A24-1463 Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Minnesota v. Deshon Israel Bonnell

Minnesota Supreme Court · Filed February 25, 2026

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Opinion text

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A24-1463

Saint Louis County Hudson, C.J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: February 25, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
Deshon Israel Bonnell,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, Saint
Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, Saint Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. A sender of an electronic message does not retain a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s

separate and independent account or device.

2. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were not

triggered when the law enforcement officers searched his accomplices’ Facebook accounts

because appellant claims no ownership interest in those accounts and he did not retain a

1
legitimate expectation of privacy in the electronic messages he sent to his accomplices after

the messages were received and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts.

3. Appellant’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were

violated by law enforcement’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant

authorizing the searches of his two Facebook accounts lacked any temporal or subject-

matter limitations.

4. Although the district court erred when it failed to suppress the evidence

collected exclusively during the search of appellant’s two Facebook accounts and when it

later admitted that evidence at trial, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors.

5. Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting the contents of constitutionally obtained social media messages pursuant to the

immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), the

errors were harmless because they did not significantly affect the verdict.

6. When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the corroborative

evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s

eyewitness testimony that appellant fatally shot the decedent, and the State presented

sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction.

Affirmed.

2
O P I N I O N

HUDSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant Deshon Israel Bonnell directly appeals his conviction of first-degree

premeditated murder for the shooting death of Joshua LaValley. On appeal, Bonnell makes

six arguments. First, he argues a sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the

recipient’s separate and independent account or device. Second, he argues officers violated

his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections when they searched the separate

and independent Facebook accounts of his accomplices, which contained digital copies of

electronic messages he sent to his accomplices that were received and stored in their

accounts. Third, Bonnell argues officers violated his Fourth Amendment and state

constitutional protections when they searched his two Facebook accounts. Fourth, he

argues the district court committed harmful error when it admitted the evidence collected

from the accomplice’s Facebook accounts and his two Facebook accounts at trial. Fifth,

he argues the district court committed harmful error when it admitted evidence of prior bad

acts at his trial in violation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Sixth, Bonnell argues

the direct eyewitness testimony of his accomplice, who testified that she saw Bonnell shoot

the victim, was not adequately corroborated and that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction.

We conclude, as a matter of first impression, that a sender of an electronic message

does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received

message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. We

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further conclude that Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections

were not triggered when an officer searched his accomplices’ Facebook accounts because

Bonnell claims no ownership interest in those accounts and because he did not retain a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the electronic messages he sent to his accomplices after

the messages were received and stored in his accomplices’ Facebook accounts. We also

conclude, however, that Bonnell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital

copies of the sent messages that were stored in his two Facebook accounts, and therefore

the searches of his two Facebook accounts triggered his federal and state constitutional

protections. And Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections were

violated by the officer’s searches of his two Facebook accounts because the warrant

authorizing the searches of his Facebook accounts lacked any temporal or subject-matter

limitations.

Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court’s failure to suppress the evidence

collected exclusively from the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts and its

erroneous admission of that evidence at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the errors. In addition, although we

assume without deciding that the district court erred when it admitted the contents of social

media messages—which were constitutionally obtained from accomplices’ Facebook

accounts—pursuant to the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of

Evidence 404(b)(1), we conclude that the errors were harmless because they did not

significantly affect the verdict.

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Finally, we conclude that when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the

corroborative evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of the

accomplice’s eyewitness testimony that Bonnell fatally shot the decedent, and therefore the

State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction. Based on our

conclusions, we affirm.

FACTS

On January 6, 2019, a man snowmobiling on the Mesabi Trail in Saint Louis County

found a dead body lying in the snow. The snowmobiler immediately called 911, and the

law enforcement officers who arrived on the scene identified the decedent as Joshua

LaValley. When crime-scene analysts and officers from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal

Apprehension (BCA) arrived at the scene, they found a shoe print in the snow with a

distinctive circular tread on the sole. 1 They also found one spent .22-caliber bullet casing

near the body. A medical examiner determined that LaValley died from two bullet wounds

to the face, one to his right jaw and one to the right side of his nose.

The next day, officers found LaValley’s car parked outside Bailey French’s house.

After staking out the vehicle, officers observed a man enter the vehicle and drive it a short

distance, at which point they approached the man and identified him as Anthony Howson.

1
The distinctive circular tread is significant because accomplice Bailey French
testified at trial that before going out onto the Mesabi trail where she personally witnessed
Bonnell fatally shoot LaValley twice in the face, she and accomplice Anthony Howson
switched shoes so she could walk more easily in the snow. In addition, a police officer
testified that the distinctive circular tread in the shoe print found at the scene matched the
sole of a pair of Osiris shoes found in Howson’s house. Howson testified at trial that on
the night of the murder he lent the Osiris shoes to French so she could walk with Bonnell
in the snow.

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The officers discovered LaValley’s EBT card on Howson during a search. Officers

returned to French’s house and discovered that Bonnell and his girlfriend, Bailey French,

were inside. The officers asked Bonnell and French to step outside.

After Bonnell stepped outside, two officers directed him to sit in the passenger seat

of their squad car, where they conducted an on-scene interview. At the start of the

interview, the officers told Bonnell that they did not know if he was connected to the crime,

but they did know he had “probably” been “speaking with . . . an individual,” Howson,

whom they suspected was involved. As part of the interview, Bonnell confirmed that he

and French were dating. He also asserted that he was heavily intoxicated on the night of

the murder and did not remember anything that happened. The officers repeatedly told

Bonnell that he was free to leave the car if he wanted to, and he eventually did so. 2

While officers interviewed Bonnell, two other officers interviewed French. French

went into detail about the killing, identified Bonnell as “Pineapple,” and indicated that she

and Bonnell texted and sent messages through social media on the night of the murder. In

a separate interview with law enforcement officers, Howson also admitted to taking part in

the murder and to using Facebook Messenger to communicate with Bonnell and French

that night.

After his on-scene interview, Bonnell, who lived with his mother, went home.

Thirty minutes later, officers arrived at his mother’s house, arrested him, and read him his

2
Immediately after Bonnell stepped out of the car, the agents seized Bonnell’s cell
phone without a warrant. Bonnell does not contest the seizure of his cell phone on appeal.
Moreover, the police never tried to search the contents of Bonnell’s cell phone.

