A24-1797

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1795
A24-1797

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jamie Alden Godbout,
Appellant.

Filed October 27, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Kirk, Judge*

Carlton County District Court
File Nos. 09-CR-23-1975; 09-CR-22-1785

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy C. Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Jeffrey L.H. Boucher, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Sean Michael
McGuire, Assistant Public Defenders, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
These consolidated appeals arise out of appellant’s multiple convictions for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct in two different files. In the first file—the tried case—
appellant raises several challenges to his convictions and sentencing following a jury trial,
including an erroneously included jury instruction. In the second file—the plea-agreement
case—appellant contends that the district court erroneously convicted and sentenced him
for the multiple offenses for which he pleaded guilty.
Regarding the tried case, we conclude that the district court committed reversible
error by including an inapplicable jury instruction; we thus reverse and remand that file for
a new trial. Regarding the plea-agreement case, we affirm the district court’s entry of
judgment of conviction and sentence based on appellant’s plea agreement.
FACTS
These cases involve first-degree criminal-sexual conduct charges against two
victims, KS and MH. In June 2022, law enforcement received a report of alleged sexual
abuse of two minor children. After investigating the reports, law enforcement interviewed
the suspected perpetrator, appellant Jamie Alden Godbout, and the two initial victims: KS
and LG. Upon further investigation, law enforcement identified a third potential victim,
MH. KS is the niece of Godbout’s former girlfriend. LG and MH are both children of
Godbout’s former girlfriend, but Godbout is not their father. Godbout is not related to any
of the victims by blood, marriage, or adoption.
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Respondent State of Minnesota charged Godbout with multiple first-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct offenses committed against victims KS, LG, and MH. The district
court severed Godbout’s charges such that it would hold three different trials for the
charges corresponding to each victim.
Godbout proceeded to a jury trial on the charges the state brought against him for
alleged criminal sexual conduct against KS. Over Godbout’s objections, the district court
permitted the other two alleged victims, LG and MH, to testify during this trial. The district
court determined that LG’s and MH’s testimony was admissible under either
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024) or as Spreigl evidence.1
KS was 18 at the time of Godbout’s trial. During her testimony, KS explained that
Godbout lived with her grandparents intermittently and with his parents intermittently. KS
testified that as a child she went to Godbout’s parents’ house on weekends and sometimes
during the week and that she experienced several instances of sexual abuse during this
period.
KS first came forward with these allegations by telling Godbout’s former
girlfriend— KS’s aunt—about the abuse. KS explained that she initially disclosed the abuse
to Godbout’s former girlfriend because she was going to send one of KS’s younger cousins
to spend time with Godbout. KS maintained that she did not want her younger cousins to

1 “Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, which would
otherwise be inadmissible, but which the state can seek to have admitted for the limited
purpose of showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or
plan.” State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2003); accord Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b)(1); State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Minn. 1965).
4
suffer any abuse. The record reflects that KS later messaged Godbout saying that she lied
about these allegations. At trial, however, KS testified that Godbout pressured her to take
back what she said because Godbout had told KS that “he was going to kill himself.”
LG and MH t estified later during the trial. As explained above, LG and MH are
KS’s cousins; however, none of the victims are related to Godbout by blood, marriage, or
adoption. Like KS, both LG and MH testified that Godbout sexually abused them multiple
times.
During trial, Godbout objected to a portion of the following jury instruction.
A “significant relationship” includes:

Any of the following persons related to the complainant by
blood, marriage, or adoption: brother, sister, stepbrother,
stepsister, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, grandparent,
great-grandparent, great-uncle, great-aunt; or

An adult who jointly resides intermittently or regularly in the
same dwelling as the complainant.

