State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1554

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Deondre Demetrius Ramsey,
Appellant.

Filed October 28, 2024
Reversed and remanded
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-18991

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of attempted second-degree intentional murder
and possession of a machine gun, arguing that the convictions must be reversed because
multiple errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Because we conclude that the
2
cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary errors deprived appellant of
his right to a fair trial, we reverse both convictions and remand to the district court for a
new trial.
FACTS
In September 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Deondre
Demetrius Ramsey with attempted second-degree intentional murder, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2022). The charge arose from a
shooting in downtown Minneapolis that occurred outside of a nightclub at approximately
2:32 a.m. on September 17, 2022. The incident was captured on surveillance video from
the City of Minneapolis surveillance video system. The surveillance video shows a person
wearing a blue hat, white t-shirt, and jeans, shooting the victim from behind and then
running from the scene while concealing the weapon in their pants. The complaint alleged
that the shooter in the surveillance video was Ramsey, that Ramsey was arrested with a
Glock pistol that had a full-auto sear 1 and an extended magazine, that Ramsey confirmed
the Glock pistol that he was arrested with was the same weapon that was used in the
shooting, and that Ramsey did not deny that he shot the victim. The matter proceeded to a
jury trial.
On the first day of trial, before voir dire, the district court permitted the state, over
Ramsey’s objection, to amend the complaint to add an additional charge of possession of
a machine gun, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.67, subdivision 2 (2022).

1 A “full-auto sear” is a machine gun conversion kit that allowed the Glock pistol to fire
automatically with one pull of the trigger.
3
At trial, the state presented testimony from two Minneapolis Police Department
(MPD) officers who were the first to respond to the scene. One officer testified that he was
parked near the intersection of Fifth Street and Hennepin Avenue when he heard
“automatic gunfire” before responding to the scene. The state also called an MPD
intelligence analyst, who testified about collecting the surveillance video. Then, a criminal
intelligence analyst from the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, testified about how she
identified the shooter as Ramsey. The analyst testified that another officer, who was in
charge of the first precinct, received information that the shooter goes by the name “Block.”
Based on this information, the analyst viewed the surveillance videos and identified
Ramsey based on “tattoos, between him being with [a known individual,] and searching
for the name ‘Block.’” The analyst testified that “investigators keep records of nicknames
and monikers of people they’re tracking with trends,” that she received information that
the shooter went by the name “Block,” and she had information from other agencies that
Ramsey went by “Block” or “Block Money,” and she identified Ramsey as the shooter.
She further testified that she received the name, date of birth, and street name of Ramsey
from the Saint Paul Police Department and a photo of Ramsey from the Minnesota
Repository of Arrest Photos. Based on this testimony, Ramsey objected and asked the
court for a mistrial, arguing that the s tate agreed not to elicit testimony regarding his
criminal record and police contacts, that the analyst’s testimony implied law enforcement
4
knew him from another case, and that he was a known person to the police. 2 The state
asked that the court deny the request for a mistrial arguing that in preparation for trial they
had three conversations with the analyst, which included discussions that the state was not
going to elicit anything about Ramsey’s past. The state also argued that the testimony was
not intentionally elicited by the state. The district court noted that the testimony was
prejudicial, but denied Ramsey’s motion because the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial
to the case.
An MPD sergeant then testified about her role in the investigation, including her
interview with Ramsey following his arrest (Scales interview), and her interpretation of the
surveillance videos. The sergeant used a PowerPoint presentation that consisted of still
photographs from the surveillance video to describe her interpretation of the incident. In
addition, the sergeant testified about finding a Glock magazine in Ramsey’s car and that
“he had a history of possessing it.” Ramsey objected arguing that the sergeant’s testimony
unfairly suggested he had a history of using firearms.
A special agent testified about his surveillance and arrest of Ramsey . During his
testimony he stated that Ramsey was a “felon” who was “commonly in possession of
firearms.” Ramsey objected, arguing that the testimony unfairly suggested he had a history
of using firearms and his status as a felon.