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Miranda rights for the first time. Bonnell requested an attorney, and the officers did not

question him further. Bonnell’s mother, however, allowed the officers to enter and search

the house. On top of the fridge, the officers located a brown paper bag that had the words

“.22 Ruger pistol” written on it. There was no gun inside the bag, but there was .22-caliber

ammunition. The officers also located spent .22-caliber ammunition in Bonnell’s bedroom

in the basement of the house.

The officers later sought and received a warrant to search French’s home, where

they found a Ruger .22-caliber pistol under the mattress in one of the bedrooms. BCA

analysts subsequently tested the pistol for fingerprints and DNA, and compared the spent

casing found at the scene to a casing test-fired from the pistol found in Bonnell’s home.

The BCA fingerprint analyst testified that she found a fingerprint above the trigger of the

gun that matched French, but did not find fingerprints matching Bonnell. The BCA DNA

analyst testified, however, that she found a mixture of DNA profiles on the gun. On the

magazine, she found a mixture of four or more people’s DNA, and the major male profile

matched Bonnell’s profile. On the trigger, she found a mixture of three or more people’s

DNA, and the major male profile also matched Bonnell’s. She was not provided with

French’s or Howson’s DNA profiles and was unable to confirm whether their DNA

matched the DNA on the gun. The BCA firearms analyst testified at trial that the spent

cartridge found in Bonnell’s basement bedroom came from the pistol.

In February 2019, a law enforcement officer applied for a single warrant authorizing

the officer to search 12 separate Facebook accounts, five of which are relevant here. The

first relevant account was owned by French, and the second and third relevant accounts

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were owned by Howson. The fourth and fifth relevant accounts were purportedly owned

by Bonnell (including an account named “Pineapple Man”). For each Facebook account,

the warrant application sought “[a]ll contact information,” “[a]ll Photos or videos,” “[a]ll

Neoprints, including profile contact information,” “[a]ll activity logs,” “[a]ll other records

of communications made or received by the users or between users,” and “[a]ll IP logs.”

The warrant did not provide time or date ranges for the records. The probable cause

statement in the warrant application described the discovery of LaValley’s body and that

LaValley’s personal effects were found in Howson’s possession. It also stated the

following:

During the investigation, several cellular devices were secured from
Howson, French and Bonnell. With statements provided to Investigators it
was discovered Howson, French and Bonnell spoke amongst each other and
others via phone calls, text messaging, Facebook and other social media
accounts before, during and after the murder of LaValley.

Two weeks later, a grand jury indicted Bonnell for first-degree premeditated murder,

see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1), and first-degree intentional murder while committing a

felony (aggravated robbery), see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3).

In March 2019, Facebook complied with the warrant and provided copies of all 12

Facebook accounts. During his review of Howson’s Facebook accounts, the officer found

a self-portrait photograph (aka “a selfie”) of Howson, French, Bonnell, and LaValley that

was taken the day before the murder. During the review of French’s Facebook account,

the officer discovered digital copies of messages that Bonnell sent from his Pineapple Man

Facebook account to French, which were received and stored in French’s Facebook

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account. 3 As relevant here, French received the following messages from the Pineapple

Man Facebook account:

January 2 and January 4, 2019
• A message asking French whether anything happened between French
and a man named K.

• A message that said, “I know if I loose another person I’ma go on a
rampage.”

• A screenshot of an image (sent through Facebook) from Pineapple Man
to an unknown man with a picture of Bonnell holding a gun with a caption
that said, “Better stop texting my chick before you get dropped b****.”

• A message that said, “Diff between me and other n*****s il actually do
what I say I’m gonna do.”

• A message that said, “I’m having the worst day . . . I just really wanna
shoot someone.”

• A message that said, “I don’t even wanna be alive . . . I’m a terrible
person.”

January 5, 2019 (the day before the murder)

• A message that said, “[LaValley] has a punchable face.” 4

• A message that said, “Ight I’m down I still wanna pop him.” 5

3
Bonnell does not contend that he had an ownership interest in French’s Facebook
account or any of the devices on which her account was stored.
4
This message was a response to several messages sent from French’s Facebook
account to the Pineapple Man Facebook account. French initially sent messages that read,
“I have someone your gonna wanna take care of . . . Who goes by the name [LaValley’s
nickname],” and then sent a message that included a screenshot of an image (sent through
Facebook) of French and LaValley together.
5
This message was a response to messages sent from French’s Facebook account to
the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “Trust me . . . we can . . . take his s***

9
• A message that said, “Why not take him out now I can do it it’s not hard.” 6

• A message that said, “He [LaValley] knows to much I gotta take him
out . . . I need to take a video of me shooting [LaValley] to send to my
crew there killers they love this s*** . . . I’m shooting him anyway your
not gonna tell me I’m not. You tell me no il shoot him right here.”

• A message that said, “No I’m shooting someone tonight he knows too
much . . . I need you to find a spot we can go to dump.” 7

• A message that said, “Damn ight well I’m capping him tonight.” 8

January 6, 2019 (the day of the murder)

• A message that said, “I didn’t do it for payment I did it cause I love you.”

During the officer’s review, the officer discovered digital copies of the electronic

messages listed above stored in both French’s and Bonnell’s Facebook accounts. 9

In June 2019, Bonnell’s attorney informed the district court that the defense had no

omnibus issues and that Bonnell wished to enter not guilty pleas to all the charges. Based

on defense counsel’s statements, the district court made a record of “the entry of not guilty

n send him out without a beating or with one depending on how he reacts and what he
says.”
6
This message was a response to messages sent from French’s Facebook account to
the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “Not yet tonight we scare him our next
move is annihilation and we gotta plan that out.”
7
This message was a response to messages sent from French’s Facebook account to
the Pineapple Man Facebook account, which read, “It’s not a good time yet besides i have
a plan that will make him wish you did shoot him.”
8
“Capping” can be used as a colloquial term for “shooting.”
9
Because the officer obtained records containing copies of French’s and Bonnell’s
Facebook accounts at the same time, the information obtained during the review of
Bonnell’s Facebook accounts could not have been used to justify the request for the warrant
to search French’s Facebook account.

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plea[s] and the waiver of any omnibus issues.” Three months later, in September 2019,

Bonnell entered a guilty plea to first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony

(aggravated robbery). Bonnell subsequently filed a postconviction petition, alleging that

the factual basis for his guilty plea was inaccurate. The district court denied the

postconviction petition. In December 2022, we reversed the district court’s order and

remanded for trial on the charges pending when Bonnell pleaded guilty. See Bonnell v.