This instruction pertained to the “significant relationship” element of the type of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct the state had charged Godbout with committing. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2024). Godbout objected to the district court’s use
of the “blood, marriage, or adoption” portion of this jury instruction on the ground that it
did not apply to the state’s alleged facts because there was no evidence to support that
Godbout was related to KS by blood, marriage, or adoption. The district court read the
instruction over Godbout’s objection, however, and throughout the trial, the state argued
that Godbout acted like an uncle to KS because of how long Godbout dated KS’s aunt. The
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state even admitted a “family photo” of Godbout with KS’s aunt and children, presumably
to support this significant-relationship theory.
Closing argument followed. At the beginning of the state’s closing argument, the
record reflects that the prosecutor became emotional and may have started crying. Godbout
objected, and the district court gave the parties a few minutes of break. After this short
break the prosecutor restarted her closing argument. During her closing argument, the
prosecutor compared KS to Jesus Christ:
And in [KS’s] 13, 14-year-old brain, she decided that she could
be the protector, that she would just take it herself so that the
younger girls didn’t have to. She would draw the attention off
of her eight and ten-year -old cousins and she would take it.
And in the words of Jesus himself, there is no greater love than
to lay down one’s life for another.

Later in her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed how Godbout was
effectively an uncle to KS:
Third, you’ve been provided an instruction on the
definition of a significant relationship, and included in that is a
guardian and an uncle. While Mr. Godbout never married
[KS’s aunt] taking the title of uncle, he certainly functioned
like a spouse to [KS ’s aunt]. They were together for six or
seven years, they lived together, spent all their time together,
and we know from the testimony you heard from [the]
interview of Mr. Godbout that they were together all the time.
Again, for that period of time. They lived in the same place,
they shared a child together. KS also testified that at one point
she was in a family picture with Mr. Godbout and [KS].

Significant relationship can also be established, and just
to be clear, it can be one or the other. It does not have to be
both. So, the law provides, these are different ways that you
can show significant relationship. One can be by any— I
apologize. One can be by any of these relationships, or it could
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be by jointly or intermittently residing together, which clearly
was the case here.

There was testimony, I think from almost every witness,
that they lived together . . . and also spent time together at the
Godbout house. So, again, the State has met the third element
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The jury found appellant guilty of three counts of criminal sexual conduct against
KS. Godbout subsequently pleaded guilty to two charges of criminal sexual conduct against
MH. The state dismissed its charges of criminal sexual conduct against LG.
Godbout appeals.
DECISION
We first analyze the issues relating to Godbout’s trial and sentencing for the charges
relating to KS—the tried case. We conclude that the district court made a reversible error
by including inapplicable jury instructions related to the “significant relationship” element
of Godbout’s criminal-sexual-conduct charges. We therefore reverse Godbout’s
convictions for criminal sexual conduct against KS and remand for a new trial. We next
analyze the sentencing issue related to Godbout’s convictions of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct against MH—the plea-agreement case. Here, we affirm, concluding that
the district court convicted Godbout of the offenses he pleaded guilty to, in accordance
with his plea agreement.
I. The district court committed reversible error in Godbout’s trial for criminal
sexual conduct against KS because it instructed the jury using an inapplicable
definition of “significant relationship.”

We begin our review of the tried case by addressing Godbout’s claim that he is
entitled to relief because of numerous errors that occurred, including (A) admission of other
7
crimes and bad acts evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (relationship evidence) and
Spreigl, (B) an erroneous jury instruction, (C) prosecutorial misconduct, (D) admission of
statements he made after an equivocal request for counsel, and (E) cumulative error.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted LG’s and
MH’s testimonies pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20.

