Karen Marie Firman, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1263

Karen Marie Firman,
Appellant,

vs.

Town & Country Campground Inc., et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 7, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-23-524

Matthew J. Barber, Kojo A. Addo, Hannah R. Mielke, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Nicholas H. Jakobe, Erstad & Riemer, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the summary -judgment dismissal of her premises -liability
negligence claim stemming from personal injuries suffered when she fell on stairs at a
campground owned by respondents. Appellant argue s that summary judgment was
erroneously granted because there are material fact s in dispute regarding whether
2
respondents breached their duty of care, and whether respondents’ breach of their duty of
care was the proximate cause of appellant’s injuries. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from injuries sustained by appellant Karen Marie Firman when
she fell at respondent Town & County Campground Inc. (the “campground”), a roughly
five-acre property owned, at the time, by respondents Jill E. Olmstead and David
Olmstead.1 The campground was originally a farm. Jill’s parents purchased the farm in
the 1960s and converted it to a campground in 1968. Jill and David later purchased the
campground in 1996.
The campground has a main office building that was present on the property when
Jill’s parents purchased it. The main office building has a public entrance with a set of
wooden stairs with three treads and a top landing leading to the entrance. The stairs have
rubber mats affixed to the middle portion of each tread and at the front of the top landing,
but most of each tread is uncovered. There is also a wooden railing on each side of the
stairs. As far as Jill recalls, these stairs were present when th e farm was converted into a
campground, if not longer.
The campground offers a “work campers” program under which campers can work
for the campground for a certain number of hours in exchange for discounted or free
camping. Appellant and her husband had been visiting the campground since about 2003,
and had been part of the work campers program since about 2005. As a worker and camper,

1 For ease of reference the Olmsteads will be referred to individually by their first names.
3
appellant had used the stairs to the main office countless times without incident and was
aware of their condition.
On May 25, 2021, appellant went to the main office to take a break from some work
she was performing at the campground as part of the work campers program. As appellant
began to ascend the steps to the main office, she, without using the handrailing, stepped on
the first tread with one foot, and when attempting to raise her other foot to the second tread,
caught her toe on the “edge” of the second tread and lost her balance. Although appellant
acknowledged that she does not remember exactly what happened next, she recalls
attempting to regain her balance, by “plant[ing]” her foot and catching herself. But
appellant’s attempt to regain her balance was unsuccessful, and she fell backwards onto
the cement walkway at the base of the stairs. Appellant fractured her wrist and femur as a
result of her fall, and both injuries required surgical repair.
Appellant brought this action against respondents alleging that respondents were
negligent in maintaining the stairs to the main office and that the deteriorated condition of
the stairs caused her to fall and sustain substantial injuries. In deposition t estimony, the
campground’s former office manager testified that she believed that the stairs were
dangerous because they were old, the wood was rotting, the railing was loose, and the depth
of the step was “very narrow.” According to the office manager, s he often told people to
be “careful” on the steps because she routinely observed people tripping on the stairs.
Although the office manager acknowledged that people “didn’t always fall” when they
tripped on the stairs, she recalled one individual falling on the steps and breaking her wrist.
4
Another campground worker testified in his deposition that he believed that the
“stair tread, which you step on, was not deep enough to handle . . . the average -size foot.”
He also testified that he measured the steps before and after appellant fell and claimed that
they were “not in code” because “they were either too high or too low.” According to the
campground worker, he shared his concerns about the stairs with David “at least” twice
and at one point attempted to “reinforce” the handrails when they became “wobbly.” But
the campground worker acknowledged that he could not recall “what the specifications [of
the stairs] should have been according” to the proper code. And the campground worker
admitted that he has no professional experience in residen tial construction and that he did
not know when the stairs were built or if they were built according to the applicable code.
Respondents moved for summary judgment, claiming that “there is no evidence or
expert testimony indicating that some dangerous condition of the stairs caused [appellant]
to trip.” The district court agreed, determining that there was insufficient evidence to
“establish a material fact in dispute, including . . . the standard of care, i.e., the required
depth of the stairs under the applicable building code, or an expert opinion on the
appropriate depth of the stair trea d.” The district court also determin ed that there was
insufficient evidence showing a breach of the standard of care, “i.e., that the wooden stairs
at issue were indeed NOT in compliance with the applicable building code or were not
deep enough per expert testimony.” The district court, the refore, granted respondents’
motion for summary judgment. This appeal follows.