2 Prior to trial, the state agreed not to elicit testimony regarding Ramsey’s criminal records,
that he had been investigated in other cases, that he was a person of interest, or otherwise
mention his past criminal acts and cases.
5
Following this testimony Ramsey made a second request for a mistrial, arguing that
the state’s three law enforcement witnesses labeled Ramsey a criminal, noted he had a
criminal record, called him a felon who was known to carry a gun, suggesting he was
known to law enforcement as a dangerous person with a criminal record who carries guns.
The state asked that the court deny the request for a mistrial arguing the sergeant
merely testified to the fact that law enforcement had probable cause to arrest Ramsey for a
felony offense and that law enforcement knew a firearm was used in that offense. The state
further noted that, “this was a misstep”. The district court agreed that there was
inadmissible testimony regarding Ramsey but denied the motion for a mistrial and found
that a curative instruction was appropriate. The court instructed the parties to prepare a
curative instruction.
The state also called two medical professionals, who testified about the victim’s
gunshot wounds and called the owner of the nightclub to lay foundation for the surveillance
footage. An MPD forensic scientist also testified that cartridge casings collected at the
scene were consistent with having been fired from the firearm that was in Ramsey’s
possession when he was arrested. The defense did not call any witnesses and Ramsey
waived his right to testify.
Following the conclusion of testimony, the state gave its closing argument during
which it showed the jury a side-profile view booking photograph alongside the name
“Deondre Demetrius Ramsey,” a date of birth, and the phrase “Block Money.” Ramsey
made a third request for a mistrial, arguing that the photograph was not entered into
evidence and this was another instance of the jury being exposed to inadmissible evidence
6
of Ramsey’s bad character. The photograph was not admitted into evidence. The state
requested that the court deny the request for a mistrial, arguing that the photograph was
referenced during the analyst’s testimony and was included in the exhibit admitted when
the analyst testified about receiving an arrest photo used to identify Ramsey during the
investigation.3 The district court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating there was
“nothing in the photograph that indicates that it was taken during the booking process,”
and found the photograph “otherwise relevant because it shows the defendant, it is
consistent with the testimony, and it is not unreasonably prejudicial.”
The jury found Ramsey guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced Ramsey
to a 19-month prison term on the conviction of possession of a machine gun and a
concurrent 240-month prison term on the conviction of attempted second-degree murder.
Ramsey appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting opinion testimony
about the surveillance video because it was helpful to the jury.4

Ramsey argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the MPD
sergeant to do “the jury’s job for it” because she interpreted the surveillance videos using
a PowerPoint presentation, which consisted of still photographs from the surveillance
videos. Ramsey further argues that the MPD sergeant who provided testimony lacked first-