State, 984 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn. 2022) (holding that “the evidence in the plea colloquy

record is inadequate to show that Bonnell ‘cause[d] the death’ of LaValley ‘while

committing . . . aggravated robbery’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Minn. Stat.

§ 609.185(a)(3))). Concurrently, Howson and French pleaded guilty and were convicted

of second-degree intentional murder in connection with LaValley’s death under an aiding

and abetting theory of criminal liability. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (second-

degree intentional murder); Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (aiding and abetting liability).

In May 2023, Bonnell filed a motion to reopen the omnibus hearing. His motion

listed nine different issues that he sought to litigate at the hearing, including suppression

of “any information obtained as a result of the February 12, 2019, Search Warrant for

Facebook data as the warrant lacks specificity.”

The district court granted Bonnell’s motion and held a contested omnibus hearing

in September 2023. When the district court asked defense counsel to identify the issues

that would be litigated at the hearing, defense counsel made a general reference to the

issues raised in the May 2023 motion to reopen the omnibus hearing. The State called

several witnesses. In addition, the parties stipulated to the admission of several documents,

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including the search warrant application, the search warrant, and the officer’s “receipt,

inventory and return” form, in which the officer averred that he obtained, pursuant to the

search warrant, records containing copies of all five of the relevant Facebook accounts in

March 2019. After all the evidence was presented, the parties agreed to submit their

arguments in writing.

In October 2023, Bonnell filed his written argument. 10 As part of Bonnell’s

argument, defense counsel wrote, “At issue is the validity of the search warrant for

Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook records and whether probable cause was established to support the

warrant.” (Emphasis added.) In describing the State’s burden, defense counsel wrote, “The

State must therefore prove the following: (1) [the officer’s] affidavit established probable

cause to seize all of the data on Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook accounts, and (2) the authorization

for the extraction of the data was sufficiently particular to limit the area subject to search

and the items subject to seizure.” (Emphasis added.)

On the issue of particularity, defense counsel argued, “[T]he warrant allowed

officers to search Mr. Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts without providing any time frame.

It also allowed officers to conduct a wholesale review of everything and anything on

10
As part of his written argument, Bonnell erroneously asked the district court to
“suppress” the “search warrant.” The legal principle underlying Fourth Amendment
suppression motions is “a ‘prudential’ doctrine that requires the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence.” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572 (Minn. 2024) (emphasis added)
(quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011)). Search warrants that lack
particularity are not “suppressed,” instead they are deemed “invalid.” State v. Hannuksela,
452 N.W.2d 668, 672–73 (Minn. 1990) (concluding that the search warrant was “invalid”
because it lacked particularity); see also State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 711–13
(Minn. 2003) (concluding that the language of the warrant was sufficiently particular and
therefore rejecting appellant’s claim that the search warrant was “invalid”).

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Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook accounts.” (Emphases added.) In summarizing his particularity

argument, defense counsel wrote, “The failure to place or observe any limits on the search

or seizure of data from Mr. Bonnell’s Facebook accounts independently requires

suppression of all evidence obtained during the search.” (Emphasis added.) Bonnell’s

written argument never acknowledged, much less addressed, the issue of whether the

searches of his accomplice’s Facebook accounts triggered Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment

protections. Instead, defense counsel simply included a single sentence in the concluding

paragraph of his written argument, which read, “The wholesale review of the twelve

Facebook accounts—and specifically Mr. Bonnell’s two (2) Facebook accounts—violated

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the

Minnesota Constitution.”

In November 2023, the State filed its written argument. The State argued that

despite Bonnell’s assertion to the contrary, the language of the warrant established probable

cause and was sufficiently particular to justify the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook

accounts. The State also observed that Bonnell lacked standing to challenge the searches

of the Facebook accounts owned by French and Howson because he made “no showing of

a reasonable expectation of privacy in another person’s social media account.”

In March 2024, the district court denied Bonnell’s suppression motion. On the issue

of probable cause, it stated, “Considering the totality of the circumstances as it relates to

the Bonnell Facebook accounts, the Application for Search Warrant establishes a sufficient

nexus between the property to be searched—Bonnell’s Facebook account—and the crime

that was under investigation at the time—an apparent homicide.” On the issue of

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particularity, the court wrote, “Considering the totality of the circumstances, giving

deference to the issuing judge, and considering the stage of the investigation, a more

precise description of the information to be obtained from Bonnell’s Facebook data would

not be available in this instance.” The court did not discuss the searches of the accomplice’s

Facebook accounts, which is not surprising because Bonnell’s written argument can

reasonably be read as narrowing the focus of his argument to the searches of Bonnell’s two

Facebook accounts. Bonnell did not file a motion for reconsideration challenging the scope

of the district court’s analysis.

In April 2024, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence of

Bonnell’s prior bad acts—as described in Facebook messages from Bonnell stored in

French’s Facebook account—under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). Bonnell argued the evidence of his prior bad acts

was inadmissible. On April 26, 2024, the district court granted the State’s motion,

concluding that the evidence was admissible under both exceptions.

After the district court granted the State’s motion in limine, the case proceeded to

trial. At the jury trial, French testified that she personally witnessed Bonnell fatally shoot

LaValley twice in the face. During her testimony, the State introduced messages between

French’s and Bonnell’s Facebook accounts as trial exhibits. 11 Each exhibit included a chart

with the date, time, and contents of electronic messages Bonnell sent to French that were

received and stored in her Facebook account, along with copies of the relevant messages

11
Complete copies of the Facebook records obtained from the accounts owned by
Bonnell, French, and Howson were also admitted as trial exhibits.

14
from French’s Facebook account. 12 Howson also testified about the facts surrounding the

murder. During his testimony, the State introduced the photograph of Howson, French,

Bonnell, and LaValley that was taken the day before the murder, along with copies of the

relevant messages from Howson’s Facebook account. Officers also testified about their

investigation, and the State introduced an exhibit of a call Bonnell made from jail in which

Bonnell says he needs to delete the Pineapple Man Facebook account. In total, three trial

exhibits were admitted that consisted of Facebook records obtained exclusively from

Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. Finally, BCA firearms and DNA analysts testified about

the results of their testing.

