Cedric Lamont Berry v. State of Minnesota

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A25-0152

Hennepin County Moore, III, J.

Cedric Lamont Berry,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: April 8, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Cedric Lamont Berry, Oak Park Heights, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying appellant’s

postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing because the undisputed facts alleged

in the petition did not entitle him to relief as a matter of law.

Affirmed.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

1
 O P I N I O N

MOORE III, Justice.

In this first-degree murder case, appellant Cedric Lamont Berry asks us to decide

whether the district court abused its discretion when it summarily denied his petition for

postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Berry’s postconviction petition

claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not raising several

specific claims on direct appeal, but Berry’s petition did not allege facts that, if proven by

a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle him to relief.

Because Berry’s ineffective assistance claims fail as a matter of law, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Berry’s postconviction petition without

an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

This appeal arises from the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the

non-fatal shooting of her boyfriend, J.M-M., on December 31, 2019. In connection with

these crimes, a Hennepin County grand jury indicted appellant Cedric Berry and his

accomplice Berry Davis on four charges: first-degree premeditated murder under Minn.

Stat. § 609.185(a)(1); attempted first-degree premeditated murder under Minn. Stat.

§§ 609.17, subd. 1, and 609.185(a)(1); kidnapping with intent to commit great bodily harm

or terrorize under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3); and felony murder during commission

of a kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). The indictment alleged both principal

and aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability on all counts. After a joint trial, a jury

found Berry and Davis guilty as charged. The district court then entered judgments of

2
conviction and imposed prison sentences, which we affirmed on direct appeal. See State

v. Berry, 982 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 2022); State v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2022).

Our opinion resolving Berry’s direct appeal provides a more complete description

of the facts underlying the crimes. See Berry, 982 N.W.2d at 750–54. We therefore limit

our discussion here to the facts below relevant to Berry’s postconviction petition, which

alleged that Berry’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to argue

that (1) the district court did not advise Berry of his procedural rights under the Minnesota

Rules of Criminal Procedure; (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove the mental state

elements for aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder; (3) the district court

improperly instructed the jury on transferred intent; and (4) Berry’s trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to adequately address allegedly prejudicial material exposed to the

jury.

Pretrial Proceedings

After the State filed its criminal complaint against Berry, the district court presided

over a first appearance under Minn. R. Crim. P. 5. 1 The court immediately appointed a

public defender present at the hearing to represent Berry. But the district court did not

advise Berry of his procedural rights under Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.03, 2 nor did it ensure that

1
Among other things, Rule 5.01 requires the district court to inform the defendant at
the first appearance of the charges, ensure the defendant has a copy of the charging
document, and inform the defendant of their rights, including the right to have counsel
appointed if eligible, and the opportunity to enter a plea. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.01.
2
Rule 5.03 includes an enumerated list of matters on which “[t]he court must advise
the defendant.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.03. These include the defendant’s right to remain
silent, rights to counsel and to communicate with counsel, and the right to a jury trial. Id.

3
counsel had advised Berry of those rights. Berry’s attorney did not address, on the record,

the district court’s failure to advise Berry of those rights.

The district court subsequently presided over Berry’s initial appearance on the

indictment for first-degree and attempted first-degree premeditated murder as required by

Minn. R. Crim. P. 19. The district court apparently did not ensure that Berry himself—as

opposed to his attorney—had received a copy of the indictment as set forth in Rule 19. 3

See Minn. R. Crim. P. 19.04, subd. 2. Again, the district court did not advise Berry of his

Rule 5.03 rights as directed by Rule 19, and Berry’s counsel, who was present with him at

the hearing, did not address that failure on the record. The district court determined that

Berry and Davis would be tried together and denied Berry’s pre-trial motion to sever the

joint trial.