Godbout argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting LG and
MH to testify. The state argues that the district court properly admitted LG’s and MH’s
testimonies pursuant to the relationship-evidence rule in Minn. Stat. § 634.20, and pursuant
to Spreigl. We first analyze whether the district court properly admitted LG’s and MH’s
testimonies pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Because we conclude that the district court
properly admitted this testimony as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20
relationship evidence, we do not reach Godbout’s Spreigl argument.
Appellate courts review a district court’s admission of relationship evidence
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 for an abuse of discretion. State v. Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d
646, 651 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010). Minnesota Statutes section
634.20 relationship evidence is admissible if “(1) it demonstrates similar conduct by the
accused; (2) the conduct is perpetrated against the victim of domestic abuse or against
another family or household member; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id.
Regarding the first element, the state sought to admit LG’s and MH’s testimonies
because they both alleged that Godbout sexually abused them. Because this conduct
constitutes similar conduct as to what KS described in her testimony, we conclude that the
8
district court acted within its discretion here. Regarding the second element, the state
sought to admit LG’s and MH’s testimonies because they also intermittently lived with
Godbout. Moreover, LG and MH are related to KS. Because LG and MH were household
members, and related to KS, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion
here, too. Regarding the third element, the district court concluded that the probative value
of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Specifically, the district court determined that the trial hinged on whether the jury believed
KS’s account of the incidents; thus, the district court determined that this evidence was
more probative than it might be unfairly prejudicial. Because each of these three elements
are met, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it
admitted this evidence as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Godbout also argues that the district court erred by reading an objected-to portion
of a Minn. Stat. § 634.20 cautionary instruction to the jury before KS, LG, and MH
testified. “[W]hen a district court admits relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20,
over a defendant’s objection that the evidence does not satisfy section 634.20, the court
must sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of such evidence, unless the defendant
objects to the instruction by the court.” State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Minn. 2019).
During trial, Godbout objected to the second paragraph of the below cautionary
instruction.
So, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you’re about to
hear evidence of alleged conduct by the defendant on one or
more separate occasions. Evidence of other crimes or
occurrences is being offered for the limited purpose of assisting
9
you in determining whether the defendant committed those
acts with which the defendant is charged in the Complaint.

Evidence of other domestic conduct is being offered for
the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of
the relationship between the defendant and the family or
household members in order to assist you in determining
whether the defendant committed those acts with which the
defendant is charged in the Complaint.

The evidence is not to be used to prove the character of
the defendant or that the defendant acted in conformity with
such character. The defendant is not being tried for and may
not be convicted of any behavior or offense other than the
charged offenses. You are not to convict the defendant on the
basis of conduct on a separate occasion. To do so might result
in unjust or double punishment.

The district court overruled Godbout’s objection.
We do not find Godbout’s argument persuasive. Zinski provides that district courts
must instruct jurors on relationship evidence “unless the defendant objects to the
instruction.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, Godbout only objected to a portion of the
cautionary instruction. Godbout did not object to “the instruction.” See id. We therefore
conclude that Godbout’s reliance on Zinski is misplaced. Moreover, even if Zinski
supported Godbout’s argument, we are not persuaded that the inclusion of this second
paragraph constituted error by the district court.
Because we conclude that the district court permissibly admitted LG’s and MH’s
testimonies pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20, we decline to address Godbout’s Spreigl
arguments.
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B. The district court committed reversible error by including an
inapplicable “related by blood, marriage, or adoption,” paragraph in its
definition of “significant relationship.”
Godbout argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury on a “significant
relationship” theory that was factually inapplicable to him. The state agrees that
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(2) (2024)— the “related to the complainant by blood,
marriage, or adoption,” provision—does not apply to Godbout’s case but maintains that its
inclusion was harmless. In its jury charge, the district court provided the following
definition of “significant relationship” for the jurors:
Any of the following persons related to the complainant
by blood, marriage, or adoption: brother, sister, stepbrother,
stepsister, first cousin, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, grandparent,
great-grandparent, great-uncle, great-aunt; or
An adult who jointly resides intermittently or regularly
in the same dwelling as the complainant.
Godbout objected to this jury instruction, arguing that there is no evidence in the record to
support a conclusion that Godbout is related to KS by blood, marriage, or adoption. In
claiming this, Godbout contended that the jurors are going to be le d “astray.” The state
countered that Godbout “functioned as an uncle” to KS.
After attorneys for both sides presented arguments to the district court outside of the
presence of the jury, the district court decided to use the above instruction. Then, during
closing argument, the state argued that the jury could find Godbout guilty u sing either
definition of significant relationship—intermittently residing together, or relation by blood,
marriage, or adoption. The prosecutor’s statements in reliance on the blood, marriage, or
adoption language included the following: “While Mr. Godbout never married [KS’s aunt]
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taking the title of uncle, he certainly functioned like a spouse to [KS’s aunt]. . . . [KS] also
testified that at one point she was in a family picture with Mr. Godbout and [KS].
Significant relationship . . . can be one or the other,” intermittently residing together or
relation by blood, marriage, or adoption.
Appellate courts
review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of
discretion. A district court abuses its discretion if it fails to
properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense
charged. A properly objected-to instructional error regarding
an element of an offense requires a new trial only if it cannot
be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no
significant impact on the verdict.