3 On appeal, the state concedes that the photograph was not admitted into evidence at trial.
The photograph admitted into evidence during the analyst’s testimony was not a side-
profile view and was more similar to a driver’s license photograph. The exhibit did include
Ramsey’ name, date of birth, and the phrase “Block Money.”
4 We address this issue to provide guidance on remand.
7
hand knowledge and her opinions were not helpful to the jury. At trial, the sergeant
explained the process of creating the PowerPoint and then used it to explain her
interpretation of events, including the video’s depiction of three males arriving at the
nightclub in a blue vehicle, going to the vehicle presumably to retrieve a firearm, getting
involved in an altercation with a group of individuals, and then the shooting. The defense
objected to the exhibit, and the district court overruled the objection and determined that
the photos were relevant and more probative than prejudicial. The state argues that the
sergeant’s testimony was helpful for the jury to be able to understand which individuals
depicted in the footage the state alleged were Ramsey and his companions. We agree.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 701 allows a lay witnesses to testify as to “opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Minn. R. Evid. 701.
This court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). A district court “abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” Id. (quoting State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017)).
Ramsey cites two precedential cases to support his argument that the sergeant’s
testimony was inadmissible under rule 701. Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42 (Minn.
1977); and Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. App. 1984). These decisions
are distinguishable from Ramsey’s case.
8
Dunshee addressed whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding
expert witness opinion testimony, which is subject to a different rule of evidence and
outside the purview of rule 701. 255 N.W.2d at 47-48. The Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that the testimony “would have been little more than an interpretation of the
photographs,” which called into question “whether [it] would appreciably aid the jury,”
and explained that the expert had not examined the physical items in the photograph, did
not witness the accident, and did not conduct any scientific tests. Id. at 48.
In Dahlbeck, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding a coworker’s lay witness opinion testimony describing accident pictures because
the coworker’s opinion was speculative and would do little more than interpret photos,
which the jury was capable of. 355 N.W.2d at 165-66.
Here, the sergeant’s testimony did more than identify Ramsey on the surveillance
video. Instead, the sergeant affirmed that she used the photos from the surveillance video
to “track th[e] person in the blue hat from when they got to the parking lot, went to [the
nightclub], left [the nightclub], committed the shooting, and went back to the car.”
Although “[c]ourts should be cautious about the influence of a law enforcement officer’s
opinion on ultimate issues,” State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909, 915 (Minn. App. 2001),
the district court here did not abuse its discretion. The sergeant did not identify Ramsey as
the shooter. She identified a person in a white t-shirt and blue hat, and the testimony likely
was helpful to the jury in interpreting the surveillance video. Unlike Dunshee and
Dahlbeck, the sergeant in this case was familiar with the nightclub and surrounding area
where the shooting occurred and had prior knowledge of a known associate of Ramsey.
9
This knowledge aided in her explanation of the photos. Moreover, Ramsey objected to the
testimony based on speculation and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Because the officer had enough personal knowledge to give a helpful, non -
speculative opinion to the jury, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to allow the sergeant’s testimony.
II. Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Ramsey of a fair trial.
Ramsey argues that prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary errors occurred
during trial. Ramsey argues that each error individually, and the errors when considered
cumulatively, deprived him of his right to a fair trial, and mandate reversal of his
convictions and a new trial.
First, we consider the objected-to errors and conclude that more than one instance
of prosecutorial misconduct occurred because the prosecuting attorney repeatedly failed to
adequately prepare three law enforcement officers to prevent them from testifying to
inadmissible character evidence, elicited inadmissible testimony that violated Ramsey’s
right to confrontation, and used a booking photograph that was not introduced at trial
during closing argument. Second, we consider the unobjected-to error and conclude that
the district court committed plain error when it allowed hearsay statements identifying
Ramsey as the shooter. Finally, we consider the prejudicial effect of these errors and
conclude that their cumulative effect warrants a new trial.
A. Objected-to Prosecutorial Misconduct
A prosecutor commits misconduct if she materially undermines the fairness of the
trial by violating clear or established standards of conduct. State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d
10
777, 782 (Minn. 2007). For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, “we have utilized a
harmless-error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the
misconduct.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012). Under that test, if
the defendant establishes prosecutorial misconduct, we then consider whether that
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for serious misconduct or “whether
the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict” for less
serious misconduct. Id. at 150.
1. The prosecutor failed to adequately prepare three law
enforcement officers to prevent them from testifying to
inadmissible character evidence.

Ramsey moved for a mistrial based on testimony from three witnesses, arguing that
in each instance, the prosecutor elicited inadmissible character evidence describing prior
bad acts. Generally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible evidence.
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 1965) (holding
that when the state seeks to introduce evidence of a defendant’s other crimes or bad acts,
the state must provide written notice to the defendant within a reasonable time before trial).
Here, the parties agreed that the state would not elicit or attempt to elicit criminal records
or evidence that Ramsey was investigated in prior cases and would not otherwise mention
other criminal acts or cases. “[T]he state has an absolute duty to prepare its witnesses to
ensure that they are aware of the limits of permissible testimony.” State v. McNeil, 658
N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. App. 2003).
First, Ramsey challenges testimony from the analyst about using an arrest photo to
identify Ramsey during the investigation. The analyst used the word “arrest” when
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describing an exhibit, which was a photo of Ramsey. Ramsey argues that because the
testimony described how investigators identified Ramsey, the analyst was temporally
referring to a prior arrest. The testimony was as follows:
Q: Now showing you page 2 of Exhibit 15, what do we see here?
A: This is a photo that I had received and confirmed later it came
from the Minnesota Repository of Arrest Photos. Saint Paul Police
Department had provided me with the name and date of birth and
street name of Mr. Ramsey.

