State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0119

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Patrick Alan Haddeland,
Appellant.

Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-20-16698

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation after concluding that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring
probation. We affirm.
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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Patrick Alan Haddeland with two
counts of aiding and abetting the manufacture of counterfeit currency, aiding and abetting
the receipt of stolen property, and identity theft. In November 2022, Haddeland pleaded
guilty to identity theft and the other counts were dismissed. The district court sentenced
Haddeland to 58 months in prison, but granted Haddeland a downward dispositional
departure, and stayed the sentence for five years.
Haddeland failed to report to probation. Haddeland’s probation officer (PO) alleged
that Haddeland violated his probation because he failed to complete intake and notify his
PO that he had been charged with new crimes—two counts of gross-misdemeanor
counterfeiting of currency, felony mail theft, and providing false information to police.
After Haddeland was arrested i n August 2023, the state moved to correct
Haddeland’s original 58-month sentence because his criminal- history score had been
incorrectly calculated. Haddeland’s correct criminal-history score at the time of sentencing
was five and one-half , but he was incorrectly sentenced with a criminal-history score of
two. The district court resentenced Haddeland to 58 months in prison, stayed for five years.
This sentence was the same as Haddeland’s original sentence. The district court noted that
it was a downward durational and downward dispositional departure.
On December 6, 2023, Haddeland’s PO filed a violation report alleging that
Haddeland failed to complete outpatient treatment, contact his PO, and pay restitution. At
a hearing, Haddeland admitted that he failed to pay restitution. The district court reinstated
probation and ordered Haddeland to enter inpatient treatment. The district court stated that
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if Haddeland was unsuccessfully discharged or he absconded, he was required to report to
jail to serve 60 days.
On December 26, 2023, Haddeland’s PO filed a violation report alleging that
Haddeland had been discharged from inpatient treatment but failed to report to jail. The
PO noted that “[Haddeland] has a history of non-compliance with probation and treatment
providers,” and has new criminal charges.
Haddeland was not arrested until August 31, 2024. At a contested probation-
revocation hearing, Haddeland testified that he understood that he was required to complete
treatment or serve 60 days in jail. He testified, however, that he left to “get a couple things.
. . . [a]nd . . . it resulted in [him] not being able to come back” because the treatment center
did not have the resources to pick him up. Haddeland stated:
[W]hen I couldn’t return and I asked for help returning, man, I
was salty. I was like, well, F-off then, you know. And that
didn’t help anything. That kind of spun things out of control
for me. But, legitimately . . . did I obey the judge’s orders, no,
I didn’t obey the judge’s orders . . . [but] . . . I didn’t think that
my disobeying the judge’s orders would translate to me . . .
now in jeopardy of 58 months.

The district court revoked Haddeland’s probation and executed his sentence. The
district court found that Haddeland admitted that he left treatment and never reported to
jail, which was an intentional and inexcusable violation of his probation. The district court
determined that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation
because the public needed to be protected from Haddeland’s further criminal activity.
Additionally, Haddeland admitted “flouting” the district court’s order and his deliberate
disobedience demonstrated his “preference for breaking the law over obeying the law .”
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The district court determined that Haddeland was also in need of treatment that could most
effectively be provided when he is confined, and that it would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation if probation was not revoked because it would encourage
Haddeland to disobey court orders. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Haddeland argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation. A district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. App.
2023) (quotation omitted).
Before revoking probation, a district court must “1) designate the specific condition
or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable;
and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 250. Haddeland challenges only the district court’s determination that the
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
In determining if the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation, a district court considers subfactors, including whether “(i) confinement is
necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the
offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he
is confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation
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were not revoked.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005). While “[o]nly
one Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation,” State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d
317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023), here, the district court
found that all three existed.
Protect the public
Haddeland claims that his confinement is not necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity because his criminal-history score was factored into his sentence,
the district court did not find that he had been convicted of new offenses, and he did not
violate his probation by committing new offenses.
In deciding whether to revoke probation, a district court may consider an offender’s
criminal history. State v. Osborne, 732 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 2007) (stating that district
court may consider defendant’s record in determining the threat to the public and the need
for confinement). A district court may also consider the severity of the underlying offense
when making findings on the third Austin factor. See Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607; see
also Osborne, 732 N.W.2d at 254 (stating that defendant who committed “severe”
underlying offense was “entitled to less judicial forbearance”) . Additionally, a district
court may consider whether the offender received “a downward dispositional departure
when deciding whether to revoke probation.” State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331
(Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). And, while a district court may
not reflexively revoke probation in response to a series of technical violations, Osborne,
732 N.W.2d at 253, a history of noncompliance with probation is relevant to determining
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whether confinement is appropriate. State v. Rottelo, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011).
The district court stated that Haddeland had five criminal-history points, and that
the offense was a severity-level eight. The district court stated that the presumptive
sentence was 98 months in prison, but Haddeland was granted a durational and
dispositional departure. The district court noted that Haddeland was afforded probation,
he violated the conditions more than once, and that he was charged with at least four
felonies that occurred when he was supposed to be in treatment or jail . These
considerations are all relevant in deciding whether confinement is necessary to protect the
public. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation after finding
that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
Correctional treatment can most effectively be provided during confinement
The district court determined that Haddeland needed treatment that could most
effectively be provided when he is confined. Haddeland claims that the record does not
show that he would receive treatment in prison, but it does show that he is willing to receive
treatment in the community. But Haddeland’s probation was revoked because he failed to
go to treatment in the community.
Haddeland was required to report to treatment. He left, and when the treatment
center could not pick him up, which it was never required to do, he never returned. Then
he was on warrant status for nearly nine months. There is no evidence that Haddeland
received treatment during that time. The district court stated: “Haddeland has
demonstrated that he is interested in getting treatment only on his terms and when it’s
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convenient for him.” The record supports this determination. T he district court did not
abuse its discretion by revoking probation after finding that Haddeland needed treatment
that could most effectively be provided when he is confined.
Unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation was not revoked
Finally, the district court determined that it would unduly depreciate the seriousness
of the violation if probation was not revoked. Haddeland claims that the district court
erroneously focused on “its image and concerns of how other hypothetical probationers
might view this case and not on the seriousness of this single violation.”
First, the district court noted that Haddeland violated his probation more than once.
The record shows that this was not a “single violation.” The district court also did not just
consider how “hypothetical probationers might view this case.” The district court stated
that allowing Haddeland to continue on probation “would tell Haddeland and other
probationers that there is no serious consequence for violating a court’s order.” Haddeland
admitted that when the treatment center was unable to pick him up, he “was like, well,
F-off then.” He admitted that he “didn’t obey the judge’s orders,” but he did not think that
“would translate to . . . 58 months [in prison].” The district court’s determination is
supported by the record. See State v. Bachmeier, No. A12-0883, 2013 WL 599322, at *2
(Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2013) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion by
finding that reinstating probation would depreciate the seriousness of violation when
probationer “demonstrated that he does not take probation seriously”) . The district court
did not abuse its discretion by revoking probation.
Affirmed.