State v. Torrez, 8 N.W.3d 674, 677 (Minn. App. 2024), aff’d, 21 N.W.3d 467 (Minn. 2025).
“The overwhelming evidence of guilt is a factor, often a very important one, in determining
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error has no impact on the verdict.” State v. Juarez,
572 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn. 1997). “[A]ppellate courts must look to the basis on which
the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict.” “If
the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error, the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn. 1996) (citation
omitted).
Minnesota law defines a “significant relationship” as a relationship “in which the
actor is” either (1) “the complainant’s parent, stepparent, or guardian,” (2) “related to the
complainant by blood, marriage, or adoption,” or (3) “an adult who jointly resides
intermittently or regularly in the same dwelling as the complainant and who is not the
complainant’s spouse.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 15(1)-(3) (2024).
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Godbout argues that the district court’s inclusion of the “blood, marriage, or
adoption” definition of significant relationship was erroneous because there was no
evidence offered to support that Godbout was related to KS by blood, marriage, or
adoption. Godbout maintains that “this court cannot tell from the verdict that the error was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” We agree.
Upon review, we cannot determine whether the inclusion of this jury instruction had
no significant impact on the jury’s verdict. See Torrez, 8 N.W.3d at 677. The parties agree
that Godbout is not related to KS by blood, marriage, or adoption, yet during trial the state
furthered a theory that Godbout was functionally KS’s uncle. During closing argument, the
state argued that the jury could find Godbout guilty based on either definition of significant
relationship.
Because the jury was not asked in the verdict form whether they found unanimously
that Godbout was related to KS specifically or specifically lived intermittently with KS ,
the jury may have relied on an inapplicable jury instruction that suggested it could be either
one or the other, when it had to be only lived intermittently with KS regarding this element
of the crime. One or more jurors may have believed that Godbout was related to KS but
not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the state proved that they lived
together intermittently or regularly enough to satisfy the instruction on residing together.
We conclude that Godbout is entitled to a new trial on the charges involving KS. See
State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. 1992) (reversing and remanding for a new
trial where it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant would have been
convicted without the erroneous jury instruction). Although we conclude that this issue is
13
dispositive, we address other arguments raise d by Godbout relating to the tried case, to
narrow the issues on remand for the new trial.
C. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, and, on
appeal, the state did not show that the objected -to prosecutorial
misconduct did not impact the jury’s verdict.
Next, Godbout argues that counsel for the state committed prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument in two ways: (1) inappropriately displaying emotion and
potentially crying in front of the jury and (2) comparing KS to Jesus Christ. At the
beginning of the state’s closing argument, the transcript shows that the prosecutor began,
paused, and Godbout objected. After a brief break, the prosecutor proceeded with her
closing argument.
The prosecutor and defense counsel later made a record outside the presence of the
jury. The prosecutor said that she felt as if she was going to get emotional, defense counsel
objected, and the parties took a break. Defense counsel explained that he objected because
he thought he saw the prosecutor beginning to cry. In explaining the objection, defense
counsel asserted that “if a juror sees a prosecutor or a defense attorney crying and showing
that type of emotion that would tend to inflame their passions and potentially align
themselves unfairly with whichever side is making that very impassioned argument.”
Although we cannot tell from the transcript whether the prosecutor was in fact
crying, the district court implicitly acknowledged that the prosecutor was crying, stating,
“I think the next issue we had was that [the defense] objected to . . . the emotion or the
crying specifically.” The prosecutor contended that she “was not crying at that moment.”
She acknowledged that she “could definitely feel emotion” and explained that she
14
sometimes became emotional during closing arguments. Even so, the prosecutor
maintained that any emotion she showed during her closing argument in this case was not
intentional.
Emotions are a natural part of trials, especially a trial involving an alleged crime
against a child. The district court dealt with this issue appropriately by using a short break
to allow the attorney to compose herself. The district court was in the best position to
determine if this would merit a mistrial. See State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.
1985). We discern no error in this circumstance.
Shortly after resuming the state’s closing argument, the prosecutor compared KS to
Jesus Christ:
And in [KS’s] 13, 14-year-old brain, she decided that she could
be the protector, that she would just take it herself so that the
younger girls didn’t have to. She would draw the attention off
of her eight and ten-year -old cousins and she would take it.
And in the words of Jesus himself, there is no greater love than
to lay down one’s life for another.