(Emphasis added).

Ramsey moved for a mistrial based on this testimony, arguing that the parties agreed
that the state would not elicit any testimony about Ramsey’s prior criminal record. 5 The
district court denied the motion, stating, “I find that the evidence is not relevant. I find that
it is prejudicial. I find that it is not unfairly prejudicial. I find that it was not intentional,
and I believe both sides are conceding that, by either the prosecutor or by the police
officer.” Defense counsel did not request a curative instruction immediately and reserved
the ability to request a curative instruction.

5 The state argues that we should review the analyst’s statement about the arrest photograph
under the modified plain-error standard because Ramsey’s objection was untimely. We
note that although Ramsey did not object during the witness’s testimony, the district court
was given an opportunity to provide a curative instruction and declare a mistrial. See State
v. Morgan, 477 N.W.2d 527, 531 (Minn. App. 1991) (“Th[e] failure to object deprives the
trial court of [the] opportunity to either give the jury a curative instruction, or, if the
argument is sufficiently egregious, to declare a mistrial.”). And because we later review
the errors collectively and conclude that under either standard this error alone did not affect
Ramsey’s substantial rights or play a substantial part in influencing the verdict, we do not
decide whether Ramsey’s objection was timely.
12
Second, Ramsey challenges the testimony from the MPD sergeant, and argues that
the testimony suggested that Ramsey had a history of possessing the Glock that was in his
possession when he was arrested. The testimony was as follows:
Q: What did you find in the car?
A: I found a Glock brand empty magazine in, I believe, the center
console.
Q: Why is that significant to this case?
A: I think it is – I believe that it is further – just a little bit more
evidence to show that the Glock that was recovered and – was
something that was – that he had a history of possessing it.

(Emphasis added). Ramsey objected and the district court sustained the objection
to the extent that the testimony was about “her belief that the defendant had a history of
use.” The district court offered to provide a curative instruction, Ramsey did not request
one.
Third, Ramsey challenges the following testimony from the special agent,
Q: In the third week of September, near September 17th to the
21st , were you brought into an investigation of a man named
Mr. Deondre Ramsey?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And how so?
A: We were informed that Mr. Ramsey had an active felony
warrant through the State of Minnesota and that he was a felon
that was commonly in possession of a firearm.

(Emphasis added). Ramsey moved for a mistrial. The district court determined,
I agree with the defendant that there has been
inadmissible testimony regarding the defendant’s Saint Paul
arrest history through [the analyst], and there has been
inadmissible testimony through the defendant’s history of use
by [the sergeant]. And, most recently, there has been
inadmissible testimony by our [special agent] who testified that
the defendant has an active felony warrant and that he was
known as a felon commonly in possession of a firearm.
13
The active felony warrant isn’t so much troubling
because he had an active felony warrant for this offense. What
is troubling is that he was known as a felon, meaning he had a
prior history, commonly in possession of a firearm, meaning,
arguably, that he’s for whatever reason, prohibited from
possessing a firearm, which is not an element of this offense.
While I find that all troubling and all deserving of an
instruction if requested, which I will give, I do not find it a
sufficient basis for a mistrial at this point. And so I’m going to
deny the defendant’s motion for a mistrial.

Later the district court opined,
And, Counsel, this strikes me as – I think the baseball
term is unforced error. None of this is supposed to happen.
You need to talk to your witnesses before they take the stand,
and in areas that are as delicate as these, you need to think
through the questions that you ask before you solicit an answer
that you’re not anticipating. This could have been avoided. As
I indicated at the bench, you’re creating unnecessary issues for
appeal here, and it is affecting this defendant’s right to a fair
trial.

