State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1786

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sanussi Tamsir Bangoura,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-23-2042

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of aiding and abetting second -degree murder
by drive-by shooting, aiding and abetting second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon,
and reckless discharge of a firearm, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to defeat
his self-defense claim or to find him guilty under a theory of accomplice liability and that
the prosecutor committed misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Sanussi Tamsir Bangoura had a long-standing dispute with J.M. On
August 2, 2023, J.M. was in a church parking lot when Bangoura drove past the parking
lot with his roommate, Brandon Williams-Gillard. Bangoura parked his vehicle in the
parking lot exit, preventing J.M. from leaving. Williams-Gillard approached J.M. and,
while striking the hood of J.M.’s car, challenged J.M. to a fight. J.M. agreed, but requested
it occur “down the block.”
While in transit to the fight location, J.M. contacted friends to assist in the fight.
J.M. arrived at the location, as did four of his friends. Bangoura parked about a block away
from J.M. and J.M.’s friends (J.M.’s group).
J.M.’s group walked toward Bangoura’s vehicle, and the two groups started yelling
challenges at each other. J.M.’s group told Bangoura and Williams-Gillard to exit the car,
or they would “pop” the tires. During the altercation, one of J.M.’s friends, C.R.- N.,
punched Bangoura through an open window. C.R.-N. told police that he punched
Bangoura because he saw Bangoura reaching for a gun. Around the same time as the
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punch, Bangoura and Williams- Gillard pulled out pistols and started shooting. J.M.’s
group ran away. Bangoura continued shooting as they drove away. C.R.-N. video recorded
the incident on his cellphone.
Two of J.M.’s friends were hit by bullets; one of whom was killed. Police were
unable to recover the firearms, but they did recover 9mm and .40 caliber casings and bullets
from the scene and from Bangoura’s car. Police also found 9mm and .40 caliber
ammunition in Williams-Gillard’s bedroom, and a drum magazine for a pistol in
Bangoura’s bedroom.
When questioned by police, Bangoura first denied involvement. Later, he told
police that, because of the threat to “pop” the tires, he believed that someone had a knife,
and he shot into the air to scare J.M.’s group away.1
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Bangoura with aiding and abetting second-
degree murder by drive-by shooting, aiding and abetting second-degree assault with a
dangerous weapon, and reckless discharge of a firearm.
At trial, Bangoura testified that he believed someone in J.M.’s group had a firearm,
and when he heard someone say, “pop [th]em,” he thought he was going to be shot.
However, on cross -examination Bangoura testified that J.M.’s group never directly
mentioned having a gun; they only mentioned fist-fighting . When questioned on why he
did not drive away, Bangoura testified, “If I drove forward, I would have hit them. . . . I
tried to back up, but [Williams- Gillard] was yelling at me, telling me to stop.” On cross-

1 J.M. told police he possessed a knife during the incident.
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examination, Bangoura stated that Williams-Gillard had threatened him in the past and so
he was fearful that Williams-Gillard would shoot him if he drove away. The district court
granted Bangoura’s request for a self-defense jury instruction.
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
It does not matter, nor do I have to prove, whose bullet actually
killed [P.A.] and whose bullet actually hit [C.R.-N.], because
Mr. Bangoura and Mr. Williams-Gillard were acting with the
same goal of committing this drive-by shooting . . . . They’re
equal participants, and so they’re both charged with aiding and
abetting the murder to [P.A.] and the assault on [C.R.-N.]

Bangoura did not object to this statement.

