State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0663

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Barry Alan Klingelhoets,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-23-1166

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy C. Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, John P. Fitzgerald, First Assistant Attorney,
Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew C. Wilson, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Smith, John
P., Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this direct appeal from final judgments of conviction for first- and second-degree
burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and fifth-
degree drug possession, appellant argues: (1) that the district court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal after respondent rested its case- in-chief because the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he constructively possessed certain items relating
to the underlying charges; (2) that the court abused its discretion by declining to provide a
jury instruction that he requested on circumstantial evidence; (3) that the court committed
a structural error by not inviting him to allocute at sentencing; and (4) that, if the court’s
failure to invite him to allocute was not a structural error, he is entitled to be resentenced
after being provided an opportunity to do so. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Barry Alan Klingelhoets by
amended complaint with five counts: first-degree burglary, in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.582, subdivision 1(b) (2022); second-degree burglary, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.582, subdivision 2(a)(4) (2022); unlawful possession of a
firearm, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2022);
unlawful possession of ammunition, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713,
subdivision 1(2); and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 152.025, subdivision 2(1) (2022). These charges arose from an
investigation following a call to law enforcement that reported someone had entered a
3
building without permission. The matter proceeded to a four-day trial, after which a jury
found Klingelhoets guilty of all charges. Consistent with applicable law, the following
factual summary is based on the trial evidence and presented in the light most favorable to
the state.1
Underlying Incident and Investigation
In the evening hours of December 26, 2023, D.J. received a notification from a
surveillance camera that “somebody was in [a] building” in which D.J. rented space. The
building, which was leased to D.J. and two other tenants, is a two-story “big warehouse.”
D.J. rented a section of the building for the purpose of storing plumbing materials. A week
before the December 26 incident, the building had been burglarized and several tenants,
including D.J., had items stolen. In a photograph captured by the surveillance camera on
December 26, a person wearing a backpack and a jacket with a hood covering his head can
be seen looking through boxes in the building.
After D.J. received the notification from his camera on December 26, he called law
enforcement and went to the building with his brother and his son, arriving at around 9:30
p.m. D.J., his brother, and his son “set up a perimeter” around the building to watch for
anyone leaving, but they saw no one exit.

1 See State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 493 (Minn. 2026) (concluding that, “when asked to
rule on a motion for a judgment of acquittal before a verdict has been returned, a district
court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State”); see also Allwine
v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 537 (Minn. 2023) (explaining that, in considering a district
court’s decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal, appellate courts “view all the
evidence presented and draw any inferences in favor of the State”).
4
Law enforcement later arrived, set up their own perimeter around the building,
announced their presence over a loudspeaker, encouraged the suspect to come out, stated
that a police canine was on the scene, and said that there was a risk that the suspect could
be bitten. Four officers and a police canine entered the building and attempted to find the
suspect. After searching, the canine located Klingelhoets on the floor of a room inside the
building. When he was arrested, Klingelhoets was wearing a hooded jacket and gloves with
a leather or rubber exterior on both of his hands.
Near the location of Klingelhoets’s arrest, law enforcement found a wrench, a
butane torch, a lighter, and a glass pipe containing a substance that later tested positive for
methamphetamine. The officers searched the rest of the building and did not find evidence
that another individual had been present during the incident. Law enforcement also found
a backpack on the ground roughly 20 feet away from where they arrested Klingelhoets. 2
The backpack contained 399 rounds of .22-caliber ammunition, a .22 -caliber magazine, a
container of gunpowder, a gun-cleaning kit, a screwdriver, and other tools. The officers
found no other backpacks in the building. In addition, law enforcement observed that a
wooden door on the outside of the building had been pried loose, which created an opening
that allowed access inside.
The next day, two carpenters who were working to repair the wooden door called
law enforcement because they had found a firearm in the building. The firearm was in a