In its closing argument, the State focused on the messages sent from Bonnell’s

Pineapple Man Facebook account to French’s Facebook account, arguing that Bonnell was

planning to kill LaValley that night, that he had a motive to kill LaValley for flirting with

his girlfriend, and that Bonnell, French, and Howson made a concrete plan for the murder

through Facebook messages. In contrast, defense counsel argued that the Facebook

messages showed that French was “an absolutely wickedly manipulative person who

craves attention and wants to feel like she can control the people in her life,” and that the

plan was “to scare Mr. LaValley—perhaps beat him up and leave him somewhere without

his car.” Defense counsel also argued that the testimony of French and Howson was not

12
The exhibits also contained copies of the relevant pages from the records obtained
from Bonnell’s Facebook account. Although the electronic messages were identical, they
appeared on different pages of the records obtained from the accounts owned by French
and Bonnell.

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credible, that Bonnell never walked down the Mesabi Trail, and that Howson was the actual

shooter.

On the charge of first-degree premeditated murder, the jury was instructed on both

principal and aiding and abetting theories of criminal liability. The jury found Bonnell

guilty as charged. The district court convicted Bonnell of first-degree premeditated murder

and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. 13

This direct appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by addressing an issue of first impression, specifically

whether a sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in

the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and

independent account or device. Next, we determine whether the searches of French’s and

other individuals’ Facebook accounts triggered Bonnell’s Fourth Amendment and state

constitutional protections after the messages Bonnell sent were received and stored in the

recipient’s account or device. Then, we consider whether the searches of Bonnell’s two

Facebook accounts violated his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections

based on his assertion that the searches of his accounts were conducted pursuant to a

warrant that was not sufficiently particular, and if so, whether the district court’s admission

13
On the charge of first-degree murder while committing or attempting to commit a
kidnapping, the jury was also instructed on both principal and aiding and abetting theories
of criminal liability. Although the jury found Bonnell guilty of this charge and the district
court entered a conviction, the district court later vacated the conviction in accordance with
Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (precluding adjudications of conviction for lesser included offenses),
in light of State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 765–67 (Minn. 1999).

16
at trial of the digital messages and data collected during the searches was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt.

We also consider whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting, under

the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1),

constitutionally obtained Facebook messages that described Bonnell’s prior bad acts, and

if so, whether the erroneous admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

Finally, we consider whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict,

the corroborative evidence was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of

French’s direct eyewitness testimony that she saw Bonnell shoot LaValley, and if the State

presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction.

Bonnell contends that the sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable

expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the digital copy of the received

message that is stored in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. This

is an issue of first impression for our court.

The protections of the Fourth Amendment are “personal right[s]” that may be

invoked when an individual “personally has an expectation of privacy in the place

searched” and that “expectation is reasonable.” In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565,

571 (Minn. 2003) (emphasis added). In State v. Perkins, we explained that the Fourth

Amendment’s “protections are not triggered unless an individual has a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the invaded space.” 588 N.W.2d 491, 492 (Minn. 1999)

17
(emphases added). Put differently, “a defendant who cannot demonstrate a legitimate

expectation of privacy relating to the area searched . . . may not contest the legality of the

search or seizure.” State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1999) (emphasis added).

Although we have never considered the issue presented, other state and federal

courts have addressed the issue. For example, in State v. Patino, the Rhode Island Supreme

Court concluded that the sender of a text message does not have a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the digital copy of a text message contained on the recipient’s device because

after the message is received by the recipient, the sender can no longer control what the

recipient does with the message. 93 A.3d 40, 56–57 (R.I. 2014). Similarly, in Guest v.

Leis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that an email sender loses a legitimate expectation of

privacy in an email that has already reached its recipient because at that moment, “the

e-mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose ‘expectation of privacy ordinarily

terminates upon delivery’ of the letter.” 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United

States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)).

The reasoning in Patino and Guest is consistent with the rule that the federal circuit

courts of appeal have uniformly applied to physical letters. For example, in United States

v. Dunning, the First Circuit concluded that “if a letter is sent to another, the sender’s

expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery.” 312 F.3d 528, 531 (1st Cir.

2002) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.

1999); King, 55 F.3d at 1196; United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1994);

Ray v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 658 F.2d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1981).

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We agree that when an electronic message or physical letter is received by the

recipient, the sender no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the message or

letter because the sender cannot control what the recipient does with the message or letter.

Consequently, we conclude that the sender of an electronic message does not retain a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored

in the recipient’s separate and independent account or device. 14

In urging us to adopt a different rule of law, Bonnell cites to obiter dicta in Carpenter

v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 319 (2018). Carpenter “present[ed] the question whether

the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical

cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements,”

id. at 300, and held that “[t]he Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records here was a

search under th[e] [Fourth] Amendment,” id. at 320. In that case, Justice Kennedy

remarked in dissent that the third-party doctrine “may not apply when the Government

obtains the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ ” when

held by a third party. Id. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Carpenter majority

14
In support of his view, Bonnell cites several federal and state cases that involved a
search of the defendant’s Facebook account, device, or computer. See, e.g., United States
v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 333 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 571 (2024) (holding
that the defendants had standing to challenge the searches of Facebook accounts that
belonged to them, while observing that defense counsel conceded that appellants lacked
standing to challenge the searches of Facebook accounts “belonging to two co-conspirators
who [were] not parties in this appeal”); People v. Joly, 970 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2021) (involving a search of the defendant’s tablet computer which contained an email
that the defendant had sent to his attorney); State v. Jereczek, 961 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2021) (involving a search of the defendant’s family computer). Bonnell’s reliance on
these cases is misplaced because they do not involve searches of separate and independent
accounts or devices belonging to the recipient of the electronic message.

19
acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’s position would be a “sensible exception” to the third-

party doctrine. Id. at 319. Bonnell’s reliance on Carpenter is misplaced for two reasons.

