Court of Appeals Bryce Holstad, et al v. Town of May Hennesy, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Moore, III, McKeig, Thissen, JJ

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STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A24-1113
Court of Appeals
Bryce Holstad, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Town of May,
Respondent.
Hennesy, J.
Concurring in part, dissenting in part,
Moore, III, McKeig, Thissen, JJ.
Filed: September 23, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
________________________
Devon C. Holstad, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellants.
Robert A. Alsop, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
respondent.
Jason M. Hill, Troy J. Gilchrist, Town Law Center PLLP, Wayzata, Minnesota, for amicus
curiae the Minnesota Association of Townships.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. A cartway established under Minnesota Statutes section 164.08,
subdivision 2(a), must be at least two rods wide, regardless of the size of the parcel it
connects, and a town does not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, when it
rejects a petitioner’s cartway route proposal and selects an alternative route that the town

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reasonably concludes to be in the public’s best interest and less disruptive and damaging
to the affected landowners.
2. A town does not exceed its statutory authority when it conditions opening a
cartway on constructing that cartway to particular standards and requires the petitioning
landowner to obtain other federal, state, and county regulatory approvals.
3. Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(d), and Minnesota
Statutes section 164.10, when read together, grant a town discretion to decide whether to
expend public funds on a cartway.
4. Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(c), allows a town to
include its attorney fees incurred until a cartway is opened in the town’s damages,
including fees incurred in connection with a petitioner’s appeal of the cartway
determination.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
HENNESY, Justice.
This case asks us to consider the scope of a town’s authority when establishing a
cartway under Minn. Stat. § 164.08. Appellants Bryce Holstad and Jody Holstad (the
Holstads), owners of an approximately 2.5-acre landlocked property, petitioned
respondent Town of May (the Town) to establish a cartway providing access to their
property after the Holstads failed to reach an agreement with their neighbors to create a
private easement that would allow access. After inspecting the relevant properties and
hosting multiple public hearings, the Town approved a different cartway route than the

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one the Holstads proposed, required them to construct the cartway in accordance with a
town engineer’s plan, and specified that all relevant regulatory bodies must approve the
cartway prior to its opening or use. The Town declined to expend public funds for the
cartway, making the Holstads solely responsible for its construction and maintenance.
The Town further ordered the Holstads to pay damages to the neighbors1 and to pay the
Town’s professional fees and other costs, including attorney fees.
The Holstads appealed to the district court. The district court upheld the Town’s
cartway determination and ordered the Holstads to pay the Town’s professional fees
incurred in connection with establishing the cartway. The Holstads appealed this decision
to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted the Holstads’ petition for further
review. In their appeal before us, the Holstads raise three main arguments. First, they
argue that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law when it rejected
the Holstads’ proposed cartway route and instead required a route the Holstads claim is
more “disruptive and damaging” and fails to give them “meaningful access” to their
property. Second, the Holstads claim that the Town exceeded its statutory authority by
conditioning the establishment of a cartway on specific construction requirements to
improve the route and on federal, state, and county regulatory approval. Third, they assert
that the Town erred in requiring them to pay for both the cartway’s construction and the
Town’s attorney fees associated with their appeal.

1 These damages were to compensate the owners of the land taken to establish the
cartway. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c).

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We conclude that the Town did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to
law, when it rejected the Holstads’ petitioned-for cartway route and instead selected the
engineer’s route. We further conclude that the Town did not exceed its statutory authority
when it required the Holstads to improve the cartway through construction before the
cartway could be opened or used, or when it required them to obtain federal, state, and
county regulatory approvals before construction. We also conclude that the Town did not
err by ordering the Holstads to pay for the cartway’s construction. And finally, we
conclude that the Town did not err by requiring the Holstads to pay the Town’s attorney
fees associated with the Holstads’ appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
court of appeals.
FACTS
The Holstads, mother and son, own an approximately 2.5-acre landlocked property
(the Holstad Property) along the St. Croix River in the Town of May. For the entire time
that the Holstads have owned the property—and the entire time Bryce Holstad’s
grandfather owned it before them—the property has been without roadway access. The
Holstad Property abuts land owned by the National Park Service to the north and west. It
abuts National Park Service land and the St. Croix River to the east. To the south, the
Holstad property borders privately owned property (the neighboring property). The public
road nearest to the Holstad Property is State Highway 95, commonly known as the “St.
Croix Trail.” Prior to submitting their cartway petition, the Holstads attempted to
negotiate a private easement with the neighboring property’s owners (the neighbors), but
the negotiations were unsuccessful.

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In June 2022, the Holstads petitioned the Town to establish a cartway over the
neighboring property pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2. The Town Board
inspected the relevant properties, examined the Holstads’ proposed cartway location on
the neighboring property, and held public hearings to determine the cartway’s location
and possible damage to the Town and the neighboring property. The Holstads, the
neighbors, and an engineer for the Town each made a proposal as to a location for the
cartway.
The Holstads proposed that the Town establish a cartway over an “existing private
driveway” that runs east from St. Croix Trail and provides access to the neighboring
property, without any improvement to the driveway.
The Town found that the “driveway” the Holstads proposed as a cartway route is
“an unimproved gravel/sand path that is used for ingress and egress to [the neighbors’]
seasonal cabin on the St. Croix River.” “As it moves from west to east, it traverses the
bluff and steep ravines and then drops down to the seasonal cabin. Before doing so,
however, it threads through heavily forested areas and steep ravines and drop offs on both
sides.” The unimproved “driveway” route, at most points, is barely wide enough for a
single passenger vehicle2 and will not accommodate emergency vehicles. During the
winter months, the driveway route is almost completely impassable. In fact, an appraiser
had to use a snowmobile to reach the lower area of the parcel during the winter. The

2 The Town received evidence that the “driveway” route was, at its narrowest, less
than 11 feet wide.

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Town concluded that establishing a cartway using the existing driveway, without
improvements, is neither feasible nor consistent with public health, safety, or welfare.
The neighbors opposed both the establishment of a cartway and the Holstads’
proposal. If, however, a cartway were to be established, the neighbors agreed that it
should follow the same general path as the Holstads’ proposal, but they argued that it
should be two rods3 wide and incorporate improvements, including “retaining walls,
guardrails, and extensive grading and filling.” Although the Town did not make specific
findings regarding the cost of this option, the town engineer provided very high-level
estimates that the improvements would cost between $1.4 million and $1.9 million.
The town engineer proposed another route, which would enter the neighboring
property in the same fashion as the Holstads’ proposed route, but “turn[] north before
reaching many of the extremely steep slopes and ravines on the [neighboring property].”
Compared to the Holstads’ proposed route, the engineer’s route is shorter and “avoids
steep slopes, drop-offs and ravines.” The engineer’s route is also farther away from the
river, closer to the boundary of National Park Service regulations, and comparatively less
intrusive to the neighbors because it does not approach their cabin. Again, the Town did
not make specific findings regarding the cost of this option, but the town engineer
presented estimates that the improvements required for this route would also range from
$1.4 million to $1.9 million.

3 A rod is a unit of measurement equaling 16.5 feet. In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543,
546 n.1 (Minn. 2003).

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Ultimately, the Town adopted a resolution approving a cartway consistent with the
engineer’s proposed route. The Town reasoned that because a cartway is open to the
public, the Town must expect public traffic on the cartway and must likewise consider
potential dangers invited by cross traffic. To address safety concerns, the Town’s
resolution requires the cartway to be improved in accordance with the engineer’s
recommendations, which includes a requirement that the cartway be at least two rods
wide with a paved width of 16 feet and two-foot gravel shoulders. The resolution further
requires the Holstads to obtain regulatory approvals from relevant federal and state
agencies and the local county before constructing the cartway. Finally, the resolution
requires that “[n]o construction, opening, or use of the cartway shall be made until it is
certified by the Town Board” as compliant with the conditions set forth in the resolution.
With respect to damages, the Town awarded the neighbors $200,000 for the taking
of their property in order to establish the cartway. The Town also ordered the Holstads to
“pay for the cost of the Town’s professional and other services, hearing costs,
administrative costs, recording costs and other costs and expenses which the town may
incur in connection with the proceedings for the establishment of the cartway.” See Minn.
Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c) (providing that a petitioner will pay these costs in damages to
the town). The Town estimated its legal, engineering, administrative, and finance fees to
be approximately $95,500.
The Holstads appealed the Town’s resolution to district court, see Minn. Stat.
§§ 164.08, subd. 2(b), 164.07, subd. 7; and moved for partial summary judgment. The
Town opposed the motion and requested attorney fees in connection with the Holstads’

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appeal. The district court denied the Holstads’ motion. It concluded that both the Town’s
selection of an alternative route for the cartway and its requirement that the cartway be
improved at the Holstads’ expense were consistent with applicable law and supported by
the record. The district court also upheld the Town’s requirement that the Holstads pay
for the Town’s professional fees associated with establishing the cartway, including
attorney fees in connection with the appeal to district court.
The Holstads further appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed. Holstad v.
Town of May, 17 N.W.3d 764, 767 (Minn. App. 2025). The court of appeals held that the
Town did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, when it selected an
alternative cartway route to the route the Holstads requested. Id. at 775–76. The court of
appeals also upheld the construction and federal, state, and county regulatory approval
requirements imposed by the Town, reasoning that “the requirement to obtain regulatory
approvals does not undermine the establishment of the cartway” and that the Town had
“implied authority” to impose construction and improvement conditions when exercising
its mandatory duty to establish a cartway pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2. Id. at
771–73. As to damages, the court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c),
authorizes the Town to “include in the damages award attorney fees in connection with
the appeal of the town’s order establishing a cartway and engineer fees in overseeing
construction.” Id. at 778. The court of appeals therefore affirmed the district court’s
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding damages. Id. at 778–
79. We granted the Holstads’ petition for further review.