3
Berry’s claim under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure also cites Minn. R.
Crim. P. 8, which governs second appearances on a criminal complaint and requires the
district court to “again inform” the defendant of the charges and the defendant’s rights, and
“ensure the defendant has a copy of the complaint or indictment.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
8.01(c). Here, however, the district court never held a second appearance under Rule 8
because the grand jury issued its indictment shortly after Berry’s Rule 5 hearing, at which
point Rule 19 governed subsequent pre-trial proceedings. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 19 cmt
(noting that “Rule 19 reflects the necessary differences between the procedures under an
indictment and under a complaint”). It is possible that Berry’s reference to a Rule 8 hearing
was intended to refer to a first appearance on the indictment under Rule 19.04. In any
event, the crux of Berry’s claim is that the district court did not strictly comply with the
procedural rules governing the first appearances on his criminal charges, including by
failing to ensure that Berry personally received a copy of the charging documents.
Accordingly, consistent with our general practice of construing claims raised in pro se
postconviction petitions “liberally and with an understanding eye,” Andersen v. State,
940 N.W.2d 172, 181 (Minn. 2020), we treat Berry’s Rule 8 claim as an analogous claim
under Rule 19. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 19.04, subd. 2 (providing that a defendant appearing
for the first time on an indictment “must be advised of the charges” and that the district
court “must also advise the defendant in accordance with Rule 5.03 (Statement of
Rights)”).

4
 The State’s Case

At trial, the State produced considerable circumstantial evidence linking Berry to

the shooting of J.M-M. and the kidnapping and eventual murder of Baugh. For purposes

of this appeal, the most critical facts proven by the State are as follows.

The State’s evidence included surveillance video showing Berry buying a burner

phone under a fake name (“set-up” phone). Cell site location information (CSLI) data

placed Berry’s personal cellphone in the store at the time of purchase of the set-up phone.

CSLI data showed Berry then traveled with Davis and Lyndon Wiggins to Elsa Segura’s

address. Berry, Davis, and Wiggins left the set-up phone with Segura, who then used the

set-up phone to lure Baugh to a sham real estate showing at the Maple Grove home where

she was later kidnapped. The set-up phone was never used for any other purpose.

CSLI data also showed that Berry and Davis traveled together to Walmart in the

days leading up to the shootings. Store surveillance footage showed Davis buying a pair

of Midland two-way radios, ammonia, and bleach. The day of the murder, Berry procured

the rental U-Haul truck used to kidnap and transport Baugh.

Later that day, around 2:30 p.m., Berry and Davis left their cell phones at an address

in North Minneapolis. About thirty minutes later, Baugh arrived at the Maple Grove house

for the sham showing and entered the house. Home security cameras in the neighborhood

repeatedly captured the U-Haul circling the house just before and shortly after Baugh’s

arrival. The U-Haul backed up to the house with the cargo door facing the garage, two

men entered through the front door, and then exited through the garage with what looks

5
like a person. None of the footage shows Baugh leaving the house. Her car was left in the

driveway, and she was never seen alive again.

Around 5:40 p.m. that same day, surveillance footage and eyewitnesses placed the

U-Haul near a North Minneapolis address where J.M-M. and Baugh were staying

temporarily. Aside from J.M-M., Baugh, and Baugh’s mother, no one else knew Baugh

and J.M-M. were staying at that location. J.M-M. testified that a masked Black male

entered the house with Baugh’s housekey, shot J.M-M. several times, and fled, leaving the

housekey behind. J.M-M. described the shooter as wearing a black ski mask with one hole

for eyes. Investigators later found a mask matching that description in Berry’s vehicle.

About fifteen minutes after J.M-M. was shot, activity on Berry’s and Davis’s cell

phones resumed and the phones began traveling together. Cell phone data shows Berry’s

phone placing an outgoing call to Berry’s wife around 5:55 p.m., suggesting that Berry was

in physical possession of his phone at that time. Between around 5:55 and 6:30 p.m.,

various city surveillance cameras and license plate readers captured the U-Haul and Berry’s

vehicle traveling together between the North Minneapolis location where J.M-M. was shot

and the Minneapolis alley where Baugh was eventually murdered. CSLI data from Berry’s

and Davis’s phones matched the vehicles’ movements. Cameras and witnesses place the

U-Haul driving into the alley while Berry’s vehicle parked close by.

A ShotSpotter device 4 near the Minneapolis alley detected a three-round burst of

gunshots at 6:37 p.m., the exact time that CSLI data placed Berry’s phone in the alley.