Ramsey argued that a curative instruction was not sufficient under the
circumstances. However, the district court read the following curative instruction
addressing all three issues to the jury:
Members of the jury, the defendant is on trial for crimes
charged and those crimes alone. I instruct you that you are to
disregard any testimony about defendant’s arrest history or
defendant’s alleged possession of a firearm prior to September
17th, ’22 – 2022. You may not consider or use this evidence
or testimony in your deliberations. And again, I refer you to
the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the case about
what you’re not to do when I instruct you that something is to
be disregarded or stricken.

Here, each of the three law enforcement officers provided inadmissible character
evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
14
inadmissible evidence). We acknowledge that the testimony was provided in response to
open-ended questions and the parties agreed that the conduct was not intentional.
However, we agree with the district court that this could have, and should have been
avoided. Given that the testimony referring, even ambiguously, to Ramsey’s criminal
history occurred three times during trial and was from three different experienced law
enforcement officers, we conclude that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by
not meeting its obligation to adequately prepare its witnesses prior to trial.
2. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument
by displaying a “booking” photograph that was not introduced at
trial.

Next, Ramsey argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by displaying
Ramsey’s booking photograph during closing arguments. The state presented the
photograph, which was a profile view of Ramsey, alongside Ramsey’s name, date of birth,
and the phrase “Block Money,” while arguing that Ramsey was identified as the shooter.
After the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, Ramsey renewed his motion for a mistrial
because the photograph was not received into evidence during trial . The district court
determined the photo was relevant and not unreasonably prejudicial and denied the motion
for a mistrial.
“A prosecutor’s closing argument should be based on the evidence presented at trial
and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence.” State v. Bauer, 776 N.W.2d 462,
475 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). A prosecutor engages in misconduct when
they refer to facts that were not admitted as evidence. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776,
788-89 (Minn. 2006). To determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred during
15
closing argument, we examine “the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective
phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v.
Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993).
We conclude that it was error for the prosecutor to use the booking photograph
during closing argument. 6 The state concedes that the photograph used during closing
argument was not introduced at trial. 7 And the Minnesota Supreme Court does “not
approve of the practice of admitting ‘mug shots’ or ‘booking photographs,’ particularly if
the defendant has already been identified.” State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 418 (Minn.
1992).
While the state argues that the photograph was duplicative of other photographs
introduced at trial, this is not persuasive. The photograph admitted during trial was not an
obvious booking photograph but showed Ramsey wearing street clothes and looking
directly into the camera. In contrast, the photograph used during closing argument was a
side profile of Ramsey from the neck up, and thus was easily identifiable as a booking
photograph. And because there was no eyewitness testimony, a large portion of the state’s

6 The state argues that we should review the prosecutor’s use of the booking photograph
under the modified plain-error standard because Ramsey’s objection was untimely. We
note that, similar to above, although Ramsey did not object until after the jury started to
deliberate, the district court was given an opportunity to declare a mistrial. See Morgan ,
477 N.W.2d at 531. And because we later conclude that the cumulative effect of errors
deprived Ramsey of a fair trial, we ultimately need not decide whether Ramsey’s objection
was timely.
7 At trial the state noted that it thought the photograph had been admitted, but was not
careful to make sure they were using the exhibit that had been admitted during closing
argument.
16
case was focused on Ramsey’s physical features and identifying Ramsey as the individual
depicted on the surveillance video.
In sum, the state had no good faith basis to believe that the photograph was
admissible, and we conclude that the prosecutor committed misconduct by showing and
referring to it during closing arguments.
B. Unobjected-to Prosecutorial Misconduct
If the defendant does not object during trial, we “review the prosecutor’s statements
under a modified plain error analysis.” State v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716, 726 (Minn. 2022)
(citing State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299-300, 302 (Minn. 2006)). Under the modified
plain-error test, the appellant bears the burden to show that the prosecutor committed error
and that the error is plain. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. An error is plain if it “contravenes
case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. If a defendant establishes plain error, the
burden shifts to the state to show that “the plain error did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights.” State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Minn. 2021). Ramsey argues that
the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible hearsay evidence
identifying Ramsey as the shooter.
1. The prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible
hearsay evidence identifying Ramsey as the shooter and violating
Ramsey’s right to confrontation.

