In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. I. S., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0982

In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. I. S., Child.

Filed April 13, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-24-979

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant M.I.S.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Joshua J. Kannegieter, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Worke , Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this juvenile-delinquency matter, appellant challenges the district court’s
disposition order and findings that he is guilty of third- and fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct. Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his guilt because the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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victim lacked credibility and no evidence corroborated that the victim did not consent.
When we view the evidence in a light favorable to the district court’s findings, we conclude
that the evidence is sufficient. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2024, respondent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile-delinquency
petition charging appellant M.I.S. with third-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1a(c) (2022) (nonconsensual penetration
with coercion), and the lesser-included offense of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 1 (2022) (nonconsensual
penetration). The petition alleged that M.I.S. sexually assaulted E.C. on June 14, 2023. At
the time of the offense, M.I.S. and E.C. were both 14 years old.
In a January 2025 bench trial, t he district court heard testimony from seven
witnesses: E.C., E.C.’s father’s former girlfriend (L.B.), E.C.’s mother, a sexual-assault
nurse examiner (SANE), two law enforcement officers, and M.I. S. The district court also
received photographs. The following summarizes the district court’s written factual
findings along with the trial evidence stated in the light most favorable to the district court’s
findings.
The district court found that E.C. credibly testified to the “facts and circumstances
of June 14, 2023.” E.C. testified that she met M.I.S. in elementary school. They were
friends and did not have an intimate or sexual relationship. On June 14, 2023, E.C. and
M.I.S. texted via a social -media and messaging app and arranged to meet near a walking
path in a St. Joseph park.
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E.C. testified that, while they were walking together, M.I.S. said he wanted to “show
[her] something” and the two went inside a park restroom. E.C. identified photographs as
accurate depictions of the restroom. Once inside, M.I.S. “took [E.C.’s] clothes off,” put a
condom on, “shoved” E.C. onto a bench, and put his finger and penis into her vagina. E.C.
“told him to stop,” said, “no,” and tried “kicking and pushing him” off her during the
encounter. But M.I.S. was “taller,” “stronger,” and “weigh[ed] more than” E.C. Before
ejaculating, M.I.S. took off the condom “and threw it on the ground by the door.” M.I.S.
told E.C., “You need to take—you need to buy Plan B.” E.C. explained that Plan B is a
“contraceptive to take so you don’t get pregnant.” M.I.S. left E.C. inside the restroom.
As she walked away from the park, E.C. called her father’s girlfriend, L.B., because
she felt “safe talking to her.” E.C. testified that she talked with L.B. about getting Plan B.
The district court found that L.B. testified credibly and that she confirmed that E.C.
called her on June 14. L.B. also testified that E.C. sounded “really upset” and “scared” and
“was crying.” E.C. told L.B. that “she got touched inappropriately.” L.B. denied talking to
E.C. about getting Plan B. L.B. also testified that she told E.C.’s father about the phone
call.
The district court found that E.C.’s mother credibly testified that, when E.C. got
home, she was “crying,” “had leaves in her hair,” “had dirt on her face,” and “went straight
to the shower.” Father called mother and told her what happened to E.C., then mother
contacted the police.
E.C. spoke with law enforcement, and officers investigated. The first law
enforcement officer testified about photographs taken inside the park restroom, including
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“the condom on the floor.” The first officer testified that E.C.’s statement to him on June 14
was consistent with her testimony.
Following the assault, E.C. also went to the hospital, cooperated with gathering and
preserving evidence, and spoke with a SANE. The SANE testified that E.C. was “tearful”
and “very cooperative” and reported “quite a bit of pain and tenderness” in her vaginal
opening.
M.I.S. testified that the June 14 incident was consensual sexual contact. M.I.S.
explained that he had “a sexual encounter” with E.C. “like a week or two” before June 14.
Before their first sexual encounter, M.I.S. and E.C. “texted each other” and decided to
“hook up one time.” E.C. “chose the location,” “brought the condom,” and did not “express
any hesitation” when they met up. M.I.S. testified that he and E.C. had sex in the park
restroom. He also testified that the condom found inside the restroom was from the first
sexual encounter.