4
ShotSpotter devices employ acoustic sensors to detect gunfire and automatically
alert law enforcement as to the location of the gunshots. Many police departments,

6
Police found Baugh dead in the same alley shortly thereafter. She had been shot three

times at point-blank range, including once in the temple, with the same gun used to shoot

J.M-M. Investigators found duct tape wrapped around Baugh’s wrist and neck and later

matched Berry’s fingerprints to five prints lifted from the adhesive, interior side of the tape

used to bind Baugh’s neck. When processing the U-Haul, investigators recovered zip-ties,

black gloves, and duct tape packaging in the cargo area. They also found Baugh’s blood,

fingerprints, and several of her acrylic fingernails that had been ripped off. Multiple

witnesses noted that the truck reeked of bleach and ammonia, which can be used to destroy

DNA evidence. Still, analysis of a DNA mixture recovered from the zip ties could exclude

99.995% of the general population—but not Berry—as a source of DNA.

Following Berry’s arrest, law enforcement seized his vehicle and recovered an

opened roll of duct tape matching the brand of packaging found in the U-Haul, a pair of

Midland two-way radios, and a black ski mask with a single eye hole. Although Berry had

no personal connection to Baugh before the crimes, investigators found a picture of Baugh

saved on Berry’s phone. Berry’s phone had searched for “gun stores in Indiana.”

Investigators also discovered an envelope with the name “Monique Baugh” handwritten

on the front in the trash outside an address where Berry was known to stay. He later asked

his cousin to retrieve a gun from that same address during a jailhouse call following his

arrest.

including the Minneapolis Police Department, use this technology. See State v. Harvey,
932 N.W.2d 792, 797 n.2 (Minn. 2019).

7
 Closing Arguments and Jury Instructions

The State’s closing argument portrayed Berry and Davis as principals in the

kidnapping and shootings, with Berry being the likely shooter. In the alternative, the State

argued that the jury could also find Berry guilty of the charged offenses on an aiding-and-

abetting theory even if they could not conclude he was the shooter beyond a reasonable

doubt. According to the State, even if Davis acted as the principal, Berry intentionally and

substantially participated in the planning and execution of the crimes. The district court

gave the jury the model instruction on aiding-and-abetting liability that applied to all

charges. That instruction stated the jury could find Berry guilty if they concluded that he

“aided” or “conspired with another or otherwise procured the commission of a crime by

another person and the crime was committed.” The jury instructions on each individual

charge clarified that aiding-and-abetting liability requires that the defendant play an

“intentional role in aiding the commission of the crime.” That in turn required the jury to

conclude that Berry “knew another person was going to commit or was committing [the]

crime[s]” and “intended that his presence or actions aid in the commission of th[ose]

crime[s].” On the premeditated murder charge specifically, the district court also gave the

jury the model instruction on transferred intent, which allowed the jury to conclude that

the intent element of first-degree premeditated murder was satisfied “[i]f the defendant

acted with premeditation and with the intent to cause the death of a person other than the

deceased.” Berry’s trial counsel did not object to any of these instructions.

Then, shortly after the jury retired for deliberations, Berry notified his counsel that

members of the prosecution team were wearing bracelets that read “Forever Monique”

8
during closing arguments, similar to the bracelets worn by Baugh’s family in court

throughout the trial. After notifying the court and providing the district court judge a

sample bracelet to inspect, Berry’s counsel moved for a mistrial, characterizing this as

“improper” prosecutorial conduct that may have prejudiced the jury. The district court

denied the motion, stating on the record:

I did not notice the bracelet at all or that any of the family members are
wearing it. It’s clear that it’s so small, you can’t even read it from a distance.
I think it would have been wise for the State not to have it on, just to be as
cautious as possible, but I don’t think it creates a mistrial or any unnecessary
process.

Counsel accepted this ruling without requesting a hearing to determine whether any of the

jurors had seen or read the bracelets under the procedure announced in Schwartz v.

Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1960), known as a “Schwartz

hearing.” See State v. Jackson, 977 N.W.2d 169, 170 & n.1 (Minn. 2022).

The jury ultimately found Berry guilty on all counts. Accordingly, the district court

entered judgments of conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-

degree premeditated murder, and kidnapping, and later sentenced Berry to life in prison

without the possibility of release. 5

Appeal and Postconviction Proceedings

Berry then appealed his conviction, raising three main issues. See Berry,

982 N.W.2d at 754–55. His appellate counsel primarily argued that the district court

committed reversible error by not holding a Frye-Mack evidentiary hearing on the

5
The district court left the felony murder charge unadjudicated as a lesser-included
offense.

9
admissibility of the CSLI data that the State repeatedly used to establish Berry’s

whereabouts and personal participation in the crimes. Id. at 755–58. Counsel also argued

that the district court committed prejudicial error when it denied the defendants’ repeated

motions to sever their joint trial and also when it denied Berry’s motion for additional

peremptory challenges during jury selection. Id. at 758–61. Concluding that these

arguments did not warrant relief, we affirmed. Id. at 750.

