In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. I. G. and O. C., C. D. C., A. R. G., R. M. K., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1228

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. I. G. and O. C., C. D. C., A. R. G., R. M. K., Parents.

Filed March 10, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-JV-24-550

Daniel T. Donnelly, Donnelly Law Office, Austin, Minnesota (for appellant mother J.I.G.)

Robert J. Jarrett, Steele County Attorney, Campbell R. Housh, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Prairie County Alliance)

Benjamin Cass, Smith, Tollefson, Rahrick & Cass, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent
father O.C.)

Beau A. Hartman, Hartman Law Office, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent father
A.R.G.)

Julie A. Nelson, Owatonna, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s termination of her parental rights to four
children, appellant mother argues that the district court erred by determining that
(1) termination was in the children’s best interests, (2) the county made reasonable efforts
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for reunification of mother and the children, and (3) termination was supported by at least
one statutory basis. We affirm.
FACTS
On the day before Halloween in 2023, a gas-station and convenience-store
employee in Steele County reported to law enforcement that two young children —eight
and six years old—had come into the store twice that morning without warm clothes or a
caregiver. Responding officers returned the children to their home, where they learned that
appellant mother, J.I.G., had been asleep all morning with her youngest child, who was two
years old, and did not know where her other three children were. It was discovered that
her four-year-old child had found his way onto the bus and gotten himself to school. After
the officers’ visit to the home, the children were placed in emergency protective care.
Mother’s history includes several traumatic events throughout her life, mental- and
chemical-health concerns, and significant contact with child protective services in multiple
states relating to several of her older children, who are not the subject of this proceeding.
Mother has various mental-health diagnoses, including depression, posttraumatic stress
disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Records indicate that mother has received
services for her mental and chemical health through child-welfare case plans in other
proceedings, but that she will attend appointments sporadically or discontinue the services
after a time. Although the facts of mother’s “extensive” history with
child-protective-services agencies in multiple states are not fully established in the record,
it appears that all of her older children were removed from her custody before she moved
to Minnesota. In May 2009 and May 2012, a child-protection agency in Georgia received
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substantiated reports that mother was neglecting her children and using controlled
substances. In April 2013, a Georgia report indicates that mother was arrested for child
abandonment. In May 2014, mother gave birth to a child in Michigan, and the record
shows that the State of Michigan took custody of that child shortly thereafter.
After mother moved to Minnesota, the county in which she was living at that time
received reports of physical and verbal abuse and neglect of three of the children who are
the subject of these proceedings. In those reports, two of the children disclosed that mother
had hurt them, but mother insisted that the children had caused the harm to each other. The
reports also stated that mother left the children unattended for hours at a time while mother
slept during the day. In February 2020, the three children were removed from mother’s
care and remained out of the home until later that year.
At some point in 2020, while working on regaining custody of her three children,
mother began dating A.G., whom she later married and with whom she shares her youngest
child—the fourth child subject to these proceedings. A.G. testified that, during their
yearlong marriage, mother behaved in an erratic manner on a daily basis, “going from being
super happy to super angry . . . at the blink of an eye.” He testified that he witnessed mother
abuse the older children, such as whipping one of them with a belt and screaming at them.
During their marriage, A.G. believed that mother used controlled substances because he
observed her shaking and having heavily dilated pupils. He also testified that mother would
disappear without warning and he would be forced to find someone to take care of the
children. On one occasion, mother was gone for a week.
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Sometime in 2022, mother and A.G. moved to Steele County, where respondent
Minnesota Prairie County Alliance (the county’s human- services agency) is located.
Beginning in April 2023, the county began receiving reports that mother was abusing the
children. In May, one of the children’s teachers reported to the county that she had received
anonymous emails informing her that the children had been abused at home for years; the
emails asserted that mother beat the six-year-old nearly to death when he was four and that
she had kept one of the children out of school and hidden because there were visible marks
on the child. Another report alleged that the children were seen with bruises and scratches
on their bodies, that mother would hit the children with a belt and “ smack” the children,
that mother slept most of the time and did not provide the children with food, and that, in
the winter months, mother would punish the children by making them stay outside in the
cold, sometimes for days. In August, officers received a report that the children were found
at a gas station and convenience store on their own, and in October, officers received the
report that led to the four children being removed from mother’s home.
At various points in 2023, the three oldest children were all identified as
“emotionally disturbed” children for whom special services were recommended. In early
October 2023, the oldest child was enrolled in Prairie Care, a program that provides
outpatient services for children with behavioral issues. Shortly after starting Prairie Care,
the child told a staff person that her mother would hit, slap, spank, and kick her and that
she did not feel safe at home because she feared mother. The staff person reporting this to
the county stated that they saw bruises all over the child’s body. A week later, the county
received a report that mother had not gotten out of bed and thus the children did not eat the
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previous day; the report also stated that the oldest child had new bruising and a mark on
