State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1129

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brandon Capone Williams-Gillard,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-23-2043

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of aiding and abetting second-degree murder,
aiding and abetting second-degree assault, and drive -by shooting, arguing that (1) the
2
district court made several prejudicial evidentiary errors, and (2) the prosecutor committed
misconduct by misstating the law on accomplice liability. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Brandon Capone
Williams-Gillard with three crimes: aiding and abetting second-degree murder, aiding and
abetting second-degree assault, and drive-by shooting. An eight-day jury trial was held in
late November and early December. The following summarizes the evidence presented at
trial.
Williams-Gillard and Sanussi Bangoura (codefendant) are friends and share a house
in Duluth. Codefendant has a long-running conflict with another Duluth resident, whom
we will call Jason to preserve his privacy. This conflict eventually expanded to involve
friends of codefendant and Jason. It is undisputed that members of the two friend groups
had orally confronted and threatened each other in the past.
In early August, Jason drove alone to a church parking lot to deliver a rent check to
his ex-girlfriend. As he was leaving , a blue Chrysler 300—owned and driven by
codefendant—cut him off. Williams-Gillard jumped out of the front passenger seat and
began “punching” and “smacking” Jason’s car and yelling at Jason to exit the vehicle to
fight. Because he was outnumbered, Jason told Williams-Gillard and codefendant to
follow him down the road to his friend’s house where they could have a fistfight. The two
vehicles proceeded to the home of Jason’s friend (victim). During the drive, Jason called
another friend, whom we will call Carter, who was present at victim’s house, and asked
him to come outside to back him up in a fight.
3
Upon arrival, Jason parked and exited his vehicle. He was then joined by Carter,
victim, and two other individuals, whom we will refer to as Michael and Oliver. The five
men walked down the street toward the Chrysler, yelling at codefendant and Williams-
Gillard to get out of the car to “box.” Williams-Gillard momentarily exited out of the
passenger door, but then re-entered the vehicle. As Jason and friends approached, Carter—
who was filming the interaction on his cell phone—observed codefendant reaching for
something he assumed was a gun. Carter punched codefendant in the face through the
open driver’s side window and began running away. Multiple shots were then fired out of
the Chrysler as the vehicle sped off. One of them hit Carter in the buttocks. Another hit
victim in the head.
A home-security camera located on a nearby house captured the shooting. The
video footage depicts the five men approaching the Chrysler on foot, followed by
codefendant driving off with his right hand on the steering wheel and his left hand extended
out of the window, firing a gun. Williams-Gillard’s actions are not discernible from the
security footage. But Carter’s cell phone video shows Williams- Gillard sitting in the
passenger seat, with a phone on his lap and a black fanny pack strapped around his body.
At the time of the shooting, Williams-Gillard appears to be holding an unknown dark object
at chest level.
After the Chrysler left the scene, Carter immediately called 911. Jason and Oliver
took Carter to the hospital to be treated for his gunshot wound. Michael stayed at the scene
with victim, who later died from his injury.