2 While we acknowledge there was some trial testimony that the backpack was 50 feet
away from where law enforcement found Klingelhoets, other testimony by several officers
establishes that the backpack was located at a distance of about 20 feet from him.
5
drawer in the same room in which law enforcement had discovered Klingelhoets. Because
both carpenters handled the firearm before law enforcement arrived, an officer obtained
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples from each carpenter. Forensic analysis of the
firearm later revealed the presence of three DNA profiles, including a mixture of both
carpenters’ DNA; Klingelhoets’s DNA profile was excluded. Although it was missing a
“[s]tock, trigger guard, [and] foregrip,” the firearm “had a trigger mechanism, an action,
and a barrel,” which made it capable of firing. Law enforcement “dry fir[ed]” the firearm
to confirm its capability to fire bullets. And a forensic scientist determined that the firearm
was a fully functional “Remington Model 41 22 Short, 22 Long or 22 Long Rifle caliber
rifle.”
Trial
On the first day of trial, Klingelhoets requested that the district court add the
following language to a pattern jury instruction on circumstantial evidence: “In order to
return a verdict of guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all circumstances proved
must be consistent with that conclusion and inconsistent with any other rational
conclusion.” The district court denied Klingelhoets’s request based on its determinations
that it was not “the standard for a jury” and that the requested “heightened scrutiny [was]
an applied standard for appeal.”
After the state rested its case-in-chief, Klingelhoets moved for a judgment of
acquittal as to all the charges. Citing State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App. 2015),
Klingelhoets asserted that the district court was required to “apply the same standard [that]
appellate courts use to review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence,” that the charged
6
“counts [were] based on circumstantial evidence,” and that “there [were] several
reasonable hypotheses other than guilt.”3 The district court denied Klingelhoets’s motion,
reasoning that “the issue [was] whether or not there [was] sufficient evidence to go to the
jury,” that “circumstantial evidence is not treated differently than direct evidence,” and that
there was sufficient evidence of each charge for the jury’s consideration.
The jury found Klingelhoets guilty of all charges.
Sentencing
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the district court reviewed the presentence
investigation report (PSI) and the sentencing worksheet. At the sentencing hearing, the
district court stated that it considered these materials. The district court also explained that
it had reviewed the PSI and the victim impact statement. Klingelhoets did not make a
statement and the court did not invite him to allocute before it sentenced him.
The district court convicted Klingelhoets of all five offenses and imposed four
concurrent, presumptive sentences under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: 68
months’ imprisonment for first- degree burglary; 60 months’ imprisonment for unlawful
possession of a firearm; 60 months’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of ammunition;
and a stayed sentence of 19 months’ imprisonment for fifth -degree possession of a
controlled substance. As to second-degree burglary, the district court did not impose a

3 “In Sam, the court of appeals held that district courts must apply the circumstantial-
evidence test to motions for judgment of acquittal when the State’s case rests on
circumstantial evidence.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 491 (citing Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 831). “But
unlike [Klingelhoets’s] motion[] for judgment of acquittal, which [was] made and decided
before the verdict was returned, the motion in Sam was made after the jury returned a guilty
verdict.” Id. (citing Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 821).
7
sentence because it determined that the charge was an included offense of first-degree
burglary.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Klingelhoets challenges his convictions and sentences on several grounds. He
asserts: (1) that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal after
the state rested its case-in-chief because the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
constructively possessed the firearm, the backpack and its contents, and the other items
that law enforcement found near him; (2) that the court erred in declining to provide his
requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence; (3) that the court committed a
structural error by not inviting him to allocute at sentencing; and (4) that, if the court’s
failure to invite him to allocute was not a structural error, he is entitled to be resentenced
after being provided an opportunity to do so.
As elaborated on below, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Klingelhoets’s motion for judgment of acquittal because, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the state, a jury could reasonably conclude that Klingelhoets was guilty.
Moreover, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion in declining to provide
Klingelhoets’s requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. We also conclude
that the court did not commit a structural error by failing to invite Klingelhoets to allocute
at sentencing. And we conclude that the lack of allocution was a harmless error. We next
address each of Klingelhoets’s arguments in turn.
8
I. The district court did not err in denying Klingelhoets’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.