Appellant objected. Away from the jury, the district court said that quoting Jesus was
inappropriate. The district court attempted to cure this issue by “reread[ing] the statements
of the attorneys, and the duties and the statements of the Judge . . . to the jury before” the
district court excused the jury to deliberate.
Appellate courts review objected-to prosecutorial misconduct under a two-tiered
harmless-error test.
2 State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 749 (Minn. 2010). Under either

2 The supreme court has questioned whether this two-tiered approach is still good law,
while declining to decide the question. See State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297, 304 n.2
(Minn. 2016) (“Recent cases have questioned whether the two-tiered . . . standard for
15
tier, the defendant must first establish that prosecutorial misconduct occurred. See id. A
prosecutor engages in misconduct by either violating established standards of conduct or
caselaw. State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008). If the prosecutor engaged
in misconduct, the standard we apply to determine whether reversal is required varies based
on the “seriousness of the misconduct.” McDaniel, 777 at 749. We review “less serious”
misconduct to determine “whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in
influencing the jury to convict.” Id. (quotation omitted). When reviewing “more serious”
misconduct, we reverse “unless the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
We conclude that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. “A prosecutor is not
permitted to appeal to the passions of the jury during closing argument.” Nunn v. State, 753
N.W.2d 657, 661 -62 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). And a prosecutor has a duty to
avoid arguments that will “divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Here, we conclude that the prosecutor’s comparison of KS to Jesus
Christ appealed to the passions of the jury and diverted the jury from its duty to decide the
case based on the evidence. And, given that Jesus Christ is one of the most important
historical-religious figures in Western History, we conclude that this misconduct falls into
the “more serious” misconduct category.

reviewing objected-to misconduct remains viable.”). See also State v. Carridine,
812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012); McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d at 749. The two -tiered
harmless-error approach comes from State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1974).
16
The state disagrees, arguing that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct or, if
it did, that the misconduct was not serious. Regarding the prosecutor’s comparison of KS
to Jesus Christ, the state argues that, even if the statement was misconduct, the prosecutor’s
statement was brief in the context of her whole closing argument, comparing this case to
State v. Benitez, No. A14-2188, 2015 WL 9437512, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 28, 2015), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016).
Benitez is a nonprecedential case, which is “not binding authority.” Minn. R. Vic.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Moreover, Benitez involved a prosecutor likening the general
concept of criminal punishment for crimes against children to a quote attributed to Nelson
Mandela. 2015 WL 9437512, at *5. In that case, the district court “determined that the
prosecutor’s closing argument was ‘within the bounds of legitimate advocacy.’” Id. at *5.
This was not the case in Godbout’s trial, in which the district court determined that the
Jesus comparison was inappropriate.3
For these reasons, we conclude that the prosector engaged in serious misconduct
during closing argument. But because we reverse and remand for a new trial on an
independent basis, we need not determine whether this misconduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