M.I.S. testified that E.C. texted him on June 14 “about meeting up and hooking up
one more time.” E.C. “said she didn’t have a condom on her” but that “she had Plan B.”
They met again at the park restroom and had sex without a condom. E.C. then told M.I.S.
that she “actually didn’t have” Plan B and started “sobbing.” M.I.S. testified that E.C. “was
afraid of getting pregnant” and “really did not want her mom to find out.” M.I.S. left while
E.C. was still inside the restroom.
M.I.S. also testified about his statement to law enforcement on the night of June 14.
M.I.S. acknowledged that he did not tell officers about his first sexual encounter with E.C.
or their conversation about Plan B. M.I.S. explained that he could not provide his messages
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with E.C. because, “after you see the text message and you swipe out of [the app], it deletes
automatically.”
The district court also received testimony about E.C.’s behavior after the sexual
assault.1 E.C. testified that she struggled after the assault; she “started sneaking out
and . . . getting in trouble at school and made very poor decisions.” Mother confirmed these
behavioral changes and testified that E.C. “started lying,” “missing school,” and “taking
off in the middle of the night.” Mother also testified that, when M.I.S. rode his bike past
their house in September 2024, E.C. started “crying” and was “hysterical.”
E.C. testified that, in October 2023, she met a 17-year-old boy on a dating app and
told him she was 16 years old. E.C. and the older boy had sex twice in a park in Cold
Spring. During the second incident, law enforcement approached a parked vehicle with
E.C. and the older boy inside. E.C. admitted at trial that she did not initially tell law
enforcement she had sex with the older boy because it made her “feel uncomfortable.” A
second law enforcement officer testified about his contact with E.C. in Cold Spring ,
confirming that E.C. at first lied about her age and about having sex with the older boy.
After trial, the district court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order,
determining that M.I.S. was guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct as well as the
lesser-included offense of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court found
that, “when viewed in sequence and considering the context and the totality of

1 The district court granted M.I.S.’s pretrial motion to admit evidence about E.C.’s sexual
relationship with another boy, discussed in the next paragraph. The admission of this
evidence is not an issue on appeal.
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circumstances, [E.C.’s] false statements from October do not significantly undermine her
credibility related to the June 14, 2023 incident.” The district court also found that M.I.S.
“was not credible.”
On May 19, 2025, the parties appeared for a disposition hearing. The district court
continued the case without adjudication for 180 days, subject to certain conditions. M.I.S.
appeals.
DECISION
M.I.S. argues that E.C. lacked credibility and that there was no corroborating
evidence that she did not consent to sexual intercourse. M.I.S. essentially argues that the
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of guilt for third- and fifth-degree criminal
sexual conduct.
“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin ,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Palmer ,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (stating that appellate courts “use the same standard of
review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence”).
Appellate courts must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to” the finding of
guilt and must assume that the fact-finder “disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with”
it. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263.
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The state has the burden to prove M.I.S.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 13.06. “A person who engages in sexual penetration with anyone
under 18 years of age is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if . . . the actor
uses coercion to accomplish the penetration.” Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1a(c).
“Coercion” is defined as “use by the actor of words or circumstances that cause the
complainant reasonably to fear the infliction of bodily harm upon the complainant or
another, or the use by the actor of confinement, or superior size or strength, against the
complainant to accomplish the act.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14 (2022). “ A person is
guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree if the person engages in nonconsensual
sexual penetration.” Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1.
On appeal, M.I.S. challenges the sufficiency of the state’s evidence that “the sexual
penetration occurred without consent or that M.I.S. used coercion.” Appellate courts do
not reweigh the evidence, State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009), and generally
“accord great deference” to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations, State v. King,
990 N.W.2d 406, 420 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “In a prosecution under
sections 609.342 to 609.3451 . . . the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (202 4); see also State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539
(Minn. 2004) (holding that the testimony of a single credible witness can provide sufficient
evidence to support a conviction).
