State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1010

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Ernest Marshall,
Appellant.

Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-21-6821

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his fifth-degree assault conviction, arguing that the testimony
of two law-enforcement officers deprived him of his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
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FACTS
Law-enforcement officers responded to an assault in downtown Rochester early in
the morning on November 26, 2021. Officers M.K. and B.C. found the victim outside of
a bar, on the ground, bleeding, and with a substantial laceration on his forehead. The victim
was transported to the hospital. According to law enforcement, he had several face
lacerations and severe swelling of the face, and he was throwing up blood.
A bystander informed officers that someone hit the victim in the head with a bottle.
Officers located shards of glass and “what appeared to be a Patron bottle near a pool of
blood.” Staff at a bar nearby informed officers that the victim had been in an argument
with a B lack male who had long dreadlocks and was wearing a black coat. Dispatch
informed the responding officers that city-owned security cameras in downtown Rochester
might have captured the incident, and Officer B.C. left the scene to review the video
footage.
Officer B.C. reviewed the footage from security cameras that had views of Third
Street Southwest and the alley near where the incident occurred. The security-camera
footage showed the victim walking down the street before a person approached him. The
person then pulled what appeared to be a bottle from his jacket and struck the victim once
in the face with it. The victim collapsed. Upon viewing the security-camera footage,
Officer B.C. requested that it be saved for evidence.
In the meantime, Officer R.A. had also responded to the scene. Dispatch gave
Officer R.A. the following description of the suspect: “[a] black jacket with fur and Black
male with dreads.” As Officer R.A. was searching the immediate area surrounding the
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crime scene for persons matching the description dispatch had provided, he came upon
appellant Joseph Ernest Marshall, who matched the description of the assailant, and
detained him.
Officer B.C. then informed Officer R.A. that the individual whom Officer R.A.
detained was the same individual he had seen in the security-camera footage. Officer R.A.
noted that Marshall had distinctive shoulder-length dreadlocks that assisted him in
verifying that the person he detained matched the description of the person who assaulted
the victim. Marshall was also wearing a coat, hat, and boots that matched those of the
person in the city’s security-camera footage.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Marshall with one count of third-degree
assault for inflicting substantial bodily harm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1
(2020), and one count of fifth-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.224,
subd. 4(b) (2020).
The district court held a jury trial in January 2024. The state’s evidence included
testimony from Officer B.C. and Officer R.A. The prosecutor played the city’s
security-camera footage for the jury during Officer B.C.’s direct examination and asked
him what he saw when he viewed the city’s security-camera footage of the incident for the
first time:
PROSECUTOR: What did you observe in the footage?
OFFICER B.C.: I observed a male, the Defendant, swinging
some sort of object in overhead motion that was consistent with
the broken glass that we found on scene and photographed.
MARSHALL’S ATTORNEY: Objection, improper
identification.
THE COURT: Sustained.
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At another point during Officer B.C.’s direct examination, the prosecutor asked him what
“Exhibits 3 through 9” were, for the purpose of introducing them into the record:
PROSECUTOR: I’m showing you what has been marked as
Exhibits 3 through 9. I will have you page through that. So
what are Exhibits 3 through 9?
OFFICER B.C.: Those are still shots of the Defendant
producing—
MARSHALL’S ATTORNEY: Objection, improper
identification.
THE COURT: Sustained.
PROSECUTOR: Without making any identifications, what
are Exhibits 3 through 9?
OFFICER B.C.: Those are photos of an individual producing
an item from their pocket and striking it over the head of the
victim.

Later, the prosecutor showed Officer B.C. exhibit 17— another still shot—and asked him
what it was:
PROSECUTOR: What is Exhibit 17?
OFFICER B.C.: This is an individual that matched the
description of the Defendant walking with a—
MARSHALL’s ATTORNEY: Objection, improper
identification.
THE COURT: I’m going to let Officer [B.C.] finish his
description first. How are you identifying that, Officer [B.C.]?
OFFICER B.C.: Based off of the clothing and physical
description of the individual.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled at this time.