3 Although district courts typically should not issue cautionary instructions sua sponte,
State v. Vance, 714 N.W.2d 428, 443 (Minn. 2006), it may have been beneficial for the
district court to explain that it sustained Godbout’s objection and to inform the jury that
the prosecutor’s comments were inappropriate.

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D. The district court erred by admitting statements Godbout made after
making equivocal requests for counsel during a custodial interview.
Godbout argues that the district court erred by admitting a statement that was
allegedly obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Godbout argues
that although the district court cited the “stop and clarify” standard in its memorandum of
law accompanying its order admitting portions of his custodial interview with law
enforcement, the district court failed to apply this standard correctly.
Law enforcement interviewed Godbout about the allegations against him on July 29,
2022.4 Detective C.W. questioned him. Godbout waived his Miranda rights and decided to
speak with law enforcement. His initial Miranda waiver is not at issue on appeal, and the
parties stipulated that the interview constituted a custodial interview. Importantly,
Godbout’s discussion of “his lawyer” during the interview may have been confusing
because, at the time of this interview, Godbout had appointed counsel to assist him in a
CHIPS
5 proceeding relating to his son.
At the very beginning of the interview:
DETECTIVE: Are you willing to make a statement or answer
questions at this time?

GODBOUT: Um I was actually going to ask you about that.
Um I just found out who my attorney was today, so like, I don’t
know if I am supposed to have an attorney with, or if I’m not.
But I— I’m inno—I —the reason why I voluntarily—wanted to
get the statement is because I’m innocent and I want my son
back soon.

4The facts indicate that Godbout was interviewed in Superior, Wisconsin by a Superior,
Wisconsin detective. Because we received no briefing on how this may change the analysis,
we express no opinion on whether this fact has any relevance.
5 CHIPS is an acronym for “Child in Need of Protection or Services.”
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DETECTIVE: Ok, so, . . . here’s what I’m gonna say, . . .
you’ve already talked—I’m gonna read you this ok, and then
. . . I’ll ask ya . . . I’ll read you this and we’ll talk afterwards,
er we’ll— um you’re at least willing to let me go forward with
. . .