Berry then timely petitioned for postconviction relief in Hennepin County district

court, asserting several ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. 6 Berry argued

that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency

of the State’s evidence proving that he knew his alleged-accomplices would murder Baugh

and intended his actions to further the commission of that crime. Berry also argued that

appellate counsel was ineffective by not arguing that the district court committed plain

error when it instructed the jury on transferred intent. Next, Berry claimed that appellate

counsel was ineffective by failing to assert violations of Minnesota Rules of Criminal

Procedure 5 and 8 arising from the district court’s failure to advise him of his procedural

rights at his first appearances. Finally, Berry appeared to argue that appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to bring ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claims based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to (1) properly object to the prosecution

6
The limitations period for filing a petition for postconviction relief is two years after
an appellate court’s disposition of the direct appeal. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2).
We decided Berry’s direct appeal on December 21, 2022, and Berry filed his
postconviction petition on August 7, 2024.

10
wearing the “Forever Monique” bracelets; and (2) request a Schwartz hearing to determine

whether the jury was exposed to this allegedly prejudicial material.

Berry’s petition relied exclusively on the district court transcripts and briefing on

appeal; he did not include affidavits or make new factual allegations. Berry’s petition

requested a new trial, or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing. For its part, the State did

not contest that Berry’s appellate counsel did not make the other arguments Berry raised

in his petition.

The district court agreed with the State, however, that even when the transcripts and

briefing on appeal are viewed in the light most favorable to Berry, he was conclusively

entitled to no relief under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel announced in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Concluding that the petition did not raise

factual allegations that would entitle Berry to relief even if proven at an evidentiary

hearing, the district court summarily denied the petition. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We review a district court’s denial of a postconviction petition for abuse of

discretion. Erickson v. State, 842 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2014). Generally, a

postconviction court abuses its discretion when it acts “in an arbitrary or capricious

manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or ma[kes] clearly erroneous

factual findings.” Heard v. State, 22 N.W.3d 154, 159 (Minn. 2025) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is

required, a postconviction court must accept “the facts alleged in the petition as true and

construe[] them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d

11
612, 618 (Minn. 2017). And where, as here, a petitioner is self-represented, we construe

claims raised in the petition “liberally and with an understanding eye.” Andersen,

940 N.W.2d at 181.

Still, the petitioner bears the ultimate burden to allege facts entitling him to relief;

he “must do more than offer conclusory, argumentative assertions, without factual

support.” State v. Turnage, 729 N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2007). A postconviction court

may therefore deny a petition without an evidentiary hearing if “the petition and the files

and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”

Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1. That is true if the alleged facts—even when taken as true—

are “insufficient to grant the requested relief” as a matter of law. Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d

635, 642 (Minn. 2025) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the overarching standard of review of a district court’s summary denial of

a postconviction petition is abuse of discretion, we review the merits of any underlying

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 60. To succeed

on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised in a postconviction petition, the

defendant must allege facts that, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, meet the

two-prong test for ineffective assistance set out in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Here, the

only factual allegation in the petition is that appellate counsel failed to raise the claims

Berry describes. The State does not dispute that allegation. Thus, we need only decide

whether appellate counsel’s failure to—or decision not to—bring these claims is ineffective

assistance as a matter of law. We therefore review the Strickland test, as developed in our

case law, before applying this test to each of Berry’s ineffective assistance claims in turn.

12
 To provide effective assistance, counsel must exercise the same level of skill and

diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would under the circumstances. State v.

Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993). Accordingly, Strickland’s first prong requires

the petitioner to show that counsel’s performance was deficient when judged against “an

objective standard of reasonableness” (the “performance prong”). Fields v. State,

733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Appellate counsel need not raise all possible issues to meet that

standard. To the contrary, requiring appellate counsel to raise every “colorable” claim

rather than weeding out weaker ones disserves the goal of “vigorous and effective

advocacy.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983); see also Jackson v. State,

817 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 2012). Thus, in evaluating the performance prong, appellate

counsel may decline to raise claims that they could have reasonably concluded would not

prevail—counsel only has a duty to bring the “most meritorious” claims on appeal. E.g.,

Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016). And we employ a “strong

presumption” that appellate counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in

selecting which issues to raise. Id.; Davis, 15 N.W.3d at 647.