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ANALYSIS
This appeal requires us to determine the scope of a town’s statutory authority
under the cartway statute, Minn. Stat. § 164.08. Before we do so, we provide a brief
overview of cartways and cartway law in Minnesota, and in particular the history of what
is now Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2.
Neither section 164.08, nor any other relevant statute, specifically defines a
“cartway” or how it differs from other roads or paths. Cases discussing cartways extend
back hundreds of years and into English law. See Sarah R. Jewell, Cartways—An Ancient
Relic Disturbing Today’ s Rural Landscape?, 42 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1139, 1141
(2016). “Cartways” were originally one of many forms of “ways,” or roads, including
horseways and footways, “all of which became known as highways, so long as they were
open to public use.” Id. A modern cartway, however, is a type of public road or highway
open for modern vehicles such as automobiles. See Minn. Stat. § 160.02, subd. 26
(defining “[r]oad” or “highway” to include “cartways”); id., subd. 28 (defining “[t]own
roads” to “include[] those roads and cartways which have heretofore been or which
hereafter may be established, constructed, or improved under the authority of the several
town boards”).
Even if cartways are not explicitly defined by statute, they are the subject of
Minnesota Statutes section 164.08. The first version of this statute was adopted in 1913;
“[i]ts origin and purpose are obscure.” Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elysian Twp.,
LeSueur Cnty., 167 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Minn. 1969). “Apparently it was intended to
expand the common-law rules governing ways of necessity ….” Id. As all parties agree,

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the creation of a cartway is related to the power of eminent domain. Specifically, the
cartway statute “in effect giv[es] the owner whose property is isolated the right to require
the town to condemn an easement for private access on condition the petitioner
compensates the owner of the subservient tenement for the taking.” Id. But “[t]he cartway
when laid out by public authority is a public way, open to the free use of the public,
though laid out and opened primarily for the benefit of a particular person.” Carlson v.
Elmo Twp., 169 N.W. 805, 806 (Minn. 1918). If the resulting cartway were not a public
way, the condemnation of the land it occupies could amount to an unconstitutional taking
of land for private use, because “[i]t is elementary that private property cannot be taken
under the power of eminent domain for a purely private purpose.” Powell v. Town Bd. of
Sinnott Twp., Marshall Cnty., 221 N.W. 527, 528 (Minn. 1928); see City of Duluth v.
State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986) (emphasizing that exercising eminent domain
powers to benefit private interests is constitutional “[a]s long as the predominant purpose
being furthered is a public one”); Trout Brook Realty Co. v. Town of Featherstone,
217 N.W. 499, 500 (Minn. 1928) (rejecting argument that “the land required … was taken
for private use, and not public”).
Although a cartway is a public way, it is financed differently from other public
ways. “Town road and bridge funds shall not be expended on the cartway unless the town
board … by resolution determines that an expenditure is in the public interest.” Minn.
Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d). “If no resolution is adopted to that effect, the grading or other
construction work and the maintenance of the cartway is the responsibility of the
petitioner ….” Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 164.10 (“Any town board may expend town road and

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bridge funds upon a legally established cartway the same as on town roads if, in the
judgment of the board the public interests require it ….”). But a group of taxpayers may,
by petition, call for a town’s electors to vote on whether to expend town funds on a
cartway. Minn. Stat. § 164.10; see Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d) (explicitly providing
that its provisions are subject to the section 164.10 petition process).
Against this background, we consider the Holstads’ challenges to the Town’s
cartway resolution. First, we consider whether the Town acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
or contrary to law, by rejecting the Holstads’ proposed cartway route and selecting the
town engineer’s route. Second, we discuss whether the Town exceeded its authority under
Minn. Stat. § 164.08 when it required the Holstads to construct the cartway in accordance
with its resolution and to obtain federal, state, and county regulatory approvals as
conditions to opening the cartway. Next, we analyze whether the Town erred by ordering
the Holstads to pay for constructing the cartway. Finally, we address whether the Holstads
are obligated to pay the Town’s attorney fees associated with the Holstads’ appeals.
I.
First, the Holstads argue that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously or
contrary to law by selecting the town engineer’s proposed cartway route instead of their
petitioned-for route. The Town argues that it acted within its statutory authority to select
the alternative route because the route the Holstads proposed is neither safe nor compliant
with the statutory width requirement for a cartway. The parties’ dispute as they now
frame it questions whether, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), a cartway that
serves a landlocked parcel between two and five acres in size must be at least two rods

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wide. We therefore begin our analysis by interpreting the statutory width requirement. We
then consider whether the Town otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary
to law when it selected the engineer’s route.
A.
1.
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” Kennedy v.
Pepin Twp. of Wabasha Cnty., 784 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 2010). When interpreting a
statute, we must first “determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is
ambiguous.” State v. Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d 620, 624 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a statute is ambiguous, we
construe statutes as a whole so that statutory language is understood in context. If the
language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning.” Id. If the statute is
ambiguous, meaning the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation, then we may “go beyond the language at issue to ascertain the intent of the
Legislature.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the statutory provision at issue is Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), which
provides, in full:
[1] Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract of land
containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto except over a
navigable waterway or over the lands of others, or whose access thereto is
less than two rods in width, the to wn board by resolution shall establish a
cartway at least two rods wide connecting the petitioner’s land with a public
road. [2] A town board shall establish a cartway upon a petition of an owner
of a tract of land that, as of January 1, 1998, was on record as a separate
parcel, contained at least two but less than five acres, and has no access
thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others. [3] The

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town board may select an alternative route other than that petitioned for if
the alternative is deemed by the town board to be less disruptive and
damaging to the affected landowners and in the public’s best interest.
The Holstads argue that because the “at least two rods wide” requirement appears only in
the first sentence of this provision, and not the second, the width requirement applies only
to cartways that serve parcels five acres or more in size, not parcels between two and five
acres. Because the Holstad Property is approximately 2.5 acres, the Holstads claim that
any cartway connecting their property to a public road is not subject to the two rods
requirement. We disagree.
The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), requires that a cartway
serving a landlocked parcel between two and five acres in size be at least two rods wide.
The Holstads’ argument ignores the overall structure of subdivision 2(a), and in particular
the connection between its first two sentences. The first sentence not only governs a tract
of land that is at least five acres; it also provides defining criteria relevant to the
definition of a cartway generally,4 addressing not only its minimum width, but also the
requirement that it “connect[] the petitioner’s land with a public road.” Id. The second
sentence, standing on its own, requires neither that a cartway be any particular width nor
that it connect landlocked property to a public road. See id. In other words, it is
impossible to determine a cartway’s characteristics set out in the second sentence without
reference to the first. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015) (emphasizing
that “we construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its

4 As noted above, Minnesota Statutes do not contain an explicit definition of the
term “cartway.”

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provisions”). If we were to accept the Holstads’ reasoning that a cartway serving their
property need not be two rods in width, we might also necessarily conclude that the
cartway need not connect their property to a public road. We reject this conclusion.
Instead, reading Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), as a whole reveals that the only
reasonable interpretation is that the first sentence’s width requirement—along with its
requirement that a cartway connect the parcel in question to a public road—applies to all
cartways in subdivision 2(a), regardless of the size of the landlocked parcels they serve.5
2.
In their briefing and during oral argument, the Holstads advanced an alternative
argument—namely, that even if, as we have just held, the two-rod width requirement is
relevant to cartways serving smaller parcels like theirs, that requirement applies only to
land taken to establish a cartway, not the “travelable portion” of the cartway. In the
Holstads’ view, the statutory width requirement is met so long as the land designated for
cartway purposes satisfies the statutory two-rod width requirement. But the travelable
portion, they argue, does not have to be two rods wide. And because they “could be
granted a 33-foot wide cartway over the existing driveway even if the travelable portion
of the driveway is less than 33-feet wide,” the Holstads argue that the Town acted under

5 We note that Minn. Stat. § 164.11 states that, “[l]and dedicated to public use as a
street, road, or cartway, if not less than 30 feet in width, shall be deemed a legal cartway.”
But what is before us here is a petition for a cartway under Minn. Stat. § 164.08,
subd. 2(a), and our analysis focuses on that provision; no party argues that this case
involves land already dedicated to public use being “deemed a legal cartway.”

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an erroneous theory of law in concluding that a two-rod-wide cartway was not possible
over their requested route.
But the Holstads are countering a legal theory the Town never advanced and thus
that we need not decide. The Town has never asserted that the two-rod requirement
extends to the travelable portion of a cartway. In fact, the Town’s resolution granting the
Holstads a cartway calls for the cartway to “be in width provided by the statute [i.e., two
rods] but its improved surface should be … 16 feet wide with 2-foot gravel shoulders
and … allow for emergency vehicle access.”6 Moreover, although the Town now argues
that the petitioned-for route does not “satisfy the 2-rod width requirement for a valid
cartway under the statute,” it frames that argument in terms of “the topography of the
petitioned route,” which “has one section that is less than 11 feet wide with a sharp cliff
face on one side and a steep drop-off on the other.” The resolution itself does not cite the
two-rod width requirement in rejecting the Holstads’ requested route. Rather, the
resolution reasons that the route the Holstads proposed, “even with superficial
modifications such as paving,” would present “health, safety, [and] welfare concerns,”
citing both its narrowness and the “existing extreme topography under and adjacent to the
driveway.” In other words, although the resolution does consider the narrow width of the

6 The town engineer’s standards, attached to the resolution as Exhibit A, call for a
16-foot paved surface with “[b]oulevard grading/restoration for snow storage” of “4 feet
along each side.” The Holstads do not argue that their petitioned-for route would meet
such requirements, nor do we see any evidence in the record suggesting that it would.