Officer B.C. then testified to the following observations about the person whom Officer
R.A. had apprehended near the crime scene:
PROSECUTOR: [O]nce you made these observations from
dispatch using the city street surveillance, what did you do
next?
OFFICER B.C.: I informed Officer [R.A.] that the individual
that I witnessed in this footage was indeed the individual that
he had detained at that time.
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DEFENSE: Objection, lack of foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.

Marshall’s trial attorney cross-examined Officer B.C. and primarily asked questions about
the city’s surveillance recording system and digital file storage.
Officer R.A. testified next. During Officer R.A.’s direct examination, the
prosecutor asked the following questions:
PROSECUTOR: In your comparison from your interaction
with Mr. Marshall and the street surveillance, were you
confident in making an identification?
OFFICER R.A.: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And what was the identification you were
able to make?
MARSHALL’S ATTORNEY: Objection, [im]proper
identification.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer the question.
OFFICER R.A.: Thank you. The identification that I was able
to make is that the suspect that we were attempting to locate
that was described was the person that I had located and
detained.

Marshall’s trial attorney cross-examined Officer R.A., asking him questions about when
he arrived at the crime scene, why he arrested Marshall, and the manner in which he
inspected Marshall upon arrest. Marshall waived his right to testify and presented no
evidence. Near the end of trial, the district court gave a standard instruction to the jury
regarding evidentiary rulings it made throughout the trial:
During this trial, I have ruled upon objections to certain
testimony and exhibits. You must not concern yourself with
the reasons for the rulings since they are controlled by our
Rules of Evidence. By admitting evidence or testimony and
exhibits as to which objections were made, I did not intend to
indicate the weight to be given such testimony or exhibits. You
are not to speculate as to the possible answers to those
questions that I did not require to be answered, and you are to
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disregard all evidence I have ordered stricken or have told you
to disregard.

Marshall never requested a curative instruction during trial. The jury returned a
guilty verdict on the fifth-degree assault charge but acquitted Marshall of the third-degree
assault charge.
Marshall appeals.
DECISION
Marshall argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred by
admitting the officers’ testimony to which he objected and by not sua sponte issuing a
curative instruction with regard to Marshall’s objections to portions of the officers’
testimony identifying Marshall. In making this argument, Marshall contends that the
officers should not have been permitted to testify under Minn. R. Evid. 701 because the
officers were merely “interpreting” a video that the jury themselves viewed. The state
argues that admitting the testimony was not an abuse of discretion.
We first analyze the three objections Marshall made that the district court overruled
and consider whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting these three
portions of testimony. Then, we consider the two objections that the district court
sustained.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled three of
Marshall’s objections to the officers’ testimony because their testimony
embraced factual, rather than legal, conclusions.
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and [an
appellate court] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
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State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020) (quoting State
v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017)). “The defendant has the burden on appeal
of proving both that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence and that
the defendant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Chomnarith, 654 N.W.2d 660, 665 (Minn.
2003). An appellate court “will reverse the district court’s ruling if the error substantially
influenced the jury’s decision.” State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Minn. 2009).
Lay opinions that are rationally based on a witness’s perceptions are admissible if
they are helpful to a jury. State v. Washington , 725 N.W.2d 125, 137 (Minn. App. 2006),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 20, 2007). The Minnesota Rules of Evidence provide that
lay-opinion testimony is admissible when it
is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness;
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.

