child support, a parent’s
income from . . . operation of a business includes the parent’s income from joint ownership
of a closely-held subchapter S corporation.” 837 N.W.2d at 711. The supreme court
explained that “section 518A.30 require[s] the district court to identify [such a business’s]
gross receipts, cost of goods sold, and ordinary and necessary expenses; then use those
figures and apply the statutory formula to arrive at [the] income from . . . operation of a
business” that is attributable to the party who jointly owns the business. Id. at 712. “The
portion of the resulting figure attributable to [that party’s] ownership interest must then be
incorporated into her ‘gross income’ under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a).” Id. Thus, while we
acknowledge that Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29(f) provides that “[g]ross income
does not include the income of . . . the obligee’s spouse[,]” we conclude that the district
court erred by disregarding as spousal income under section 518A.29(f) the portion of
mother’s income from her operation of Graydon Home LLC that is attributable to her
ownership interest, rather than incorporating that amount into her gross income under
section 518A.29(a). See Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 712.

6 The district court credited the information provided in the newspaper article. See Minn.
Stat. § 518A.28(c) (2022) (“The court may consider credible evidence from one party that
the financial affidavit submitted by the other party is false or inaccurate.”).
17
Thus, to determine the portion of mother’s gross income under section 518A.29(a)
that results from her operation of the Graydon Home LLC business, the district court should
have subtracted from Graydon Home LLC’s gross receipts the sum of the business’s costs
of goods sold and its ordinary and necessary expenses. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.30; see also
Haefele, 837 N.W.2d at 712. As the supreme court explained in Haefele, the district court
should have then incorporated into mother’s gross income under section 518A.29(a) that
portion of the resulting figure that is attributable to mother’s ownership interest in Graydon
Home LLC. 837 N.W.2d at 712. The district court did not do so and therefore erred.
Furthermore, the district court ruled that mother was voluntarily underemployed,
such that the calculation of her gross income under section 518A.29 should include
potential income per section 518A.32. But neither the district court’s findings of fact nor
the underlying record—nor a combination of the two—are sufficient to allow us to review
the district court’s determination that mother is voluntarily underemployed, just as they are
insufficient for us to consider mother’s gross income under section 518A.29(a).
Indeed, mother “failed to provide any documentation of her profit[s] and losses for
the store,” despite being ordered to do so by the district court. As the party requesting to
modify child support, mother bore the burden of proof. See Heaton v. Heaton, 329 N.W.2d
553, 554 (Minn. 1983). Minnesota Statutes section 518A.28 (2022) provides that, “[i]n any
case where the parties have joint children for which a child support order must be
determined, the parties shall serve and file with their initial pleadings or motion documents,
a financial affidavit, disclosing all sources of gross income for purposes of section
518A.29.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.28(a). The financial affidavit must include “relevant
18
supporting documentation necessary to calculate” the party’s income. Id. “If the court
determines that a party does not have access to documents that are required to be disclosed
under [section 518A.28], the court may consider the testimony of that party as credible
evidence of that party’s income.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.28(d).
At the end of the motion hearing, the district court ordered that mother submit
documentation verifying her income. Although mother filed her 2022 individual tax return
and documentation of the commissions she earned from her essential oils business, she did
not file a profit-and-loss statement from Market by Graydon Home. The district court did
not find that mother lacked access to this documentation. Based on the inadequacies of the
district court’s findings and the record before us, we must remand the case for
reconsideration. See Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 353–54 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Erickson
v. Erickson, 385 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1986), for its statement that the supreme court
“cannot stress enough the importance of having findings of fact that demonstrate the
[district] court actually did take all relevant factors into consideration” and holding that,
“[b]ecause of the inadequacy of the [child support] magistrate’s findings, [the supreme
court was compelled to] remand the case for reconsideration”).
In sum, we affirm in part because, when calculating father’s gross income, the
district court neither abused its discretion by including father’s transportation costs nor
erred by including father’s overtime earnings. But we reverse in part because, when
calculating mother’s gross income, the district court erred by disregarding mother’s share
of income from the jointly owned business, Graydon Home LLC. We remand for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court shall: (1) use
19
the calculation in section 518A.30 to identify the share of Graydon Home LLC’s income
attributable to mother’s ownership interest therein; (2) include that share of Graydon Home
LLC’s income in mother’s gross income under section 518A.29(a); and (3) make findings
to explain whatever decisions the district court renders about mother’s voluntary
underemployment and about what amount (if any) to include in her gross income as
potential income. The district court on remand shall have discretion to reopen the record
and to invoke section 518A.28(d). We express no opinion on how the district court should
resolve the remanded questions.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.