In maintaining that “the district court erred in denying [his] motion for judgment of
acquittal,” Klingelhoets contends that “there was insufficient circumstantial evidence” and
“the circumstances proved were . . . consistent with a reasonable hypothesis other than that
of guilt.” The state counters that the evidence was sufficient. We agree with the state,
beginning with (A) a discussion of the applicable law and standard of review before turning
to (B) our analysis of the district court’s decision to deny Klingelhoets’s motion for
judgment of acquittal.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When he moved for judgment of acquittal, Klingelhoets relied on our decision in
Sam and argued that the district court needed to “apply the same standard [that] appellate
courts use to review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence.” On appeal, Klingelhoets
and the state both assert that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review governs our
analysis.
4 Despite the parties’ agreement, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
Firkus is controlling.

4 Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the
facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). When a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence, “[appellate
courts] apply a two-step test to assess the sufficiency of the evidence.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d
at 478. First, appellate courts must “winnow down the evidence presented at trial by
resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, which results in a subset of
facts that constitute the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotations omitted). Second, appellate
courts “consider whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts, are
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “During the second step, [appellate
9
“Upon the adoption of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, motions for a
judgment of acquittal replaced motions for a directed verdict, although substantively they
are the same.” Id. at 491 (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 17(1) (1976) (“Motions for
directed verdict are abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their
place.”)); see also State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Minn. 2005) (“A motion for
acquittal is procedurally equivalent to a motion for a directed verdict.”) . “A motion for a
directed verdict presents the district court with a question of law.” State v. McCormick, 835
N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. App. 2013) (citing M.W. Ettinger Transfer & Leasing Co. v.
Schaper Mfg., Inc., 494 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. 1992)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013).
“We review questions of law de novo and our review is not deferential.” State v. Mattson-
McCarty, 30 N.W.3d 822, 827 (Minn. App. 2025) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 18, 2026); see also Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 493 (applying de novo review to a district
court’s decision to deny “motions for judgment of acquittal [that] were made by [the
appellant] and decided by the district court before a verdict was returned” and
“conclud[ing] that the district court did not err in applying the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
test for direct evidence when it denied the motions”).
A motion for judgment of acquittal “may be made at the close of the prosecution’s
case, in which case a district court must rule on the motion and is prohibited from reserving

courts] do not defer to the factfinder but examine the reasonableness of the inferences” and,
“[i]f the circumstances proved when viewed as a whole, support a reasonable inference that
is inconsistent with guilt, the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction and
[appellate courts] must reverse.” Id. at 486 (quotations omitted). “But [appellate courts]
will not reverse a conviction based on mere conjecture.” Id. (quotation omitted).
10
its ruling.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 491 (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subds. 18(1)(a),
18(2)) (other citation omitted). “When a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal at the
close of the State’s evidence, the district court must hold the State to its burden.” Id. at 492
n.18. “The district court must rule and may not reserve its ruling until after the jury
deliberates.” Id. (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03 subd. 18(2)). “That is because, given the
presumption of innocence and the state’s burden to prove the offense, a defendant has no
obligation to present any evidence and should not be put at risk of providing evidence that
fills gaps in the state’s case.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also State v. Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d
271, 283 (Minn. 2025) (“In a criminal proceeding, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quotation omitted)). “A defendant
cannot be compelled to put on a case when the State has not met its burden. ” Firkus, 31
N.W.3d at 492 n.18.
“Under . . . [Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03], a motion for a judgment
of acquittal must be granted ‘if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Id. at
492 (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(1)(a)). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
“generally described that the test for granting a motion for a directed verdict is whether the
evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s determination, after viewing
the evidence and all resulting inferences in favor of the state.” Id. (quotation omitted); see
also Allwine, 994 N.W.2d at 537 (explaining that “[t]he test for granting a motion for
acquittal is whether the evidence is sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s
determination” and that, in considering a district court’s decision on a motion for judgment
11
of acquittal, appellate courts “view all the evidence presented and draw any inferences in
favor of the State” (quotation omitted)). “In determining whether to grant the motion, the
district court does not consider the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Allwine, 994
N.W.2d at 537. And the supreme court has “stated that a ‘district court may only deny the
motion when the evidence is sufficient to present a factual question for the jury.’” Firkus,
31 N.W.3d at 492 (alteration in original) (quoting Allwine, 994 N.W.2d at 537).
In Firkus, the appellant challenged the district court’s denial of his motions for
judgment of acquittal, which the appellant made after the state rested its case and which
the district court decided before the verdict was returned. Id. at 491. As Klingelhoets did
in the district court, the appellant in Firkus cited Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 830, and “argue[d]
[that] the district court should have applied the circumstantial-evidence standard that
appellate courts use when reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence after a jury
has returned a guilty verdict.” Id.
In rejecting the appellant’s argument, the supreme court observed that it had “not
previously instructed district courts to apply the appellate standards for reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence after a verdict has been returned in considering motions for a
judgment of acquittal during trial.” Id. at 492. The supreme court furthermore explained
that it had “not [said] that the district court must use the two-step circumstantial -evidence
test when deciding a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a circumstantial-evidence case.”
Id. The supreme court held that “the standard proposed by [the appellant in Firkus], and
adopted by the court of appeals in Sam, is unworkable for two reasons: first, the logical
12
impossibility of applying the test prior to a verdict; and second, the mandatory time
restraints in the district court.” Id.
Thus, the supreme court
conclude[d] that when asked to rule on a motion for a judgment
of acquittal before a verdict has been returned, a district court
should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and determine whether a jury could reasonably conclude
that the defendant was guilty—the general sufficiency-of-the-
evidence standard, not the heightened circumstantial-evidence
test—regardless of the type of evidence produced at trial.