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Holstads’ proposed route as a reason to reject their proposal, it does not specifically fault
the Holstads’ route for having a travelable surface less than two rods wide.7
Therefore, we reject not only the Holstads’ argument that their cartway is not
subject to the statutory two-rod width requirement, but also their argument that the Town
improperly applied the two-rod requirement to the entire travelable surface of the
cartway. Accordingly, the Holstads’ arguments that the Town acted contrary to law by
concluding that the cartway must be two rods wide fail.
B.
Having rejected the Holstads’ arguments that the Town made an error in law
regarding a cartway’s statutorily required width, we next determine whether the Town
otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law when it selected the
engineer’s route.
A town “acts in a legislative capacity” when it reviews a petition to establish a
cartway. Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 381 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We will “set aside a township’s cartway determination only if it appears that the
evidence is practically conclusive against it, or that the local board proceeded on an
erroneous theory of law, or that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously against the best

7 In this perhaps-unusual case, the petitioners suggest that a town could satisfy its
duty under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), to establish a cartway at least two rods wide
by designating a path that is in some places “less than 11 feet wide with a sharp cliff face
on one side and a steep drop-off on the other.” We can easily imagine this scenario in
reverse in a future case, that is, a town designating a narrow cartway through precarious
terrain as an alternative to the cartway petitioner requests. In such a case, the petitioner
might then challenge that cartway as not satisfying the two-rod width requirement as a
practical matter. Because that case is not before us, however, we express no opinion on it.

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interests of the public.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A local
governmental entity’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if it reflects its will rather than
its judgment, or when a decision is based on whim or is devoid of articulated reasons.” In
re Year 2019 Salary of Freeborn Cnty. Sheriff, 955 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Minn. 2021)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Holstads assert that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and contrary
to law, in selecting the engineer’s route. Although they argue the Town’s decision was
“based on whim” and “devoid of articulated reasons,” they do not specify how or how
this makes the Town’s decision arbitrary and capricious. See id. (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Holstads primarily argue the Town acted
contrary to law in three respects, dovetailing that argument with our standard that a
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it “relied on factors not intended by the legislature.”
See Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006) (“[A]n agency ruling is arbitrary and capricious if the
agency (a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem; (c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the
evidence; or (d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained as a
difference in view or the result of the agency's expertise.”). First, the Holstads claim that
the engineer’s route is more “disruptive and damaging” than the Holstads’ proposal
because the engineer’s route requires the Holstads to construct an expensive cartway in
an ecologically sensitive area. Second, the Holstads insist that the Town did not follow
our precedent in Kennedy v. Pepin Township of Wabasha County because the Town

18
rejected their proposed cartway before considering alternatives. Finally, the Holstads
assert that the Town failed to provide them “meaningful access” to their property, as
Kennedy required, because the Town’s designated cartway came with a $1.4 million price
tag that is the Holstads’ sole responsibility, making the Town’s chosen cartway “illusory
and prohibitively burdensome” for the Holstads. We address each argument in turn.
1.
Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), explicitly authorizes a town
to select an alternative to a petitioner’s proposed cartway route if the town “deem[s]” the
alternative route to be “less disruptive and damaging to the affected landowners and in
the public’s best interest.” In Kennedy, we interpreted subdivision 2(a) to require that “a
township establish the route requested by the petitioner unless the township determines
both that an alternative route will be less disruptive and damaging to neighbors and that
the alternative route is in the public’s best interest.” 784 N.W.2d at 384. But we also
emphasized that the town—not a reviewing court—has discretion to select an alternative
cartway route if it makes such determinations. Id. at 384–85.
In this case, the Town determined the engineer’s proposed route would be less
disruptive because “it pulls the cartway back from the [neighbors’] seasonal cabin, avoids
substantial steep and narrow slopes where two-way vehicle traffic (or even any vehicle
traffic[)] is not feasible … and avoids additional clearing, tree cutting and excavation on
some of the most sensitive areas of the [neighboring property].” While the Holstads are
correct that the engineer’s proposed route requires extensive construction before the
cartway can be opened, the Holstads’ proposed route would require similar construction.

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Indeed, the Town found that “use of the existing driveway in an unimproved state is not
feasible nor consistent with public health, safety or welfare.” As discussed above, the
Holstads’ proposed route, in its current state, does not allow for two-way vehicle traffic
and is not passable for emergency vehicles. Therefore, substantial construction would be
required to widen the Holstads’ proposed route to address usability concerns. Compared
to the Holstads’ selected route, the engineer’s route avoids several of the steep slopes,
ravines, and drop-offs, which suggests that the engineer’s route would also be safer than
the Holstads’ proposed route after construction. The Town’s decision to require the
engineer’s route was based on a thorough investigation—including photos, a video,
landowners’ testimonies, and the engineer’s expert opinion—as well as an in-depth
review process that included multiple hearings where all impacted parties could present
their arguments. The Town articulated its reasons for selecting the engineer’s proposal in
its resolution. As such, the Town’s decision was not “based on whim,” “devoid of
articulated reasons,” or simply “its will rather than its judgment.” See Salary of Freeborn
Cnty. Sheriff, 955 N.W.2d at 924 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Holstads argue—reasonably—that an over-one-million-dollar construction
project in an ecologically sensitive area is “disruptive and damaging.” But it appears that
the location of their property, and the configuration of its surroundings, make “disruptive
and damaging” construction inevitable to ensure the public can use the cartway and to
address safety concerns. Because the Town reasonably found the engineer’s route less
disruptive and damaging than the Holstads’, we reject the Holstads’ argument to the
contrary.

20
2.
The Holstads also claim that the Town acted contrary to law by failing to follow
what the Holstads characterize as “Kennedy’s central holding.” As noted above, in
Kennedy we interpreted the last sentence of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), to require
“that a township establish the route requested by the petitioner unless the township
determines both that an alternative route will be less disruptive and damaging to
neighbors and that the alternative route is in the public’s best interest.” 784 N.W.2d at
384. Relying on this one sentence, the Holstads argue that Kennedy requires the Town to
“directly compare” any alternative route with their petitioned-for route, and that the Town
failed to follow Kennedy because it rejected their requested route before considering
alternatives. We disagree with the Holstads’ reading of Kennedy.
In Kennedy, the sequence of the township’s decision-making process was not at
issue, nor did our use of “and” suggest that a town is required to conduct its decision-
making in a particular order. See id. Even assuming the Holstads’ characterization of
Kennedy were correct, the Town’s resolution indicates that it evaluated all proposed
cartway routes at public hearings and determined that the engineer’s proposal is the “most
practical and least disruptive or damaging route for the cartway.” In other words, the
Town did “directly compare” the engineer’s proposed route with the Holstads’. The
Holstads’ “direct comparison” argument is therefore unpersuasive.
3.
Finally, the Holstads argue that the Town’s mandated cartway route fails to
provide them “meaningful access” because it requires them to undertake a $1.4 million

21
construction project, which they argue makes the Town’s cartway designation “illusory
and prohibitively burdensome.” The text of Minnesota Statutes section 164.08,
subdivision 2(a), does not explicitly require that a cartway route provide a petitioner with
“meaningful access.” Instead, this requirement comes from Kennedy. See 784 N.W.2d at
383 (stating that “[i]f a selected route does not provide meaningful access to a tract of
land, then it fails to satisfy the requirement that a cartway be provided”).
In Kennedy, the petitioner requested that a township establish a cartway for access
to his land and a dispute arose as to the cartway’s location. Id. at 380. After evaluating
three route options, the town board adopted the adjoining property owners’ proposal
because it was the “least costly, and least disruptive to adjoining property owners.” Id. at
381. This route, however, only gave the petitioner access to an unusable portion of his
property. Id. Following State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 20 N.W.2d 345, 348
(Minn. 1945), which held that a petitioner was entitled to a cartway that provided access
to a usable portion of his land even though an unusable portion of his land was connected
to a public road, we concluded that a cartway route must provide access to a usable
portion of the petitioner’s land in order to satisfy the statutory requirements. Kennedy,
784 N.W.2d at 382–84. In that context, we held that the town had “acted upon an
erroneous theory of law when it selected a cartway route … that did not provide
meaningful access to petitioner’s land.” Id. at 384. In short, Kennedy stands for the
proposition that a cartway route that does not provide the petitioner access to a usable
portion of their property does not provide “meaningful access.”