First, we are not bound by a dissent nor by the obiter dicta in the majority. Sheehy

Lee v. Kalis, 19 N.W.3d. 186, 193 n.9 (Minn. 2025) (explaining that “obiter dicta” is

generally “considered to be expressions in a court’s opinion which go beyond the facts

before the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the opinion and not

binding in subsequent cases”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); City of

Duluth v. Wendling, 237 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1975) (explaining that we were not bound

by dicta in Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)). Neither the exception proposed by

Justice Kennedy in dissent, nor its passing reference by the majority, is binding here. 15

Second, the type of third party contemplated by Kennedy in proposing his exception

was an intermediary handling messages in transit such as a mail carrier or an internet

company that provides email accounts, not the end recipient of a message as is the case

here. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Jackson,

96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (letters held by mail carrier) and United States v. Warshak,

631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (personal emails held by the defendant’s internet

service provider)). In sum, the non-binding dissent and obiter dicta in Carpenter does not

15
The majority in Carpenter was clear that its “decision today is a narrow one” and
that it did “not express a view on matters not before us.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 316. And
the issue before the Supreme Court in Carpenter involved “a detailed log of a person’s
movements over several years,” id. at 319, not the modern-day equivalent of a person’s
“papers” or “effects.” Thus, the majority opinion’s statement regarding Justice Kennedy’s
proposed exception is obiter dicta because it went beyond the facts before the Court and
was not necessary or essential to the Court’s analysis.

20
support Bonnell’s claim that the sender of an electronic message retains a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the

recipient’s separate and independent account or device.

Because the rule adopted in Patino and Guest is sound and the caselaw cited by

Bonnell does not call that rule of law into question or support a different rule of law, we

hold that the sender of an electronic message does not retain a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the digital copy of the received message that is stored in the recipient’s separate

and independent account or device.

II.

Next, we apply the newly articulated rule of law to the facts of Bonnell’s case.

Bonnell sent electronic Facebook messages to French and Howson that were received and

stored in French’s and Howson’s Facebook accounts. Bonnell does not claim that he had

any ownership interest in French’s and Howson’s Facebook accounts, or that he has any

other claim to privilege in his communications with French or Howson. Moreover, under

the newly articulated rule of law, Bonnell did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the digital copy of the received messages that were stored in French’s and Howson’s

separate and independent accounts or devices. Consequently, the searches of French’s and

Howson’s separate and independent Facebook accounts did not trigger Bonnell’s Fourth

Amendment or state constitutional protections.

III.

Next, we consider Bonnell’s argument that the searches of his two Facebook

accounts violated his Fourth Amendment protections because the warrant authorizing the

21
searches of his two accounts lacked particularity and was therefore invalid. The State

argues that the warrant was valid because it was sufficiently particular, and therefore the

searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts did not violate his Fourth Amendment

protections.

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,

section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution require that a search warrant describe the

evidence to be seized with particularity. This particularity requirement “prohibits law

enforcement from engaging in general or exploratory searches.” State v. Bradford,

618 N.W.2d 782, 795 (Minn. 2000). “If a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant that is

not particular—in other words, does not adequately describe the places or things to be

searched with specificity—the search is unconstitutional.” State v. Zielinski, 10 N.W.3d 1,

21 n.9 (Minn. 2024). Determining whether a warrant is sufficiently particular requires a

“case-by-case examination.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 601 (Minn. 2024).

In conducting this analysis, we consider “the circumstances of the case . . . , as well as the

nature of the crime under investigation and whether a more precise description is possible

under the circumstances.” State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. 2003).

When reviewing the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, “we review

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.”

State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2020). “Under the de novo standard, we do

not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise independent review.”

Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).

22
Bonnell contends that the warrant authorizing the searches of his two Facebook

accounts was invalid because it lacked particularity as to both subject-matter and time

limitations. We address his particularity arguments in turn.

When a search warrant seeks to search an electronic account or device, the subject

matter is defined by the scope and type of data that the investigators would like to access.

See Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 600 (noting that the subject matter of the search warrant

at issue was the defendant’s entire Facebook account). Here, the warrant authorizing the

searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts sought “[a]ll contact information,” “[a]ll

Photos or videos,” “[a]ll Neoprints, including profile contact information,” “[a]ll activity

logs,” “[a]ll other records of communications made or received by the users or between

users,” and “[a]ll IP logs.” Critically, the warrant was not subject to any temporal

limitations. In other words, the warrant authorized access to the entirety of both of

Bonnell’s Facebook accounts.

In Sardina-Padilla, we “addressed whether a warrant authorizing a search of all

content on a social media account for a limited time period meets minimal constitutional

requirements for particularity.” Id. at 599. In that case, officers applied for a warrant to

search “[a]ll content” of two Facebook accounts associated with Sardina-Padilla for an

approximately three-month period. Id. at 591. Although we concluded that the warrant in

Sardina-Padilla was valid based on its temporal limitation, we said “that the portion of the

warrant authorizing law enforcement to search ‘[a]ll content’ associated with Sardina-

Padilla’s Facebook accounts—standing on its own [without a temporal limitation]—would

be ‘clearly impermissible.’ ” Id. at 599. We also stated that “[a] warrant permitting a broad

23
search can be sufficiently particular if greater specificity is not possible because officers

do not know all the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime.” Id. (emphasis added).

“A warrant which describes things in broad or generic terms may be valid ‘when the

description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under

investigation permit.’ ” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Minn. 1990) (quoting

United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Here, it cannot be said that a search of all information and messages from Bonnell’s

two Facebook accounts is “as specific” as it could be. In Hannuksela, the extent of the

police’s knowledge of the crime was “that [the subject of the warrant] was the victim of

foul play and that appellant was involved.” Id. We therefore upheld a somewhat vague

warrant because it specifically described searching personal property that might contain

items belonging to the victim. Id. In contrast, the warrant authorizing the searches of

Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts was not tailored to, for example, messages shared

between Bonnell and the co-conspirators in the crime, which would be likely to show

evidence of a crime. See State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1999) (stating that

“probable cause to search exists [if] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The Eleventh Circuit—in a case that we affirmatively cited in Sardina-Padilla,

7 N.W.3d at 601—considered whether a warrant authorizing access to all of the defendant’s

Facebook data was sufficiently particular. United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 974

24
(11th Cir. 2017). 16 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the warrant was invalid, noting

that if the police had wanted to make the warrant sufficiently particular, “[w]ith respect to

private instant messages, for example, the warrants could have limited the request to

messages sent to or from persons suspected at that time of being prostitutes or customers.”

Id. A similar subject-matter limitation applies here.