Ramsey argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting inadmissible
evidence from the analyst identifying Ramsey as the shooter. Ramsey argues that this
evidence violated his right to confrontation and was inadmissible hearsay. Specifically,
Ramsey challenges the following testimony:
17
Q: And then during your briefing, were you given additional
information that could lead you on the path to potentially
identify the shooter in this shooting?
A: Yes. [An officer] had received information that the shooter
goes by the name Block.
. . . .
Q: Were you able to identify the shooter in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: And how did you do that?
A:When reviewing the still shots and video from inside [the
nightclub], the videos, they’re incredibly clear. They are clear
enough to see scars, marks, tattoos. Scars, marks, and tattoos
are something that are unique. And combined with the tattoos
that I could see, him being in the presence of – it appeared to
me that he was with [an associate], so I had assumed – well,
I’ll back up. Between the tattoos, between him being with [the
associate], and searching for the name “Block,” I ended up
looking at Deondre Ramsey. And I had information from other
agencies previously that he went by Block, or Block Money,
and the tattoos that I could see on the video matched.

(Emphasis added.)

Ramsey argues that admitting the analyst’s statement identifying the shooter
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. We review whether the admission of evidence violated the Confrontation
Clause de novo. State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Minn. 2021). And the plain-error
analysis applies to unobjected-to alleged violations of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses. See State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 649-50 (Minn. App. 2018),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018).
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to confront the witnesses
against him.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 864 (Minn. 2008). The Confrontation
Clause prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear
18
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
for cross -examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). A
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause are violated when (1) “the statement in
question was testimonial,” (2) “the statement was admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted,” and (3) “the defendant was unable to cross-examine the declarant.” Sutter, 959
N.W.2d at 765.
We first address whether the statements at issue were testimonial. Here, an officer
received information from someone that the shooter goes by the name “Block” and then
conveyed this information to the analyst. We conclude that these statements are testimonial
because they were made for the purpose of establishing past events for a later criminal
prosecution. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Second, we address whether the statements were offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. The state argues that the statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause
because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that Ramsey’s street-name
was “Block.” Instead, the testimony was offered to show why the analyst focused on
Ramsey as a suspect, and the out-of-court statement was admissible as a tip offered to
explain steps in the investigation. We are not persuaded.
“In criminal cases, evidence that an arresting or investigating officer received a tip
for purposes of explaining why the police conducted surveillance is not hearsay.” State v.
Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2002). But “a police officer testifying in a criminal
case may not, under the guise of explaining how the investigation focused on the defendant,
relate hearsay statements of others.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the statement was not
19
offered only to explain the investigation, but also to directly tie Ramsey to the crime. The
prosecutor directly asked, “were you able to identify the shooter in this case?” We note
that this was a leading question to elicit the analyst’s personal belief that Ramsey was the
shooter. See State v. Hardy, 354 N.W.2d 21, 24-25 (Minn. 1984) (concluding it was error
for a prosecutor to attempt to use the contents of a tip to tie the defendant to the crimes
because “the potential of the evidence being used for an improper purpose outweighed its
very limited probative value”); see also Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d at 915 (reversing and
remanding for a new trial because officer expressed personal opinion about defendant’s
guilt). And the record demonstrates that during closing argument, the state relied on the
out-of-court statement to argue that “Block” was Ramsey’s nickname and Ramsey was the
shooter.
Lastly, we conclude that Ramsey was not able to cross-examine the police officer
who communicated with the analyst, or the individual who communicated with the police
officer because the state did not call these individuals to testify. And the state had the
burden to allow Ramsey to confront the witnesses who offered the statements against him.
State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 2001). Therefore, we conclude the prosecutor
elicited inadmissible testimony that violated Ramsey’s right to confrontation.
III. The cumulative effect of the errors deprived Ramsey of his right to a fair trial.