5
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
respondents. A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 . A genuine issue of material fact exists if,
considering the record as a whole, a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving
party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc. , 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 200 8). “[M]ere
speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.”
Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
“[T]he nonmoving party must do more than rest on averments.” Citizens State Bank
Norwood Young Am. v. Brown , 849 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn. 2014) . We apply a de novo
standard of review to a district court’s legal conclusions and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Staub v. Mrytle Lake Resort, LLC , 964 N.W.2d
613, 620 (Minn. 2021).
To succeed on her negligence claim, appellant must show “(1) [the] existence of a
duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury.” Bjerke v.
Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007) . “Summary judgment is appropriate when
the record lacks proof of any of the four elements.” Kellogg v. Finnegan, 823 N.W.2d 454,
458 (Minn. App. 2012).
“It is well established . . . that a landowner has a duty to use reasonable care for the
safety of all entrants upon the premises.” Olmanson v. LeSueur County, 693 N.W.2d 876,
880 (Minn. 2005). This non-delegable duty requires an owner and possessor of land to
6
maintain his property in a reasonably safe condition for visitors on the premises. Niemann
v. Northwestern College, 389 N.W.2d 260, 261-62 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 27, 1986).
Here, as the district court stated, “there is no dispute that [respondents] generally
owed a duty of care to their guests to maintain their property in a reasonably safe
condition.” But appellant contend s that summary judgment was erroneously granted
because there are material fact s in dispute regarding whether respondents breached their
duty of care, and whether respondents’ breach of their duty of care was the proximate cause
of appellant’s injuries.
Breach of a duty is typically a question of fact for the jury. See Domagala v.
Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 28-29 (Minn. 2011) (stating that whether a defendant ’s action
satisfies a duty of care is a jury question). But there is no fact issue for the jury when the
plaintiff fails to present any evidence of breach and the jury would be forced to
speculate. See Sandvik v. Jammes, 160 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1968) (stating that proof
of negligence must furnish more than a basis for speculation); Harvet v. Unity Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 428 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn. App. 1988) ( acknowledging that allegations based on
speculation fail to create a jury question).
The district court here stated that the crux of appellant’s claim is that “the tread
depth of the stairs was too narrow and not up to ‘code.’” But the district court determined
that appellant “produced no competent evidence for a jury to rely on in ascertaining
[respondents’] duty with respect to the depth of the stairs, and whether that duty was
breached.” Specifically, the district court noted that appellant failed to identify “the depth
7
required for these stairs by the applicable building code, which code applied to the building
built in the 1960s, and whether [respondents] were required to upgrade their stairs if the
building code changed.” The district court also determined that appellant failed to produce
“the measurements of the stairs to demonstrate that the stairs did not comply with the
applicable building code,” nor did she produce “an expert that has otherwise explained that
these stair treads were unsafe.” Although the district court noted that appellant makes
“general references to the poor conditions of the stairs,” the district court stated that “[t]his
is a red herring” because appellant’s “entire case rises or falls on the depth of the stairs.”
Thus, the district court determined that there were no material facts in dispute for trial on
the standard of care.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that she failed to present
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether respondents
“breached their landowner duties by failing to maintain the deteriorated, or narrow, or both
dangerous conditions of their stairs.” To support her position, appellant relies heavily upon
Staub. In that case, a women died after falling down a flight of stairs at a resort. Staub,
964 N.W.2d at 616. The woman’s trustee sued the resort and its owner, arguing that they
proximately caused her death by negligently failing to keep the stairs in a safe condition.
Id. In depositions and affidavits, multiple witnesses described seeing the woman rolling to
the ground at the bottom of the stairs, and one witness described warning the owner
repeatedly that the steps were dangerous. Id. at 617-18. The resort and its owner moved
for summary judgment, arguing the trustee’s causation theory was speculative. Id. at 619.
8
The district court agreed, reasoning that, although the stairs were “cracked, chipped,
leaning, and weathered,” no one observed what caused the woman to fall. Id.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, concluding that “a jury could reasonably
infer that the poor and degraded condition of the stair was a substantial factor in causing
[the woman’s] death.” Id. at 625-26. The supreme court relied on the fact that the record
showed that the woman “was on the landing before she fell and that she, in fact, fell,” and
that the stairs were degraded and unsafe. Id. at 625. The supreme court concluded that
“[l]ife experience and common sense,” would allow a jury to decide “that a degraded,
cracked, and chipped stair, leaning away from a building, is a dangerous condition that may
cause a person using the stair to fall.” Id.
Unlike in Staub, in which there was an issue of material fact related to proximate
cause, this case involves whether there is an issue of material fact related to the standard
of care and a breach of that standard of care. 2 But in determining that there was an issue
of material fact related to proximate cause, the supreme court recognized that the evidence,
“including deposition testimony, expert reports, and photographs,” established that “[t]he
stair was degraded and in p oor condition; the landing was rough and rocky and the steps
themselves were cracked, chipped, inconsistently spaced, leaning, and unsafe to use.” Id.
Although the supreme court noted that the resort disputed the claim that the stair was
dangerous, the court stated that “[w]hether the stair was in fact dangerous—in other words,
whether [the defendants] were actually negligent in maintaining the stair and breached