her arm. Prairie Care reported to the county that mother had not been engaged in the oldest
child’s care because mother was missing appointments and not completing home
assignments.
During an interview with the county, the oldest child disclosed that mother slapped
her and pulled her hair every day when she came home from school and that sometimes
mother used a belt or hanger to hit her, the six-year -old, and the four-year-old. She also
said that, at the beginning of October, mother had prevented her from coming inside,
making her sleep outside without a mattress, for a “full week” and that sometimes mother
made her do chores “all night long” so she could not sleep. The six-year -old’s father
testified at trial that his son had reported to him that mother had made him sleep outside
also. The oldest child reported that she did not want to go home and that she sometimes
wished she could live in a foster home.
During an interview the next week, the six-year -old admitted that mother hits his
siblings with a belt or her hand and pulls the oldest child’s hair. In the last week of October,
the youngest, who was two years old, was reported to have a “goose egg” on her forehead
and a gouge on her cheek, which mother blamed on the oldest of the four children. At the
end of October, mother reported that the oldest child’s behavior had worsened and that she
wanted to put her in a residential care program; meanwhile, Prairie Care described the same
child as a “model student.” Mother also stated that her oldest child kept the six-year-old
and four-year-old children awake at night, was hitting and pushing her siblings and had hit
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the six-year-old with a hanger, had stopped showering and wearing clean clothes, and told
mother that she would try to get mother in trouble by reporting that mother had hit her.
In the days following the incident at the gas station and convenience store that led
to the children being removed from mother’s home, mother texted county workers and told
them that she did not want her oldest child back in her home and that she did not think she
would ever get the children back. While in foster care, the three older children stated that
mother hit them with hangers and belts and that they feared being returned to mother and
hoped instead to remain in foster care. The county filed a petition for children in need of
protection or services.
In December 2023, mother appeared before the district court and admitted that the
children were in need of protection or services because she could not provide them with
necessary care. The district court ordered mother to complete a parenting-capacity
assessment and any recommendations, complete a mental- health evaluation and any
recommendations, cooperate with chemical testing, demonstrate responsive parenting and
converse with the children appropriately, participate in and attend all of the children’s
appointments, and remain in contact with the county.
During the months that followed, mother had supervised parenting time with the
children. County workers intervened during many of these visits because mother was not
engaging with the children and the children began climbing on furniture or on cabinets,
posing a safety concern. Often, mother did not seem engaged with or concerned about the
children or their emotions. Mother also spoke to the children about this case and, during
one visit, told them that they needed to do their part to help her keep them. During another
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visit, mother became upset with the children for not eating all of their food, shamed them,
and later physically restrained her oldest child and would not let her escape; county workers
ended the visit early after forcing mother to stop. Mother also missed many of her visits
with the children despite the county assisting mother with transportation, and the county
implemented a requirement that mother confirm the visit before noon on visit days to
prevent the children from traveling nearly an hour to attend the visit when mother was not
going to be present. Even when she confirmed visits, mother would miss them.
To address mother’s chemical health, the case plan required mother to submit to
chemical testing. The county attempted to administer urinalysis tests (UAs) on 17 different
occasions, but mother refused to provide a sample on 14 of those occasions. Of the three
UAs mother completed, the results were negative twice and the third was positive for
fentanyl, morphine, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. Mother asserted that she had
been in a car accident and that the hospital gave her these “medications,” but county
workers obtained the hospital records and none of the medications provided to mother
contained fentanyl or methamphetamine. The county arranged to meet mother wherever
she was located to administer the UAs , but she often refused to provide her location or
ignored county workers when they appeared. On one occasion, the worker went to
mother’s home and mother ignored the worker until mother came out to collect a package.
When the worker approached her, mother “was mumbling and slurring” and would not
make eye contact. When it was explained that the report would be positive if she refused
to submit to a test, mother responded that “it was what it was.” During interactions with
mother, workers observed mother pacing, talking very fast, struggling to hold
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conversations, and not making eye contact. During mother’s testimony on the first day of
trial, the district court had difficulty keeping mother focused. After the district court
repeatedly attempted and failed to help mother recall important information for this case,
it asked her whether she was taking medications or was under the influence of substances.
Mother admitted to taking prescription medications but denied taking any other substances.
After mother’s continued failure to engage in the case plan, the county petitioned in
April 2024 for involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights. In the petition, the
county asserted that the children had been out of the home for 514 days within the last five
years, including the days since their removal on October 30, 2023. In the district court’s
order granting the county’s petition for involuntary termination, it found that the three older
children had been out of the home for 590 days between February 10, 2020, and June 11,
2024, and that the youngest had been out of the home for 226 days between October 30,
2023, and June 11, 2024.1
At trial, two of the children’s fathers testified in support of the petition, as did two
county workers, the guardian ad litem, and the parenting-assessment provider. The district
court found all of their testimonies credible. Mother testified on her own behalf, and the