M.I.S. maintains that this is a “rare case” where “grave doubts” regarding his guilt
mandate reversal. M.I.S. relies on, among other cases, State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290
8
(Minn. 1993).2 The district court convicted Huss of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
against his three-year-old daughter. Huss, 506 N.W.2d at 290-92. The only direct evidence
was daughter’s testimony. Id. at 292. The supreme court described daughter’s testimony,
stating she “was on the stand for almost an hour before she made any accusation of abuse,
and then she said both her mother and her father had touched her in a bad way.” Id.
Daughter denied having any “yucky secrets” and “called a hug and a touch to her hair ‘bad
touches.’” Id. The supreme court also noted that daughter testified she had showered at
Huss’s house on the day she testified, even though she had not seen Huss “for

2 M.I.S. cites several other “rare” cases in which the supreme court reversed a conviction
because the complainant lacked credibility and there was no corroborating evidence of the
alleged offense. State v. Housley, 322 N.W.2d 746, 750-51 (Minn. 1982) (concluding that
the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had no right to defend
himself from plain-clothes officers who violently broke into his home to execute a
warrant); State v. Langteau, 268 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978) (ordering a new trial when
(1) the complainant testified he was robbed shortly after visiting a friend in a hospital even
though it was closed to visitors before the alleged offense occurred and (2) there was no
evident reason for the defendant to rob the complainant, “with whom he was well
acquainted”); State v. Gluff, 172 N.W.2d 63, 63 (Minn. 1969) (ordering a new trial when
“the victim’s identification [was] based on an inadequate opportunity for observation; the
description given at the time of the offense [did] not coincide with the defendant’s actual
appearance; the lineup procedures were unfair and prejudicial; and the jury was permitted
to infer that defendant had a prior police record”).
M.I.S. also cites cases in which appellate courts have rejected
sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470, 477
(Minn. 1979) (“Despite the minor inconsistencies in the state’ s case and the relative
inconclusiveness of the supporting evidence, we defer to the jury’s right to believe the
complainant and disbelieve the defendant and hold that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the verdicts of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d 699,
700 (Minn. 1977) (affirming conviction, in part, because “the victim’s testimony was
positive and not contradicted, and was strongly corroborated by other evidence”); Marshall
v. State, 395 N.W.2d 362, 365-66 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming conviction despite
complainant’s less detailed testimony and weak corroborating evidence of the offense),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1986).
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approximately a year before trial.” Id. Daughter could not identify Huss in the courtroom
and testified that “her father was bald and blind,” even though Huss was neither. Id.
The supreme court reversed Huss’s conviction, reasoning that daughter’s
contradictory testimony, coupled with her repeated exposure to “books and a video about
sexual abuse,” raised “questions about the validity of the accusations made against” her
father. Id. at 292-93. The supreme court concluded that, “on these unusual facts, the state
did not meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 293.
M.I.S. contends that the state’s evidence in his case is like the state’s evidence in
Huss. M.I.S. argues that “there were reasons to doubt E.C.’s credibility, her testimony was
contradicted, and her claims of non- consent and coercion were not corroborated.” We
address M.I.S.’s four arguments in turn.
First, M.I.S. argues that E.C.’s testimony was contradicted by other witness
testimony. M.I.S. contends that, “while E.C. claimed she talked to L.B. about Plan B and
L.B. agreed to get it for her, L.B. testified credibly that this did not happen.” While
accurately stating the testimony, M.I.S.’s argument relies on a minor inconsistency that
does not justify reversal. See State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Minn. 1983)
(stating that “inconsistencies and conflicts in some particular area” between state witnesses
“are a sign of the fallibility of human perception—not proof that false testimony was given
at trial” and that “[t]his is especially true when the testimony goes to the particulars of a
traumatic and extremely stressful incident”).
M.I.S. also contends that his “version of events . . . was consistent and plausible.”