On June 20, 2024, the jury found Bangoura guilty as charged. The district court
sentenced Bangoura to 367 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Bangoura argues that the evidence was insufficient to negate his self-defense claim
or to prove he was guilty of aiding and abetting the offenses. We will evaluate each
argument in turn.
A. Self-defense
Bangoura first argues that the dispelling of his self-defense claim was based on
circumstantial evidence. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently concluded that
video recordings are “direct evidence of what they show,” and applied the “standard
applicable to direct evidence” in reviewing whether there was sufficient evidence to
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disprove self-defense. State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 40 (Minn. 2024). Because the
record in this case includes video footage of the incident, we apply the same standard.
“[I]n cases based on direct evidence, [reviewing courts] view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder disbelieved any testimony
conflicting with that verdict.” Id. at 39 (quotation omitted). The verdict will not be
overturned if “the fact-finder, acting with regard for the presumption of innocence and the
[s]tate’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty.” Id.
For a defendant to obtain a self-defense jury instruction, they must first provide
sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude they acted in self-defense.
State v. Baker, 13 N.W.3d 401, 409 (Minn. 2024). Self-defense elements include: (1) the
absence of aggression or provocation from the defendant; (2) the defendant must have an
actual and honest belief they are in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the
defendant’s belief of imminent danger is reasonable; and (4) the defendant’s subjective
belief in the inability to retreat is objectively reasonable based on the information available
to the defendant at the time force was used. Id. Additionally, the degree of force used
cannot exceed what a reasonable person would believe to be necessary under the
circumstances.
2 Id.
Upon a district court granting a self-defense jury instruction, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to dispel the self-defense claim. Id. at 408. “[T]he [s]tate may disprove the

2 This is not an element of self-defense but a requirement as part of the defense. Id.

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claim by disproving any of the four elements or by disproving that the degree of force used
was reasonable.” Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
Bangoura claims that there was insufficient evidence to determine he was guilty of
aiding and abetting second-degree murder by drive-by shooting and aiding and abetting
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. We disagree. First, the district court
granted Bangoura a self-defense jury instruction. Not all defendants obtain this jury
instruction. See State v. Vazquez, 644 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. App. 2002). And “[w]e
presume that juries follow instructions given by the district court.” State v. Segura,
2 N.W.3d 142, 167 (Minn. 2024). The jury was aware of Bangoura’s self- defense claim
and the state’s burden to disprove it, and it determined the state met its burden disproving
self-defense.
Further, there was sufficient evidence to show that Bangoura’s subjective belief that
he could not retreat was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Bangoura and
Williams-Gillard waited while J.M.’s group walked to Bangoura’s vehicle from a block
away. While testifying, Bangoura indicated that, when J.M.’s group arrived at his car, he
still had the opportunity to place the car in reverse and drive away. Bangoura’s claim that
he spent time and drove around with Williams-Gillard —a person he feared might kill
him—did not persuade the jury; we reject this testimony. See Blevins, 10 N.W.3d at 39-40.
This evidence is sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bangoura had multiple
chances to flee.