1 During trial, the district court received testimony that all four children were much
improved outside of mother’s care. The oldest child had been running away from school
and wandering around looking for food, and now she can self-regulate and participate in
activities with her friends. The six-year-old child has shown that he is moving on from the
worry and fear he felt, particularly after mother failed to show up for his birthday when she
promised him, and he is beginning to feel settled. The four-year-old child had been stealing
food, destroying property, and staying awake all night, and now he can sleep through the
night, play with his siblings, and sit with family at dinner. And the youngest child now
lives with her father, and he testified that she is no longer jumpy and scared like she was
when she first came to live with him.
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district court found her testimony not credible because her testimony conflicted with
evidence in the record and she did not provide records or evidence to support her assertions.
The district court found in its order that mother frequently diverted her answers away from
the best interests of the children to discuss the effect that termination would have on her.
The district court granted the county’s petition, determining that termination was in the
children’s best interests, services will not remedy the circumstances that led to the
out-of-home placement within the reasonably foreseeable future, and several statutory
grounds supported the termination.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
A district court must make three determinations before granting a county’s petition
to terminate parental rights, including that “(1) at least one statutory ground for termination
is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family or reasonable efforts to do so are not required, and (3) termination is in
the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App.
2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); accord Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b),
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7-8(1) (2024); 2 see Minn. Stat. § 260C.012(a) (2024). Mother challenges the district
court’s determinations on each of these points.3
Appellate courts review an order for involuntary termination of parental rights to
“determine whether the district court’s findings (1) address the statutory criteria and (2) are
supported by substantial evidence. [Appellate courts] must closely inquire into the
sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (citation and quotation
omitted). Appellate courts review the factual findings for clear error and whether a
statutory basis supported termination for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A district court abuses
its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
When reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts (1) view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not find their own facts, (3) do
not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ.

2 Section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b), was amended in 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 115,
art. 18, § 38, at 1742-44. The amendment did not change the substance of the applicable
subsections but removed a subsection that does not apply here and renumbered the
subsections. Therefore, we cite the most recent version of the statute. See Interstate Power
Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that,
generally, “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case”).