Id. at 493 (footnote omitted). Applying this standard, the supreme court ruled that “the
district court did not err in applying the sufficiency-of-the-evidence test for direct evidence
when it denied the [appellant’s] motions [for judgment of acquittal].” Id. And the supreme
court noted that, “[u]nder the direct-evidence standard, a court views the evidence and all
resulting inferences in favor of the State and asks whether the evidence is sufficient to
present a fact question for the jury’s determination, and, if so, whether a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 477 n.5.
We now apply these principles in reviewing the district court’s decision to deny
Klingelhoets’s motion for judgment of acquittal.5

5 We emphasize that, although he asserts that the circumstantial-evidence standard of
review applies, Klingelhoets expressly frames his sufficiency- of-the-evidence argument
throughout his appellate briefing as relating to the district court’s decision to deny his pre-
verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, not in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his convictions. For example, Klingelhoets describes this issue as: “Did the district
court err in denying [ Klingelhoets’s] motion for judgment of acquittal where there was
insufficient circumstantial evidence of [his] constructive possession of the firearm,
backpack, and the other items?” And in concluding both his opening and reply briefs,
Klingelhoets maintains that this court “should reverse because the district court erred in
denying [his] motion for judgment of acquittal.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has “long
13
B. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a jury could
reasonably conclude that Klingelhoets was guilty of all charges,
regardless of the type of evidence produced at trial.

To establish Klingelhoets’s guilt of first-degree burglary under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.582, subdivision 1(b), the prosecution was required to prove that he entered “a
building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enter[ed] a building without
consent and commit[ted] a crime while in the building” and that he possessed “a dangerous
weapon” when he entered the building or at any time that he was in the building. Minn.
Stat § 609.582, subd. 1(b); see also State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018)
(discussing the essential elements of first-degree burglary under Minnesota Statutes section
609.582, subd. 1(b) (2016)), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). “‘Dangerous weapon’
means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2022).
As to second-degree burglary under Minnesota Statutes section 609.582,
subdivision 2(a)(4), the state had to establish that Klingelhoets committed burglary while
possessing a tool for the purpose of gaining access to money or property. State v. Nixon,
957 N.W.2d 131, 133, 134–35, 137 (Minn. App. 2021) (addressing a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge to a conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4) (2016)); see