Along with showing that counsel’s performance was defective, Strickland also

requires the petitioner to establish prejudice: “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”

(the “prejudice prong”). Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 373 (Minn. 2020) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable probability

means “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Leake v. State,

13
767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Put

differently, “a defendant must show that counsel’s errors actually had an adverse effect.”

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We recognize that Strickland’s two prongs may overlap when evaluating appellate

counsel’s performance. Because effective appellate advocacy often involves “weeding

out” weaker claims, counsel may reasonably decline to raise an issue precisely because she

does not believe it has a reasonable probability of success. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d

1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). 7 Still, we may analyze these two prongs in either order. If we

determine that the factual allegations in the petition do not satisfy either the performance

prong or the prejudice prong, we may “dispose of a claim on one prong without considering

the other.” Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

If, on de novo review, we conclude that the postconviction court correctly applied

the Strickland test and reached the proper result, then the court did not rely on an erroneous

view of the law or the facts and therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition

without an evidentiary hearing. See Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 596.

7
As the Miller court put it:

[E]very weak issue in an appellate brief or argument detracts from the
attention a judge can devote to the stronger issues, and reduces appellate
counsel’s credibility before the court . . . . For these reasons, a lawyer who
throws in every arguable point—‘just in case’—is likely to serve her client
less effectively than one who concentrates solely on the strong arguments.

882 F.2d at 1434.

14
 A.

With the applicable law and standard of review in mind, we now consider Berry’s

specific ineffective assistance claims. To begin with, Berry contends that his appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his accomplices planned to

murder Baugh and J.M-M. and intended his actions to aid the commission of those

crimes—the mental state requirements for aiding-and-abetting liability. We disagree.

Appellate counsel’s decision not to raise a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge

does not fall below Strickland’s objective standard of reasonableness for two reasons.

First, appellate counsel does not act unreasonably by declining to challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting an aiding-and-abetting theory when the State presented

sufficient evidence of principal liability. Here, it is far from clear that the jury based its

verdict on an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability rather than a principal one.

The State’s primary theory of the case characterized Berry as a principal, and its evidence

supported that theory. The ski mask found in Berry’s vehicle matched J.M-M.’s

description of his shooter. Investigators identified a likely match between Berry’s DNA

and a DNA profile found on the zip-ties recovered from the back of the U-Haul. Berry’s

fingerprints matched five partial prints lifted from the interior, adhesive side of the duct

tape found wrapped around Baugh’s neck, which would be physically impossible unless

Berry personally unwrapped or handled that portion of the tape. Berry was present at the

murder scene at the exact time Baugh was shot. Only one gun was used in both shootings.

And although investigators never recovered the murder weapon, Berry had searched before

15
for “gun stores in Indiana” and was recorded instructing a family member to retrieve a gun

from the garage of a house at which he was known to stay.

Reviewing this evidence alongside the more general evidence linking Berry to the

preparatory steps and crime scenes discussed above, it would not have been objectively

unreasonable for appellate counsel to conclude that the jury had sufficient evidence to

convict Berry as a principal. Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence proving Berry’s mental

state in relation to aiding and abetting would have been irrelevant. See Allwine v. State,

994 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Minn. 2023). And for all the same reasons, appellate counsel could

have reasonably concluded that the State had sufficient evidence to prove that Berry

intentionally aided the commission of the crimes, even if the jury could have theoretically

concluded that Davis, not Berry, pulled the trigger.

Second, counsel did raise an evidentiary challenge to the admissibility of the State’s

CSLI evidence, which was critical to establishing Berry’s personal participation in the

crimes. Although the State had other evidence establishing that Berry purchased the set-up

phone and procured the rental U-Haul truck used to kidnap and transport Baugh, the CSLI

data proved that Berry delivered the set-up phone to Segura, traveled with Davis to buy the

radios, ammonia, and bleach, followed the U-Haul transporting Baugh between J.M-M.’s

house and the murder scene, and was present in the alley at the exact time of the murder.