22
We have never extended the concept of “meaningful access” beyond the context of
access to usable property. The Holstads invite us to do so. Specifically, they argue that
“meaningful access” should mean that the petitioner must be able to afford any
construction necessary to use the cartway. Here, the Holstads claim that even though the
Town granted their cartway petition, they still have to expend time, energy, and a
prohibitive amount of money to build the cartway, which demonstrates that the Town’s
cartway route does not actually give them “meaningful access” to their property. In short,
the Holstads urge us to hold that “meaningful access” must be analyzed from the
petitioner’s perspective, and that the “meaningful access” analysis requires a town to
consider affordability for the petitioner as a factor in selecting a cartway route. We
decline to do so.
As an initial matter, a town’s cartway determination is a legislative one that should
be given substantial deference. See id. at 381. If we were to hold that “meaningful
access” means a cartway must be affordable to the petitioners, we would erode the
legislative authority the statute gives a town by prioritizing petitioners’ needs over the
public interest, including public safety. This case involves challenging factual
circumstances where, it appears, there is no option that meets statutory and practical
width requirements and serves the public’s best interest as determined by the Town, and
is also affordable according to the Holstads. If we were to expand the “meaningful
access” analysis to include affordability, we would be mandating a potentially impossible
task—that the Town establish a cartway that is at least two rods wide, safe for the public
to use notwithstanding the challenging terrain in which it must be located, and falls

23
within the Holstads’ budget. We do not interpret the language of the cartway statute to
require towns to do the impossible. We therefore decline at this time to expand the
“meaningful access” analysis beyond what we held in Kennedy—“meaningful access”
requires a cartway to provide petitioners access to a usable portion of their property. See
Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006) (stating that “we will not read
into a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted, either purposely or
inadvertently”).8
Applying this interpretation of “meaningful access” here, we conclude the Town
did not fail to provide the Holstads “meaningful access.” Unlike in Kennedy, the record in
this case does not suggest that the Holstad Property includes any unusable portions, and
the Holstads do not assert otherwise. Accordingly, any cartway that allows the Holstads
to legally access their property also satisfies the “meaningful access” requirement. Nor do
the Holstads assert that the cartway route the Town granted would fail to connect the
Holstad Property to a public road. We therefore conclude the Town satisfied the
“meaningful access” requirement9 and did not act arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary
to law when it selected the engineer’s route instead of the Holstads’ proposal.

8 The partial dissent would instead expand the definition of “meaningful access” to
“include a range of practical considerations,” including “[p]hysical barriers, legal
restrictions, and burdens that make construction or use practically unattainable” without
explaining how the text of the statute or our decision in Kennedy compels such a result.
9 While we decline to expand the “meaningful access” analysis beyond what we
required in Kennedy, nothing in our decision should be interpreted to mean that a town is
prohibited from considering affordability for the petitioner in exercising its discretion to
determine a cartway route pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a). In fact, in this
case the Town noted that satisfying the statutory and practical width requirements and

24
II.
Second, the Holstads argue that the Town exceeded its statutory authority under
Minn. Stat. § 164.08 when it conditioned opening the cartway on specific construction
requirements and federal, state, and county regulatory approvals. The Holstads argue that
when a town “establish[es]” a cartway under the statute, the town’s authority is limited to
its “general condemnation authority” under its eminent domain power, which only allows
the town to legally declare a route a cartway. Relying on our prior cartway decision in
Rose, 20 N.W.2d at 348, the Holstads assert that the only discretion a town has when
establishing a cartway is in selecting the route. The Holstads also argue that constructing
a road on the designated cartway route is a separate process that requires a town to invoke
its general police power—a power that is beyond the scope of eminent domain and
therefore beyond the scope of the cartway statute. Accordingly, the Holstads contend, a
town may impose only one condition precedent prior to establishing and opening a
cartway—payment of damages enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c). Here,
because the Town conditioned opening the cartway on construction requirements and
federal, state, and county regulatory approvals, in addition to payment of damages, the
Holstads insist that the Town exceeded its statutory authority under Minn. Stat. § 164.08.
The Town agrees that establishing a cartway involves the exercise of a town
board’s eminent domain power, but it argues that it did not exceed its statutory authority

addressing public safety concerns would require significant construction, no matter which
route it picked, and determined that the engineer’s route will be easier and no more
expensive than other options satisfying those requirements and public safety concerns.

25
because placing conditions on a cartway is “an ordinary part of the process” and is
“within the Town Board’s authority.” The Town further argues that requiring the Holstads
to obtain necessary regulatory approval before constructing a cartway merely restates
other requirements of non-cartway law. We begin by considering whether the Town has
the statutory authority to order the Holstads to construct a cartway to particular standards
before its opening and use. We then discuss whether the Town exceeded its statutory
authority when it required the Holstads to obtain federal, state, and county regulatory
approvals before constructing and opening the cartway.
A.
We have not previously decided whether the cartway statute grants a town
discretion to require petitioners to make specified improvements to the designated
cartway route before the cartway can be opened. The Holstads argue that it does not. We
are not persuaded, because the Holstads’ arguments are founded in several faulty
assumptions. First, the Holstads’ argument is based on a misreading of our decision in
Rose. Second, we reject the Holstads’ characterization of the eminent domain power the
cartway statute grants a town as limited to establishing a cartway and requiring payment
of damages. Third, the Holstads’ position that a town can never place conditions on the
opening of a cartway is not supported by the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 164.08,
which gives separate meaning to the establishment, construction, and opening of a
cartway. We elaborate on each point in turn.

26
1.
First, we reject the Holstads’ argument that our decision in Rose “makes clear …
[that] prior to the establishment of a cartway the Town’s discretion is limited to
determining the route of the cartway.” Rose is not so restrictive. In Rose, a landowner
petitioned the town for a cartway to be “established, opened, and constructed” connecting
his property to a town road, but the town board “took no action on the petition.”
20 N.W.2d at 346. The landowner commenced a mandamus proceeding to compel the
town board to act upon the cartway petition and establish the cartway. Id. The district
court granted a writ of mandamus commanding the town “to establish a cartway”; “to
construct a reasonably serviceable and durable cartway two rods wide, fit and suitable for
use during the entire year”; and to “establish, open, and construct the cartway at the sole
expense of the town.” Id. at 346–47. But the district court’s order allowed “the exact
route and location of” the cartway “to be determined by the town board in the exercise of
its discretion.” Id. at 346. The town appealed. Id. at 346–47.
Because Rose was a mandamus case, we considered whether the cartway statute
imposed a mandatory duty on the town to establish a cartway, such that mandamus would
lie. Id. at 348 (noting that “the right to the writ here depends on whether the duty of the
town board to establish the cartway petitioned for was mandatory or discretionary”). In
concluding that it did, we noted the following:
[t]he settled construction of the statute is that it is the mandatory duty of a
town board to establish a cartway upon petition of a landowner where the
statutory conditions exist and the route named in the conditions is a proper
one; but the town board may exercise a reasonable discretion in varying the
route proposed as the public interest may require, provided it adheres to the

27
termini and general course stated in the petition …. All the facts entitling
relator to the cartway having been found to exist, it was the mandatory duty
of the town board to establish it . The only discretion left in the board under
the circumstances was laying out the road under the rule stated . This was
provided for in the decision below.
Id. (emphasis added). Mandamus will issue only to compel a clear and mandatory duty,
not a discretionary power, id., and our discussion of discretion in Rose must be
understood in that context. That is, in Rose we were distinguishing between the town’s
mandatory duty to establish a cartway, and its discretionary authority to select a route. Id.
Our statement that “[t]he only discretion left in the board under the circumstances was
laying out the road under the rule stated,” as “provided for in the [district court]
decision,” id., must also be understood in that light. We were not attempting to enumerate
every source of discretion available to a town. Instead, we were merely determining
which actions taken (or not taken) by the town were mandatory, and which were
discretionary.
Indeed, the remainder of our Rose decision refutes the proposition that we limited
a town’s discretion to “determining the route” of a cartway. In the rest of Rose, we
considered and reversed the district court order requiring the town to fund and construct a
cartway. Because “the expenditure of town funds to improve cartways lies in the
discretion of town boards in virtue of statutory provision,” we held that it was error “to
command the town board to construct an improved roadway on the cartway when
established.” Id. at 348–49. Accordingly, we reject the Holstads’ argument that the
Town’s discretion under the cartway statute is limited to determining the route.

28
2.
Next, we discuss the Holstads’ argument regarding a town’s eminent domain
power in the context of cartway establishment. As we discussed above, it is undisputed
that a town establishing a cartway is an exercise of its eminent domain power. See
Powell, 221 N.W. at 528. The Holstads assert that because the cartway statute grants a
town only the general power of eminent domain, and because such power is limited to
establishing cartways and requiring payment of damages, the Town exceeded its eminent
domain power by conditioning opening the cartway on meeting enumerated construction
requirements. We disagree.
Contrary to the Holstads’ assertion that the eminent domain power is a narrow
power, we have limited the eminent domain power in only two respects: (1) the property
can only be taken for public use; and (2) its owner must be justly compensated. See
Knapp v. State, 145 N.W. 967, 968 (Minn. 1914). In Knapp, we further commented on the
broad nature of the eminent domain power:
The power of eminent domain, or the right to take private property for public
purposes, inheres in the state as an attribute of its sovereignty, and is vested
in the Legislature. The Legislature can take private property against the will
of the owner only for public use and after just compensation to the owner has
been paid or secured . Except as restricted and controlled by these two
requirements, the power of the Legislature to take private property is
unlimited and its determination so to do conclusive . Whether the use be
public and whether proper compensation has been made are judicial
questions, the final determination of which rests with the courts . All other
questions involved in the taking of private property are of a legislative nature;
and the determination of such questions by the Legislature, or by an agency
established by and acting under the authority of the Legislature, is final and
cannot be reviewed by the courts.

29
Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, in eminent domain cases, once a government entity
has demonstrated a proper purpose for a taking, the government has discretion to carry
out such taking in a manner that accomplishes the public purpose. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that the
government agency demonstrated a proper public purpose for taking, affirming the court
of appeals’ decision upholding the government agency’s proposed plan for access road
rather than the appellant’s proposed plan).
Similar considerations apply to the delegation of eminent domain power that the
cartway statute grants to towns. As discussed above, a cartway, “when laid out by public
authority is a public way, open to the free use of the public.” Carlson, 169 N.W. at 806.
Absent restriction by the Legislature, we conclude that the delegation of eminent domain
power provided in the cartway statute includes the authority to ensure that a cartway is
suitable for public use. In particular, the grant of eminent domain power includes the
authority to ensure that a cartway is safe. Any other result would require the town to use
the State’s eminent domain authority to take private property for the creation of a cartway
that, in its judgment, is not in the public interest. We see nothing in the cartway statute
that requires such a result. Indeed, the cartway statute explicitly requires a town to
consider the public interest. See Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a) (allowing a town to
select an alternative route for a cartway “if the alternative is deemed by the town board to
be … in the public’s best interest”); id., subd. 2(d) (prohibiting town road and bridge
funds from being expended on a cartway unless the town board “by resolution determines
that an expenditure is in the public interest”).