4
The Police Investigation of the Scene and Williams-Gillard’s House
Police promptly arrived at the scene and began collecting evidence. Several
.40-caliber shell casings were discovered on the street where the shooting occurred,
.40-caliber bullet remnants were found in and around surrounding residences, and a 9mm
bullet was recovered from a vehicle parked on the street. Police obtained home-security
footage and interviewed individuals present at the scene, including Michael. Officers also
went to the hospital, where they interviewed both Jason and Carter. Officers obtained
additional statements from Jason and Carter in the days following the incident.
After identifying Williams-Gillard and codefendant as suspects, officers proceeded
to their home in search of them. There, officers located codefendant, who informed them
that his Chrysler was parked behind the house. Officers searched both the vehicle and the
home.
The search of the Chrysler revealed two 9mm shell casings, one located on the
driver’s seat and the other on the driver’s side floorboard. Additionally, a pair of rubber
gloves was found in one of the vehicle’s center-console cupholders. Four shell casings—
three 9mm and one .40-caliber—were located inside one of the gloves.
In the home, officers found various firearm paraphernalia. Codefendant’s bedroom
contained a “drum-type magazine” for a pistol, three .30-06 -caliber rifle cartridges, a gun
holster, and a “sawed-off rifle barrel.” And in Williams-Gillard’s room, officers found two
pistol magazines (one extended) both containing unfired bullets, along with several boxes
of ammunition, including 9mm and .40-caliber ammunition matching shell casings
recovered at the scene of the shooting.
5
Williams-Gillard’s Post-Shooting Conduct and Apprehension
Immediately after the shooting, codefendant drove Williams-Gillard to an auto
repair shop where his vehicle was being serviced. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Williams-
Gillard picked up his vehicle and proceeded alone to the Miller Hill Mall where he met up
with three friends, whom we will call Raymond, Anna, and Nina. The four shopped for an
hour or so and then went to Raymond’s home. During this time, Williams-Gillard made
many phone calls and, because of security cameras positioned around his property, saw
that police officers were at his house. Williams-Gillard told his three friends that, while he
was in the car with codefendant, codefendant was punched through his window, prompting
him to begin angrily shooting his gun. Williams-Gillard stated that codefendant fired about
nine rounds and that he had shot his own firearm twice or maybe three times.
Williams-Gillard then asked Raymond to go to his house and retrieve ammunition
from his bedroom. Raymond left with Nina to do so but did not enter Williams-Gillard’s
home because police officers were there. Upon returning home, Raymond spoke at length
with Williams-Gillard, who was visibly upset and “crying.”
That evening, police apprehended Williams-Gillard at Raymond’s home. Williams-
Gillard informed the arresting officers that Raymond, Anna, and Nina had “nothing to do
with anything.” All four individuals were then transported to the police station where
Williams-Gillard, Raymond, and Anna provided statements to law enforcement. The next
day, Raymond and Anna voluntarily returned to the police station to provide additional
statements.

6
The Trial
At trial, the jury heard testimony from 40 witnesses, including Jason, Carter,
Michael, Raymond, and Anna. And the district court admitted over 200 exhibits, including
video footage of the shooting, the audio recordings of the 911 calls, recorded witness
statements made to police, and three recorded phone calls codefendant made from jail. 1
Williams-Gillard did not testify and presented no evidence.
The jury found Williams-Gillard guilty as charged and the district court sentenced
him to 480 months in prison for aiding and abetting second-degree murder and lesser
concurrent prison terms for the other two offenses.
Williams-Gillard appeals, contending that the district court made numerous
evidentiary errors and the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.
DECISION
I. The district court’s alleged evidentiary errors do not warrant relief.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v.
Boswell, 20 N.W.3d 640, 651 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied (Minn. June 25, 2025). A
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an “erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810
(Minn. 2017). Even if evidence was erroneously admitted, we will not reverse unless there
is a “reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the
verdict.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). The

1 Codefendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and did not
testify.
7
appellant bears the burden of proving abuse of discretion and that admission of the
evidence was prejudicial. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006).
Williams-Gillard argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
(1) evidence that he possessed a firearm on previous occasions, (2) codefendant’s hearsay
statements made in three recorded jail calls, (3) Raymond’s hearsay statements contained
in a recorded statement to police, and (4) Jason’s hearsay statements made in two recorded
statements to police. We address each argument in turn.
A. Prior Possession of a Firearm

Under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or
act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But this so-called Spreigl2 evidence may be
admissible for other purposes, such as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. To admit Spreigl
evidence:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Minn. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).

2 State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965) (stating that Minnesota courts
generally adhere to the “rule excluding evidence connecting a defendant with other crimes,
except for purposes of impeachment”).
8
Williams-Gillard contends evidence that he possessed a firearm on previous
occasions is “inadmissible character evidence” not subject to a rule 404(b) exception. The
challenged evidence was elicited through the following testimony of Carter and Anna.
PROSECUTOR: So there was conflict, and—and you’re
saying that you and your friends would help [Jason] out and—
when you guys would have run-ins with [codefendant] and
[Williams-Gillard]?
CARTER: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: What were—were there ever any weapons
involved when you guys would have run-ins in public?
CARTER: Like, just —we’d just see them, but never—they
would never be brought into it.