But on appeal, we defer to the district court’s finding that M.I.S. was not credible. See
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King, 990 N.W.2d at 420; Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263. The district court’s findings indicate
that it disbelieved M.I.S.’s testimony that the June 14 incident was consensual. The district
court stated that M.I.S. failed to disclose to law enforcement the alleged “prior incident”
with E.C. in which he claimed they had consensual sex. The district court also found that
M.I.S.’s “alternate version of events” was “strained considering the totality of evidence.”
Second, M.I.S. argues that E.C.’s description of the sexual assault in the restroom
was “highly improbable.” He contends that E.C.’s testimony was not plausible because she
claimed that, “while M.I.S. held her down and she struggled, he was able to remove her
clothes, remove his pants, and place a condom on his penis.” M.I.S. points to E.C. ’s
testimony that he “ripped her clothes off while she attempted to fight him off, but her
clothes were not damaged and she did not have any visible injuries, such as bruises or
abrasions.” We are not persuaded. M.I.S. essentially asks us to disregard the district court’s
finding that E.C.’s testimony was credible and to reweigh the evidence, which we decline
to do. See Franks, 765 N.W.2d at 73 (stating that appellate courts cannot reweigh the
evidence).
Third, M.I.S. contends that “E.C. had a documented history of lying,” citing the
evidence that E.C. lied to the older boy and the second law enforcement officer. E.C.
admitted that she told the older boy and the second officer that she was 16 years old. E.C.
also admitted that she did not initially tell the second officer that she had sex with the older
boy.
The district court considered E.C.’s false statements to police and determined that,
“when viewed in sequence and considering the context and the totality of the
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circumstances,” the lies did not “significantly undermine her credibility related to the
June 14, 2023 incident.” We add that the district court also found credible E.C.’s mother’s
testimony that E.C. “began lying, leaving home in the middle of the night, and missing
school” after the June 14 sexual assault. Again, we do not reweigh the evidence or
second-guess the district court’s credibility determinations. See id.
Finally, M.I.S. argues that E.C.’s testimony about the sexual assault was “not
corroborated.” M.I.S. criticizes the state because it did not subpoena the records of his
messages with E.C., “which would have been helpful in assessing” witness credibility.
M.I.S. also argues that , “[w]hile E.C.’s distraught call to [L.B.] and her emotional state
when arriving home could be considered corroboration” of the sexual assault, “E.C. very
well might have been distraught over the possibility of being pregnant and fearing
consequences if her parents found out she was sexually active at age fourteen.”
When viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of guilt, “the facts and the
legitimate inferences drawn from” E.C.’s testimony support the district court’s finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that M.I.S. used coercion to engage in nonconsensual sexual
penetration with E.C. See Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263. E.C.’s testimony on its own is
sufficient to sustain both guilty verdicts; no corroboration is required. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.347, subd. 1; Foreman, 680 N.W.2d at 539.
Still, the state offered corroborating evidence, including E.C.’s immediate report to
L.B. after the sexual assault, E.C.’s statements to the SANE and first law enforcement
officer about the assault, E.C.’s mother’s observations of E.C. after the assault—including
her tearful demeanor, changed behavior, and “hysterical” response to seeing M.I.S. bike
12
past her home —along with evidence of the used condom in the restroom. See State v.
Johnson, 679 N.W.2d 378, 387 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that corroborative evidence of
sexual assault includes a “prompt complaint by a victim” and “[t]estimony from others
about a victim’s emotional condition after a sexual assault”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 17,
2004).
As a result, the state’s evidence against M.I.S. is materially different from the
evidence in Huss. Unlike the three-year-old daughter in Huss, E.C. was a teenager at the
time of the sexual assault and trial. E.C. testified to the sexual assault in detail and identified
M.I.S. as her assailant . And E.C.’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence, as
already discussed. This is not a “rare case” that mandates reversal. See State v. Balsley,
999 N.W.2d 880, 887 (Minn. App. 2023) (stating that Huss is “unique to [its] facts and
easily distinguished”), aff’d, 10 N.W.3d 671 (Minn. 2024). Thus, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s findings of guilt.
Affirmed.