The detective also gestured to the Miranda warning document and read the warning .
Godbout said he did not have any questions about it, and the detective began interrogating
Godbout.
Later, during the interview, Godbout said that his former girlfriend “made up these
allegations” after a court hearing involving his son. The detective asked, “What kind of
allegations?” Godbout replied, “Something about . . . molestation.” The detective asked,
“Do you know who that involved?” Godbout initially replied that he did not know but later
acknowledged that she was referring to KS.
Approximately 15 minutes later, Godbout was explaining the status of his son’s
CHIPS case when he exclaimed, “that’s what I gotta call my attorney about because, like,
[my ex-girlfriend] made that allegation yet it’s totally bullsh-t.” The detective asked, “What
allegation is that?” Godbout explained that he was talking about the “molestation”
allegation.
Godbout moved the district court to suppress statements he made to law
enforcement during this custodial interview because he referenced consulting an attorney
and the detective did not cease the interrogation to clarify if he was requesting his right to
counsel. The district court determined that Godbout did invoke his right to counsel at about
70 minutes into the interview by saying that he did not want to mention the “L word.” Thus,
the district court suppressed all of Godbout’s statements after this point.
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“The validity of a suspect’s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent
presents a mixed question of fact and law.” State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 882 (Minn.
2021) (citation omitted). Appellate courts “review the factual issue of whether a suspect
unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his right to silence for clear error. But we
review the application of the reasonable officer standard to the facts of the case de novo.”
Id. (citation omitted).
If a defendant initially agrees to speak with law enforcement without counsel, but
later “makes an equivocal or ambiguous statement that could be construed as a request for
counsel, investigators must cease questioning the suspect except as to ‘narrow questions
designed to “clarify” the accused’s true desires respecting counsel.’” State v. Ortega,
798 N.W.2d 59, 71 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted). “This ‘stop and clarify’ rule ensures
that suspects are aware of their right to have counsel present during a custodial
interrogation so that any subsequent waiver of this right is knowing and intelligent.” Id. at
71-72.
Upon our de novo review, we agree with Godbout that statements made after the
37-minute point in the interview should have also been suppressed. At that point in the
interview, Godbout exclaimed, “that’s what I gotta call my attorney about because, like,
[my ex-girlfriend] made that allegation yet it’s totally bullsh-t.” Rather than asking for
clarification about whether Godbout was invoking his right to counsel, the detective asked,
“What allegation is that?” Godbout replied, “[M]olestation.”
Instead of suppressing Godbout’s statements from this point onward, the district
court admitted these statements and suppressed Godbout’s statements after “around
20
70 minutes into the interview.” To the extent that it is helpful upon remand, we conclude
that Godbout unequivocally invoked his right to counsel when he said “that’s what I gotta
call my attorney about” because this statement could have been construed as a request for
counsel. In drawing this conclusion, we also observe that Godbout referenced an attorney
several times during his interview, rather than just twice.
E. Cumulative errors denied Godbout a fair trial.
Finally, Godbout argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in his trial merit
reversal. “An appellant may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the errors, when
taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying the appellant a fair trial.” State v. Fraga,
898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Although the jury-instruction error
is an independent basis to reverse and remand , we conclude that this is a rare case where
the cumulative effect of all the errors provides another basis for reversal and remand for a
new trial.
II. The district court permissibly convicted and sentenced G odbout to two
consecutive 144- month terms of imprisonment for two counts of criminal
sexual conduct against MH.
After the jury returned their findings of guilt on the charges against KS, Godbout
pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against MH. On
appeal, Godbout argues that the district court erroneously convicted and sentenced him for
two offenses because the state did not prove separate acts or behavioral incidents.
Specifically, Godbout argues that, because the date ranges for the counts are the same, the
state charged him with alternative legal theories for committing a single act of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, not separate acts of criminal sexual conduct. We review this issue
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de novo. State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 809-10 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 27, 2018).
A criminal defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included
offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2024). Section 609.04 prohibits
district courts from entering multiple convictions under different sections of a statute for a
single criminal act. State v. LaTourelle , 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984). Section
609.035 “prohibits the imposition of multiple sentences for offenses arising from a single
behavioral incident in most cases.” Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 810. Whether multiple offenses
arose from a single behavioral incident “depends on the facts and circumstances of the
case.” Id. (quotation omitted). Generally, offenses are part of a single behavioral incident
“if the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place and were motivated by a
single criminal objective.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Although the date range for the two counts is the same, the counts do not describe a
single criminal act. Count 1 alleges first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a single
act of sexual penetration when the victim is under age 13 and the actor is more than 36
months older. Count 2 alleges a single act of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving
sexual penetration when the victim is under 16 and the actor has a significant relationship
to the victim. Moreover, in the factual basis for the guilty pleas, Godbout admitted that
criminal sexual conduct occurred multiple times.
Based on this record, and in compliance with his plea agreement, Godbout admitted
to perpetrating multiple acts of criminal sexual conduct upon MH. We are not persuaded
by Godbout’s argument that he did not admit to engaging in two separate incidents of
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criminal sexual conduct, warranting separate convictions and sentences. We therefore
reject this argument and affirm the district court’s entry of judgment of conviction for two
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and imposition of permissive consecutive
sentences.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.