PROSECUTOR: You would see—
CARTER: Just see ‘em.

PROSECUTOR: You would see what?
CARTER: Just see weapons.

PROSECUTOR: Okay.
CARTER: Yeah.

PROSECUTOR: And what do you mean, you would see
weapons?
CARTER: Just, like, in laps, and that’s about it when we’re,
like, passing each other and stuff like that.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. But no one was —you would see
people with weapons, but no one was using the weapons?
CARTER: Yeah.

PROSECUTOR: And would that include people on your side
as well?
CARTER: Yeah.

The prosecutor pursued a similar line of questioning with Anna:
9
PROSECUTOR: And in the—in the month time frame that you
had known Mr. Williams-Gillard leading into this shooting,
had you ever seen him with any weapons?
ANNA: Just one time.

PROSECUTOR: And when was that?
ANNA: We were, like, all at his house, and it was just in his
room. There was just a gun on his —like, by his safe in his
room.

Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
this testimony, the record persuades us that its admission was harmless. In determining
whether erroneously admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, we consider the
record as a whole and weigh the following nonexclusive factors: “(1) the manner in which
the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive,
(3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether
the defense effectively countered the evidence.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54 (quotation
omitted). Not every factor is “relevant or persuasive in every case.” Id. at 55. And “strong
evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongfully admitted evidence.” Id.
at 54 (quotation omitted). With this in mind, we consider the relevant Bigbear factors.
First, the evidence that Williams-Gillard possessed a firearm on prior occasions was
not presented in a prominent manner. Indeed, the above exchanges span three pages of an
approximately 1,400-page transcript. See id. at 56 (stating that number of transcript pages
may be considered when analyzing whether the challenged evidence featured prominently
in the state’s case). And the state did not mention this evidence in either its opening
statement or closing arguments.
10
Second, the persuasive value of the evidence was minimal. Anna testified that she
had observed Williams-Gillard with a firearm “one time.” And Carter made only a general
statement that he had observed unidentified members of codefendant’s friend group with
“weapons.” Moreover, numerous photo exhibits and testimonial evidence about the
magazines and ammunition found in Williams-Gillard’s bedroom effectively rendered
Anna’s and Carter’s statements cumulative.
Finally, the state presented strong evidence of Williams -Gillard’s guilt. The jury
viewed video evidence of the shooting, including cell-phone audio of Williams-Gillard
engaging in smack talk and footage of him sitting in the vehicle out of which shots were
fired with something dark and indiscernible in his hands. Law enforcement recovered two
types of shell casings from the scene; casings from .40-caliber bullets—which can be linked
to codefendant—and casings from 9mm bullets. Williams-Gillard’s bedroom contained a
large quantity of ammunition of the same brand and caliber used in the shooting. Anna
described Williams-Gillard as “anxious” and “crying” after the shooting and stated that he
told her and their other friends that he was in codefendant’s car at the time of the shooting.
And Anna testified— without objection —that she overheard Williams-Gillard admit to
Raymond that he “shot his gun twice” during the incident. Considered cumulatively, these
facts form overwhelming evidence of Williams-Gillard’s guilt that undermines any
persuasive value of the challenged prior-gun- possession evidence.
3 Such “overwhelming

3 This summary of the evidence excludes the evidence that Williams-Gillard challenges on
appeal.
11
evidence of guilt is a factor, often a very important one,” in determining whether an error
was harmless. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 59 (quotation omitted).
On this record, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability that the district
court’s admission of evidence that Williams- Gillard has previously possessed a firearm
significantly affected the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, any error in its admission was
harmless.
B. Codefendant’s Jail Calls