3 Mother also argues that the district court denied her right to due process, but because she
does not identify how she was deprived of this right, we do not address this argument. See
In re Welfare of Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (explaining
that an inadequately briefed argument is forfeited).
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Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see Ewald v. Nedrebo,
999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney in a family-law appeal), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); see Vangsness v. Vangsness,
607 N.W.2d 468, 472, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review in
a similar fashion).
With these standards of review in mind, we address each of mother’s arguments
using the order in which the parties’ briefs addressed them.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
was in the children’s best interests.
Mother first argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. She asserts that the
district court’s findings were clearly erroneous because the children’s stories of abuse are
inconsistent, multiple people testified that they never saw mother abuse the children, and
the county failed to provide evidence of physical harm. She argues that the children are
not better off without her because they struggled in foster care and in the care of others and
that her interests and the children’s interests are aligned against termination because the
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children love her and have a relationship with her. The county asserts that, although there
is a bond between mother and the children, a bond is not enough to overcome the evidence
supporting termination. The county specifically argues that there is a pattern of absence as
a parent and that mother’s noncompliance with the case plan demonstrates that she cannot
meet the children’s needs, notwithstanding her love for them. The county also points to
the district court’s credibility determinations that support the allegations that mother
physically abused the children.
The district court determined that it was in the children’s best interests that mother’s
rights be terminated because “the children can only achieve safety and stability away from
Mother,” finding that mother is unable to provide for the children’s mental or emotional
health, for their proper supervision , or for their education. It also found, among other
things, that mother “is impulsive and has no insight into how her choices and behaviors
negatively impact the children,” “is unwilling or unable to prioritize the children’s needs
over her own,” and is “unable to manage her own mental health needs” and that “this has
rendered Mother unable to meet the children’s mental education, developmental, and safety
needs.”
“We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s conclusion
that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Child of
A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018). We defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472.
In considering the best interests of the child, the district court balances three factors:
“(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest
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in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992) ; accord Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). A child’s competing interests include the need for a stable environment,
their health, and their preferences. Id. “During this balancing process, the interests of the
parent and child are not necessarily given equal weight.” Id. A district court must consider
the circumstances of the particular case when employing this balancing test. Id. And
ultimately, if a statutory basis to terminate parental rights is present, “the best interests of
the child must be the paramount consideration. . . . Where the interests of parent and child
conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
Here, the county established, via testimony from several witnesses whom the district
court credited, that the children’s needs were not being met while in mother’s care and that
mother was abusing and neglecting the children. The parenting- assessment provider
testified that mother’s infrequent visits with the children after they were removed from her
care demonstrate that mother does not prioritize the children’s needs. The six-year-old’s
father testified that he believed his child’s statement that mother made him and his siblings
stay outside for long periods of time, including overnight, without proper clothing and
during the winter. The youngest child’s father testified that he witnessed mother whipping
a child with her belt and using physical discipline with the children and that she would
disappear, sometimes for days at a time, and leave the children alone. A child-protection
worker testified that the child- welfare proceedings that began in a different Minnesota
county involved substantiated allegations of abuse and neglect of the children by mother
that were similar to the facts that led to the proceedings here and that the oldest child once
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told the worker that mother had caused all the bruises on her body. In addition, the county
presented evidence of multiple reports from the children about mother’s abuse and their
fear of being returned to her. Because the district court’s factual findings are supported by
evidence in the record, we conclude that they are not clearly erroneous. We further note
that we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations when weighing best interest
factors, Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472, and that the district court found the county’s
witnesses credible and did not credit mother’s testimony.4
Because substantial evidence supports the district cour t’s determination that the
children’s needs cannot be met while in mother’s care, and because it addressed the relevant
factors, made credibility determinations, and weighed the interests of the children and
mother, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination of
mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts toward reunification of mother and the children.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
county made reasonable efforts because the law does not require that she comply with the
reunification plan, the plan did not comply with the statutory requirements, and the county
did not act in good faith when making efforts to support mother in reunifying with the