30
The partial dissent disagrees, reasoning generally that when the Legislature
delegates its eminent domain power, “it does not carry with it whatever additional
regulatory powers might be useful in administering the taking.” Although we have
sometimes stated that statutes delegating or governing the power of eminent domain
should be strictly construed, see, e.g., Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 231
(Minn. 2008), we typically invoke the strict-construction rule to protect the person whose
land or other rights are being taken. See, e.g., id. at 231–32 (invoking strict construction
on behalf of landowner to reject de facto taking); Fletcher v. Chi., St. P ., M. & O. Ry. Co.,
69 N.W. 1085, 1087 (Minn. 1897) (discussing strict construction on behalf of landowner
with respect to railway’s legal right to condemn land for particular purpose). Here, by
contrast, the partial dissent wishes to invoke the strict construction principle not on behalf
of anyone who would be deprived of property against their will, but rather on behalf of
the Holstads—the private individuals who will receive the most obvious and direct
benefit of the Town exercising eminent domain. We disagree that the principle of strict
construction applies in these circumstances.
It is unclear what outcome, precisely, the partial dissent thinks is proper in this
case. The partial dissent seems to believe that the only authority the Town had in this case
was to establish a cartway route—either the Holstads’ petitioned-for route or an
alternative. Specifically, the partial dissent suggests that the cartway statute leaves the
Town powerless to impose conditions that could remedy the Town’s concerns that either
route, without improvement, would be unsafe and unusable by the public—concerns for
which the partial dissent never meaningfully accounts. Effectively, the partial dissent

31
seems to suggest that the Town was required to simply grant the Holstads an easement
across their neighbors’ property to no discernible public benefit because the easement is
not usable by the public. But taking private property for purely private use is outside the
eminent domain power.
The Holstads also argue that the structure of the cartway statute itself imposes a
restriction on the Town’s use of the eminent domain power. Specifically, they argue that
because Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c), provides that “[t]he amount of damages shall be
paid by the petitioner to the town before such cartway is opened,” any other “attempt to
condition the establishment of the cartway on construction or improvement is necessarily
an exercise of power greater than what is given to the Town under the statutes.” We
disagree.
Subdivision 2(c) is entirely concerned with the petitioner’s responsibility to pay
damages. It concerns matters relating to computing and paying damages, including the
timing of such payment, and provides in full:
The amount of damages shall be paid by the petitioner to the town before
such cartway is opened . For the purposes of this subdivision damages shall
mean the compensation, if any, awarded to the owner of the land upon which
the cartway is established together with the cost of professional and other
services, hearing costs, administrative costs, recording costs, and other costs
and expenses which the town may incur in connection with the proceedings
for the establishment of the cartway . The town board may by resolution
require the petitioner to post a bond or other security acceptable to the board
for the total estimated damages before the board takes action on the petition.
Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c). We agree with the Holstads that this portion of the
statute makes paying damages a condition precedent to opening the cartway. But nothing
in subdivision 2(c) states that paying damages is the only permissible condition

32
precedent. Nor does it state, for example, that “the cartway shall be opened upon the
payment of damages by the petitioner”—which would provide much stronger support for
the argument that payment of damages, by itself, is sufficient for the cartway to open.
“We may not add language to a statute; rather, we must apply the plain language of the
statute as written.” Energy Pol’y Advocs. v. Ellison, 980 N.W.2d 146, 156 (Minn. 2022)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we reject the Holstads’
argument that paying damages is the only permissible condition a town may impose prior
to opening a cartway.
3.
The Holstads make one final challenge to the Town having statutory authority to
order the Holstads to construct a cartway to particular standards in establishing the
cartway. The Holstads argue that, because the definition of “[t]own roads” in another
chapter of Minnesota Statutes includes those “cartways which … hereafter may be
established, constructed, or improved under the authority of the several town boards,”
Minn. Stat. § 160.02, subd. 28,10 we should draw a distinction between establishing a
cartway, which is mandatory under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2, and constructing or
improving a cartway, which is not. We agree with the Holstads that section 164.08,
subdivision 2, distinguishes between establishing a cartway and its construction. Indeed,
the plain language of section 164.08, subdivision 2, distinguishes between establishing a
cartway, its construction, and its opening—treating each event differently. Compare

10 The definitions provided in Minn. Stat. § 160.02 also apply to chapter 164. See
Minn. Stat. § 164.01.

33
Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a) (providing that a town shall establish a cartway under
certain circumstances), with id., subd. 2(c) (“The amount of damages shall be paid by the
petitioner to the town before such cartway is opened.” (emphasis added)), and id., subd.
2(d) (providing that if a town does not determine by resolution that an expenditure on a
cartway is in the public interest, “the grading or other construction work and the
maintenance of the cartway is the responsibility of the petitioner” (emphasis added)), and
id., subd. 2(e) (addressing circumstances “[a]fter the cartway has been constructed”
(emphasis added)). We need not determine, for purposes of this decision, the precise
interaction between establishing, constructing, and opening a cartway. That the cartway
statute contemplates opening a cartway as separate from its establishment—and
presumably, at least in some cases, after any necessary construction—undermines the
Holstads’ contention that the cartway statute restricts a town’s ability to condition a
petitioner’s using a cartway on steps the town reasonably requires for the public to safely
use the cartway.
In summary, our case law on eminent domain supports the Town’s position that a
town has the statutory authority to establish a cartway (i.e., to designate the legal right-of-
way on a selected route) and to require the cartway petitioner to improve the route so that
the public can safely use it as a condition to opening and using the cartway. See Knapp,
145 N.W. at 968; Carlson, 169 N.W. at 806. Neither Rose nor section 164.08’s language
compels a contrary conclusion. See Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a); Rose, 20 N.W.2d at

34
348. We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ decision that the Town has authority to
condition opening a cartway on the Holstads meeting certain construction requirements.11
B.
The Holstads also argue that the Town exceeded its statutory authority by
requiring them to obtain federal, state, and county regulatory approvals before
constructing and opening the cartway. Specifically, the Holstads assert that a town’s
authority under the cartway statute is limited to establishing the cartway and ordering
enumerated damages, and therefore the Town exceeded its statutory authority by
conditioning opening the cartway on such regulatory approvals. The Town disagrees,
arguing that requiring the Holstads to obtain necessary regulatory approvals prior to
constructing the cartway is nothing more than restating the requirements of (non-cartway)
law. The Town asserts that because it cannot control other regulatory bodies, and because
regulations from those bodies may apply to the Holstads’ cartway, including such
regulatory requirements in the resolution simply recognizes that the Holstads will be

11 Our decision does not mean, however, that a town has unchecked power to impose
arbitrary construction conditions when establishing a cartway. As the Town conceded
during oral argument, any construction requirement a town imposes must be reasonable.
Here, the Holstads would have us look to the $1.4 million cost of meeting the Town’s
requirements and conclude that such requirements cannot be reasonable. But given the
location and condition of the properties involved, significant construction will be required
to satisfy the statutory width requirement and to address public safety concerns no matter
which cartway route the Town requires. Put differently, we see no evidence that the Town
chose a cartway route with the intent to make construction unaffordable to the Holstads.
While we understand the Holstads’ frustration, the record suggests that the estimated
$1.4 million construction cost is the unfortunate reality of creating a cartway that is safe
for the public and meets the statutory width requirement in an ecologically sensitive and
highly regulated area.

35
required to comply with any other applicable regulations. The Holstads respond that
because the Town cannot speak for other regulatory bodies, it cannot guarantee that those
regulatory bodies will approve their cartway construction, which in turn means the Town
failed its mandatory duty to establish a cartway.
We agree with the Town. A town exercises its eminent domain power to establish a
cartway under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, but the eminent domain power does not include
authority to disregard federal, state, and county regulations otherwise governing the
property. Cf. Minn. Power & Light Co. v. State, 225 N.W. 164, 164 (Minn. 1929)
(observing that property owned by the state cannot be condemned under eminent domain,
unless explicitly or impliedly authorized by statute); Town of Oronoco v. City of
Rochester, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn. 1972) (declining to adopt a general rule that
“authorities possessing the right to condemn … by virtue of that right … possess
exemption from zoning regulations”). Constructing a cartway requires complying with
regulatory approvals regardless of who carries out construction; if the Town, instead of
the Holstads, were tasked with construction, the Town would also need to obtain
approvals from those regulatory bodies. Put differently, the Holstads must comply with
regulatory requirements to construct a cartway in an ecologically sensitive and highly
regulated area, regardless of whether the Town includes such requirements in its
resolution. Thus, the requirement to obtain regulatory approvals before constructing the
cartway was not an impermissible condition the Town imposed on the Holstads, but
merely restated existing non-cartway law. We conclude that the Town did not exceed its

36
statutory authority by requiring the Holstads to obtain third-party regulatory approvals
before constructing and opening the cartway.12
III.
Next, we consider whether the Town erred by requiring the Holstads to pay for the
cartway’s construction. In its resolution, the Town ordered that it would not expend funds
for the cartway, leaving the Holstads solely responsible for financing the cartway’s
construction and maintenance. The Holstads argue that a cartway is supposed to be an
unimproved road over existing driveways, paths, or trails, and that allowing the Town to
require construction of a cartway would defeat the purpose of the cartway statute. But if
the Town chooses to construct or improve the cartway in the public’s best interest, the
Holstads argue, the Town, rather than the Holstads, should be responsible for the cost.
The Holstads’ argument requires us to interpret the relevant statutory provisions.
Our review is de novo. See Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 381. We begin with the plain
language of the relevant statutes. See Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d at 624.
Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(d), states:
Town road and bridge funds shall not be expended on the cartway unless the
town board, or the county board acting as the town board in the case of a
cartway established in an unorganized territory, by resolution determines that
an expenditure is in the public interest . If no resolution is adopted to that
effect, the grading or other construction work and the maintenance of the

12 The partial dissent argues that the Town should consider the necessity of
permitting as part of the requirement to provide “meaningful access.” But the partial
dissent does not explain what is to happen when, as in this case, every proposed route—
the Holstads’ and the alternatives—would require construction, and therefore permitting,
in order to provide “meaningful access.”