Berry’s phone placed an outgoing call to his wife approximately 40 minutes before Baugh’s

shooting, implying that Berry was in physical possession of his phone when she was

murdered. No other evidence placed Berry himself, rather than just his vehicle, at the scene

of either shooting or other key locations.

16
 Moreover, our consideration of CSLI evidence was relatively new at the time of

Berry’s direct appeal, having been addressed in only three of our prior opinions: State v.

Garland, 942 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2020); State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2019);

and State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. 2019). These decisions also came in the wake

of the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Carpenter v. United States,

585 U.S. 296 (2018), which altered the admissibility of CSLI evidence by recognizing a

privacy interest in cellular location information and holding that accessing historical CSLI

data constitutes a search requiring a probable cause determination under the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 316–19. Although Harvey held that a Frye-Mack hearing was not

required to decide the admissibility of CSLI evidence, Berry’s appellate counsel vigorously

challenged the admissibility of CSLI evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 702 without a hearing

on the questions of whether it (1) is based a novel or emerging scientific theory; and (2) had

foundational reliability. See Berry, 982 N.W.2d at 755–56. Given the evolving law

governing the admissibility of CSLI at the time, it would not have been objectively

unreasonable for Berry’s counsel to conclude that focusing on excluding the CSLI

evidence—rather than challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole—offered the

best prospect of acquittal at retrial. See Allwine, 994 N.W.2d at 537 (holding appellate

counsel “was permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims” on direct appeal).

Indeed, disqualifying the CSLI evidence would have made a sufficiency challenge to the

State’s remaining evidence far stronger. Our rejection of counsel’s arguments to that end

on direct appeal does not alter this conclusion.

17
 For those reasons, Berry cannot overcome our strong presumption that appellate

counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment in electing to challenge the

admissibility of the CSLI evidence, rather than the sufficiency of the evidence proving

Berry’s mental state in relation to aiding and abetting. See Zornes, 880 N.W.2d at 371.

Berry’s ineffective assistance claim on this ground therefore fails as a matter of law because

even if the facts alleged in his postconviction petition were proven by a preponderance of

the evidence at a postconviction evidentiary hearing, they fail to establish that counsel’s

decision not to raise this sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fell below Strickland’s

objective standard of reasonableness.

B.

Next, Berry claims that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing

to challenge the district court’s transferred-intent instruction given in connection with the

premeditated murder charge. Berry’s arguments on this issue are not clearly developed

and somewhat difficult to follow. He appears to assert that the instruction was erroneous

because these facts do not implicate the typical transferred-intent scenario where, for

example, the defendant intended to shoot one person but accidentally shot another. Berry

argues the transferred-intent instruction was erroneous because Baugh and J.M-M. were

both intended victims of separate shootings. But Berry also seems to argue that the

transferred-intent instruction prejudicially affected the jury’s verdict because it could have

improperly allowed the jury to infer intent to kill Baugh from intent to kill J.M-M. or infer

intent to kill J.M-M. from intent to kill Baugh.

18
 Berry forfeited direct appellate review of this issue because his trial counsel did not

object to the instruction. See State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266, 280 (Minn. 2023). Thus,

we could have provided relief only under the plain-error exception to our forfeiture

doctrine. Id. Appellate counsel would have had to establish that the district court’s

decision to instruct the jury on transferred intent was “(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) . . .

affect[ed] substantial rights.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998); see also

Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d at 280. And even if Berry could have carried the “heavy burden”

of showing that “there is a reasonable likelihood” that an error in the jury instructions had

a “significant effect on the verdict of the jury,” Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), we could have granted a new trial only if

failure to do so would have “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of judicial proceedings.” See State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001)

(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Assuming without deciding that giving the transferred-intent instruction was

erroneous on these facts, Berry’s ineffective assistance claim still fails as a matter of law

because it would not have been objectively unreasonable for counsel to conclude that a

plain-error challenge to the jury instructions would have failed, at least at the third prong

of the analysis regarding the error affecting substantial rights.