Williams-Gillard next argues that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting three recorded calls codefendant made from jail. The parties do not dispute, and
we agree, that the recordings are hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted and is generally inadmissible. Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c), 802. But Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) provides an exception to this general rule
for statements made against the declarant’s penal interest.
For a statement to be admissible under the statement-against-interest exception, the
district court must: (1) determine that the declarant is unavailable to testify; (2) determine
that the hearsay statement “at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true ”; and (3) scrutinize the
statement to avoid violating the Confrontation Clause. Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3); State v.
Morales, 788 N.W.2d 737, 762 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
When admitting hearsay under this exception, the district court must “construe the
term ‘statement’ narrowly and allow only those statements that directly inculpate the
12
declarant and not admit a larger narrative that merely contains some inculpating
statements.” State v. T ovar, 605 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2000). Statements of arrested
accomplices may be admissible if they are “truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely
attempts to shift blame or curry favor.” Morales, 788 N.W.2d at 764 (quoting Williamson
v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994)).
Codefendant made three calls from jail. During the first call, he stated that Raymond
was a “snitch[].” In the second call, he described the shooting, asserting that the entire
situation “was all in [Williams- Gillard’s] hands.” Codefendant stated that Williams-
Gillard told him to “block [Jason] in” while at the church parking lot and then instructed
him to follow Jason to the site of the shooting. Codefendant admitted that he “sho[t] up in
the air,” but explained that it was Williams-Gillard who was “aiming in on” and “shooting”
at Jason and his friends. Finally, in the third call, codefendant stated, “I believe the angle
that I was shooting, I couldn’t have hit anybody, especially because I was driving.”
It is undisputed that codefendant was unavailable to testify because he invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Williams-Gillard a sserts that
admission of these recordings was an abuse of discretion because the calls (1) contain
“inadmissible narrative,” and (2) are blame- shifting and not truly against codefendant’s
penal interest.
4 This assertion has merit.

4 The state argues that Williams-Gillard forfeited the argument that the calls contain
inadmissible narrative because, at a pretrial hearing, he agreed that it was generally “safe
to leave the redaction issues in [the parties’] hands.” We are not persuaded. Defense
counsel immediately followed this statement with, “I was going to ask the Court to review
[codefendant’s] county jail calls . . . before issuing a decision on that one issue.”
13
“Rule 804(b)(3) does not consider whether an entire [statement] is, on balance,
against the declarant’s interest.” Id. at 763. Rather, it requires district courts to “parse a
declarant’s generally self-inculpatory narrative to separate and omit from the narrative non-
self-inculpatory declarations or remarks.” Id. Codefendant’s jail calls included several
self-inculpatory statements, but they were interspersed within a blame-shifting narrative
that tends to downplay his involvement. We therefore conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting codefendant’s recorded calls.
But the record persuades us that admission of the jail recordings did not significantly
affect the jury’s verdict. See Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54 (listing the nonexclusive harmless-
error factors). Codefendant’s calls were not presented in a prominent manner— they are
referenced on only 19 transcript pages. And the content of the calls has minimal persuasive
value; the information relayed is largely cumulative of the video evidence of the shooting
and the testimony provided by Jason, Carter, Michael, and Anna. The prosecutor did
describe the calls—and played two short audio excerpts—during closing arguments. B ut
the excerpts and related discussion were brief, comprising only three of the 41-page closing
arguments. Finally, as discussed above, the evidence of Williams-Gillard’s guilt was
strong. On this record, admission of codefendant’s jail calls was harmless.
C. Raymond’s Statement to Police

Williams-Gillard argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a
video recording of the statement Raymond gave to police the day after the shooting
14
occurred.5 Again, the parties agree —and so do we—that Raymond’s police statement
constitutes hearsay. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Williams-Gillard challenges the district
court’s admission of the recording under Minn. R. Evid. 807, the residual hearsay
exception.
The residual hearsay exception permits admission of a hearsay statement that
satisfies a number of requirements and has “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.” Minn. R. Evid. 807. We evaluate the trustworthiness of a statement
using the totality of the circumstances. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 292 (Minn.
2019). In doing so, we consider the four factors first set forth in State v. Ortlepp, 363
N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1985):
(1) there is no Confrontation Clause issue because the declarant
testifies, admits to making the prior statement, and is available
for cross-examination by the defense counsel; (2) the statement
is recorded, removing any real dispute about what the declarant
said; (3) the statement is against the declarant’s penal interest;
and (4) the statement is consistent with the State’s other
evidence that “pointed strongly toward” the defendant’s guilt.

Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281 at 293 (quoting Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d at 44). But these factors
are not the “only relevant factors” under the totality test. State v. Vangrevenhof, 941
N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). We may also assess whether the statement was voluntary,
whether the statement was made under oath and subject to cross-examination, the
relationship between the declarant and the litigants, and whether the declarant recanted the
statement. Id.

5 Williams-Gillard does not challenge the admission of the video recording of the statement
Raymond made to police on the day of the shooting.
15
On the day after the shooting, Raymond told police that Williams- Gillard told him
that he had shot his gun two, maybe three times during the incident. At trial, Raymond
recanted this statement, testifying that Williams-Gillard only told him that “some sh-t had
happened.” Raymond explained that he lied to police about Williams-Gillard shooting his
gun to try to expedite the return of his own firearm, which had been confiscated during the
search of his home following Williams-Gillard’s arrest.
Over Williams-Gillard’s objection that the statement was not trustworthy because
Raymond had recanted, the district court admitted the statement under the residual
exception. The court reasoned that (1) Raymond had testified, (2) he admitted making the
statement, (3) the statement matched Anna ’s testimony, and (4) his long-standing
friendship with Williams-Gillard played a role in his differing testimony.
On appeal, Williams- Gillard concedes that the first two Ortlepp factors (the
declarant’s availability and the existence of a recording) are satisfied. But he argues that
the third factor is not because Raymond’s statement was not against his penal interest, as it
does not subject him to criminal liability. See Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 293. We are not
persuaded. “[T]he third Ortlepp factor may be satisfied even when a declarant’s statement
is not against the declarant’s penal interest if the declarant is hostile to the state and
supportive of the defendant.” State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 653, 659 (Minn. App. 2004)
(citing State v. Whiteside, 400 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Mar.
18, 1987)), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). Raymond was hostile to the state, as shown
by the need to subpoena him to obtain his testimony at trial. And Raymond is supportive
16
of Williams- Gillard— he testified that Williams-Gillard is “one of [his] closest friends.”
Accordingly, we conclude that the third Ortlepp factor is satisfied.
Williams-Gillard also contends that the district court erred in concluding the fourth
Ortlepp factor—that the statement is consistent with other evidence—was met because
Anna’s testimony has its “own trustworthiness issues.” We are not convinced. Anna’s
testimony aligns exactly with Raymond’s statement to police; both consistently describe
spending time with Williams-Gillard at the mall and then at Raymond’s house, and both
state that Williams-Gillard told Raymond that he had shot his firearm twice. The assessment
of Anna’s credibility was a function of the jury. State v. Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn.
2005).
Finally, Williams-Gillard asserts that the unsworn nature of Raymond’s statement
and his subsequent recantation render it untrustworthy. See Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d at
736. Although the statement was not made under oath, the fact that Raymond came to the
police station of his own accord—the day after the shooting— to make the statement
supports its veracity. See Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 295 (considering the voluntary nature
of a statement in analyzing its trustworthiness). And while Raymond did recant th e
statement at trial, a recanted statement may be sufficiently trustworthy under the residual
hearsay exception when “(1) other uncontradicted evidence discredits the declarant’s
recantation; (2) the declarant possesses a motive to falsely recant; (3) the declarant’s
recantation is itself inconsistent; and (4) the prior hearsay statements are strongly
corroborated by evidence admitted at trial.” Id. at 293 (quotation omitted). That is the
situation here. As discussed above, Anna’s testimony discredits Raymond’s recantation and
17
Raymond’s close friendship with Williams-Gillard provides him a clear motive to falsely
recant. Moreover, the officers’ discovery of 9mm shell casings in codefendant’s car and
the matching 9mm ammunition in Williams-Gillard’s bedroom further corroborates the
substance of Raymond’s police statement.
Because we conclude that Raymond’s police statement was sufficiently trustworthy
under Ortlepp and Vangrevenhof, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in
admitting it.
D. Jason’s Statements to Police