held that a party forfeits appellate review by failing to brief or argue an issue on appeal.”
State v. Robinette, 964 N.W.2d 143, 147 n. 6 (Minn. 2021) (discussing “the axiomatic
principle that issues not argued in the briefs are deemed waived on appeal” (quotation
omitted)). Based on our careful review of the record, however, even if Klingelhoets had
not forfeited a sufficiency-of-the -evidence challenge to his convictions and the
circumstantial-evidence standard of review applied here, we would still affirm because the
circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, do not support a reasonable inference
inconsistent with guilt as to each offense of which he was convicted. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d
at 484.
14
also Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4) (“Whoever enters a building without consent and
with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime
while in the building, . . . commits burglary in the second degree . . . if[,] . . . when entering
or while in the building, the burglar possesses a tool to gain access to money or property.”).
To prove Klingelhoets guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful
possession of ammunition under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2), the
state was required to prove that he was “a person who ha[d] been convicted of . . . a crime
of violence” and was therefore not “entitled to possess ammunition or a pistol or
semiautomatic military-style assault weapon.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2); see also
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601 (“To convict [the appellant] of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person, the State was required to prove in relevant part that he knowingly
possessed the firearm.”).
And a “person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the fifth
degree . . . if . . . the person unlawfully possesses one or more mixtures containing a
controlled substance classified in Schedule . . . II,” Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1),
which includes methamphetamine, Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(d)(2) (2022). See State v.
Traxler, 583 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn. 1998) (citing Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1)
(1996), and explaining that the statute “provid[es] that an individual is guilty of a controlled
substance crime in the fifth degree if the individual unlawfully possesses one or more
mixtures containing methamphetamine”).
Klingelhoets’s arguments on appeal focus only on the sufficiency of the evidence
proving that he constructively possessed the firearm, the backpack and its contents, and the
15
other items that law enforcement found near him. “Possession may be proved through
evidence of actual or constructive possession.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Constructive
possession may be proved by showing that the item was found “in a place under [the ]
defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not normally have access.” State
v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975). But if the item was found “in a place to
which others had access,” the state must prove that “there is a strong probability (inferable
from other evidence) that [the] defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion
and control over [the item].” Id.
The trial evidence adduced in the state’s case-in-chief, viewed in the light most
favorable to the state, see Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 493, established as follows.
D.J.’s surveillance camera triggered an alert that someone was trespassing in the
building where the incident occurred. The camera captured an image showing a person in
a hooded coat wearing a backpack going through boxes in the building. D.J., his brother,
and his son arrived at the building after receiving the alert; they watched the exterior to see
if a person exited but saw no one do so.
Law enforcement arrived ten minutes after D.J. and his family members, and they
set up a perimeter around the building. A wooden door on the exterior wall of the building
had been pried open. Law enforcement used a squad car loudspeaker system to announce
their presence. Four officers and a police canine entered the building to locate the suspected
trespasser. The officers found Klingelhoets in the building, on the floor next to a glass pipe
containing methamphetamine, a lighter, and a wrench. Klingelhoets was arrested while
wearing a hooded jacket, and he had gloves with a leather or rubber exterior on both hands.
16
The officers found a backpack around 20 feet from Klingelhoets, in plain view on
the floor. Klingelhoets’s clothing and the backpack were consistent with the image
captured by the surveillance camera. Law enforcement found no other individuals in the
building. The backpack contained 399 rounds of .22-caliber ammunition, a .22-caliber
magazine, a container of gunpowder, a gun-cleaning kit, a screwdriver, and other tools.
The officers located no other backpacks in the building. The next day, carpenters working
in the building found a loaded, .22-caliber firearm and bullets in the drawer of a cabinet
located a few feet from where Klingelhoets was hiding when he was apprehended.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that a
jury could reasonably conclude that Klingelhoets was guilty of all charges, regardless of
the type of evidence produced at trial. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 493. Put differently,
“view[ing] the evidence and all resulting inferences in favor of the State,” the evidence
adduced in the state’s case-in-chief was “sufficient to present a fact question for the jury’s
determination, and . . . a reasonable jury could [have found] the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 477 n.5.
Without considering the weight and credibility of the evidence, the record
established in the state’s case-in-chief was sufficient to present a factual question for the
jury as to Klingelhoets’s constructive possession of the firearm, wrench, screwdriver, other
tools, ammunition, and the methamphetamine in the glass pipe—all of the items the state
needed to prove that Klingelhoets possessed to sustain his convictions of first-degree
burglary, second-degree burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession
of ammunition, and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. See id. at 492; see
17
also Allwine, 994 N.W.2d at 537. The evidence showed that “there [was] a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that [Klingelhoets] was at the time consciously
exercising dominion and control over [the items].” Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611.
Klingelhoets’s arguments that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review
applies and that the circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable hypothesis other
than that of guilt are foreclosed by Firkus , 31 N.W.3d at 493. The district court properly
decided Klingelhoets’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case,
before the verdict, and without reserving its ruling. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 491, 492 n.18.
Moreover, the district court appropriately held the state to its burden and correctly
determined that the state had met that burden. Id. at 492 n.18. And as in Firkus, “the district
court did not err in applying the sufficiency-of -the-evidence test for direct evidence when
it denied [Klingelhoets’s] motion[].” Id. at 493.
We therefore discern no error in the district court’s decision to deny Klingelhoets’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
II. The district court acted within its discretion in declining to provide
Klingelhoets’s requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence.