In the Fourth Circuit—in a case discussed by both parties—the court upheld a search

warrant seeking “all private communications” from Facebook accounts that belonged to

the appellants. United States v. Zelaya-Veliz, 94 F.4th 321, 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

145 S. Ct. 571 (2024). But that case is materially distinguishable because the warrants at

issue were two-step warrants: “while the warrants authorized the government to search all

of the information disclosed by Facebook, they only permitted the subsequent seizure of

the fruits, evidence, or instrumentalities of violations of enumerated federal statutes.” Id.

(emphasis added). Here, by contrast, the warrant authorizing the search of Bonnell’s two

Facebook accounts was a one-step warrant that allowed the officer to both search and seize

16
As here, the search warrant in Blake

required Facebook to “disclose” to the government virtually every type of
data that could be located in a Facebook account, including every private
instant message Moore had ever sent or received, every IP address she had
ever logged in from, every photograph she had ever uploaded or been
“tagged” in, every private or public group she had ever been a member of,
every search on the website she had ever conducted, and every purchase she
had ever made through “Facebook Marketplace,” as well as her entire contact
list.

868 F.3d at 966–67 (footnotes omitted).

25
all data in Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. 17 The warrant application did not tailor its

search to data or messages that would be likely to show Bonnell’s participation in

LaValley’s murder or another violation of Minnesota law.

We have stated, however, “that a temporal limitation may make a warrant

sufficiently particular, even if the authorized search is otherwise broad as to subject matter.”

Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 600. Bonnell points out that the warrant authorizing the

searches of his two Facebook accounts lacked any temporal limitations, while the State

asserts that the undefined timeframe was necessary to establish that Bonnell owned the

Pineapple Man account. In Sardina-Padilla, we cautiously upheld the warrant but noted

that the “warrant’s broad scope raises a close question.” Id. at 602. Our decision to uphold

the warrant in that case hinged in large part on the temporal qualifier, which limited the

search to data generated within a three-month period. Id. We also affirmatively cited a

case from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which upheld a

warrant that was tailored to “ ‘a specified, fairly narrow period of time close’ to the alleged

criminal activity.” Id. at 600 (quoting United States v. Charles, No. 16-065 (JNE/FLN),

2016 WL 5939333, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 12, 2016), aff’d 895 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2018)).

Here, there is no temporal limitation. The warrant authorizing the searches of

Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts allowed the collection of information from the moment

the accounts were created until the warrants were issued, a span of many years. But at the

time they sought the warrant, officers had already interviewed French and Howson and

17
Indeed, the entirety of Bonnell’s Facebook account data—more than 8,000 pages—
was entered into evidence as a court exhibit at trial.

26
thus had some sense of the events leading up to LaValley’s murder. The warrant application

stated that the officer knew from French’s initial interview that the incident precipitating

the murder had occurred when LaValley tried to physically touch French at the apartment

on January 5, 2019. Because officers must be “as specific as the circumstances and the

nature of the activity under investigation permit,” Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d at 674, they

should have tailored the application to the weeks leading up to the murder—to ascertain

whether there was any evidence of intent or planning—to the date when Bonnell and his

co-conspirators were arrested and thus no longer had access to their accounts. 18

The warrant authorizing the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts goes far

beyond the three-month temporal limitation in Sardina-Padilla and lacks any subject

matter or time limitations to meet the particularity requirement. 7 N.W.3d at 602 (“[A]

search warrant permitting police to seize ‘[a]ll content’ associated with a social media

account for a period of almost three months comes ‘perilously close to violating the

requirement of particularity.’ ”).

18
To the extent that the State argues that law enforcement should be able to seek a
broader search warrant for the purposes of establishing foundation and authenticity of the
ownership of a social media account, we disagree. In State v. Zanter, the police sought
three search warrants for the defendant’s home, each time seeking to do additional forensic
testing in the house that they had not performed during the preceding searches. 535 N.W.2d
624, 628–29 (Minn. 1995). In finding that the third and final search warrant lacked
probable cause, we wrote, “the police failed to provide the issuing judge with sufficient
new information that could have led the judge to conclude that a fair probability existed
that other enumerated items not discovered during the two previous, exhaustive searches
of the Zanter home would now be discovered during a third search.” Id. at 634 (emphasis
added). Therefore, if the police receive data from a properly tailored search warrant and
discover that it is insufficient to establish the authenticity of the account, police must seek
another warrant to broaden the scope.

27
Therefore, we conclude that the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts

violated his Fourth Amendment and state constitutional protections because the searches

were conducted pursuant to a warrant that lacked particularity and therefore was invalid.

Because the searches of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts violated his constitutional

protections against unlawful searches, the district court erred when it denied Bonnell’s

motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the two searches, and when it later

admitted at trial exhibits containing the pages from Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. 19

19
Bonnell also argues that the Facebook searches were unconstitutional because the
evidence was derived from Bonnell’s provision of his phone number during the interview
with the special agents in the squad car. Officers asked for Bonnell’s phone number within
the first four minutes of the interview, and Bonnell provided it without reluctance. During
the interview, officers also learned that Bonnell had recently turned eighteen, and that he
did not have a high school diploma or a GED. After Bonnell stated numerous times that
he lived with his mother and wanted to call her, one of the officers told Bonnell that he did
not need to talk to his mother because he was an adult. Bonnell argues that the interview
was unduly coercive, and the results of the interview should be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (explaining
derivative evidence is entitled to suppression as “fruit of the poisonous tree” if “whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”). Because we conclude that the search
of Bonnell’s Facebook accounts violated Fourth Amendment and state constitutional
protections based on a lack of particularity, we do not consider Bonnell’s alternative
argument.
Similarly, Bonnell argues for the first time on appeal that the admission into
evidence of the portion of his squad car interview where he provided the agents with his
phone number was error and was entitled to suppression. Because the evidence was
unobjected-to, we review the district court’s decision for plain error. See State v. Griller,
583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Under plain error review, the appellant must show
(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the appellant’s substantial rights. Id. An
error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that it had a
significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Id. at 741. Having carefully reviewed the record,
we conclude there is sufficient admissible evidence tying Bonnell to LaValley’s death, and
the recording entered into evidence of Bonnell providing his phone number to law

28
IV.

We turn now to the issue of whether the district court committed harmful error when

it failed to suppress the evidence obtained during the unconstitutional searches of Bonnell’s

two Facebook accounts and when it later admitted at trial exhibits containing messages

from those accounts. “When an error implicates a constitutional right, we will award a

new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis,

820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012). “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if

the jury’s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” Id. (citation omitted). In

considering whether erroneously admitted evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,

we have said, “[i]mproperly admitted evidence is harmless . . . when the evidence is

cumulative.” State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013). Other relevant

factors include “the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly

persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively

countered by the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although overwhelming evidence of guilt is also an important consideration, a court cannot

focus on the evidence of guilt alone. Id.