37
cartway is the responsibility of the petitioner, subject to the provisions of
section 164.10.
(Emphasis added.) The cross-referenced statute, Minnesota Statutes section 164.10,
provides:
Any town board may expend town road and bridge funds upon a legally
established cartway the same as on town roads if, in the judgment of the
board the public interests require it; provided, that where any town board has
refused to allocate funds for the upkeep of a cartway, then, upon the petition
of ten taxpayers of the town, the town board shall present for the approval of
the voters, after due notice, at the annual town meeting the petition for
allocation of funds, and at the town meeting the electors of the town shall
allow or reject the petition . If the majority of those voting approve the
petition for allocation of funds, the town board shall expend road and bridge
funds on the cartway.
(Emphasis added.) These two provisions together plainly require that a town not expend
funds on a cartway unless the town determines the expenditure (not the construction) will
serve the public interest. See Rose, 20 N.W.2d at 348 (observing that “the expenditure of
town funds to improve cartways lies in the discretion of town boards in virtue of statutory
provision”); Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 380 (noting that the cartway statute “provides that
the petitioning landowner may be required to pay to construct the cartway itself unless
the town board determines that establishment of the cartway is in the public interest”).
We reject the Holstads’ arguments to the contrary.
First, the Holstads argue that a cartway, as established, necessarily must be an
unimproved road. The Holstads cite a number of cases from our court and from the court
of appeals upholding using an existing unimproved pathway as a cartway. But in none of
the cited cases did the deciding court make a legal determination that a cartway must be
unimproved. Rather, the appellate courts reviewed the decision-making processes of the

38
town boards that had decided to use an unimproved path as a cartway and determined, in
each case, whether the town board acted arbitrarily or capriciously or contrary to law in
doing so. See, e.g., Cich v. Bay Lake Twp., No. A18-0542, 2018 WL 5915444, at *4
(Minn. App. Nov. 13, 2018) (holding that “[t]he township board followed the
requirements set forth in section 164.08 and acted within its discretion in selecting the
route proposed in the petition”). Moreover, in both Rose and Kennedy, we discussed the
possibility that a cartway might be an improved road. Rose, 20 N.W.2d at 348; Kennedy,
784 N.W.2d at 380, 385 (discussing possible cartway routes, that would cost either
$100,000 or $300,000 “to construct,” one of which would “require[] construction over a
mile and a half of ‘rough terrain with steep slopes,’ necessitating ‘large culverts’ ”).
As we have already noted, the cartway statute itself recognizes that sometimes a
cartway will be an improved road. Subdivision 2(d) provides that if a town does not
determine that expending funds on a cartway is in the public interest, “the grading or
other construction work and the maintenance of the cartway is the responsibility of the
petitioner.” Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d). And subdivision 2(e) addresses
circumstances that occur “[a]fter the cartway has been constructed.” Id., subd. 2(e)
(emphasis added). Although these provisions do not mean that every cartway must be an
improved road, they foreclose the Holstads’ suggestion that an improved cartway is
somehow exceptional.
The Holstads also cite several Attorney General Opinions from the early 1960s to
support their position that the Town is required to fund any cartway construction or
improvement necessary to satisfy public interest. See Op. Att’y Gen. No. 377b-1 (May 8,

39
1963); Op. Att’y Gen. No. 377b-1 (Nov. 21, 1960); Op. Att’y Gen. No. 377b-1 (June 23,
1960). These opinions rely on the then-existing cartway statute and Carlson v. Elmo
Township, which construed the word “may” in the 1917 version of the cartway statute 13
as not “merely permissive or wholly discretionary with the board” but “imposing a duty
upon the board of the extent the public interests may require.” 169 N.W. at 807. Based on
these sources, the Attorney General’s opinions concluded that “if a cartway is legally
established then it is the duty of the town board to construct and maintain such cartway to
the extent the public interest may require and to that extent it is not wholly discretionary
with the town board.” See Op. Att’y Gen. No. 377b-1, at 3 (Nov. 21, 1960).
Although Attorney General opinions are entitled to careful consideration in some
circumstances, we are not bound by them. See Star Tribune Co. v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of
Regents, 683 N.W.2d 274, 289 (Minn. 2004). But in any event, the cartway statute has
changed significantly since these opinions were issued. At the time of the Attorney
General opinions the Holstads cite, the cartway statute did not contain its current
language establishing a default rule that the town will not pay for a cartway. See Act of
Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 500, art. 5, § 8, 1959 Minn. Laws 679, 774–75 (codified as amended at
Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2 (1961)) (adopting language largely contained within current
subdivision 2(a)); Act of May 14, 1979, ch. 83, § 1, 1979 Minn. Laws 116, 117 (codified
as amended at Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2 (1980)) (adding language of current

13 The relevant language of the 1917 cartway statute the Attorney General’s opinions
addressed reads, “[a]ny town board may expend road or bridge funds upon a legally
established cartway the same as on town roads if in the judgment of such board the public
interests require it.” See Minn. Stat. ch. 13, § 2542 (Supp. 1917).

40
subdivision 2(d)). Instead, at the time of the Attorney General’s opinions, the only
relevant provision was Minn. Stat. § 164.10, which, since its enactment, has stated that
“[a]ny town board may expend town road and bridge funds upon a legally established
cartway the same as on town roads if, in the judgment of the board the public interests
require it.” (Emphasis added.) The current version of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, however,
specifically states that a town board “shall not” expend public funds on a cartway “unless
the town board … determines that an expenditure is in the public interest.” Minn. Stat.
§ 164.08, subd. 2(d) (emphasis added). Because “we construe a statute as a whole and
interpret its language to give effect to all of its provisions,” the current versions of Minn.
Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d), and Minn. Stat. § 164.10, must be read together. Riggs,
865 N.W.2d at 683.
Under the current version of the statute, it is plain and unambiguous that a town’s
discretion to consider the public interest in selecting an alternative route under
subdivision 2(a), and a town’s discretion to consider whether to expend public funds to
serve the public interest under subdivision 2(d), are independent. The Holstads’ argument
that the Town must fund any construction it deems necessary to satisfy the public interest
ignores the plain text of the statute as it currently exists. As such, we conclude that the
Town did not err in determining not to expend public funds on the cartway’s construction.
IV .
Finally, we decide whether the Town erred by including its attorney fees
associated with the Holstads’ appeals of the cartway determination as a part of their
damages under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c). In the resolution by which the Town

41
established the cartway, it ordered the Holstads to “pay for the cost of the Town’s
professional and other services, hearing costs, administrative costs, recording costs and
other costs and expenses which the Town may incur in connection with the proceedings
for the establishment of the cartway.”
On appeal, the Holstads challenge the requirement that they pay the Town’s
professional fees, arguing that, to the extent those professional fees include attorney fees
the Town has incurred in connection with the Holstads’ appeals, they are improper under
the statute. This inquiry also requires us to engage in statutory interpretation.
Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(c), provides:
The amount of damages shall be paid by the petitioner to the town before
such cartway is opened . For the purposes of this subdivision damages shall
mean the compensation, if any, awarded to the owner of the land upon which
the cartway is established together with the cost of professional and other
services, hearing costs, administrative costs, recording costs, and other costs
and expenses which the town may incur in connection with the proceedings
for the establishment of the cartway . The town board may by resolution
require the petitioner to post a bond or other security acceptable to the board
for the total estimated damages before the board takes action on the petition.
In the Holstads’ view, the Town’s resolution established (or should have established) a
cartway,14 and this marked the end of “proceedings for the establishment of the cartway.”
Because Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c), only allows a town to recover “expenses which
the town may incur in connection with the proceedings for the establishment of the

14 The Holstads have not been consistent as to whether the Town’s resolution here
actually established a cartway. When discussing the Town’s selection of the cartway
location and its authority to order cartway construction the Holstads are adamant that the
Town failed in its statutory duty to establish a cartway. When arguing that they should not
be responsible for ongoing attorney fees, however, the Holstads appear to concede that
the Town’s resolution did establish a cartway.