2 We also note that, unlike Staub, here the victim testified as to how she fell.
9
some duty of care to [the woman] —is an issue that may be addressed on remand.” Id. at
625 n.11. The supreme court added that, “[g]iven the procedural posture here, . . . we
assume that the stair had deteriorated to the point where it was dangerous because [the
plaintiff] introduced evidence supporting such a conclusion: the photographs , the [expert]
report . . ., and witness testimony and affidavits discussing the dangerous condition of the
stair.” Id.
Appellant argues that, under Staub, the evidence in the record is sufficient to
establish an issue of material fact as to whether the narrowness of the stairs was dangerous
or hazardous. But Staub is distinguishable from the circumstances presented in this case.
As respondents point out, “[i]n Staub, the plaintiff had presented expert testimony to
support a claim that the staircase at issue was dangerous,” whereas “[a]ppellant here has
no expert to offer any opinion that the stairs were . . . dangerous.”
Appellant argues that expert testimony was unnecessary because “ Staub does not
say expert reports are required to create a genuine issue of material fact on breach where
there is testimony and photographs showing the deteriorated condition of the stairs.”
Indeed, we acknowledge Staub does not say that expert testimony was necessary in that
case. And “expert testimony is not necessary in cases where the nature of the alleged
negligent conduct is such that inferences to be drawn from the facts are within the range of
common experience of [people] and where jurors are equally capable of drawing inferences
as are experts.” Schulz v. Feigal, 142 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1966).
However, expert testimony was a factor that the supreme court listed in
“assum[ing]” that the stair had deteriorated to the point where it was dangerous. See Staub,
10
964 N.W.2d at 625 n.11. Moreover, the supreme court has stated that “if it would be
speculative for the factfinder to decide the issue of negligence without having the benefit
of expert testimony on the standard of care, the expert testimony is necessary. ” Atwater
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 1985).
Here, as the district court determined, “[t]he average person has no idea what the
safe dimensions are for a set of stairs. If they encounter a borderline set of stairs in their
own life they might think, like [appellant’s] witnesses, that the dimensions are
questionable, but they would have no idea whether their suspicions are correct.” Moreover,
appellant failed to present any evidence indicating that the stairs were not up to code.
Without any evidence that the stairs were in violation of the applicab le code, or without
any expert testimony stating that the tread of the stairs was dangerous due to a failure to
comply with the applicable code, a jury would be left to speculate as to whether the stairs
were unsafe. See Sandvik, 160 N.W.2d at 704 (stating that proof of negligence must furnish
more than a basis for speculation); see also Harvet, 428 N.W.2d at 579 (acknowledging
that allegations based on speculation fail to create a jury question).
Appellant argues further that, under Rowe v. Goldberg , 435 N.W.2d 605 (Minn.
App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 1989), she has “presented sufficient evidence that
[r]espondents’ stairs were dangerously narrow, and the jury will be capable of considering
the evidence and determining whether the stairs were dangerous or hazardous without
reference to the building code.” In Rowe, the plaintiff was injured when she fell down the
stairs at her employer’s home. 435 N.W.2d at 60 6. After the jury found that the plaintiff
was 90% negligent, the plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred
11
in limiting the scope of expert testimony. Id. On appeal from the denial of her motion,
this court affirmed, concluding that it was appropriate to limit testimony regarding
nonconformity with a building code when no showing had been made that the structure in
question was required to comply with the code. Id. at 607.
Appellant’s reliance on Rowe is unavailing. Here, unlike in Rowe, there is no
indication that respondents were not required to comply with the applicable building code.
In fact, as the district court determined, there is no evidence in the record related to the
“depth required for these stairs by the applicable building code, which code applied to the
building built in the 1960s, and whether [respondents] were required to upgrade their stairs
if the building code changed.”
Moreover, in Rowe, there was an expert who “was allowed to show the jury
photographs of the steps with measurements,” “play a video tape of the steps while he
walked up and down the steps,” and testify “regarding what changes could be made to
modify the pattern of ingress and egress.” Id. In contrast, appellant here offered no expert
testimony related to the alleged dangerousness of the stairs. Although appellant repeatedly
points out that the stairs were warped, rotten, had frayed rubber mats, and a loo se railing,
and offered photographs and layperson testimony to support her position, tellingly, she
does not claim that these conditions were the cause of her fall. Instead, she claims that the
narrow tread of the stairs was the cause of her fall. Specifically, appellant’s answers to
interrogatories state that when she tripped on the stairs, she at tempted “to regain her
balance” by stepping “backwards onto the stair below her,” but the “stairs were too narrow,
causing [her] to fall down the stairs onto th e ground.” And appellant acknowledges on
12
appeal that “after [r]espondents’ stairs tripped her, . . . she could not regain her balance
because the stairs were too narrow.” But without any evidence demonstrating the proper
depth of the tread, through expert testimony and/or the applicable building code, the jury
would be left to speculate as to whether respondents breached their duty because there is
insufficient evidence demonstrating the proper standard to be applied to the depth of stairs.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did no t err when it granted summary
judgment in favor of respondents.3
Affirmed.

3 Because we conclude that the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment
in favor of respondents on the standard of care and the breach of that standard of care, we
need not address appellant’s argument that summary judgment was inappropriate on the
issue of proximate cause. See Kellogg, 823 N.W.2d at 458 (“Summary judgment is
appropriate when the record lacks proof of any of the four elements.”).