Klingelhoets contends that the district court abused its discretion when it declined
to give the jury his requested instruction on circumstantial evidence. This argument is
unavailing.
Appellate courts review “a district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction
for abuse of discretion.” State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 222 (Minn. 2015). “A district court
has considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions and in selecting language for jury
18
instructions.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When the instructions read as a whole correctly
state the law in language understandable to the jury, there is no reversible error.” Id. “But
the district court errs when it gives instructions that confuse, mislead, or materially misstate
the law.” Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it fails to properly instruct the jury on
all elements of the offense charged.” State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). “Upon review, instructions are viewed in their entirety to determine
whether they fairly and adequately explain the law of the case.” State v. Peterson, 673
N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2004).
The district court provided the jury with the following instructions on direct and
circumstantial evidence:
A fact may be proven by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, or by both. The law does not prefer one form of
evidence over the other. A fact is proven by direct evidence
when, for example, it is proven by witnesses who testify to
what they saw, heard, or experienced, or by physical evidence
of the fact itself. A fact is proven by circumstantial evidence
when its existence can be reasonably inferred from other facts
proven in the case.

This is the pattern jury instruction. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.02 (2024).
Klingelhoets requested that the district court provide an additional instruction to the jury:
“In order to return a verdict of guilty on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all
circumstances proved must be consistent with that conclusion and inconsistent with any
other rational conclusion.” The district court denied Klingelhoets’s request based on its
determinations that it was not “the standard for a jury” and that the requested “heightened
scrutiny [was] an applied standard for appeal.”
19
“In State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn. 1980), [the Minnesota
Supreme Court] stated that a district court’s jury instruction in a criminal case involving
circumstantial evidence does not need to state that the circumstances proved must be
‘consistent with [the] conclusion [of guilt] and inconsistent with any other rational
conclusion.’” Fox, 868 N.W.2d at 222. The supreme court “noted that such language is not
a ‘mandatory’ instruction in circumstantial evidence cases ” and “explained that tests for
sufficiency of the evidence are conceptually distinct from jury instructions and ‘not every
sufficiency of the evidence test should be read to the jury.’” Id. (quoting Turnipseed, 297
N.W.2d at 312).
In Fox, the supreme court rejected the appellant’s argument that—as Klingelhoets
maintains, here—“the district court erred by declining to give [the appellant’s] requested
jury instruction on circumstantial evidence,” to wit, “In order to return a verdict of guilty
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all circumstances proved must be consistent with
that conclusion and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” Id. at 221–22
(quotation omitted). The supreme court reasoned that it had “followed Tu rnipseed in two
relevant cases.” Id. at 222 (citing State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 723 (Minn. 2010)
(Meyer, J., concurring) (“Although we eventually abandoned the special jury instruction,
State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. 1980), we retained the traditional rational
hypothesis review standard.”); State v. Jones , 516 N.W.2d 545, 548 n.4 (Minn. 1994)
(holding that Turnipseed controlled and that the district court did not err in failing to give
a rational-hypothesis jury instruction on circumstantial evidence)). And the supreme court
observed that it “did not adopt the rule advocated by the concurrence” in State v. Andersen,
20
784 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2010)— which had “urged the [supreme] court to adopt a rule
requiring district courts to provide a rational-hypothesis instruction to the jury in
circumstantial evidence cases”— and that the supreme court has not overruled Turnipseed.
Id. Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that “the district court did not materially
misstate existing law by giving the pattern jury instructions on circumstantial evidence and
direct evidence and not a ‘rational hypothesis’ instruction, like that proposed by [the
appellant],” and the supreme court held that “the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it declined to give [the appellant’s] proposed ‘rational hypothesis’ jury instruction on
circumstantial evidence.” Id.
Turnipseed and its progeny—including Fox—remain good law, and “[t]he court of
appeals is bound by supreme court precedent, as it has repeatedly acknowledged.” See State
v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). Consistent with this binding line of supreme
court precedent, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in declining
to provide Klingelhoets’s requested jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. See Fox,
868 N.W.2d at 222; see also Peterson, 673 N.W.2d at 486.
III. The district court did not commit a structural error by failing to invite
Klingelhoets to allocute at sentencing.