42
cartway,” the Holstads assert that any costs incurred after establishing the cartway—
including the Town’s attorney fees in connection with the Holstads’ appeals—cannot be
included in the damages award. The Town counters that petitioners’ right to appeal a
town’s cartway decision is a necessary part of the cartway process. The Town argues that
this means “[a] cartway proceeding cannot conclude until there is either no appeal or a
properly filed appeal is finally resolved.”
The Holstads’ argument is unpersuasive. Even assuming the premise of the
Holstads’ argument—that issuing a resolution “establishes” a cartway, even when a party
files an appeal—is correct, the statute does not limit damages to expenses a town may
incur to establish a cartway. Rather, Minn. Stat. § 164.08 defines damages as including
“expenses which the town may incur in connection with the proceedings for the
establishment of the cartway.” Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c) (emphasis added). That
language is broad enough to include fees incurred in any proceedings that challenge the
resolution.
The Holstads provide three additional reasons that they should not be required to
pay the Town’s attorney fees; we find none persuasive. First, the Holstads argue that
allowing the Town to recover its attorney fees related to appeals would violate the
“American Rule,” which “establishes that attorneys’ fees may not be awarded without
explicit statutory authorization.” Dworsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, Inc., 69 N.W.2d 118,
124 (Minn. 1955). This argument is unpersuasive because, as discussed above, Minn.
Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c), explicitly authorizes a town to require that a petitioner pay

43
specific costs, including attorney fees in the form of “professional services,” connected to
establishing a cartway.
Second, the Holstads argue that the last sentence of Minn. Stat. § 164.07, subd. 8,
should govern whether the Town can recover attorney fees. Section 164.07, which
governs establishing, altering, or vacating of town roads, is relevant to cartway
proceedings because Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(b), provides that a town board’s
cartway proceedings “shall be in accordance with section 164.07.” Section 164.07,
subdivision 7, permits a party challenging certain provisions relating to town roads to
appeal to district court (as the Holstads did in this case). Section 164.07, subdivision 8,
governs trial of that matter in district court, and specifies that upon such trial, “[t]he
prevailing party shall recover costs and disbursements as in other civil cases and
judgment shall be entered upon the verdict.” The Holstads argue that this means that
“fees in connection with an appeal of a town’s cartway decision are charged ‘as in other
civil cases.’ ”
In essence, the Holstads’ argument is that interpreting section 164.08,
subdivision 2(c), to allow “damages” to include attorney fees on appeal conflicts with
section 164.07, subdivision 8. “When a general provision in a law is in conflict with a
special provision in the same or another law, the two shall be construed, if possible, so
that effect may be given to both.” Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1. If the conflict between a
general provision and specific provision is irreconcilable, “the special provision shall
prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general

44
provision shall be enacted at a later session and it shall be the manifest intention of the
legislature that such general provision shall prevail.” Id.
Here, there is no conflict, because section 164.07, subdivision 8, merely specifies
that “[t]he prevailing party shall recover costs and disbursements as in other civil cases.”
Minn. Stat. § 164.07, subd. 8 (emphasis added). “Costs and disbursements” does not
typically include attorney fees in “other civil cases.” Indeed, as the Holstads point out, a
party generally may not recover attorney fees without explicit statutory authorization.
Dworsky, 69 N.W.2d at 124. Therefore, because Minn. Stat. § 164.07, subd. 8, does not
specifically address attorney fees, there is no conflict between that provision and
interpreting Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c), to include attorney fees incurred on appeal
as damages a cartway petitioner must pay. Regardless, even if there were a conflict, we
would construe the more specific provision—section 164.08, subdivision 2(c), which
specifically defines damages as including “the cost of professional and other services,
hearing costs, administrative costs, recording costs, and other costs and expenses which
the town may incur in connection with the proceedings for the establishment of the
cartway”—as an exception to the more general reference to “costs and disbursements” in
section 164.07, subdivision 8.
Finally, the Holstads claim that allowing a town to recover costs related to
petitioners’ appeals incentivizes towns to make unreasonable cartway determinations so
as to inflate the cost of damages. But this is a policy argument that is not rooted in the
statutory language. See Expose v. Thad Wilderson & Assocs., P .A., 889 N.W.2d 279, 286
(Minn. 2016) (“[W]e must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they

45
should be.”). Moreover, we decline to presume that towns will act in bad faith. Cf. No
Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Env’t Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 325 (Minn. 1977)
(“Although the judiciary has the responsibility of ensuring that administrative agencies
comply with legislative mandates, a presumption of administrative regularity exists.”).
In any event, a town’s damage award is reviewable by district court, which
mitigates the Holstads’ concerns. See Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 3. We therefore
conclude that the Town did not err by requiring the Holstads to pay attorney fees that the
Town may incur in connection with the Holstads’ appealing the Town’s resolution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

C/D-1
C O N C U R R E N C E & D I S S E N T
MOORE, III, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The question presented here concerns the scope of a town’s authority under
Minnesota’s cartway statute. The circumstances surrounding the property are unusual,
and the parties have understandably focused on the geographic and environmental
difficulties that attend providing access to it. But unusual circumstances do not enlarge
statutory authority. Our task is to determine what authority the Legislature has conferred,
not what authority might seem useful in addressing the particular difficulties of this case.
Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), “obligates a township to
establish a cartway to provide access to an owner of a tract of land who has no access to
his or her land from a public road except over the land of others.” Kennedy v. Pepin Twp.
of Wabasha Cnty., 784 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 2010). The statute gives the town
reasonable discretion to select a route other than the one proposed by the petitioner and
permits the town to impose conditions to protect the rights of adjoining landowners and
in the public’s best interest. Id.; State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 20 N.W.2d 345,
348 (Minn. 1945). But that authority has limits. The town’s authority to select a route is
substantial, but it is not authority to condition the statutory right of access on
requirements the Legislature has not imposed. Nothing in the statute authorizes a town to
condition establishment or opening of a cartway on construction requirements or
governmental approvals beyond those the statute expressly or necessarily permits. Nor
does the statute suggest that a town’s authority expands when the property presents
unusual environmental or geographic concerns.

C/D-2
The court nevertheless upholds conditions that, in my view, rest on authority the
Legislature did not confer. The conditions require appellants to obtain multiple
discretionary governmental approvals and to incur estimated construction costs of $1.4
million to $1.9 million before the cartway may be opened along the route selected by the
Town of May (the Town). Whatever their practical justification, the statute does not
authorize those requirements. And when conditions attached to the selected route make
access practically unavailable, the Town’s statutory obligation to provide access is not
satisfied. I would hold that the Town proceeded under an erroneous understanding of the
authority granted by section 164.08, subdivision 2(a). The Town has route-selection
authority, but that does not give it an implied licensing power to condition the statutory
right of access on town-created construction requirements. Even assuming that such
power exists, the conditions here make the statutory right of access practically
unattainable. I would remand to the Town board to exercise its discretion anew within the
limits of the authority the Legislature has conferred. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in
part.15

15 I take no issue with the court’s conclusion that Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a),
imposes a two-rod width requirement on all cartways established under that provision,
although the statute could be read to apply only to property owners of a tract of land
containing at least five acres, which is larger than the Holstads’ property. See Minn. Stat.
§ 164.08, subd. 2(a) (“Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract
of land containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto except over a navigable
waterway or over the lands of others, or whose access thereto is less than two rods in
width, the town board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least two rods wide
connecting the petitioner’s land with a public road.”). I also concur that the selection of a
route is a discretionary decision “allocated by statute to the Township,” Kennedy, 784
N.W.2d at 384, and the premise that in acting on a petition to establish a cartway, a town
acts in a legislative capacity. Id. at 381. It is not in the court’s power to substitute its

C/D-3
I begin by reviewing the factual and procedural history and briefly considering the
development of Minnesota’s cartway law. Next, I explain why section 164.08,
subdivision 2(a), cabins town authority and does not authorize a town to condition access
on town-created construction standards or additional regulatory approvals. I then explain
why, even if such authority could be implied, the conditions imposed here make access
effectively illusory and therefore do not provide the meaningful access that the statute
requires.
A.
Appellants Bryce and Jody Holstad (the Holstads) own a 2.5-acre landlocked
parcel along the St. Croix River in the Town of May. The nearest public roadway is
Minnesota State Highway 95, known also as St. Croix Trail, which runs north and south
and is about one-quarter mile to the west of the Holstad Property. This subject property is
bordered on the north and west by land owned by the National Park Service (NPS), on
the south by neighboring private property, and on the east by the river. At present, it is
accessible only from the public road on foot, by traversing steep ravines, cliffs, and
gorges across NPS land. After unsuccessful efforts to obtain access through a private

judgment for that of the Town in selecting a route that provides access to the usable
portion of the Holstads’ property. Finally, I do not dissent from the court’s determination
that the Town’s attorney fees incurred in connection with an appeal of a resolution
establishing a cartway are included in “the cost of professional and other services … and
other costs and expenses which the town may incur in connection with the proceedings
for the establishment of the cartway” and are thus damages awardable to the Town under
the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c).

C/D-4
easement over the neighboring property to the south, the Holstads petitioned the Town to
establish a cartway.
The Holstads’ petition proposed that the Town establish a cartway over most of the
length of an existing unimproved gravel private driveway that runs across the
neighboring property through a forested area up to the top of the river bluff and then
down to a seasonal cabin at the base of the bluff. The Holstads’ petition was filed under
the second sentence of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), which mandates that a town
establish a cartway “upon a petition of an owner of a tract of land that, as of January 1,
1998, was on record as a separate parcel, contained at least two but less than five acres,
and has no access thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others.”
The statute permits the town to select an alternative route “other than that petitioned for if
the alternative is deemed by the town board to be less disruptive and damaging to the
affected landowners and in the public’s best interest.” Id. The Holstads argued that their
proposed route would provide meaningful access to their property and would be the
cheapest option for the Town as it would not require tree removal, grading, or
construction.
In its order setting a formal hearing upon the Holstads’ petition, the Town
determined that it would not spend town road funds on the cartway. See Minn. Stat.
§ 164.08, subd. 2(d) (“Town road and bridge funds shall not be expended on the cartway
unless the town board, or the county board … by resolution determines that an
expenditure is in the public interest.”). Because no such resolution was adopted, the
grading or other construction work and maintenance of the cartway would be the

C/D-5
responsibility of the Holstads. Id. The Town’s resolution also disclaimed any
responsibility related to the use of the cartway and expressly stated that the town “shall
not be responsible for the conditions, construction, use, or maintenance of this cartway.”
Following multiple hearings and consideration of three competing cartway routes,
the Town granted the petition and adopted a route proposed by its engineer. The Town
concluded that, because the cartway would be a public way, the engineer’s proposal
would best accommodate two-way traffic and emergency-vehicle access. The Town
rejected the Holstads’ proposed route, concluding that the use of the existing unimproved
driveway was not feasible or consistent with “public health, safety, or welfare” due to its
narrowness, inability to accommodate emergency vehicles, and being impassable during
winter months. The Town awarded damages to the affected property owner and its own
professional fees and prohibited use of the cartway “unless and until it is constructed,
improved, and approved” in accordance with conditions established by the Town’s
engineer, including a requirement that it be two rods wide. The Town also required the
Holstads to bear the full cost of constructing and maintaining the roadway and to obtain
all necessary regulatory approvals prior to construction, to assume responsibility for
maintaining the roadway, and to pay the Town’s legal fees associated with the
proceedings for the establishment of the cartway. According to the Town’s engineer,
construction of the cartway along the engineer’s route would cost between approximately
$1.4 and $1.9 million. Several local authorities submitted letters to the town board
expressing what regulatory approvals would be required to construct the cartway as
recommended by the town board.