Williams-Gillard finally argues that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting Jason’s two recorded statements to police. Jason’s first statement was made
immediately after the shooting, while he was at the hospital with Carter. His second
statement was made later that same day at the police station. We address the admissibility
of each statement in turn.
Jason’s First Statement

Jason’s first statement to police identifies Williams-Gillard and codefendant as the
shooters. The district court admitted it as a nonhearsay statement of identification under
Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). Under that rule, a statement is not hearsay if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is . . . one of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person, if the court is satisfied that the
circumstances of the prior identification demonstrate the
reliability of the prior identification.

Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C).

18
In State v. Robinson, our supreme court explained that the rationale behind this rule
“stems from the belief that if the original identification procedures were conducted fairly,
the prior identification would tend to be more probative than an identification at trial.” 718
N.W.2d 400, 408 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). The court then clarified that “[t]his
rationale applies to cases involving the prior identification of an unknown offender, where
the in-court identification is so highly suggestive that it would be misleading if the jury
were allowed to believe that this was the witness’s only identification of the offender.” Id.
Because this same reasoning does not apply to the identification of a known offender, the
court held that rule 801(d)(1)(C) “does not extend to the out-of-court accusation against an
offender whose identity was well-known to the victim.” Id.
Williams-Gillard argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the
statement under rule 801(d)(1)(C) because Williams- Gillard was a “known offender” to
Jason. See id. We agree. Jason testified that he knew both Williams- Gillard and
codefendant “from the city” and explained that he, codefendant, and their respective friend
groups had been in conflict for “years.” Based on this testimony, it is clear that Williams-
Gillard was well known to Jason. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by
admitting Jason’s first statement under rule 801(d)(1)(C). See id.
Because the district court abused its discretion, we must assess whether there is a
“reasonable possibility” that the evidence “significantly affected the verdict.” Bigbear, 10
N.W.3d at 54 (quotation omitted). An examination of the relevant factors persuades us
that it did not.
19
Jason’s first statement did not play a prominent role at trial and was only minimally
persuasive. The jury viewed the ten-minute video recording one time during an eight-day
trial. This equates to approximately 15 pages of transcript, of which approximately six
sentences specifically identify Williams-Gillard and codefendant. The substance of
Jason’s first statement was otherwise cumulative of his trial testimony. A nd his
identifications of Williams-Gillard and codefendant were cumulative of those made by
Carter and Michael, which Williams-Gillard does not challenge. Williams-Gillard had the
opportunity to and did cross-examine Jason about the discrepancies between the statement
and his testimony, and about his own prior criminal record. And while the prosecutor did
reference the first police statement during closing argument, the discussion was limited,
amounting to only four pages of their 41-page closing arguments. Finally, as we have
discussed, the evidence of Williams-Gillard’s guilt was strong. In short, we conclude that
there is no reasonable probability that the admission of Jason’s first police statement
significantly affected the jury’s verdict. See Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505.
Jason’s Second Statement

Jason’s second statement to police recounts the events of the shooting, identifies
Williams-Gillard and codefendant as the shooters, and explains Jason’s conflict with
codefendant. Williams-Gillard contends that the statement is hearsay and that no exception
applies. But he did not object to its admission at trial. We review the unobjected-to
admission of evidence for plain error. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn.
2002). Under the plain-error standard, a defendant must establish (1) error, (2) that was
plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d
20
263, 277 (Minn. 2017). An error is “plain” when it clearly or obviously contravenes
caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn.
2017). If the three plain-error requirements are met, this court may only correct the error
if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).
It is difficult to review evidentiary issues — particularly hearsay challenges—for
plain error. Indeed, “[t]he number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion make
objections to such testimony particularly important to the creation of a record of the trial
court’s decision-making process in either admitting or excluding a given statement.” State
v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). Because Williams-Gillard did not object
to the admissibility of Jason’s second statement, the state did not have the opportunity to
demonstrate that one of the many hearsay exceptions applies . Nor did the district court
have the opportunity to evaluate the statement’s admissibility under the various evidentiary
rules. Because w e conclude that Jason’s second statement is not “clearly or obviously
inadmissible hearsay,” see i d., we discern no plain error and need not consider the
remaining prongs of the plain-error analysis, Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785.
II. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by misstating the law on
accomplice liability.