Klingelhoets argues that “the district court committed [a] structural error when it
failed to offer [him] the opportunity to allocute before it imposed a discretionary sentence.”
This contention does not merit reversal.
“[S]tructural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism defy analysis by
harmless-error standards.” State v. Duol , 25 N.W.3d 135, 143 (Minn. 2025) (quotation
21
omitted). “Generally, if a defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator,
there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to
harmless-error analysis.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no right to allocution under
the U.S. Constitution. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has likewise concluded “that the failure of a district court to ask a defendant
represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before imposing a sentence is
not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor
an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Greer v. State,
973 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 2022).
As a result, we conclude that t he district court’s failure to invite Klingelhoets to
allocute at sentencing is subject to harmless-error analysis and is not a structural error. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any error that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.”); see also Greer, 973 N.W.2d at 924 (holding that, even if the district court
erred in concluding that the defendant’s right to allocution could not be raised in a motion
to correct a sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9,
the alleged error was harmless because the defendant was not prejudiced).
IV. The lack of allocution was a harmless error.

Klingelhoets maintains that, should this court decline to reverse on the basis of a
structural error, a remand for resentencing remains necessary so that he may allocute. In
response, the state asserts that the lack of allocution was a harmless error and a remand for
22
sentencing is unwarranted because the district court reviewed Klingelhoets’s PSI before
sentencing. The state’s argument is persuasive.
“Before pronouncing sentence, the [district] court must allow statements
from . . . the prosecutor, victim, and defense counsel . . . [and] the defendant, personally.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 3 ; see also State v. Young, 610 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn.
App. 2000) (“A defendant has a right to allocution before the court imposes sentence.”) ,
rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). That said, a district court’s failure to invite a defendant
to allocute is not always prejudicial. See State ex rel. Krahn v. Tahash, 144 N.W.2d 262,
262–63 (Minn. 1966) (holding that “failure to afford the accused an opportunity to speak
on his own behalf does not require that the sentence be vacated if, by a [PSI] , there is
adequate assurance, as there was in this case, that the [district] court took into account the
defendant’s version of the events leading to his conviction and other background
information which is normally considered in mitigation of the penalty”); see also Minn. R.
Crim. P. 31.01.
Here, the district court heard from counsel for both parties before imposing
sentence. Neither moved for a sentencing departure, and neither Klingelhoets nor his
attorney asked that Klingelhoets be permitted to allocute. Most importantly, the district
court noted several times during the sentencing hearing that it had reviewed the PSI. We
are mindful that, in sentencing Klingelhoets, the district court did not articulate the specific
aspects of the PSI that it considered. But we are satisfied by our review of the PSI that it
provides Klingelhoets’s “version of the events leading to his conviction and other
23
background information which is normally considered in mitigation of the penalty.” Krahn,
144 N.W.2d at 262–63.6
Thus, we conclude that the lack of allocution was a harmless error. See id.; see also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01.
Affirmed.

6 We note that the district court followed the recommendations set forth in the PSI in
imposing the following sentences: 68 months’ imprisonment for first-degree burglary; 60
months’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm; and 60 months’ imprisonment
for unlawful possession of ammunition. These sentences are consistent with the
presumptive sentences under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines based on
Klingelhoets’s criminal history score and the offense severity level of each crime. See
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A. (Supp. 2023). And despite the PSI’s recommendation of a
24-month presumptive guidelines sentence for fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance, the district court stayed the execution of a shorter sentence—19 months’
imprisonment.