We next turn to whether the cumulative effect of the identified errors requires
reversal. We first assume, without deciding that, individually the alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or did not affect
Ramsey’s substantial rights. See State v. Keeton, 589 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Minn. 1998)
20
(declining to consider whether errors standing alone would warrant a new trial because the
“errors, taken cumulatively, deprived the appellant of his right to a fair trial”); see also
Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d at 791 (considering whether the combination of the evidentiary
errors and the multiple incidents and types of prosecutorial misconduct deprived appellant
of a fair trial). “[An] appellant may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the ‘errors,
when taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying [th e] appellant a fair trial.’” State v.
Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 560
(Minn. 2009)). “When considering a claim of cumulative error, we look to the
egregiousness of the errors and the strength of the state’s case.” Id. The state argues that
the cumulative effect of the errors did not deprive Ramsey of a fair trial because “the state’s
case was also otherwise strong in its own right.” We disagree.
Here, the state’s case consisted of video evidence of a man wearing a white t-shirt
and blue hat entering the nightclub and separate video evidence of an individual shooting
the victim. Relying on details from the video evidence—tattoos and an individual known
to law enforcement—investigators identified Ramsey as the individual shown in the video
at the nightclub. A few days after the shooting, Ramsey was arrested with a Glock pistol
that, through forensic testing, was identified to be the same weapon used in the shooting.
Ramsey participated in a Scales interview, during which the interviewing sergeant
interpreted Ramsey’s nonverbal body language to mean that he agreed with her statement,
“the switch that you were caught with was the switch you used in the shoot.” Based on
this evidence, the jury may have found Ramsey guilty. But “[p]rosecutors have an
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affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial, no matter how strong
the evidence of guilt.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 300.
The jury should not have heard improper hearsay testimony identifying Ramsey as
the shooter on the surveillance video. This evidence deprived Ramsey of a fair trial because
the identity of the shooter was the main dispute at trial and there was no evidence from
eyewitnesses or from the victim identifying Ramsey as the shooter or placing him in
downtown Minneapolis on the night of the offense. The only other evidence identifying
Ramsey was dark surveillance video of a man wearing a white t-shirt and blue hat entering
the nightclub and separate surveillance video of an individual shooting the victim. See
Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at 279 (“[W]e are more inclined to order a new trial for cumulative
errors in very close factual cases.”). This error was amplified by improper testimony from
three different law enforcement officers suggesting that Ramsey had been arrested in the
past and had a propensity to possess firearms. And the state reminded the jury of that
inadmissable testimony during closing argument by using a booking photograph with the
words “Block Money” and Ramsey’s name to argue Ramsey was the shooter, referencing
both the hearsay testimony and the testimony suggesting Ramsey’s arrest history.
Additionally, after the state displayed the “booking” photograph, no curative instruction
was given. However, even if a curative instruction was given, the misconduct was
repeated, persuasive, and likely not lessened by a curative instruction. See State v.
Reardon, 73 N.W.2d 192, 194- 95 (Minn. 1955) (holding a curative instruction may not
always assuage prejudice that improper remarks may cause).
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In sum, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct and
evidentiary errors denied Ramsey the right to a fair trial. We reverse both convictions
because both convictions were based on the same evidence. And t he identification of the
shooter was also dispositive of whether Ramsey was guilty of possessing a machine gun.
Although Ramsey had a firearm in his possession when he was arrested, and he was
arrested in Ramsey C ounty, the jury found him guilty of possessing a machine gun
“between September 17, 2022, and September 21, 2022, in Hennepin County.” (Emphasis
added.) Accordingly, we reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. 8
Reversed and remanded.

8 Ramsey also argues that the district court erred by sentencing him on two convictions
arising out of the same behavioral incident. Because we reverse and remand for a new
trial, we do not address Ramsey’s alternative challenge to his sentence, nor do we address
the arguments raised in Ramsey’s pro se supplemental brief.