Minn. R. Evid. 701. “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact.” Minn. R. Evid. 704. “‘[U] ltimate conclusion testimony which embraces
legal conclusions or terms of art’ is not considered helpful to the jury.” State v. Patzold,
917 N.W.2d 798, 808 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting State v. DeWald, 463 N.W.2d 741, 744
(Minn. 1990)), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). District courts “may also exclude
8
testimony on the ultimate issue when the testimony would merely tell the jury what result
to reach.” Id. (quotation omitted). However, “the supreme court has allowed police
officers to express opinions concerning who killed a victim when the conclusion was
factual rather than legal and was offered in response to leading questions, and the officer
avoided legal terminology.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court properly overruled three of Marshall’s objections to the
identification testimony because the testimony expressed factual, rather than legal,
conclusions and thus was admissible under rule 701. See id. In Marshall’s first overruled
objection, the prosecutor had shown the testifying officer exhibit 17—a still shot from the
security-camera footage of Marshall and a woman walking—and asked him what it was.
He testified as follows:
OFFICER B.C.: This is an individual that matched the
description of the Defendant walking with a—
MARSHALL’S ATTORNEY: Objection, improper
identification.
THE COURT: I’m going to let Officer [B.C.] finish his
description first. How are you identifying that, Officer [B.C.]?
OFFICER B.C.: Based off of the clothing and physical
description of the individual.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled at this time.

Because the officer was testifying about the individual he saw in the image and the
comparison he had made of that person with the description of the suspect he had been
given, his testimony embraced a factual, rather than a legal, conclusion. Thus, his
testimony was admissible under Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 808, and DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at
744.
9
Marshall’s second overruled objection was when the prosecutor asked the testifying
officer about what he did after observing the security-camera footage:
PROSECUTOR: [O]nce you made these observations from
dispatch using the city street surveillance, what did you do
next?
OFFICER B.C.: I informed Officer R.A. that the individual
that I witnessed in this footage was indeed the individual that
he had detained at that time.
MARSHALL’S ATTORNEY: Objection, lack of foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.

Here, the officer’s testimony explained that the individual Officer R.A. had detained
appeared to be the same person whom the testifying officer had observed in the
security-camera footage. Because this testimony again embraced a factual, rather than
legal, conclusion, it was admissible under Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 808, and DeWald,
463 N.W.2d at 744.
Marshall’s third overruled objection was during the direct examination of Officer
R.A., when the prosecutor asked if the person who was detained matched the description
of the suspect they were attempting to locate:
PROSECUTOR: In your comparison from your interaction
with Mr. Marshall and the street surveillance, were you
confident in making an identification?
OFFICER R.A.: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And what was the identification you were
able to make?
DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY: Objection, [im]proper
identification.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer the question.
OFFICER R.A.: Thank you. The identification that I was able
to make is that the suspect that we were attempting to locate
that was described was the person that I had located and
detained.

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Here, the officer testified to a factual conclusion—that the person the officers had detained
matched the description of the suspect they were attempting to locate. We again conclude
that the officer’s testimony was factual and therefore admissible under Patzold,
917 N.W.2d at 808, and DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at 744.
We next consider Marshall’s argument that the officers’ testimony was not
admissible pursuant to rule 701 because the officers were merely “interpreting” a video the
jury viewed. A review of the transcript shows that each officer’s testimony was based on
their own perceptions because they were testifying about what they saw at the crime scene
or what they saw on the city’s security-camera footage during the investigation . This is
distinct from interpreting a video that the jury viewed. Officer B.C.’s and Officer R.A.’s
testimony assisted the jury in determining a fact at issue—the identity of the assailant—
because the ultimate issue of the jury trial was whether Marshall was the person who
assaulted the victim. Finally, Officers B.C. and R.A. were not testifying as experts
pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 702 because they were merely testifying about what they
perceived at the scene of the crime and on the city’s security-camera footage.
Marshall urges us to reverse the district court, arguing that the facts of his appeal
are analogous to those in three nonprecedential cases: State v. Grunig, No. A10-81,
2010 WL 4451281 (Minn. App. Nov. 9, 2010) ; State v. Turner, No. A23-1709, 2024 WL
4812939 (Minn. App. Nov. 18, 2024), rev. denied (Feb. 18, 2025); and State v. Ramsey,
No. A23-1554, 2024 WL 4587915 (Minn. App. Oct. 28, 2024).
1