Here, the Facebook messages that were obtained as a result of the seizure of

Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts and included in the challenged trial exhibits are

enforcement is unlikely to have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury. Thus,
even if the district court committed plain error in admitting this evidence, the error did not
affect Bonnell’s substantial rights, and he is not entitled to any relief based on this alleged
error. See State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1998) (explaining that a court will
not reverse a conviction based on unobjected-to error unless the appellant shows all three
prongs of the plain error test are met).

29
undoubtedly cumulative. Each of those exhibits also included duplicative records obtained

from French’s Facebook account containing identical information to that obtained from

Bonnell’s Facebook accounts. Consequently, the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable

to the erroneous admission of Bonnell’s Facebook messages as part of these exhibits, and

therefore the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

This does not end our analysis, however, because the district court admitted three

additional trial exhibits that consisted entirely of Facebook records obtained only in the

unconstitutional seizure of Bonnell’s two Facebook accounts. We conclude that the jury’s

verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of these records, for the following

reasons.

The manner in which these three exhibits were presented suggests that the jury

would not have unduly focused on the evidence. One of the exhibits was used to establish

the dates, times, and duration of calls to the Pineapple Man account during the State’s case.

Because the exhibit was referenced infrequently and not in the State’s opening statement

or closing argument, it was unlikely to be a focus for the jury. The State partially relied on

the other two exhibits to establish Bonnell as the owner of the Pineapple Man Facebook

account in its opening statement, direct examinations, and closing argument. Referring to

one of the exhibits at closing, which included pictures of Bonnell, the State explained that

the photos “are of Mr. Bonnell and Mr. Bonnell only” and thus establish him as the owner

of the Pineapple Man account. The State also cited to the other exhibit at closing, which

included verified phone number data, to explain that “the phone number tied to Pineapple

Man’s Facebook account . . . [was] [i]n that same recorded statement” that he gave to

30
officers in the squad car. While referenced in closing argument, the State presented

multiple additional pieces of evidence linking Bonnell to the Pineapple Man account and

thus these two exhibits were unlikely to pull the jury’s focus.

Furthermore, the information in these three exhibits was cumulative to the vast

amount of evidence tying Bonnell to the crime. There were numerous incriminating

Facebook messages derived from French’s account that we have determined were

admissible at trial, including multiple messages from Bonnell to French saying that he

wanted to shoot LaValley, messages describing a plan for where to take LaValley’s body,

and messages after the murder indicating that Bonnell committed the crime because of his

love for French. Moreover, DNA matching Bonnell’s profile was found on the magazine

and trigger of the murder weapon, and police found bullets in Bonnell’s bedroom that were

fired by the same gun as the murder weapon. Suppressing the messages and data derived

from Bonnell’s account would not obviate the incriminatory nature of the other admissible

evidence. Moreover, any persuasive value in these three exhibits was likewise undermined

by the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

We also observe that defense counsel generally countered during opening statements

and closing arguments that information from the Facebook accounts should be considered

less persuasive than the physical evidence.

Ultimately, of the three exhibits that came exclusively from Bonnell’s two Facebook

accounts, the two exhibits referenced in opening and closing provided information

duplicative from other admissible trial evidence, and the third exhibit was not a focus of

the State’s case. On this record, we conclude that the jury’s verdict was surely

31
unattributable to the erroneous admission of these three additional exhibits, and therefore

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 20

Next we consider Bonnell’s argument that the district court committed reversible

error when it admitted into evidence, under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions

to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), constitutionally obtained Facebook messages

contained in French’s account that described Bonnell’s prior bad acts. The State argues

that the district court did not err because the challenged messages satisfied both the

immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Rule 404(b). 21

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) generally prohibits the admission of

“[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act . . . to prove the character of a person in order

to show action in conformity therewith.” As relevant here, there are two exceptions to this

general prohibition. First, evidence of a prior bad act is admissible as immediate-episode

evidence “where two or more [crimes, wrongs, or acts] are linked together in point of time

or circumstances so that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other.” State v.

Wofford, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 1962). Evidence of a prior bad act satisfies the

immediate episode exception if “there is a close causal and temporal connection between

20
Because we find that the error was harmless, we do not address the State’s
arguments that the messages would have been inevitably discovered in the recipients’
accounts or that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.
21
In one of the challenged messages, Bonnell identifies himself as “Deshon Bonnell.”
This message does not constitute an “act,” much less a prior bad act, because it is simply a
message of identification. It therefore does not fall within the purview of Minnesota Rule
of Evidence 404(b)(1) and need not satisfy the immediate episode or Spreigl exceptions.

32
the prior bad act and the charged crime.” State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 425

(Minn. 2009). Second, under the Spreigl exception, evidence of past crimes may be

admissible when relevant to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common

scheme or plan. State v. Gomez, 721 N.W.2d 871, 877 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Spreigl,

139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)).

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). “A defendant appealing the admission of

evidence has the burden to show the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.”

Riddley, 776 N.W.2d at 424.

Bonnell argues the district court erred in admitting the following messages sent from

the Pineapple Man Facebook account and received and stored in French’s Facebook

account between January 2 and January 4, 2019, a few days before LaValley’s murder:

• A message asking French whether anything happened between French
and a man named K.

• A message saying “I know if I loose another person I’ma go on a
rampage.”

• A message that said, “I’m having the worst day . . . I just really wanna
shoot someone.”

• A message that said, “I don’t even wanna be alive . . . I’m a terrible
person.”

Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion when it

admitted the challenged statements under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to

33
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), we conclude that Bonnell failed to satisfy his

burden to show that the erroneous admission of the challenged statements was prejudicial.

To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable

possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State

v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (“To warrant a new

trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable possibility that

the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). We have previously identified a list of nonexclusive

factors that may be considered in determining whether the defendant has satisfied his

burden of demonstrating prejudice, including “(1) the manner in which the party presented

the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who

offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively

countered the evidence.” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 54. In addition, “[s]trong evidence of

guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. (quoting State

v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020)). These factors may not be relevant or

persuasive in every case because determining whether the defendant satisfied his burden is

a “fact-specific” analysis. Id. at 55.