Any error in giving the transferred-intent instruction on the premeditated murder

charge would not have affected Berry’s substantial rights as to the attempted-murder

charge involving J.M-M. No reasonable jury could have inferred intent to kill J.M-M. from

intent to kill Baugh because the district court did not include the transferred-intent

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instruction in the jury instructions on the attempted-murder charge. See State v. Gatson,

801 N.W.2d 134, 151 (Minn. 2011) (noting our presumption that “juries follow instructions

given by the court” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if the jury

had somehow thought the transferred-intent instruction was applicable to the attempt

charge, it is logically impossible for intent to kill Baugh to transfer to a shooting that

occurred around 45 minutes earlier and in an entirely different location. Intent to perform

an action occurring later in time simply cannot apply retroactively to previous action.

Likewise, any error in giving the transferred-intent instruction on the premeditated

murder charge did not affect Berry’s substantial rights because any finding of intent to kill

J.M-M. could not have impacted the jury’s finding of intent to kill Baugh. As Berry now

concedes: “Baugh was shot three times, including once from point-blank range in the

temple, leaving little doubt that her killing—if not premeditated—was intentional.” Cf.

State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 363–64 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that intent to kill can

be inferred from planning activity and the nature of the killing). Berry therefore

acknowledges that, at that moment, the shooter intended to kill Baugh—not J.M-M.

Berry’s concession that Baugh’s killing was intentional also dooms any argument

that failure to grant a new trial based on the allegedly erroneous instruction on direct appeal

might have “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” See State v. Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022). Berry has

acknowledged, both in his postconviction petition and in this appeal, that Baugh was killed

intentionally by three shots, including a point-blank shot to her temple. Thus, a reasonable

appellate lawyer could conclude that a plain-error challenge to a surplus jury instruction

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that did not affect Berry’s substantial rights would fail because affirming Berry’s

conviction for an intentional killing would not cause the public to “seriously question

whether our court system has integrity and generally offers accused persons a fair trial.”

Id.

Because Berry’s appellate counsel could have “legitimately concluded” that a plain-

error challenge to the transferred-intent instruction would not have prevailed, counsel’s

decision not to bring this claim would not fall below Strickland’s objective standard of

reasonableness even if the facts alleged in his postconviction petition were proven by a

preponderance of the evidence at a postconviction evidentiary hearing. See Zornes,

880 N.W.2d at 371. Berry’s ineffective assistance claim on this basis therefore fails as a

matter of law.

C.

Next, we turn to Berry’s ineffective assistance claim based on appellate counsel’s

decision not to raise the district court’s alleged failure to advise Berry of his procedural

rights under Minn. R. Crim. P. 5 and 8 on direct appeal. Rule 5 governs a defendant’s first

appearance on a criminal complaint. The rule requires a district court to inform a defendant

of the charges, Miranda rights, the right to communicate with counsel, and the right to a

jury trial, and to ensure the defendant has a copy of the complaint. See Minn. R. Crim. P.

5.01, 5.03. And Rule 19, which applies to first appearances on an indictment, references

the rights colloquy from Rule 5.03. Minn. R. Crim. P. 19.04, subd. 2. Rule 19 also requires

the district court to ensure that the defendant has a copy of the indictment. See Minn. R.

Crim. P. 19.02, subd. 2, 19.04, subd 2 (“If the defendant has not received a copy of the

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indictment, the defendant must be provided with one.”). While seemingly conflating Rule

8 and Rule 19 requirements, Berry argues that the district court’s overall apparent failure

to provide these advisories and personally provide him with a copy of the charging

documents violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. But because Berry’s

trial counsel did not address the district court’s alleged failures during these proceedings,

our review on direct appeal would have been limited by the plain-error doctrine.

Berry’s Rule 5 and 8 claims fail to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong as to the

effect of his appellate attorney not raising this issue on direct appeal. The undisputed facts

alleged in his postconviction petition do not establish a “reasonable probability” that a

plain-error challenge to these alleged rule violations would have changed the outcome of

his direct appeal. See Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372. Even assuming the district court failed

to advise Berry of his rights and provide him with a copy of the indictment as required by

Rules 5 and 19, Berry was represented by counsel at his first appearance and at all

subsequent proceedings, including his first appearance on the indictment under Rule 19.