4 Mother argues that the children’s best interests are served by remaining with their parent,
and she relies on In re Termination of Parental Rts. of Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626
(Minn. App. 2003), but mother misinterprets the rule in Tanghe to assert that the children’s
interests in remaining with their mother outweigh anything else. Rather, Tanghe reiterates
the principle that, even if there are statutory grounds for termination, the district court must
make specific findings that termination is in the children’s best interests, 672 N.W.2d at
626, which the district court did here.
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children. The county highlights that mother makes general assertions and does not identify
how the plan should have been different or how it failed to comply with the statutory
requirements. The county argues that the evidence supports the district court’s finding that
mother never engaged with the plan, and thus the plan could not be further tailored to
mother’s circumstances. It also asserts that mother cannot demonstrate that the county did
not act in good faith or that the plan was punitive in nature.
In any proceeding for termination, a district court must make specific findings that
“reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child and the parent were made including
individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family” or that “reasonable
efforts for reunification are not required.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8. Determining
whether the county made reasonable efforts requires the district co urt to consider whether
the services were (1) chosen “in collaboration with the child’s family,” (2) tailored to the
child’s and family’s individual needs, (3) relevant to the child’s “safety, protection, and
well-being,” (4) “adequate” to meet the child’s and family’s individualized needs,
(5) “culturally appropriate, (6) available and accessible[,] (7) consistent and timely[,] and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). To make
reasonable efforts, the county must “provide those services that would assist in alleviating
the conditions leading to” the termination proceeding. In re Welfare of M.A., 408 N.W.2d
227, 235-36 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). We review the district
court’s findings of fact regarding reasonable efforts for clear error, J.H., 968 N.W.2d at
601, and the district court’s determination of whether the reunification efforts were
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reasonable for an abuse of discretion, In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315,
323 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 21, 2015).
When crafting mother’s case plan, the county identified three categories of concern
that led to placement of the children outside of the home: mother’s mental health, mother’s
controlled substance use, and mother’s parenting, including her failure to supervise the
children and her physical abuse of the m. The case plan addresses these concerns, but
mother never engaged with the county to provide input to the case plan, nor did she meet
with the county to sign the case plan despite having received it. Although mother did not
sign the case plan, the county submitted “recommendations” to the district court that were
consistent with it, mother agreed to follow the county’s recommendations as part of her
admission that the children were in need of protection or services, and the district court
ordered her to comply with the recommendations.
The district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts toward
reunification of mother and the children. Specifically, it found that the county identified
relevant concerns, drafted a plan to address the concerns and work toward reunification,
and consistently attempted to offer assistance to mother—even when she responded with
“rude or mean- spirited comments” —and mother refused to engage with the county to
discuss or change her plan. The district court also found that there were no additional or
alternative services that the county could have provided to avoid termination of mother’s
parental rights. Finally, the district court found that mother refused to accept any
responsibility for her “consistent pattern of neglect and unpredictable behavior that has
frightened, hurt, and confused the children” and, without that acknowledgement, mother
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could not take steps to address the conduct that led to these proceedings. We review in turn
each identified condition that led to these proceedings —mental health, chemical health,
and parenting—and the efforts the county made to address each concern.
In light of mother’s mental-health needs, which include diagnoses of depression,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder, the district court required
mother to complete a mental-health assessment and follow its recommendations. There
are no records that mother completed such an assessment, but the parenting-assessment
recommendations, which mother was also required to follow, included that she receive
psychiatric medication consultations, obtain a mental -health case worker, receive
individual therapy, and complete a dialectical behavioral therapy course. Mother claimed
to have received individual therapy, obtained a mental-health case manager, signed up for
a dialectical behavioral therapy course, and obtained a psychiatrist, but the district court
found mother’s testimony not credible. Mother never submitted records to the county or
the district court to support her assertions.
To address mother’s use of controlled substances, the county required mother to
submit to random UAs. Of the 17 tests attempted, mother refused 14, and one of the three
she completed was positive for fentanyl, morphine, methamphetamine, and amphetamine .
Mother testified that she understood the county would travel to her to administer the tests,
and the record demonstrates the willingness of the county to meet mother at her location to
administer the tests, as well as mother ’s frequent refusal to provide her location or
acknowledge the county worker when they arrived. Mother also completed a
chemical-health assessment, but the district court credited a county worker’s testimony that
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the assessment was not reliable because mother was not forthright with the assessor about
her previous controlled-substance use.
As to concerns about mother’s parenting, the county required mother to, among
other things, complete a parenting-capacity assessment and follow any recommendations,
develop appropriate discipline methods, and demonstrate responsive parenting and
emotionally safe and supportive interactions with the children. Mother completed a
parenting-capacity assessment in February 2024, and the resulting recommendations were
consistent with her case plan. Although mother completed one eight-hour parenting course
immediately after the petition for children in need of protection or services was filed, she
failed to consistently demonstrate knowledge of improved parenting skills during her
supervised visits. Instead of observing improvement, county workers were forced to
intervene during several visits to stop mother from physically restraining a child or to
protect the children from harm due to mother’s failure to supervise them. Workers reported
that, during some visits, mother had inappropriate conversations with the children, such as
telling them that they have to “do their part” to help mother be with them, and secretly
recorded the children. Despite the county’s efforts to facilitate visitation, mother missed
so many visits that the county placed her on a plan to confirm her visits ahead of time to
avoid disruption to the children, and yet she continued to miss visits even after confirming
that she would be present.
Based on this record, we discern no clear error in the district court’s factual findings
about the efforts the county made, and we conclude that t he district court’s determination
that the county made reasonable efforts to support reunification is amply supported by the
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record. The record demonstrates that the county developed a case plan for mother that
identified mother’s needs and would alleviate the conditions that led to the children being
placed out of mother’s home. The record also supports that the county made extensive
efforts to work with mother by arranging transportation for supervised parenting visits,
traveling to her for UAs, and continually reaching out to schedule meetings with mother to
assess her case plan progress and tell her about the children’s well-being. Because the
record supports the determination that the county provided mother a case plan that was
tailored to the needs of mother and the children, relevant to the facts of the case, accessible,
and realistic under the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that the county made reasonable efforts to support reunification.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that at least one
statutory basis supported the termination of mother’s parental rights.
Before a parent’s rights may be involuntarily terminated, the district court must
determine that at least one of several potential statutory bases exist. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b). Here, the district court concluded that four statutory bases
supported the termination of mother’s parental rights: (1) mother has substantially,
continuously, and repeatedly failed to comply with duties imposed upon her by the parent
and child relationship, id., subd. 1(b)(2); (2) mother is palpably unfit to be a parent, id.,
subd. 1(b)(3); (3) the county made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to
the children’s placement out of the home and these efforts have failed, id., subd. 1(b)(4);
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and (4) the children are neglected and in foster care, id., subd. 1(b)(7). 5 Because only one
basis is required to support termination, we do not address all four and instead address only
the first basis.
Mother argues that the county provided insufficient evidence to show that she did
not meet the children’s needs while they were in her care. The county asserts that it
provided evidence of neglect and mother’s refusal to engage with the case plan, which
demonstrates that the children’s needs are not being met. The district court determined
that the county had proved by clear and convincing evidence that mother substantially,
continuously, and repeatedly failed to comply with her parental duties, which is a statutory
basis to terminate her parental rights. See id., subd. 1(b)(2). The district court’s findings
include that mother has not “provided for or participated in the children’s educational or
therapeutic programming since the children were removed from the home,” except for
attending one meeting for her oldest child; did not have consistent contact with the
children; and had inappropriate conversations with them during visits. The district court
determined that any further efforts at reunification would be futile because mother refused
to engage with the services offered and did not acknowledge the effect her actions had on
the children’s mental and emotional well-being.