1 Marshall cites nonprecedential caselaw solely for its persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding
11
We do not find Marshall’s comparisons to these three cases persuasive. We observe
as an initial matter that they are not binding authority. Patzold and DeWald, however, are
binding authorities, and their analyses compel us to conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in making the challenged evidentiary rulings. Moreover, we disagree
with Marshall that any of these cases— Grunig, Turner, or Ramsey—supports his
argument.
In Grunig, a law-enforcement officer testified that the defendant was seen in three
crime-scene videos by comparing a videotape to the defendant’s driver’s license photo.
2010 WL 4451281, at *1. The jury never saw the driver’s license photo and so, unlike
here, never had the opportunity to perform its own independent comparison. Id.
In Turner, a law-enforcement officer testified and, while narrating a video of a fatal
shooting to the jury, stated that an individual in the video was “the fatal shooter.” 2024 WL
4812939, at *1. Then, the officer stated that he believed the defendant was the shooter in
the video. Id. But officer testimony that interprets video evidence for a jury and amounts
to an opinion about the ultimate issue of who was guilty of the crime is different from the
testimony at issue in this case, in which law-enforcement officers offered testimony about
what they observed in the security-camera footage and how they compared the appearance
of the apprehended individual to the individual they saw in the footage.
Finally, in Ramsey, this court concluded that a district court did not abuse its
discretion when it allowed a sergeant to explain how she used video surveillance to track

authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential
opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
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the individual shown to have shot the victim in video footage, and to connect that individual
in the footage to the defendant. 2024 WL 4587915, at *3-4. We reasoned that the
sergeant’s testimony was admissible because it was helpful to the jury and did not identify
the defendant “as the shooter.” Id. at *4. The law-enforcement officers in this case
similarly provided helpful information to the jury by explaining the factual basis for the
decisions that they made on the night of Marshall’s arrest, and they did not simply state to
the jury that Marshall assaulted the victim.
We conclude that each portion of challenged testimony was admissible under
Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 808, and DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at 744, and met the requirements
for lay-opinion testimony pursuant to rule 701. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled these three objections.
B. The district court did not plainly err when it did not sua sponte issue
curative instructions for the testimony to which Marshall successfully
objected during trial.
Generally, parties forfeit appellate review of jury instructions when they fail to
request specific instructions. State v. Goodloe, 718 N.W.2d 413, 422 (Minn. 2006)
(“Failure to request specific jury instructions or to object to instructions given generally
results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal.”). However, appellate courts may consider
forfeited issues if appellants can establish plain error. State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272,
275 (Minn. 2019).
When conducting plain-error review, appellate courts must determine whether there
was (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.
State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Minn. 2011). An error is plain when it is clear
13
or obvious. Id. at 853. If the plain error affected the outcome of the case, then it affected
the defendant’s substantial rights. See id. at 852-53. If all three prongs of plain-error
review are met, appellate courts then must consider “whether reversal is required to ensure
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” State v. Coleman,
957 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). If an appellate court concludes that
any of the above requirements are not satisfied, it need not continue its analysis. State v.
Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
In State v. Washington, the supreme court addressed whether plain error occurs
when district courts do “not act sua sponte to limit . . . testimony’s impact by providing a
curative instruction.” 693 N.W.2d 195, 205 (Minn. 2005). The supreme court stated that
district courts should not “interfere with the trial strategy of the defendant” and that to
respond sua sponte to testimony “would risk highlighting or enforcing rights that the
defendant had, for tactical reasons, declined to waive.” Id. Because caselaw informs us
that district courts should generally not issue curative instructions upon their own volition,
we conclude that the district court did not plainly err when it did not sua sponte issue a
curative instruction to accompany the two sustained objections to the officers’ testimony.
Affirmed.