Here, the challenged messages were read into the record by a police officer. The

challenged messages were not highly persuasive because their persuasive value was

undermined by the large amount of other admissible evidence that established Bonnell’s

ownership of the Pineapple Man account, his participation in the crime, his relationship to

34
the crime, and his desire to hurt LaValley. The prosecutor referenced the challenged

messages twice in his closing argument. Defense counsel countered the challenged

messages in his closing argument by telling the jury, “We saw several [messages] in which

there was a discussion about shooting these guys and of course, it never happened. This

was an eighteen-year-old kid at the time, Mr. Bonnell. He has a new girlfriend. He’s trying

to impress and to appear to be a big tough guy and she loved it.” (Emphases added.) Based

on the specific facts of this case, we conclude that Bonnell failed to show that there is a

reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the

verdict, especially when the challenged messages were outweighed by the strong evidence

of guilt from other admissible evidence establishing Bonnell as the owner of the Pineapple

Man account, demonstrating Bonnell’s participation in and relationship to the crime, and

his motivation to hurt LaValley.

In sum, even assuming that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted

the challenged messages under the immediate episode and Spreigl exceptions to Minnesota

Rule of Evidence 404(b), we conclude that Bonnell failed to show there is a reasonable

possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.

VI.

Finally, we consider Bonnell’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction because the State presented only accomplice testimony and

circumstantial evidence. 22 This presents two intertwined issues. First, we must consider

22
There is no dispute that French is an accomplice whose testimony requires
corroboration under Minn. Stat. § 634.04.

35
whether the corroborative evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict,

was weighty enough to restore confidence in the truth of French’s eyewitness testimony

that Bonnell fatally shot LaValley such that it can be considered as part of our examination

of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. See State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 225 (Minn.

1995). Second, we must consider whether the State presented sufficient evidence to

support Bonnell’s conviction.

We first consider whether the presented evidence was weighty enough to

corroborate French’s testimony. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 634.04,

[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless it
is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to convict the defendant of
the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it
merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.

Minn. Stat. § 634.04. A witness is an accomplice if the witness “could have been indicted

and convicted for the crime with which the defendant is charged.” State v. Pendelton,

759 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. 2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In such circumstances, corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony is required to sustain a

conviction. “The rationale for this rule is that the credibility of an accomplice is inherently

untrustworthy.” State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 877 (Minn. 2008). Evidence to

corroborate accomplice testimony is sufficient “when it is weighty enough to restore

confidence in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266,

282 (Minn. 2023) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But accomplice

testimony “does not need to be corroborated on every point or element of the crime.” Id.

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The corroboration is complete when

36
a defendant is linked to the alleged crime with evidence that “affirm[s] the truth of the

accomplice’s testimony and point[s] to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial

degree.” Id. at 281 (citation omitted). The corroborating evidence may consist of physical

evidence associated with the crime, the testimony of eyewitnesses and experts at trial, and

suspicious and unexplained conduct of an accused before or after the crime. State v.

Pederson, 614 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn. 2000); State v. Mathiasen, 127 N.W.2d 534, 539

(Minn. 1964). Moreover, the corroborating evidence may be direct or circumstantial. State

v. Thoresen, 921 N.W.2d 547, 551–52 (Minn. 2019); State v. Rasmussen, 63 N.W.2d 1, 3

(Minn. 1954) (explaining that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate the

testimony of an accomplice).

The sufficiency requirement for corroborating evidence is less stringent than the

sufficiency requirement for sustaining a conviction. State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241,

253–54 (Minn. 2008) (“The precise quantum of corroborative evidence needed necessarily

depends on the circumstances of each case, but corroborative evidence does not need to be

sufficient to . . . sustain a conviction.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Consequently, the circumstantial evidence analysis that we apply in determining

whether the circumstances proved are sufficient to support a conviction does not govern

our review of whether the corroborating evidence is weighty enough to restore confidence

in the truth of the accomplice’s testimony. Instead, we simply view circumstantial evidence

corroborating an accomplice’s testimony in the light most favorable to the verdict. Ford,

539 N.W.2d at 225; State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 93 (stating that we “view corroborative

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict”).

37
French testified that Bonnell shot LaValley. Here, the following physical evidence

and expert testimony corroborates French’s testimony and establishes Bonnell’s

involvement in the crime: LaValley was shot twice in the face with a .22 Ruger pistol;

DNA matching Bonnell’s profile was found on the pistol used in the crime; and a bullet

casing found at the scene matched both the pistol and other bullet casings found in

Bonnell’s bedroom. In addition, the following evidence from before the murder is

incriminating: Bonnell converses with French on Facebook about where to take LaValley

to dispose of him; and Bonnell messages French repeatedly about how he is going to shoot

LaValley and film the killing. After the murder, the following activity is suspicious:

Bonnell messages French, “I didn’t do it for payment I did it cause I love you”; and Bonnell

says on a jail call that he needs to delete his Pineapple Man Facebook account. Viewed in

the light most favorable to the verdict, the above-described evidence is weighty enough to

restore confidence in the truth of French’s eyewitness testimony that Bonnell brought his

pistol to the scene and fatally shot LaValley.

Having concluded the evidence corroborates French’s eyewitness testimony, we

turn to whether the State presented sufficient direct evidence, including French’s testimony,

to support Bonnell’s conviction. Direct evidence is “[e]vidence that is based on personal

knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.”

See State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 421 n.4 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). When a

disputed element is proven by direct evidence, we apply the traditional standard of review.

State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). “Under the traditional standard, we limit

our review to a ‘painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when

38
viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to

reach the verdict which they did.’ ” Id. at 40 (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430

(Minn. 1989)).

Here, French testified, based on her personal knowledge and observations, that

Bonnell brought his pistol to the scene and fatally shot LaValley twice in the face on Mesabi

Trail. Moreover, the statements Bonnell made in the messages that he sent French provide

direct evidence that he intentionally fired the shots with premeditation. Viewed in a light

most favorable to the conviction, this direct evidence was sufficient to permit the jurors to

find Bonnell guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. Consequently, we conclude that

the State presented sufficient evidence to support Bonnell’s conviction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.