5 Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that grounds for
termination existed under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivisions 1(b)(1) and
(7), which are related to abandonment and paternity, respectively, and requests that we
correct the record. However, the district court mentions these subdivisions in relation only
to the termination of the parental rights of the purported father of the four-year-old child
and did not analyze these bases relative to mother. Therefore, there is nothing for us to
correct.
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The statute provides that parental rights may be terminated upon a showing
that the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and child relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, she lter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable.
Id. “[A] parent’s failure to comply with a reasonable case plan may constitute evidence of
neglect of parental duties.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 603. When reviewing evidence of neglect,
“we address conditions at the time of the termination hearing and whether they are expected
to continue for the foreseeable future.” Id.
The district court’s finding of continuing neglect is supported by the record. During
supervised visits, county workers intervened on multiple occasions because mother
neglected to supervise the children properly, putting them at risk of harm. While the
children were out of mother’s care, mother attended only one meeting regarding the
children’s care and education and consistently avoided meeting with county workers to
discuss her progress on the case plan and receive updates on the children. Finally, as set
forth above, the record supports the determination that the county made reasonable efforts
to support the reunification of mother and the children and that these efforts were
unsuccessful in all areas of concern. Because the district court’s findings of fact are
supported by the record, the district court did not misapply the law, and its decision is not
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contrary to logic or the facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that this statutory basis for termination was met.
In sum, the record supports the district court’s determinations that termination was
in the best interests of the children, the county made reasonable efforts to support
reunification of mother and the children , and at least one statutory basis supports
termination of mother’s parental rights. We therefore conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.