We therefore presume that counsel advised him of those rights and received copies of the

relevant charging documents on Berry’s behalf. See State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38

& n.2 (Minn. 1979) (“[E]ven without an express representation by defense counsel that he

had advised the defendant of his rights, one may properly presume that counsel had given

such advice.” (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976)). And Berry does

not allege—either in his petition or in an affidavit—that counsel failed to advise him of

those rights, that he was unaware of his rights, or that those rights were ever violated. To

the contrary, Berry understood his rights to counsel and to a jury trial because he in fact

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exercised them, and he does not otherwise explain how the court’s apparent failure to

advise him of his rights affected the result of his trial. Berry cites no authority holding that

a non-prejudicial failure to advise a represented defendant of their rights or to ensure that

such a defendant has personally received a copy of the charging document violates the due

process clauses of the federal or state constitutions, and we have found none. Berry

therefore has not shown a reasonable probability that the alleged error significantly affected

the jury verdict, and thereby his substantial rights. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741;

Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d at 280–81.

Even if the facts alleged in Berry’s postconviction petition regarding Rules 5 and 8

were proven by a preponderance of the evidence at a postconviction evidentiary hearing,

they would fail to establish a reasonable probability that a plain-error challenge to these

procedural violations would have succeeded on direct appeal. See State v. Ezeka,

16 N.W.2d at 779–80. Berry’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on appellate

counsel’s decision not to raise such a challenge therefore fails as a matter of law.

D.

Finally, we consider Berry’s claims related to the “Forever Monique” bracelets

worn by the prosecution during closing arguments. Berry appears to argue that appellate

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not raising two related ineffective-assistance-

of-trial-counsel claims. To succeed on a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the petitioner “must first

show that his trial counsel was ineffective,” again under the Strickland test. Schneider v.

State, 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007). According to Berry, trial counsel provided

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ineffective assistance by failing to (1) properly object to the prosecution wearing the

bracelets during closing arguments; and (2) move for a post-trial Schwartz hearing, which

“provides a party an opportunity to impeach a verdict due to juror misconduct or bias.” See

Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 361. As in the context of appellate advocacy, however, “[w]e

presume that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable and we give particular deference

to trial strategy.” Schneider, 725 N.W.2d at 521; see also Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d

414, 421 (Minn. 2004).

Berry has not alleged facts showing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to object to the prosecution’s wearing of the bracelets. This claim fails

immediately at Strickland’s performance prong because trial counsel did move for a

mistrial on this very basis. Berry articulates no problems with the timing and form of trial

counsel’s motion, but even if he did, appellate counsel could have reasonably concluded

that the specifics of trial counsel’s motion were trial strategy that would have been entitled

to “particular deference” on appeal. See Schneider, 725 N.W.2d at 521. District courts

also have considerable discretion in denying a mistrial motion because the judge is best

suited to “determine whether an error is sufficiently prejudicial to require a mistrial.” State

v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016). Thus, given the district court’s express

ruling on the record that jurors most likely did not see—and almost certainly could not

read—the bracelets from the jury box, appellate counsel could have “legitimately

concluded” that an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on this basis would also fail

at Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Zornes, 880 N.W.2d at 371.

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 The second ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim raised in Berry’s petition

would have failed on direct appeal for similar reasons. Again, the district court found on

the record that he did not even notice the bracelets and could not read them from a distance,

strongly implying that the jury could not have either. The jury could not have been biased

by materials it did not see. See Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 361. Thus, it would not have

been objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to conclude that any motion for a Schwartz

hearing would be denied. See id. Separately, it would not have been objectively

unreasonable for appellate counsel to conclude that it was a reasonable trial strategy to

simply move for a mistrial because of the bracelets immediately rather than wait for a jury

to return a verdict and then request a post-trial evidentiary hearing on the matter. See

Schneider, 725 N.W.2d at 521–22. Appellate counsel could also have reasonably

concluded that an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim would fail at the prejudice

prong on these facts because we would review the district court’s refusal to grant a

Schwartz hearing for abuse of discretion. See State v. Mings, 289 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Minn.

1980); State v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (describing abuse of discretion as a

“deferential standard of review”).

Thus, Berry has not established that either trial counsel’s or appellate counsel’s

failure bring these claims falls below Strickland’s objective standard of reasonableness.

The factual allegations raised in the petition—which the State does not dispute—therefore

entitle him to no relief.

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 * * *

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Berry’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Berry has failed

to allege facts that, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, would establish that

appellate counsel’s failure to raise these claims constituted ineffective assistance under

Strickland. Accordingly, Berry is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

Affirmed.

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