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Lastly, there was sufficient evidence to determine that the degree of force Bangoura
used exceeded what a reasonable person would believe necessary under the circumstances.
Bangoura brought a pistol to a fistfight , started shooting while sitting in a car with the
windows down, and continued shooting as they drove away despite J.M.’s group not having
guns. This evidence is sufficient for a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
force used was excessive. The jury had sufficient evidence to determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Bangoura did not act in self-defense.
B. Aiding and Abetting Liability
Bangoura claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his aiding and
abetting convictions. Because these convictions were based on circumstantial evidence,
we conduct a two-step analysis. State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 158 (Minn. 2024). First,
the court identifies the circumstances proved, “winnowing down the evidence presented at
trial to a subset of facts consistent with the jury’s verdict, and disregarding evidence
inconsistent with the verdict.” Id. Second, the court independently examines the
reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the proven circumstances. Id. at 158-59.
“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient only if the reasonable inferences are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.” Id. at 159 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). While the reviewing court
will not defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences, reversal will not occur
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unless there is a reasonable inference other than guilt. State v. Stone, 982 N.W.2d 500, 510
(Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d 617 (Minn. 2023).
A person is criminally liable for crimes committed by another, or for any other
reasonably foreseeable crimes committed in the pursuance of the intended crime, if the
person “intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures
the other to commit the [intended] crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subds. 1-2 (2022). The
accomplice can be liable without having prior knowledge of the crime, provided they knew
that the crime was being committed, and they intended, by their presence or actions, to aid
its commission. State v. Smith, 901 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 14, 2017). The requisite accomplice liability state-of- mind can be inferred
from circumstantial evidence, such as being at the scene of the crime, having a close
association with the codefendant before and after the crime, lacking objection or surprise
to the codefendant’s actions, and flight from the scene with the codefendant. See, e.g.,
Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 156.
A person is guilty of second-degree murder if they cause death while “committing
or attempting to commit a drive-by shooting . . . under circumstances other than those
described in [first-degree murder].” Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(2) (2022). A person is
guilty of second- degree assault if they “assault[] another with a dangerous weapon and
inflict[] substantial bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2 (2022).
Accomplice liability was reviewed in State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642
(Minn. 1996). In Atkins, the appellant was involved in robbing a motel owner who was
ultimately murdered. 543 N.W.2d at 644. Both Atkins and his codefendant identified the
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other as the murderer. See id. at 646. Atkins argued that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of murder under a theory of accomplice liability because he was in the
getaway car when the victim was shot and did not know his codefendant had a firearm. Id.
The court recognized that the evidence suggested a bullet was fired at the victim before the
appellant chased and physically assaulted him. Id. at 647. Thus, regardless of whether the
appellant knew his codefendant had a pistol before the robbery, he knew when striking the
victim. Id. The court also concluded there was evidence to support the inference that the
appellant knew the codefendant was armed because there was testimony that the
codefendant had been seen with handguns, arrested with a handgun, and had recently shot
his thumb off during a different robbery. Id. The court concluded there was sufficient
evidence to support the accomplice liability conviction. Id.
The facts of this case are similar to Atkins. Police located two different types of
pistol ammunition in Williams- Gillard’s room and a large-capacity pistol magazine in
Bangoura’s room. Bangoura was carrying a pistol during the incident. It would be
reasonable to infer that Bangoura knew that Williams- Gillard was carrying a firearm as
well. Cf. State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. 1983) (“Common sense indicates
that if two people plan a burglary[,] they usually discuss the matter in detail beforehand,
including whether or not to carry weapons. The jury could rely on that item of common
sense.”). Additionally, like Atkins, regardless of whether Bangoura knew Williams-Gillard
had a firearm or was going to shoot, he knew that Williams-Gillard had a gun when the
shooting started and continued to shoot as they drove away. See Atkins, 543 N.W.2d at 647.
It is reasonable to infer that Bangoura’s actions were to aid the shooting, and that death or
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great bodily harm were reasonably foreseeable consequences of that crime. There is no
reasonable alternative hypothesis to be drawn from Bangoura’s actions except that he knew
the crime was being committed and he intended to aid its commission. Therefore, there
was sufficient evidence to support his aiding and abetting convictions.
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Bangoura next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating that
the state’s burden did not require it to establish the principal actor or whose bullets harmed
the victims. Because Bangoura did not object at trial, this court analyzes the
prosecutorial-misconduct claim under the modified plain-error test. State v. Patzold,
917 N.W.2d 798, 806 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). If Bangoura
can establish an error that is plain, the burden shifts to the state to show that the plain error
did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Id.
A prosecutor errs when they misstate the law during a closing argument. Segura,
2 N.W.3d at 161. However, in this case, the prosecutor did not misstate the law. As
previously stated, codefendants are both held liable as the principal when it is impossible
to determine whose actions caused the harm. See Atkins, 543 N.W.2d at 646-47. This
court rejected the same prosecutorial-misconduct argument from Bangoura’s codefendant.
State v. Williams-Gillard, No. A24-1129, 2025 WL 2030626, *9-10 (Minn. App. July 21,
2025), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2025).
3 There, this court recognized:

3 This nonprecedential opinion is used for its persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c); see e.g., Moore v. State, 945 N.W.2d 421, 430 (Minn. App. 2020),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2020).

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[T]he prosecutor here told the jury that it did not matter
whether Williams-Gillard or codefendant [Bangoura] fired the
shots that killed [the] victim and injured [C.R.-N.] That
explanation captures the essence of the accomplice theory of
criminal liability, which makes accomplices criminally liable
as principals and permits the prosecution of more than one
individual when it is impossible to precisely pinpoint exactly
who dealt the critical blow.
Id. at *10.
Like Williams-Gillard, the prosecutor’s statement—“It does not matter, nor do I
have to prove, whose bullet actually killed [P.A.] and whose bullet actually hit [C.R.-N.],
because Mr. Bangoura and Mr. Williams -Gillard were acting with the same goal of
committing this drive-by shooting”—reflects the law’s essence and was not a
misstatement. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in closing argument.
Affirmed.