C/D-6
After unsuccessfully appealing the Town’s resolution establishing the cartway to
the district court and the court of appeals, the Holstads present two issues to this court:
first, whether the Town imposed conditions not authorized by the cartway statute; and
second, whether the Town’s selected route provides “meaningful access” to their property
in light of the route itself and the conditions imposed. I address these issues in turn.
B.
A town’s authority to establish a cartway is a product of legislative grant, and the
town may exercise only the power the Legislature has conferred on it in Minn. Stat.
§ 164.08. See Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984). Under that
statute, when the statutory conditions are satisfied, a town has a mandatory duty to
establish a cartway, subject to reasonable discretion to vary the proposed route as the
public interest may require and to take into account damage to the affected landowners.
Rose, 20 N.W.2d at 347–48. The statute thus gives the town authority to establish the
right-of-way, select its route, and determine the damages associated with establishing it.
It says nothing, however, about requiring roadway construction or improvement,
obtaining regulatory approvals, or imposing additional fees as conditions of establishing
or opening the cartway.
The structure of section 164.08 confirms the limits of that delegation. The statute
distinguishes between establishment, opening, construction, and maintenance and assigns
responsibilities at each stage. Under the cartway statute, the town establishes the cartway
and selects its route; before opening, the town may require payment of damages and
specified costs; and, when public funds are not used, the petitioner bears responsibility

C/D-7
for construction and maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), (c)–(e). Nowhere
does the Legislature authorize the town to prescribe construction standards as a condition
of opening. This omission matters. The Legislature knew how to make the opening of a
cartway contingent on a specified requirement: subdivision 2(c) expressly conditions
opening on payment of damages. Yet the statute contains no comparable provision
authorizing a town to withhold opening until a petitioner satisfies town-created
construction specifications or regulatory requirements. See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d
373, 383 (Minn. 2011) (“Expressio unius generally reflects an inference that any
omissions in a statute are intentional.”). We should be reluctant to infer an additional
prerequisite when doing so would confer a substantial regulatory power that the
Legislature did not identify.
The Legislature’s treatment of public roads reinforces the point. Elsewhere, the
Legislature has expressly addressed a town’s authority to establish, construct, improve,
maintain, and repair public roads. See Minn. Stat. §§ 160.17, 164.02–.03. Section 164.08,
by contrast, addresses the distinct problem of providing access to otherwise inaccessible
property and expressly assigns construction and maintenance responsibility to the
petitioner when public funds are not used. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d)–(e). That
allocation counsels against implying a town design-approval power that the statute does
not confer. See Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001)
(“The rules of construction forbid adding words or meaning to a statute that were
intentionally or inadvertently left out.”).

C/D-8
Nor does the word “opening” supply the missing authority. The statute
contemplates a sequence: establishment creates the legal right-of-way; construction
makes the route usable; and opening permits its use. But describing those stages does not
confer a substantive power at each stage. To read “opening” as an implied source of
regulatory authority would transform a procedural milestone into a discretionary
licensing regime that the statute nowhere creates. The fact that surveys, permits,
construction, or other measures may be necessary to make a particular cartway usable
does not make those measures conditions the town may impose on the exercise of the
statutory right.
General principles of eminent domain do not change the analysis. Eminent-domain
authority permits the taking authorized by the Legislature; it does not carry with it
whatever additional regulatory powers might be useful in administering the taking. See
Knapp v. State, 145 N.W. 967, 968 (Minn. 1914). Here, the Legislature made a specific
grant of eminent-domain authority for the establishment of cartways. That grant supplies
both the source and the limit of the town’s power. We should not supplement it with
conditions that determine whether, when, or how the statutory right may ultimately be
exercised. See Genin, 622 N.W.2d at 117; In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn.
2010).
The court’s contrary interpretation would allow a town to convert a mandatory
statutory right of access into a discretionary entitlement contingent on compliance with
town-created infrastructure requirements. That would alter the balance the Legislature
struck: the town controls the route and may protect adjoining landowners through the

C/D-9
authority expressly granted by section 164.08, while construction and maintenance
ordinarily remain the petitioner’s responsibility. What the town may not do, absent a
legislative grant, is turn its limited authority into a licensing power over the petitioner’s
exercise of the statutory right.
The Legislature could have granted towns that authority. It did not. As we
observed in Kennedy, “[t]o read the [cartway] statute in such a way would require this
court to read language into the statute that is not there.” 784 N.W.2d at 383. That is what
the court has done here. But section 164.08 reflects the balance the Legislature struck,
and we should not disturb that balance by implication.
C.
Even assuming the Town possesses some implied authority to regulate
construction of a cartway, the conditions imposed here cannot stand. They make
meaningful access to the Holstads’ property practically unattainable and therefore fail for
a separate reason: they do not satisfy the statute’s requirement of meaningful access. The
purpose of Minnesota’s cartway statute is straightforward: to provide landlocked property
owners with practical access to their property when access cannot otherwise be obtained.
Consistent with that purpose, we have recognized that a cartway must provide
“meaningful access” to the petitioning landowner’s property. Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at
383. That requirement necessarily concerns practical use, not merely the formal creation
of a right-of-way. A route that cannot realistically be used because of physical barriers,
legal restrictions, or burdens that make construction or use practically unattainable does
not provide meaningful access. While we did not articulate a rigid multi-factor test as to

C/D-10
what meaningful access requires in Kennedy, I would accept the Holstads’ invitation to
extend the definition of meaningful access. I would include a range of practical
considerations bearing on whether access is meaningful. Meaningful access is a practical,
functional concept. A route does not provide meaningful access merely because a right-
of-way exists on paper; the route must be reasonably capable of being used for access to
the property. Physical barriers, legal restrictions, and burdens that make construction or
use practically unattainable may therefore bear on whether access is meaningful.
Section 164.08 does not guarantee the cheapest or most convenient route, or
access free from practical difficulty. Nor does Kennedy prevent a town from considering
safety, topography, environmental constraints, or effects on neighboring landowners
when selecting a route. The statute gives towns substantial discretion to select a route that
minimizes disruption and damage. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a). But those
considerations inform the choice among available routes; they do not permit a town to
impose requirements that leave the statutory right of access effectively unusable.
The conditions here cross that line. The Town’s selected route requires a two-way
roadway capable of accommodating emergency vehicles, multiple regulatory approvals,
and construction costs estimated at $1.4 million to $1.9 million. The relevant point is not
that the statute guarantees an inexpensive cartway, but that a right of access cannot
meaningfully be exercised if the conditions imposed make construction practically
unattainable. The requirements imposed here do not merely make access inconvenient or
expensive. They make access contingent on an extensive and uncertain construction and
regulatory process that the Holstads may be unable, as a practical matter, to complete. A

C/D-11
statutory right that can be exercised only after undertaking such an enterprise is difficult
to characterize as meaningful access.
The court’s contrary approach shifts the focus from access to infrastructure. It
effectively makes the Holstads finance substantial roadway infrastructure before they
may exercise the statutory right the Legislature created to provide basic access to
otherwise inaccessible property. Nothing in section 164.08 suggests that the Legislature
conditioned that remedy on a landowner’s ability to finance such construction.
The distinction matters. The statute need not guarantee an easy route to guarantee
meaningful access. But neither does it permit a town to designate a route that is
technically available while attaching conditions that make its use practically unattainable.
Here, the selected route, subject to the conditions imposed, provides access in form but
not in substance. Because section 164.08 guarantees meaningful access, I would conclude
that the Town’s determination does not satisfy the statute.
* * *
This case presents unusual geographic, ecological, and regulatory difficulties. But
those difficulties do not enlarge the Town’s statutory authority. The question is not
whether the conditions imposed here are understandable or even sensible; it is whether
section 164.08 authorizes them.
The court’s holding extends beyond this property. It recognizes a power to impose
conditions the statute neither identifies nor limits whenever a town deems them
warranted. That goes beyond the balance the Legislature struck between providing access
to landlocked property and protecting adjoining landowners.

C/D-12
The question here is one of statutory power, not prudence. Because section 164.08
does not authorize the conditions imposed and because those conditions do not provide
the meaningful access the statute guarantees, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and
remand with instructions to open the cartway upon satisfaction of the statute’s express
prerequisites, without conditioning access on town-created construction specifications or
regulatory approvals.
MCKEIG, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence-dissent of Justice Moore, III.
THISSEN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I join in the concurrence-dissent of Justice Moore, III.