Where, as here, the defendant did not object to claimed prosecutorial misconduct at
trial, we review for plain error. State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 806 (Minn. App. 2018),
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). In doing so, we apply a “modified” plain -error test,
under which the defendant must establish that error occurred and that the error was plain.
21
Id. If plain error is shown, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the error did
not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. A prosecutor errs when they misstate the
law during closing argument. State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 161 (Minn. 2024).
Under Minnesota law, a person is liable for aiding and abetting the crimes of another
if “the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise
procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2022). Aiding and
abetting is a “theory of criminal liability”; it is not a “separate substantive offense.” State
v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020) (quotations omitted). Minnesota Statutes
section 609.05 holds an accomplice liable as if they were the principal. State v. Lee, 683
N.W.2d 309, 315 (Minn. 2004).
In closing argument, the prosecutor described accomplice liability as follows:
So in this case, [codefendant] and Mr. Williams-Gillard,
there is not a principal actor. They’re acting equally together
towards a goal of this drive-by shooting, so it does not matter,
legally, whose bullet killed [victim ] or whose bullet injured
[Carter], because they’re acting equally in this drive- by
shooting by both shooting guns. Because of that, they’re both
charged with aiding and abetting that drive-by shooting that led
to [victim’s] death and led to [Carter’s] injury.

(Emphasis added.)

Williams-Gillard contends this misstated the law because a person is either a
“principal or an accomplice to a crime” and, if a person is charged as an accomplice, “the
state has to prove that the principal committed the offense, and the defendant intentionally
aided it.” The state points to State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1996), as support for
the prosecutor’s argument. We agree that Atkins guides our analysis.
22
Atkins was found guilty under an accomplice -liability theory for intentional first-
degree murder while committing or attempting to commit a robbery. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d
at 646. The accomplice-liability theory was necessary because Atkins and another
individual had “each accused the other of firing the shots that killed” the victim. Id. In
considering Atkins’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, the supreme court explained
that the clear purpose of accomplice liability is to allow the state to charge and prosecute
two accomplices, even if “each point[s] the finger at the other as the truly guilty one.” Id.
In other words, “under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, regardless of who fired the fatal shots, either
Atkins or [his accomplice] could be charged and prosecuted for first-degree murder.” Id.
Consistent with Atkins , the prosecutor here told the jury that it did not matter
whether Williams-Gillard or codefendant fired the shots that killed victim and injured
Carter. That explanation captures the essence of the accomplice theory of criminal liability,
which makes accomplices criminally liable as principals and permits the prosecution of
more than one individual when it is impossible to precisely pinpoint exactly who dealt the
critical blow. See id. With this in mind, we see no error—let alone plain error—in the
prosecutor’s explanation of the law during closing argument. See Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at
407 (stating that an “error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’” (quotation omitted)). Because
we conclude that the prosecutor did not plainly err, we need not address the other prongs
of the modified plain-error test. See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006).
6

6 Williams-Gillard also asserts that he is entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error.
In “rare cases,” a new trial is warranted when the cumulative effect of trial error effectively
denies the defendant a fair trial. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at 278. But because Williams-Gillard
has not prevailed on most of his claims of error and, as discussed above, the few
23
In sum, Williams- Gillard has failed to establish prejudicial evidentiary error or
prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on appeal.
Affirmed.

demonstrated errors had a limited impact on the trial, we are satisfied that this is not such
a case.